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Abstract
This thesis examines John le Carre’s 1960s and 1970s Cold-War novels in their historical 
context, and devotes a chapter each to: Call fo r  the Dead (1961), The Spy Who Came in 
from the Cold (1963), The Looking Glass War (1965), Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy (1974),
The Honourable Schoolboy (1977) and Smiley’s People (1979). The thesis argues, contra 
the critical and popular consensus, that far from being ‘neutral’ representations of Cold 
War politics, these novels give expression to a powerful liberal-national ideology.
The thesis breaks down into three themes. First, le Carre’s representation of the 
British state is scrutinised via the intelligence services. Although le Carre’s novels have 
been interpreted as anti-establishment, close historicist analysis discloses a contradictory 
affirmation of the British establishment. The state is decried and disavowed by the novels’ 
protagonists for its bureaucracy, inefficiency and expedient morality, but this is a 
distraction from these protagonists’ actions’ defence and reassertion of the state.
Second, le Carre’s representation of the British nation is examined wherein the 
discursive field of ‘nation’ provides insight into who and what was being fought for in the 
Cold War. These projections of British nationality, of a neutral ‘way of life’, also expose 
anxieties about British post-war social reconstruction, British Empire and British decline. 
The books constitute a reassertion of a conservative British nationalism, probing but 
ultimately reaffirming traditional class hierarchies and British ‘decency’ both at home and 
abroad.
Thirdly, le Carre’s representation of Communism, the West’s political enemy, is 
analysed, offering insight into the tactical and ideological British anti-Communist effort 
during the Cold War. Communism is presented as an existential threat to the British 
society but without any clear ideological motive being revealed. In these novels a trenchant 
anti-Communism disproves critical claims that le Carre’s work proposes moral 
equivalence between East and West.
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Introduction
1. Le Carre’s Cold War
Beyond news media, spy fiction was, for many in the West, the primary experience of a 
Cold War that, unlike previous wars, did not involve citizens directly. John le Carre’s 
hugely successful 1960s and 1970s novels provided a portal into the politics and culture of 
the Cold War, whilst also shaping perceptions of that politics and culture. Le Carre called 
spies “the poor bloody infantry of the Cold War”,1 and “the infantry of our ideology”.2 
Contrary to the critical consensus that le Carre’s novels’ depict a moral equivalence 
between the Cold Warring sides,3 the books’ ideology is actually a trenchant condemnation 
of Eastem-bloc Communism. Despite critical and popular claims that le Carre’s novels are 
anti-establishment,4 his Cold-War books are ultimately an assertion of the British social 
and political status quo against that perceived Communist threat.
These books reflect, represent and shape Cold-War history -  the Eastern front -  but 
also the cultural and political concerns of the home front in a changing post-war Britain.
So Call for the Dead (1961) invokes early 1960s British spy scandals of Communist 
infiltration, alongside British post-war reorganisation.5 The Spy Who Came in from the 
Cold (1963) responds to the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile Crisis and British social 
‘classlessness’. The Looking Glass War (1965) reflects the U2 spy-plane incident, the Bay 
of Pigs invasion, the Swinging Sixties and British economic decline. Tinker Tailor Soldier 
Spy (1974) is a meditation upon the Cambridge Spies and British political decline. The 
Honourable Schoolboy (1977) taps the Vietnam War, British decolonisation and the
1 John le Carre, ‘Letter to his Publisher’, in review copies of The Looking Glass War (1965), p. 7. After the 
first citation all future references will be to the same edition and included in parentheses in the text.
2 Melvyn Bragg, ‘The Things a Spy Can D o’, Listener, 22 January 1976, p. 90.
3 E.g. “The agents for liberal humanism and Communism are interchangeable”. Alan Bold, ‘Introduction’, 
The Quest fo r le Carre, edited by Alan Bold (London: Vision, 1988), p. 17.
4 That nexus of ruling class institutions and personnel that Hugh Thomas called the “institutional museum o f  
Britain’s past greatness”, Hugh Thomas (ed.), The Establishment [1959] (London: Ace, 1962), p. 13.
5 Nuclear spies Nunn-May (1946), Fuchs (1947) and Pontecorvo (1950); defection o f Maclean and Burgess 
(1951); trial o f George Blake (1961); Lonsdale and Portland Spies (1961).
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Special Relationship with America. Finally, Smiley’s People (1979)6 explores detente, the 
resurgent Second Cold War and burgeoning Thatcherism.
Spy fiction filled a Cold War information void. MI5 and MI6 were not officially 
acknowledged until 1989 and 1994 respectively, while in the 1960s the government 
attempted to suppress news of one Cambridge spy, Kim Philby’s defection, and 
successfully covered up the role of another, Antony Blunt. Information only leaked out via 
a sequence of spy scandals contemporaneous with le Carre’s work. That le Carre, as David 
Cornwell, was rumoured to have been a British spy7 only added to the sense that he offered 
insight into the secret world and its elusive, abstract war.8 That his work was widely hailed 
by reviewers as “realism” is integral to his books’ bestselling, international, popularity. In 
a war of information and disinformation, of intelligence and counter-intelligence, of 
propaganda and counter-propaganda, fiction had a particularly large role to play. We need 
only cite the enduring influence of George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) to 
demonstrate this. Like Orwell, le Carre’s language and ideas became part of the culture. So 
le Carre’s public dissemination -  enhanced by television and film adaptations -  meant his 
work did not just depict but helped to define the Cold War in the popular imagination. Le 
Carre helped define the Cold War’s iconography (Berlin Wall, borders, safe houses, 
government buildings); Cold-War action (covert, bureaucratic, elite, duplicitous); Britain’s 
role within Cold War geopolitics (both insecure and magnified); the reason for the conflict 
(moderate Western ‘way of life’ threatened by expansionist, ‘ideological’ Soviet 
Communism)9 and the mechanics of that conflict (Communist infiltration of British
6 Smiley’s People was published in 1979 in the US and 1980 in the UK.
7 Le Carre worked for MI5 from 1958-60, and MI6 from summer 1960- spring 1964 (Adam Sisman, John le 
Carre: The Biography (forthcoming, 2015), NP.
8 E.g., John Gardner in H.R.F. Keating (ed.), Whodunit? A Guide to Crime, Suspense and Spy Fiction (New  
York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1982) p. 77. Also: “As an experienced member o f the service, he unveils the 
real face of the system” Firat Yildiz, Erdin? Durmus, ‘Democracy or Hypocrisy in John Le Carre’s [sic] The 
Spy Who Came in from the Cold’, Journal o f  Social Sciences, Eskisehir Osmangazi University, 2013, 14; 2, 
51-57 (p. 56).
9 George Kennan’s Cold-War defining ‘Long Telegram’ was more explicit than future propagandists about 
the conflict’s political nature: “battle between these two centers for command o f world economy will decide 
fate of capitalism and Communism in entire world”.
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-l/kennan.htm accessed 9/3/14.
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institutions). Perhaps most of all, le Carre’s novels defined the mood of the Cold War: 
unease, distrust, even paranoia, and not just about enemies, but friends, neighbours, even 
the very nation, state or system that was being defended -  an unease underlined by the 
perennial threat of nuclear war. Not for le Carre the Bond villains’ threat of world 
destruction,10 the Communist threat was always less dramatic, more domestic, but, as such, 
more insidious. Yet nuclear war is ultimately what justifies spies’ activities, as le Carre’s 
Leamas says: “‘They’re the poor sods who try to keep the preachers from blowing each 
other sky high’”.11 This makes espionage analogous to nuclear deterrence: a high-risk 
strategy that could as easily shatter as preserve the peace, as the shooting down of a US U2 
spy-plane and the capture of its pilot in May 1960 suggested. As much as le Carre’s novels 
were uneasy reading for an uneasy age however, they were also, crucially, comforting -  for 
Western, particularly British, readers. Because, despite the standard critical contrasts to Ian 
Fleming -  the dominant spy writer of the early Cold War -  the most cursory comparison of 
le Carre to history suggests something closer to fantasy than ‘realism’.12 Le Carre’s 
breakthrough 1963 novel, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold asserted British state 
competence in defiance of the defection Kim Philby and of the Profumo affair in the same 
year. 1974’s Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy reimagined the farcical investigation of Philby as 
British intelligence success. 1977’s The Honourable Schoolboy envisaged a key 
geopolitical role for Britain. 1979’s Smiley’s People fantasised the defection of the head of 
Soviet counterintelligence to the West. It is testament to le Carre’s great skill that he could 
make such romantic fantasies resemble realism.
In all these respects, le Carre’s novels are highly political. Yet commentators and 
critics often deny the political nature of le Carre’s work, as if the Cold War were merely 
incidental background to the plot or the psychology. Indeed Sarah Martin advocates
10 Ian Fleming, Moonraker 61955).
11 Le Carre, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold [1963] (London: Pan, 1964) p. 231.
12 “[Le Carre’s books] keep in circulation the ludicrous charade that Britain remains at the table o f great 
powers and what’s more, merits being there,” Fred Inglis, The Cruel Peace: Living Through the Cold War 
[1991] (London: Aurum, 1992), p. 204.
studying le Carre “without the Cold War trappings”.13 Yet to create Cold War espionage 
fiction during the Cold War was to reflect, represent and shape history as it occurred. 
Moreover, if all books are marked by the times that produce them, then every novel is a 
‘state of the nation’ novel, but perhaps particularly Cold-War spy novels, in which the 
protagonists literally ‘represent’ Britain.
It is true that there is often a lack of political specificity in le Carre: however, his 
texts contain clues to political events, figures and currents, and indeed their very silence on 
certain political issues can be significant. The elision of Communism in a book about a 
Soviet spy (Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy, 1974), the scarcity of reference to nuclear war, and 
the elusiveness of a receding but still operational Empire are all omissions it is the job of 
the historically minded critic to identify. Moreover, the defining facet of le Carre’s style, 
the supra-generic, ‘literary’ focus on his protagonists’ personal lives, does not depoliticise 
his novels but rather adheres to Raymond Williams’ definition of the realist novel, where 
“neither the society nor the individual is there as a priority”.14 The personal does not 
oppose the political, it is enmeshed with it: that le Carre combines both is key to his 
appeal. Moreover, le Carre deals in the personal lives of political figures: George Smiley 
and Alec Leamas are servants of the state, the infantry of the Cold War. Le Carre’s books’ 
personal emphasis also has a political function: an individualist rebuttal of the collectivist 
‘dogma’ of Communism that is far easier than defending capitalism.
The intention in this thesis is to get beneath the novels’ surfaces that so mesmerise 
critics and commentators (the complex plots; the insider jargon), beyond the markers of 
genre that make it seemingly so difficult to judge le Carre as a ‘novelist’; but also beyond a 
pervasive critical consensus that takes le Carre’s novels at surface value. That consensus 
attests that le Carre’s books are anti-establishment. Le Carre’s The Constant Gardener 
(2001) and his post-9/11 pronouncements have enhanced that anti-establishment, even
13 Sarah Martin, ‘The Silent Villain: The Minimalist Construction o f Patriarchal Villainy in John le Carre’s 
Karla Trilogy’ in Anna Fahraeus & Dikmen Yakali ^amoglu (eds.), Villains and Villainy: Embodiments o f  
Evil in Literature, Popular Media and Culture (New York: Rodopi, 2011), p. 48.
14 Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution [1961] (Cardigan: Parthian, 2011), p. 322.
radical, reputation.15 This is why this thesis focuses on the ‘state’ as a key theme. Le Carre 
claims his novels ask, “For how long can we defend ourselves [...] by methods of this 
kind, and still remain the kind of society that is worth defending?”16 Certainly, in admitting 
that British state means are either expedient or inept, le Carre represents an advance on the 
jingoism of Fleming, though not a huge advance on Graham Greene or the early work of 
Eric Ambler. When latterly branded a “leftie” by the Conservative government’s Michael 
Gove, le Carre objected.17 Rightly so: while critical and probing, le Carre’s anti­
establishment position is really a satirical skewering of establishment manners (by an
1 8insider to that establishment), alongside somewhat conservative complaints about 
bureaucracy that leaves the establishment as a structure entirely unchallenged. Indeed, 
quietly, and not always firmly, le Carre’s Cold-War protagonists are restorers of the British 
state and British status quo in every novel. Beyond the enlivening distractions of his 
defining anti-bureaucratic broadsides, and the ambiguities of his books’ frets about state 
means, le Carre ultimately affirms British state ends: the defence of the British ‘system’ -  
liberalism; capitalism -  as against ‘expansionist’ Soviet Communism.
Le Carre counterbalances these anxieties about state expediency with a potent 
assertion of British national ‘decency’: this decency is invested in the hugely attractive 
character of George Smiley. Smiley appears in all six of the novels in this thesis: he is le 
Carre’s readers’ guide and moral compass through the Cold War; a reassuring figure for 
British national identity (and British national anxieties), a champion of British values.19 
Thus the thesis’s second theme: the ‘nation’: that which is being fought for, that which is 
being defended in the Cold War. Smiley is quite as reassuring a British champion as Bond,
15 E.g. le Carre, ‘The United States Has Gone Mad’, The Times, 15 January 2003.
16 Le Carre, ‘To Russia, with Greetings: An Open Letter to the Moscow ‘Literary Gazette” , Encounter (May 
1966), 3-6 (p. 6). Smiley asks almost exactly the same question at Cold War’s end. Le Carre, The Secret 
Pilgrim [1991] (London: Sceptre, 1999), p. 123.
17 Le Carre, interview with Anne McElvoy, Proms, BBC2, 30 July 2013.
18 As Sisman’s biography makes clear (passim), Cornwell’s class position is contradictory: the son o f a lower 
middle-class convicted con-man, Ronnie Cornwell, with a range of shady acquaintance, above and below  
him in the social stratum. Groomed via prep, public school and Oxford, Cornwell was deemed sufficiently 
‘establishment’ to teach at Eton and to be informally recruited for MI5 and MI6.
19 Williams claimed the realist novel “creates and judges the quality of a whole way o f life in terms o f the 
qualities o f persons” {Long Revolution, p. 321).
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to whom he is conventionally posited as a polar opposite. Moreover, Smiley’s nationalism 
is fundamentally conservative: Smiley is a product and defender of the British class system 
and a nostalgic reminder of -  and stand-in for -  British imperial power.
If British state and national ends are validated in le Carre, then this rather refutes the 
other main tenet of the critical consensus:20 that le Carre depicts East and West as morally 
equivalent. This persists despite such public pronouncements as, “the Western evil is far, 
far, far less evil than the Eastern one.”21 This is the thesis’s third theme: the political 
enemy, wherein the thesis will demonstrate that le Carre depicts an expansionist Eastern 
bloc Communism that is almost as Manichaean as that of Fleming, to whom, again he is 
conventionally contrasted. Indeed, in le Carre, the Eastern bloc is presented as the 
ontological root of Cold-War expediency -  the West only imitates, reacts, defends, while 
the Communist East is unscrupulous, conspiratorial, aggressive. Nearly all these novels 
feature an incursion by Communism into British institutions (Call fo r  the Dead, Tinker 
Tailor, Honourable Schoolboy)22 or British territory (Looking Glass War, Smiley’s 
People), much as the original imperial spy novels did: rarely vice versa. If Britain is, as 
The Spy's Control claims, “defensive” and the Soviet Union offensive, then they are hardly 
equivalent. In these ways le Carre’s Cold War novels are saturated not just with political 
events but with political judgements. As such, these novels are key cultural interventions 
into the Cold War, documents of their era quite as valid as declassified government papers.
This introductory chapter will first conduct a review of the literature, broadly divided 
into espionage genre studies and work that specifically focuses on le Carre. Second, the 
chapter will establish the thesis’s critical methodology. Third, this chapter will define the 
terms -  the state, nation and political enemy -  proposed in the thesis title. Finally, this 
Introduction will offer a brief summary of the contents of each ensuing chapter.
20 A recent, mainstream example is Tony Parsons, ‘GQ Icon’, GQ, 4 December 2013, which rote references 
‘authenticity,’ ‘moral equivalence’ and ‘ends vs. means’ without sense of contradiction, whilst denying the 
novels are political.
21 John le Carre, PBS interview, 16 August 1980.
22 In Honourable Schoolboy, Hong Kong, where a Soviet mole’s money is laundered, is a British colony,
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2. Desk and Field: Literature Review 
Le Carre, Popularity and Genre
As a writer of hugely popular ‘genre’ novels, le Carre is routinely associated with ‘popular 
fiction’. Morag Shiach has noted that popular culture is often treated as “secondary and 
marginal”,23 so, via this association with popular fiction, the significance of le Carre’s 
work is accordingly diminished. But perhaps the impact of Le Carre’s novels on Britain’s 
post-war political and literary landscape -  as opposed to the impact of ‘literary fiction’ -  
can best be captured by contrasting the fates of 1963’s The Spy Who Came in from the 
Cold and the same year’s James Tait Black Prize-winner, Gerda Charles’ A Slanting Light. 
Which was more influential? Which is now best remembered?
Raymond Williams traces the word “popular” as initially meaning emanating from or 
“belonging to the people”.24 The contemporary sense of “widely favoured” was not 
widespread until the nineteenth century, with the ‘neutral’ notion of the ‘general public’ 
eventually eclipsing “the people” (Shiach, p. 174). However “the people” slipped regularly 
into common people (Shiach, pp. 19-34), so that association of “popular” with commoners 
meant that “‘low’ or ‘base’” (Williams, Keywords, p. 237) continued to be attached to 
popular forms. As we shall see, press commentators well into the 1970s regularly decried 
le Carre’s perceived attempts to “transcend” his assigned ‘thriller’ genre,25 sustaining 
Shiach’s point that the popular is that ‘other’ which is excluded from “institutions of 
legitimation” -  academia and the elite-dominated ‘popular’ press (Shiach, p. 33). Q. D. 
Leavis’s 1930s attack on detective novelist Dorothy Sayers’ work is thus crucial,26 
identifying it as ‘debased’ ‘mass fiction’, in opposition to the Leavises’ codification of
23 Morag Shiach, Discourse on Popular Culture (Cambridge: Polity, 1989), p. 15.
24 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary o f  Culture and Society [1976] (London: Fontana, rev. edn. 
1983), p. 236.
25 E.g. Maurice Richardson, ‘Le Carre tries too hard’, Review o f Looking Glass War, Observer, 20 June 
1965, p. 27; Clive James, ‘Go Back to the Cold!’ Review o f Honourable Schoolboy, New York Review o f  
Books, 27 October 1977, p. 29.
26 Q. D. Leavis, ‘The Case of Miss Dorothy Sayers’, Scrutiny, December 1937, 334-340.
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‘literary fiction’ into a canon that is largely unchallenged to this day.27 As John Sutherland 
suggests, this is a literary class-system, with popular fiction the expendable proles.28
Complicating this, despite le Carre’s supposed anti-establishment credentials, his 
work has little to do with “the people”; no sense of what Stuart Hall calls “the popular 
forces versus the power bloc” beyond its oxymoronic mainstream marginality.29 Le Carre’s 
fiction emanates from -  and, this thesis will argue, upholds and promotes -  the dominant 
culture (public schooled; Oxbridge educated; ruling class) that is usually associated with 
‘literary fiction’. This is the problem with Hall’s (and Shiach’s) emphasis on popular 
culture as e m a n a t i n g r a t h e r  than targeted at, ‘the people’. Indeed this thesis will 
argue in Chapter 1 that, via the concept of the ‘nation’, le Carre’s work merges the ‘general 
public’ with the elite dominant culture, thus using a ‘popular’ form and addressing a 
‘mass’ audience to assert the values and primacy of the dominant.
Consequently the perceived ‘debasement’ of popular, genre fiction must be 
located not in le Carre’s work’s production, but in its reception (its ‘mass’ popularity in 
terms of sales). In Fiction and the Reading Public, Q. D. Leavis attempted to understand 
the ‘popular novel’ that, as Suman Gupta claims, “developed through a market rationale 
that was outside the control of the scholarly elites”, 30 as opposed to the elite-endorsed 
‘literary’ novel.31 In doing so Leavis made the patronising distinction Pierre Bourdieu 
satirises: between “facile pleasure, pleasure reduced to a pleasure of the sense, and pure 
pleasure [...] a measure of the capacity for sublimation which defines the truly human 
man”.32 Literary fiction for the rational elite; pulp for the unthinking ‘mass’.33 As Bourdieu
27 “English students in England today are ‘Leavisites’ whether they know it or not, irremediably altered by 
that historic intervention”, Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction [1983] (Malden: Blackwell; 
1996), p. 27.
28 John Sutherland, Bestsellers (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 2.
29 Stuart Hall, ‘Notes on Deconstructing ‘the Popular” , in Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader, 
edited by John Storey (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), p. 465.
30 Suman Gupta, ‘On Mapping Genre: “Literary Fiction”/“Genre Fiction” and Globalization Processes’ in 
Globalizing Literary Genres: Literature, History, Modernity, edited by Jemej Habjan, Fabienne Imlinger 
(London: Routledge, 2016), forthcoming, NP.
31 Q. D. Leavis, Fiction and the Reading Public [1932] (London: Chatto and Windus, 1939), p. 5 (note).
32 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique o f  the Judgement o f  Taste (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1984), p. xxix.
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attests, this endorses the actual class system: “Cultural consumption [is] predisposed [...] 
to fulfil a social function of legitimating social differences” (Bourdieu, p. xxx).34 Le 
Carre’s works’ popularity -  its reception -  is irrelevant to its ‘quality’, but it is proof of its 
wide ideological dissemination.
So does this critically perceived debasement lie in the generic form  itself? If so, it 
is striking that ‘literary’ novelists have always deployed genre tropes, from the detective 
novel (e.g. Charles Dickens, Umberto Eco, Paul Auster), to the spy novel (Joseph Conrad, 
Graham Greene, Ian McEwan). It is a mistake to act, “as if genre-ness and literariness are 
fundamentally emanant qualities of fictional texts” (Gupta, NP): indeed the designation of 
‘genre’ and ‘literary’ can appear as arbitrary as the placing of political borders: why is 
Conrad’s The Secret Agent (1907) not considered genre fiction? Even were genre fiction 
always readily isolated, given that the ‘popular’ is simply the ‘other’ of the ‘literary’ 
(Shiach, p. 27) then not all ‘popular fiction’ is genre fiction.
Prefiguring structuralism, the work of Russian Mikhail Bakhtin and American 
Northrop Frye, in different ways, usefully suggested that all novels are generic: that 
‘popular’ and literary fiction alike accord to pre-existing formulas.35 Fredric Jameson also 
argues this.36 Following this, the 1970s work of Raymond Williams, then Stuart Hall and 
the Birmingham Centre, this thesis title reflects its approach, deliberately referencing 
“novels” rather than “spy novels”. Within this thesis’s ideological critique, no presumption 
is made about how successful le Carre’s ideological dissemination was. However, popular 
commentary and literary criticism do guide and even ‘fix’ readings, making it harder to 
comprehend le Carre’s work beyond a critical discourse which proclaims his work as 
oppositional whilst affirming consensus ideology. One strong element of such critical
33 Scott McCracken, Pulp: Reading Popular Fiction (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), pp. 8- 
9.
34 In this discourse, the economically based hierarchy is avoided by emphasis on “taste” on one hand, and on 
a homogenised “general public” on the other (Shiach, p. 174).
35 M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, trans/ed. Michael Holquist (Austin: University o f Texas, 1981), 
pp. 288-289.
36 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious [1981] (Abingdon: Routledge, 1983).
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guidance is the critical emphasis on le Carre’s work as ‘genre fiction’, so the historical and 
formal specifics of that genre are something we must now unpick.
The spy novel is a subgenre of the ‘thriller’, developing in tandem with the detective 
story -  all classified as ‘crime fiction’. Jerry Palmer reflects a consensus that the detective 
genre originates with Edgar Allan Poe’s Dupin tales (from 1841);37 was refined through 
Wilkie Collins’ Moonstone (1868); and codified in Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes 
stories (from 1887). We see how the detective genre flits between the ‘literary’ and the 
‘popular’ before becoming entrenched in the popular, via the “golden age” of the 1920s 
and 30s, when Agatha Christie, Margery Allingham and the aforementioned Dorothy L. 
Sayers were at a peak of popularity. According to Dennis Porter, the British Great 
Detective (explicitly revisited in George Smiley) was always a gentleman (country houses 
were a standard setting) and an amateur (gentleman hobbyists Dupin, Holmes and Lord 
Peter Wimsey) and thus “embodied the heroic qualities of an ascendant middle class that 
had learned to groom itself for an imperial role under the influence of a variety of 
ideological state apparatuses, [...] the public schools, the press and the middle-brow 
literature”. As the detective genre rehearsed a physical threat to bourgeois life and then 
‘resolved it’, via intellect, ridiculing the plodding, plebeian police, elite culture is again 
asserted via ‘popular’ forms: Bennett and Woollacott claim this was reflected in an 
aspirant, far from “common” readership. Structuralist, Roland Barthes usefully defined 
the “hermeneutic code” (solving a mystery) for the detective story and the “proairetic 
code” (‘what will happen next?’) for the thriller:40 spy stories tend to combine these codes, 
uniting action (adventure, brawn, the field) with cogitation (bureaucracy; brain; the desk).
Although there are roots in the work of American, James Fennimore Cooper {The 
Spy, 1821; The Bravo, 1831), the spy novel’s origins are primarily British. The spy novel
37 Jerry Palmer, Thrillers: Genesis and Structure o f  a Popular Genre (London: Arnold, 1978), p. 107.
38 Dennis Porter, The Pursuit o f Crime, Art and Ideology in Detective Fiction (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1981), p. 157.
39 Tony Bennett and Janet Woollacott, Bond and Beyond: The Political Career o f  a Popular Hero 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1987), p. 82.
40 Barthes, Roland, S/Z, An Essay [1970] (New York: Hill & Wang, 1974), pp. 18-20.
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was political from its inception, whether we place that inception with Rudyard Kipling’s 
Kim (1901, defending the British Empire against the Russians), or Erskine Childers’ The 
Riddle o f the Sands (1903, defending the British homeland against the Germans) -  which 
spawned a spate of hugely popular invasion fiction copies in William Le Queux and E. 
Phillips Oppenheim. Michael Denning rightly notes: “The spy became the figure for the 
fortunes of Empire in Britain, providing explanations for its decline and betrayal”.41 This is 
exactly the role of the police commissioner in Conrad’s The Secret Agent. John Buchan’s 
Richard Hannay novels in the 1910s still focused on German threat to British dominance, 
while Buchan later became himself an imperial administrator (from 1935). The spy novel 
reached a socially broader audience than detective fiction (Denning, pp. 20-21), indicative 
of the concept of ‘the nation’ (explored under ‘Terms Defined’, below) and the co-option 
of the working class into the elite’s imperial project via nationalism 42
Similar to le Carre’s use of popular forms to assert dominant cultural ideals, Denning 
asserts the crucial role of the gentleman ‘amateur’ within these imperial spy stories 
(Denning, pp. 33-35) as within the detective story. Imperialistic spy fiction reached its 
blunt apotheosis with Sapper’s Bulldog Drummond stories, from 1920, pursuing an almost 
fascistic, Mosley-ite populist nationalism. Thereafter, the late 1920s and 1930s saw a shift 
from romance to realism (starting with Somerset Maugham’s Ashenden, 1928), alongside a 
leftwards political shift, with the novels of Eric Ambler and Graham Greene (although 
even these authors still subtly asserted dominant orthodoxies). Again it is worth attesting 
the arbitrariness here: Kipling, Conrad and Maugham tend to be canonised as ‘literary’, 
while Childers and Ambler are ‘genre’. Greene himself addressed this distinction between 
“serious” and “trivial” culture (Shiach, p. 191) via his division of his work into “novels” 
and “entertainments”, a distinction he dropped for one ‘spy’ novel, The Quiet American
41 Michael Denning, Cover Stories: Narrative and Ideology in the British Spy Thriller (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1987), p. 5.
42 John M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation o f  British Public Opinion, 1880-1960 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 7.
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(1955), revived for another, Our Man in Havana (1958), and abandoned altogether by the 
time of his Philby novel, The Human Factor (1978). Yet “institutions of legitimation” have 
largely co-opted Greene’s “novels” and “entertainments” alike into the Leavises’ ‘literary’ 
canon. From the 1950s, however, Ian Fleming’s James Bond novels represented a revival 
of the imperial spy romance, before being ‘met’ by a revival of spy realism in the early 
1960s, via John le Carre and Len Deighton, who both broadened the class basis of the spy 
hero and complicated the imperialist morality of spy fiction. This thesis argues that le 
Carre did not in fact, substantially depart from dominant ideologies (imperial, social, or 
anti-Communist) via his genre modifications. Indeed, to the idea that formal 
experimentation indicates resistance to dominant ideologies, the name Ezra Pound should 
be sufficient rebuttal (from a potentially long list of modernists).
So this thesis rejects the idea that dominant ideology resides in the genre of le 
Carre’s fiction, genre being a matter ofform  not of content (Hall, pp. 455-466). Genre 
fiction is only as much a conduit of the dominant culture’s ideology as literary fiction. 
Marxist critic, Jerry Palmer’s emphasis on “the ideology of the thriller” effectively 
suggests thrillers are more reactionary than ‘literary’ fiction (Palmer, p. 149). Roger 
Bromley suggests capitalism only creates ideologically loaded “mass’Vpopular fiction, not 
the canon of literary fiction.43 Again, this conflation of form and reception patronises the 
reader: “ultimately the notion of the people as a purely passive, outline force, is a deeply 
unsocialist perspective” (Hall, p. 459), again legitimating social differences 44 Ideology 
infuses both popular and literary fiction. One can enjoy reading Evelyn Waugh’s 
Brideshead Revisited (1945) despite its -  contra Hall -  unavoidably and unchangingly 
reactionary politics. Given the ideological critique of dominant political orthodoxies 
essayed in this thesis, one might say much the same of le Carre’s work.
43 Roger Bromley, ‘Natural Boundaries: the Social Function of Popular Fiction’ Red Letters 7 (1978), 34-60.
44 As Jon Thompson says (of the Frankfurt school’s rejection o f “mass literature”), this “wholesale 
privileging o f canonical writers over noncanonical ones [...] ratifies the values o f the administrative society 
criticize[d] so effectively elsewhere”. Jon Thompson Fiction, Crime and Empire: Clues to Modernity and 
Postmodernism (Chicago: University o f Illinois, 1993), p. 26.
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So let us examine this issue of ‘pleasure’ in a ‘reactionary’ text. Just as female- 
targeted romantic novels interact with culturally encoded female fantasies, as described in 
Cora Kaplan’s ground breaking Thornbirds essay,45 thrillers interact with culturally 
encoded masculine fantasies. Spies save their country, sometimes the world, and, 
traditionally, also win the desirable female, or females in the case of Bond,46 so spy novels 
indulge male fantasies of agency and empowerment. Portly, elderly, and unskilled with 
firearms, Smiley nevertheless saves Britain in every novel, quite as effectively and reliably 
as Bond. Smiley’s “breathtakingly ordinary”47 appearance is both a useful facet of his 
spycraft (invisibility), and a fantasy of male empowerment: you do not need James Bond’s 
looks or skills to be potent as spy and man. Much is made in the texts and their critiques of 
the serial infidelity of Smiley’s wife, Ann. But Smiley did, in romance terms, ‘win’ the 
desirable female, and keeps re-winning her after every straying: indeed in the romance’s 
mythology, as cited by Frye, the hero is rewarded both by command of the kingdom (as 
Smiley is in Tinker and rejects in Call) and marriage (both events being followed by 
reunions with Ann). This also makes the key connection between the personal and the 
political: spy novels are not just fantasies of individual agency and empowerment, but 
collective, national fantasies of agency and empowerment.
If fantasy sounds far from utopian in this masculine context, Kaplan reasserts that 
readers are not empty vessels to be filled up by “reactionary” texts (Kaplan, in Burgin, p. 
156) in the Leavisite presumption: “the untutored, ‘primitive’ psyche was easily excited 
and had no strategies of sublimation” (p. 147). Hall rightly claims that culture is a site of 
ideological struggle against the dominant (Hall in Storey, p. 462), citing Williams’ concept 
of the “emergent”.48 Here we might cite Chris Mullin’s A Very British Coup (1982) -
45 Cora Kaplan, ‘The Thom Birds', fiction, fantasy, femininity’ in Formations o f  Fantasy, ed. by Victor 
Burgin, James Donald and Cora Kaplan (London: Methuen, 1986), pp. 142-166.
46 The same is true of Deighton’s nameless hero, or, Lionel Davidson’s Johnny Porter (Kolymsky Heights, 
London: Faber 1994) or Charles Cumming’s (The Trinity Six (London: Harper, 2011).
47 John le Carre, Call fo r the Dead  [1961] (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964), p. 7. Future references are to 
this edition and will be included in parentheses in the text.
48 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature [1977] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 121.
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popular literature that is left wing. However Kaplan again implies that popular fiction is 
more likely to be reactionary than “literary” fiction (Kaplan, p. 160), while both Hall and 
Kaplan underestimate the limited ‘play’ possible with a reactionary text (Kaplan struggles 
with The Thornbirds, p. 151), and the cultural power of commentary and criticism to ‘fix’ 
understandings of those texts.
The pleasure inherent in le Carre’s texts may lie partially in the indulgence of far- 
from-utopian fantasy, but primarily, it lies in the Leavisite training readers receive via 
school, university and literary criticism and also via television, marketing and press 
commentary: a learned, taught “cultural competence” (Bourdieu, xxv), which applies to all 
forms of culture, high and low, and enables a reader to take pleasure in the narrative 
urgency of plot, the intricacies of characterisation, and in transhistorical ‘humanist’ 
themes. This aestheticisation crucially also elides ideological content, in the ‘timeless’
Great Tradition outside of history or politics.
A formal focus on genre is also, indirectly, a facet of this Leavisite aestheticism just 
described. Gupta rightly says, ‘genre fiction’ is a market designation of ‘that which is not 
literature’, while “genre theory” pertains to the whole of literary production. The concepts 
“exist at different registers” (Gupta, NP). In practice however, there is a constant slippage 
between the two, a slippage which originates in Northrop Frye’s hugely influential work.
Deskmen: Le Carre and Genre Criticism
Le Carre distinguishes in his novels between bureaucratic ‘deskmen’ (Percy Alleline) and 
operational ‘fieldmen’ (Alec Leamas). Often studying le Carre as just one of multiple spy 
writers in their bulging case-files, genre-orientated critics can seem bureaucratic, collating 
and processing quantitative data: hence the designation ‘deskmen’.
We see in Lars Sauerberg’s book-length spy-study the first of the problems with 
Frye’s work: that an emphasis on the mythic root of all fiction prioritises story over 
history. In Sauerberg British decline becomes merely manifestation of Frye’s ‘wasteland’
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myth, without historical materiality.49 John Cawelti & Bruce Rosenberg’s quantitative spy 
genre study similarly occludes history.50 Deploying structuralist approaches, Denning uses 
the daunting “semantic rectangle” (p. 128) and B. K. Martin the “semiotic square” to map 
le Carre’s plots, but deep structure ends up curiously close to superficial surface here, with 
Denning claiming le Carre’s novels are “a cover story about work”, while for Martin, The 
Spy is “not a novel about spying” but “the bond of love which nature makes”.51 In both 
Denning and Martin, the Cold War recedes (Martin doesn’t even mention the Berlin Wall), 
affirming consensus views like Masters’ genre study’s claim that le Carre “is not interested 
in the political aspects of espionage”.
Frye’s location of fiction’s source only in other fiction (rather than history) can lead 
to a kind of literary solipsism. We see this in Michael Hayes’ claim that “le Carre’s work 
addresses “the nature of fiction”; repeated in Glenn Most, who, exploring le Carre’s links 
with the detective genre, concludes that The Spy's meaning is, “whether the mystery story 
is still possible in our time” (in H. Bloom, p. 99). This reduces the historical reality of the 
Cold War to a ‘text’,54 a solipsistic tendency even more pronounced in the 1990s, inpost- 
structuralism. David Seed’s formal investigations are astute but still prioritise the act of 
reading.55 Peter Bennett’s insightful thesis insists le Carre’s novels are studies in the 
“divided subjectivity” of identity, unconnected to the political divisions of the Cold War, 
nor to divisions inside Western ideology.56 After a lot of semantic fanfare, Bennett both 
dehistoricises le Carre and returns him to the genre ‘formula’ box. Allan Hepburn’s
49 Lars Ole Sauerberg, Secret Agents in Fiction: Ian Fleming, John le Carre andLen Deighton (New York: 
St Martin’s, 1984), p. 22.
50 John G. Cawelti, Bruce A. Rosenberg, The Spy Story (Chicago: University o f Chicago, 1987) p. 174.
51 B. K. Martin, ‘Le Carre’s The Spy Who Came In From The Cold: A Structuralist Reading’, Sydney Studies 
in English (1988/89), 72-88, (p. 88).
52 Anthony Masters, Literary Agents: The Novelist as Spy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 255.
53 Michael J. Hayes, ‘Are You Telling Me Lies, David? The Work o f John le Carre’ in Spy Thrillers: From 
Buchan to le Carre, edited by Clive Bloom (Houndsmills: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 113-130.
54 “History as little more than a discursive regime for the maintenance and transformation o f the past in the 
present” Andrew Milner, Re-Imagining Cultural Studies: The Promise o f  Cultural Materialism  (London: 
Sage, 2002), p. 124.
55 David Seed, ‘The Well-Wrought Structures of le Carre’s Early Fiction’ in C. Bloom, pp. 140-159. David 
Seed, ‘Spy Fiction’ in Cambridge Companion to Crime Fiction edited by Martin Priestman (Cambridge: 
University Press, 2003) pp. 115-135.
56 Peter Bennett, ‘Wilderness of Mirrors: The Representation o f Identity and Subjectivity in the Spy Novels 
of John le Carre’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Der Universitat Hannover, 1998).
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fascinating study of espionage fiction keeps offering tantalising glimpses of “Western 
ideology” and “motifs of capitalism in the narrative” (p. 184), yet Hepburn never pursues 
these ideas, and ultimately again suggests that The Spy is “an allegory of reading” (p. 183), 
which is also “impossible to interpret” (p. 186).57 Snyder follows Hepburn in this emphasis 
on ‘reading’,58 but as Snyder’s examples of “knowledge” are often factually inaccurate, 
this hardly testifies to reading’s primacy. Fiction is about fiction: history disappears.
A second problem with genre-orientated analysis is that critics deploy Frye’s genre 
of “romance” for the thriller, with romance representing an earlier stage in Frye’s 
evolutionary “cycle” from realism (Frye, p. 147). The slippage from ‘earlier’ to ‘more 
primitive’ is inherent in both Frye’s original theory and in critics’ subsequent deployment 
of it, returning us again to that Leavisite slippage between ‘popular’ and ‘inferior’. We see 
this in the work of early le Carre critic, Jacques Barzun, whereby “trashy literature” 
appeals to “primitive” urges and is part of a general death of “values” (patriotism; elite 
culture).59 Similarly, for George Grella’s fascinating study of the thriller, Frye’s 
“archetypes [...] and conventions”, reveal thrillers as “subliterary [...] inferior”.60 Lars 
Sauerberg’s spy genre study provides useful insight but again bleeds Frye’s mythic 
“archetypes” into “formula fiction” as readily distinct from ‘literary fiction’.61 Andrew 
Rutherford’s creditable attempt to defend le Carre as ‘literature’ similarly remains trapped 
within assumptions about the “novel proper”,62 as does in the 1980s, LeRoy Panek’s 
Special Branch.62, Panek’s is another quantitative genre study, hardly given credence by its
57 Allan Hepburn, Intrigue: Espionage and Cidture (New Haven: Yale University, 2005).
58 Robert Lance Snyder, The Art o f  Indirection in British Espionage Fiction: A Critical Study o f  Six Novelists 
(Jefferson: McFarland, 2011) pp. 9-11.
59 Jacques Barzun, ‘Meditations on the Literature o f Spying’, American Scholar 34 (1965), 167-178, (p. 169).
60 George J. Grella, ‘The Literature of the Thriller: A Critical Study’ (unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
University of Kansas, 1967), p. 2. See also: Robert Gillespie, ‘The Recent Future: Secret Agents and the 
Cold World War’ Salmagundi 13 (1970), 45-60 (p. 46).
61 Lars Ole Sauerberg, ‘The Novel of Espionage: An Attempt at Generic Criticism’, Pre-publications o f  the 
English institute at Odense University 9 (1977), 1-15.
62 Andrew Rutherford, ‘The Spy as Hero: le Carre and the Cold War’ [1978] in John le Carre, ed. by Harold 
Bloom (New York: Chelsea House, 1987) p. 19.
63 LeRoy Panek, The Special Branch: The British Spy Novel 1890-1980 (Bowling Green: University Press, 
1981). Panek claims le Carre possesses “the class of regular literature” (p. 237); Robert Giddings evokes “the 
espionage story in the form o f a novel with ‘class’” (Robert Giddings, ‘The Writing on the Igloo Walls: 
Narrative Technique in The Spy Who Came in from the C old \ in Bold, p. 200). Note the telling terminology.
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very title being a factual error (the Special Branch and MI5 are not synonymous). John 
Atkins’ historically perceptive le Carre chapter again accepts distinction between spy 
novels and “novels proper”,64 while Laura Tracy’s insights are undermined by her claim 
that le Carre’s novels “do not transcend generic limits”.65
Some critics combine both Frye-derived genre approaches: Bruce Merry’s unique 
insight into le Carre’s anti-Communism is undermined by his claim that this is generically 
rather than politically determined: romances must have their monsters.66 Merry then 
criticises le Carre for being too complex for genre fiction (Merry, p. 51), reaffirming the 
literary class system. Stewart Crehan’s claim for the “ideological” nature of le Carre’s 
work is lost in an invisible Cold War, while Crehan’s understanding of genre commends 
greater emphasis on plot than characterisation. “The emotional side of Smiley’s 
relationship with Ann is not merely tiresome; it exposes the limitations of writing within 
the spy genre”.67 More positively, a recent study of spy fiction, by Samuel Goodman, has 
an exemplary sense of history, whilst making no obeisance to genre snobbery, unusually
/TO
treating Greene, Fleming and le Carre as equals.
So, to conclude, genre-focused critics aestheticise le Carre’s work in two ways: first 
by an occlusion of history via an emphasis on genre as form; secondly, via folding value- 
judgements about ‘genre fiction’ into the supposedly ‘neutral’ analysis of unrelated ‘genre 
theory’. This Leavisite emphasis on the aesthetic over the historical in literature is 
noticeably more overt in empirical literary criticism’s citation o f ‘timeless’ humanist 
themes. It is this vein of le Carre criticism that is discussed next.
As the literary class system’s elite refuses entry to the upstarts, the pro-lobby pleads a case for admittance, 
leaving the original prejudice in place.
64 John Atkins, The British Spy Novel, (London: Calder, 1984) p. 170.
65 Laura Tracy, ‘The Villain as Cultural Double in the British Espionage Novel’, Clues 9:1 (1988), 11-37 (p. 
26).
66 Bruce Merry, Anatomy o f  the Spy Thriller (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1977), p. 132.
67 Stewart Crehan, ‘Information, Power and the Reader: Textual Strategies in le Carre’, (in Bold, p. 108).
68 Samuel Geoffrey Goodman, ‘Mapping New Jerusalem: National Identity and Power in British Espionage 
Fiction, 1945-1979’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Exeter, 2012). Goodman has added Deighton 
for his forthcoming book.
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Fieldmen: Empirical le Carre Criticism
Le Carre’s ‘fieldmen’, Alec Leamas and Jerry Westerby, are empiricists, “common sense 
agents”,69 unreflective upholders of a status quo that is never acknowledged as political. 
Most critics of le Carre as a single author are fieldmen, Leavisite, proclaiming an 
inductive, common sense criticism into which no theory intrudes:70 a neutrality. As Terry 
Eagleton notes, common sense “holds that things generally have only one meaning and 
that this meaning is usually obvious” (Eagleton, Literary, p. 94). So le Carre’s critics are 
often preoccupied with surface, specifically plot (relayed at length) and jargon (defining 
Lamplighters, Babysitters).71 However, critics’ plethora of factual inaccuracies (names; 
dates) is a failure at their own empirical, evidence-based level -  indicative of empirical 
authority’s fragility.72 What’s more, for all its virtue of prioritising the text, Leavis’s 
‘common sense’ criticism is loaded with political assumptions, even as it rejects politics’
H'Xrelevance to literature (Hammond, p. 15). This is empiricism as rhetoric: more correctly 
it is “pseudo empiricism”.74 Leavis’s affable formulations (“This -  doesn’t it? -  bears such
nc
a relation to that; this kind of thing -  don’t you find it so? -  wears better than that”)
nf\ •coerce the reader into an affirmation of how things are: of the status quo. Empiricism is a 
language of “naturally”, “of course” and “obviously”.
Empirical critics tend thus to find in le Carre’s work confirmations of consensus 
Cold-War ideology. So LynnDianne (sic) Beene’s claim, “the Berlin Wall [was] built to
69 Patrick J. Dobel, ‘The Honourable Spymaster; John le Carre and the Character o f Espionage’, 
Administration & Society 20 (1988), 191-215, (p. 195).
70 For “sceptical liberal intellectuals disoriented by the clashing dogmas o f the Cold War,” empiricism was “a 
recipe for political inertia, and [...] submission to the political status quo” Eagleton, Literary Theory, p. 94.
71 Linda T. Calendrillo’s ‘Role Playing and ‘Atmosphere’ in Four Modem British Spy Novels’, Clues 3:1
(1982), 111-119 almost entirely trades analysis for exposition. Other notable plotters are: Helen S. Garson, 
‘Enter George Smiley’ (in H. Bloom), Lewis, Noland, Dobler, Cawelti & Rosenberg, Panek, Rothberg, and 
Frederick P. Hitz, The Great Game: The Myth and Reality o f  Espionage (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004).
72 Ronald Paulson, Sin and Evil, Moral Values in Literature (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007) refers 
to “Bill Hayden” throughout, p. 324. The spelling of “le Carre” meanwhile is variously “LeCarre” (Panek) or 
“LeCarre” (Tracy; Neuse). Critics’ spellings are regularised henceforth.
73 Andrew Hammond, British Fiction and the Cold War (London; Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 15.
74 Perry Anderson, ‘Socialism and Pseudo-Empiricism’, New Left Review 1/35 (January/February 1966), 2- 
42.
75 F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit, [1952] (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962), p. 213.
76 Gramsci regarded “common sense” as “orthodox convictions [...] conforming socially to the general 
interests of the mling classes”. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence 
& Wishart, 1971), p. 340.
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quarantine West Berlin and seal desperate East Germans from freedom,”77 not only affirms 
rather than analyses le Carre’s work’s anti-Communist slant, it renders the West 
synonymous with “freedom”, eliding the ideology (and hypocrisy) attendant on that 
“freedom”. We see much the same strategy in critics’ Manichaeism: on one hand, routinely
<70
referencing Communism as “evil”, and, on the other, claiming a Western innocence or 
neutrality: “liberal democratic life offers no utopian goals [or] absolute ideologies” (Dobel, 
p. 200). Western ‘neutrality’ and critical objectivity are thus strongly linked in such 
empiricism. Objective criticism however is a “mirage”, as Jameson suggests: “even the 
most formalizing kinds of literary [...] analysis carry a theoretical charge whose denial 
unmasks it as ideological” (Jameson, Political, p. 43). Subjectivity will always intrude, 
whether that subjectivity upholds the Western status quo (most le Carre critics) or attempts 
to challenge it (this thesis). Criticism thus ‘fixes’ understandings of le Carre within a 
political consensus, making it hard to read against this consensus. These empirical critics 
will be considered broadly chronologically, from within four thematic clusters.
Firstly then, the enduring ‘moral equivalence’ trope in le Carre criticism claims that 
le Carre’s Cold-War work declares of West and East alike, “a plague on both your 
houses”.79 Such a proclamation of le Carre’s work as oppositional makes it harder to 
identify “emergent” ideologies within his texts. Julian Symons, in the first British study of 
le Carre, perceives an exposure of “false barriers between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ [...] ‘Our’ men 
may be personally vicious and ‘Their’ men decent human beings”.80 We see this also in 
John Halperin: “democracy is seen by the novelist as having no edge on Communism, 
moral or otherwise”,81 and confirmed by Peter Wolfe: “The accepted political divisions in
77 LynnDianne Beene, John le Carre (New York: Twayne, 1991) p. 49.
78 E.g. Ambrosetti, p. 103; Rutherford, in H. Bloom, p. 14; or Cobbs invoking “the wretched quality of 
Communist life as well as Communist morals [and] Communist dishonesty,” John L. Cobbs, Understanding 
John le Carre (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1998), p. 26.
79 Abraham Rothberg, ‘The Decline and Fall o f George Smiley: John le Carre and English Decency’, 
Southwest Review 66; 4 (Autumn 1981), 377-393, also in H. Bloom, p. 62.
80 Julian Symons, Bloody Murder [1972] (London: Pan, 1992), pp. 281-282.
81 John Halperin, ‘Between Two Worlds’ [1980] Jane Austen’s Lovers (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), p. 
220 .
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Europe are a fiction concealing the fundamental congruencies of East and West”.82 Only 
three critics challenge this moral equivalence claim: Geoffrey Hempstead (“hard to see in 
le Carre’s typologising of the ‘enemy’ [...] any sophisticated advance on Ian 
Fleming’s”), Myron Aronoff, and David Stafford: “Nowhere does [le Carre] suggest 
anything other than a passionate commitment to liberal values, and [...] paints an utterly 
dismal portrait of Soviet society”.85 The vast majority of critics however assert this 
supposed moral equivalence,86 whereby anti-Communism is essentially proclaimed as 
‘neutral’ and the political is aestheticised.
A second common critical trope is of le Carre as ‘anti-establishment’, again 
positioning le Carre as oppositional. This is relayed as the repression of the individual by 
the (British) state. Rothberg invokes “the decent individual against the corrupt Leviathan 
of the state” (in H. Bloom, p. 63). David Monaghan cites “an imbalance [...] between the 
claims of the group and those of the individual”,87 while Beene sees “individualism” 
affirmed “over institutional tyranny” (p. 51). Again, these citations barely skim the surface 
of the individual vs. the state’s trope popularity in le Carre criticism.88 A facet of this anti­
establishment trope is the British state’s use of foul means for anti-Communist ends: “the
82 Peter Wolfe, Corridors o f  Deceit: The World o f  John le Carre (Bowling Green, 1987), p. 82.
83 Geoffrey Hempstead, ‘George Smiley and Post-Imperial Nostalgia’ in Raphael Samuel (ed.) Patriotism: 
The Making and Unmaking o f  British National Identity Volume III: National Fictions (London: Routledge, 
1989) p. 238.
84 Myron J. Aronoff, John le Carre, Balancing Ethics and Politics (New York: St Martin’s, 1999), p. 93.
85 David Stafford, The Silent Game: The Real World o f  Imaginary Spies (Athens: University o f Georgia, 
1991) p. 209.
86 On moral equivalence see also: Grella, p. 136; Ambrosetti, p. I l l ;  Peter Lewis, John le Carre (New York: 
Frederick Ungar, 1985) p. 77; Richard W. Noland, ‘The Spy Fiction o f John le Carre’, Clues 1 (1980), 54-71 
(p. 54); Rothberg (p. 81); Charles A. Brady, ‘John Le Carre’s Smiley Saga’, Thought 60 (1985), 275-296 (p. 
286); Eric Homberger, John le Carre (London: Methuen, 1986, p. 52; O’Neill (in Bold, pp. 169-188, p. 187; 
Richard Bradbury, ‘Reading John le Carre’ (in C. Bloom, pp. 130-140), p. 135; Beene, p. 1; Tod Hoffman, 
Le Carre’s Landscape (Quebec: McGills-Queens University Press, 2001), pp. 75-76; Jost Hindersmann, 
“‘The right side lost, but the wrong side won’”: John le Carre’s Spy Novels before and after the end o f the 
Cold War,’ Clues (Summer 2005), 25-37 (p. 27); Andrew Hammond, British Fiction and the Cold War 
(London; Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 94.
87 David Monaghan, The Novels o f  John le Carre: The Art o f  Survival (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985) p. 131.
88 On the individual vs. the state, see: Joan Rockwell ‘Normative Attitudes o f Spies in Fiction’ in Bernard 
Rosenberg (ed.) Mass Culture Revisited (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971) p. 336, who gives this 
conflict a rare class dimension; Steven M. Neuse, ‘Bureaucratic Malaise In The Modem Spy Novel: 
Deighton, Greene And le Carre’ Public Administration 60 (Autumn 1982), 293-206, (p. 301); Helen Garson 
(in H. Bloom, p. 74); Wolfe, p. 11; Cawelti & Rosenberg p. 181; Dobler, p. 52; Powell, p. 44; Ulrike 
Holtmann, ‘Spying on le Carre: His Heroes of the Sixties and Seventies’ (unpublished M. A. Thesis, 
Osnabruck 1991), p. 127; Beene, p. 51; Bennett, p. 44; Cobbs, p. 139; Hepbum, p. 167; Hindersmann p. 26.
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totalitarian grounds of expediency” (Grella, p. 136). Sauerberg characterises the tensions 
as “individualism” vs. “totalitarian vices” (Sauerberg, p. 53). Wesley Britton cites
O Q
“manipulative bureaucracies [...] whose means were more important than the ends”. The 
origin of this ends-over-means, individual-crushing state is often posited by critics as 
Communism.90 This individual as victim of the state trope is oft repeated and again serves 
to neutralise the novels’ actual political content.91
A third critical trope is British decline. Halperin’s analysis is itself an imprecise, 
error-strewn account of “chaos” and “muddle” in le Carre (p. 220).92 Noland perceives in 
le Carre a “political fable” about “the fate of England”, without exploring British decline 
(p. 67). Steven Neuse perceives a national “loss of purpose” nowhere characterised as loss 
of Empire (p. 301). Celia Hughes perceives a lack of “ideals or sense of purpose in the 
West” and summons a past Arcadia: “once upon a time the world-order was reassuringly
Q-3
established and values were absolute”. A Christian, Hughes seems somewhat impervious 
to the earthly suffering created by British imperialism, while her suggestion that this lost 
Eden will be regained in Heaven recalls Frye’s similarly conservative world-view. This 
trope finds its height in Monaghan’s claim that feudalism was an Eden where “complete 
humanity” was realised (p. 24). Would feudal serfs have agreed? That Monaghan, in this 
first book-length study of le Carre, analyses the novels via le Carre’s ‘non-political’ The 
Naive and Sentimental Lover is indicative of how depoliticising strategies actually ratify 
political positions less naive -  or ‘neutral’ -  than conservative. Brett F. Woods echoes 
Monaghan’s imprecision: “the basic problem of modem society is the loss of touch with 
our full human nature [...] Western civilization is depicted as the residue of countless
89 Wesley Britton, Beyond Bond: Spies in Fiction and Film (Westport: Praeger, 2005) p. 128.
90 Dobel (p. 197); Tracy (p. 25).
91 On state expediency vs. the individual, see: Ambrosetti (p. 95): “the organization [...]  emerges as the real 
source o f evil in le Carre’s closed world”; Gillespie, (p. 59); Lewis (p. 150; p. 161); Edwards (in Bold, pp. 
62-63); Aronoff s entire book focuses on this ethical dilemma; Hammond, p. 87.
92 Brady’s inaccuracy-strewn piece mirrors the “nightmarish” flux he perceives in le Carre (Brady, p. 277). 
Giddings finds le Carre’s “incomprehensibility [...] emblematic of the confusion and contradictions of  
modem life itself’ (in Bold, p. 202). O’Neill takes this trope to its “unreadable” postmodern endpoint (in 
Bold p. 186).
93 Celia Hughes, ‘Serious Reflections on Light Reading: The World o f John le Carre’, Theology 84 (1981), 
274-279, (p. 275).
betrayals and discarded ideals”: presumably, it is the “ideal” of imperialism that is 
betrayed and discarded.94 Hempstead uniquely dismisses this lost Eden of imperialism 
because “the old values that are being lost” are imperial “profit” (p. 240). There are many 
further examples of this British decline trope however,95 most of which ratify the books’ 
nostalgic account of British decline as ‘neutral’.
Implicit in the above is a fourth critical trope: le Carre’s work as neutral, or non­
political. Eric Homberger declares, “It would be misleading to call [le Carre] a political 
novelist” (p. 14). Initially Tony Barley confronts politics:96 le Carre’s account of the state 
creates “conflicts between [...] the West’s self-appointment as the ‘Free World’ and its 
coercive actions” (Barley, p. 10); le Carre pits an “elite matrix of power” versus a “mass” 
either “impotent” or threatening (pp. 12-13) and contrasts a “national” “way of life” in “an 
unequal antagonism” with the “elemental evil” (p. 6) of the state, Communist “system” (p. 
14). Abruptly, Barley rejects this as “reductive” (p. 16) and dedicates the rest of his book 
to a denial of the books’ political content. Many critics prioritise personal rather than 
political readings, as in Victor Lasseter’s claim that le Carre’s books demonstrate that “any
97hope for humanity comes not from [...] ideology but from the human capacity for love”, 
or Cheryl Powell’s view that “redemptive love” is le Carre’s dominant theme.98 Wolfe 
similarly finds a “clash between individuals not ideologies” (p. 59).
A further facet of this approach is to separate politics from people via an abstract 
‘ideology’. We see this first in Ronald Ambrosetti’s evocation of the “innocent middle [...] 
caught in a cross-fire of ideologies perpetuated by the political oligarchy”.99 Dobel takes
94 Brett F. Woods, Neutral Ground: A Political History o f  Espionage Fiction (New York: Algora, 2008) p. 
129.
95 See: Barzun, p. 172; Britain’s “moral” decline (Grella, p. 143); “Britain’s tragic loss o f prestige and power 
in the postwar world”, Andy East, Cold War File (Metuchen: Scarecrow, 1983), p. 174; the untroubled 
“faith” of Empire (Atkins, p. 176); Empire as “enlarging vision” (Homberger, p. 18); Garson (in Bold, p. 79); 
Lewis (p. 37); “‘the good old English tradition’” (Holtmann, p. 94).
96 Tony Barley, Taking Sides: The Fiction O f John le Carre (Milton Keynes: Open University, 1986), p. 8.
97 Victor Lasseter, 1 Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy: A  Story of Modem Love’, Critique 31 (1990) 101-111.
98 Cheryl C. Powell, ‘Redemption for the Protagonist in three Novels by John le Carre’ (unpublished doctoral 
thesis: Florida State University, 1991), p. 4.
99 Ronald J. Ambrosetti, ‘A Study of the Spy Genre in Recent Popular Literature’ (unpublished doctoral 
thesis: Bowling Green University, 1973), pp. 103-104.
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this further: “Le Carre’s novels indict an absolute loyalty to a cause as the most dangerous 
of all characteristics to the values of the West” (p. 198).100 The implication here is that the 
West is ‘above’ ideology. Indeed, George Dobler claims his critique to be “neutral”, where 
others’ “agendas [...] distort” the texts,101 but his depoliticisation of the novels is a pretty 
fair distortion itself, while his conservative Christian agenda reveals Christ as a liberal 
individualist and Communism as “the anti-Christ” (Dobler, p. 363). Similarly, Aronoff 
asserts liberalism -  the West’s ‘system’ -  as neutrality: “a revulsion against doctrines and 
ideologies [that] reflects [le Carre’s] underlying liberal temperament” (Aronoff, p. 4). 
Former intelligence officer Tod Hoffman declares that “ideology is artificial”, while 
making a subjective case for the West (Hoffman, p. 11). This claim of le Carrean/Westem 
‘neutrality’ is repeated frequently, refuted only by Richard Bradbury, who condemns, 
“that most ideological strategies, the denial of ideology” (in C. Bloom, p. 131), and James 
Buzard: “the Western ideology which proposes that the West has no ideology, that it has
1 rv-5 #
only its cherished “way of life”. This declaration of lack of ideology in le Carre, or m 
the West, is implicit in the ‘neutrality’ and aestheticisation of empirical criticism.
When, in analyses of work emerging from and focusing on a political struggle (the 
Cold War), politics are largely absent -  true of both genre and empirical critics -  then le 
Carre criticism occupies a no-man’s land, as per this thesis’s title. To quote Smiley, 
speaking to fieldman, Jerry Westerby: “‘They think of themselves in the middle, whereas, 
of course, really they’re nowhere’”.104 Critical neutrality, like liberal neutrality -  or indeed,
Swiss neutrality -  is another mirage: there is no neutral no-man’s land.
* * *
100 In post-war American criticism also, “‘consensus’ seemed to most anti-ideological, natural”, Thomas Hill 
Schaub, American Fiction in the Cold War (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1991), p. 26.
101 George David Dobler, ‘The Novels o f John le Carre: Children, Women, Religion’ (unpublished doctoral 
thesis: University of Iowa, 1989), p. 51.
102 Beene sets Western “way of life” against Eastern “ideology” (p. 23); Woods’ tellingly titled Neutral 
Groun declares, “philosophies are dangerous because they make people willing to destroy” (Woods, p. 124).
103 James M. Buzard, ‘Faces, Photos, Mirrors: Image and Ideology in the Novels o f John le Carre’, in Image 
and Ideology in Modern/Postmodern Discourse, edited by David B. Downing and Susan Bazargan (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1991), p. 157.
104 Le Carre, The Honourable Schoolboy [1977] (London: Sceptre, 1999), p. 122. Future references are to this 
edition and are included in parentheses in the text.
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3. Faultlines: a Critical Methodology
In an attempt to recover the texts from where they are ‘fixed’ by ostensibly aesthetic 
critical approaches, this thesis will perform an ideological critique of le Carre’s Cold War 
novels. Taking the novels in chronological order, each chapter will begin with a survey of 
the novel’s reviews. This tells us less about a work’s reception105 than about the elite 
cultural consensus. Elite reviewers are neither democratic nor representative, and their 
‘objectivity’ masks both an economic dependence on the publishing industry and a 
subscription to the Leavisite agenda previously described. Reviewers do not create public 
tastes but, as discussed, they are influential upon them, as a portal of information (this 
novel exists!) and as opinion-formers. Thus reviews have been part of the political 
economy that made le Carre a bestselling author and have helped establish the terms of le 
Carre discourse by de-emphasising the political content and resonance of le Carre’s work.
Thereafter, the thesis redeploys theory derived from Alan Sinfield’s early modem 
study, Faultlines (1992), whereby the flaws in texts reveal contradictions in British 
ideology. This effectively politicises the ‘aesthetic’ approach of the Leavis school via 
Raymond Williams’ “cultural materialism”. An aesthetic contradiction is not necessarily a 
‘flaw’: citing Marxian dialectic, Freudian duality or Romantic ‘negative capability’ this 
thesis suggests textual contradictions evince rewarding textual complexity: “Substantial 
texts are in principle likely to be written across ideological faultlines because that is the 
most interesting kind of writing [...]. Their cultural power was in their indeterminacy -  
they spoke to and facilitated debate.”106
Sinfield’s cultural materialism derives from Williams’, a nuancing of Marxism that 
was a reaction to Stalinism and the abmpt transition from hot to Cold War. Unnerved
105 In all this focus on the ‘popular’, the political economy o f popularity is rarely exlored. Sauerberg’s rare 
reception study only really proves thrillers are popular, primarily with lower middle-class men, and that 
espionage thrillers peaked in the 1960s, with The Spy the first thriller to head the annual US ‘Fiction’ titles. 
Lars Ole Sauerberg, ‘Literature in Figures: An Essay on the Popularity of Thrillers’ Orbis Literarnm, 38
(1983), 93-107.
106 Alan Sinfield, Faultlines: Cultural Materialism and the Politics o f  Dissident Reading (Oxford: University 
Press, 1992), p. 235.
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liberal and former leftist writers and critics responded to both with an essentially 
conservative ‘realism’ that also emphasised ‘contradiction’ and ‘ambiguity’ (Schaub, p.
1H735), this last strongly associated with le Carre. This realism highlighted an unruly 
‘human nature’ not susceptible to theory or planning. Thus a “cultural materialist” 
emphasis on ‘contradictions’ emerges from the same post-war British debates and cultural 
currents as le Carre’s work and its criticism, however different their conclusions.
In a similar spirit then, Sinfield subtitling Faultlines as “the politics of dissident 
reading” utilises Cold-War consensus terminology to make an ^//-consensus point. 
“Dissident” summons Soviet dissidence, the rebellious rejection of the propagandistic 
‘truth’ proclaimed by the Soviet Communist system. The brainwashing propaganda of the 
West’s enemies is familiar, and ‘ideology’ is in the Soviet case associated with Gulags, 
show-trials and a muzzled press. As we saw with Cold War critical discourse upon le 
Carre, ‘ideology’ is something Britain’s enemies possess, not Britain itself. British ideas 
are ‘common sense’: moreover, if we specify this common sense as ‘liberalism’, this too is 
parlayed in conventional, empirical usage as ‘neutral’, non-ideological. But the centrist 
liberalism that dominated post-war Britain was certainly an ideology, a rationalisation of 
capitalism, whereby certain freedoms were offered as surety for capitalism’s survival, but 
with ‘freedom’ effectively a euphemism for liberal capitalist democracy.108 Moreover, as 
Communist ideology was anti-capitalist by definition, the West was fully prepared to assert 
its ideology, its ‘system’, aggressively through propaganda and through covert and overt 
attacks on the Communist ‘threat’ throughout the Cold War.
So this thesis offers a “dissident reading” of le Carre. Contrary to all the critical 
claims we have heard of moral equivalence, anti-establishment stance, the assertion of 
contemporary chaos, or that his work is simply non-ideological, le Carre conveys a
107 E.g. Giddings, in Bold p. 204.
108 US President Kennedy declared of the Peace Corps, “our young men and women, dedicated to freedom, 
are fully capable o f covercoming the efforts of Mr Khrushchev’s misioinaries, who are dedicated to 
undermining that freedom.” Quoted in Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007) p. 35.
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consensus British ideology throughout his Cold War fiction. Structuralist Louis Althusser’s 
refinement of Karl Marx’s concept of ‘ideology’ is helpful here. For Althusser,
Westerners’ very subjecthood is formed by the capitalism upon which the liberal system is 
founded:109 so literature is rarely straight propaganda but instead an inadvertent expression 
of the ideas that knit Western society together. Althusserian, Pierre Macherey’s concept of 
“the unconscious of the text” highlights this connection between Freudian unconscious and 
Marxian ideology:110 both lurk beneath surface meanings in a realm where contradictions 
can coexist.111 As such, ideology can be conveyed by its “not said”, wherein the work 
“reveals a determinate absence, resorts to an eloquent silence” (Macherey, p. 79): this is 
not dissimilar to “the dog that didn’t bark” in Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes, who le 
Carre often invokes. Critics in this understanding are detectives.112 Ideology can also 
reveal itself in inconsistencies of characterisation, a key facet of this thesis’s approach. 
“Character is a strategy -  one that will be abandoned when it interferes with other 
desiderata” (.Faultlines, p. 78). Equally, ideology can be expressed through, paradoxically, 
decrying the very thing it is actually defending, as Roland Barthes’ “Operation Margarine” 
will show regarding the state. Although, as Eagleton points out, texts may try to ‘resolve’ 
these contradictions, this will result in further “internal conflict and disorder”.113 A 
relatively straightforward version of this is when fiction tries to ‘resolve’ history, and the 
critic can measure the gap between fiction and reality:114 thus, say, the differences in the 
fates of the real Kim Philby and the fictional Bill Haydon in Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy.
109 “The imaginary relationship o f individuals to their real conditions o f existence,” Louis Althusser, Lenin 
and Philosophy [1968] (New York: Monthly Review, 2001), pp. 109. This is far closer to Williams’
“structure of feeling” than is usually acknowledged. Williams’s reinsertion o f human experience into 
Althusser’s social structures suggests “a thoroughgoing cultural materialism [...] which acknowledges the 
claims of agency and structure” (Milner, p. 127).
110 Pierre Macherey, A Theory o f  Literary Production [1966] (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 
92.
111 Jameson argues psychoanalysis itself emerged from capitalism’s creation of “psychic fragmentation” 
(Jameson, Political, p. 49).
112 Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in The Memoirs o f  Sherlock Holmes [1894].
113 Terry Eagleton, Criticism and Ideology: A Study In Marxist Literary Theory (London: Verso, 1978), p. 86 .
114 “Literary text and historical context are productively compared [...] so as to test the extent to which texts 
misrepresent their contexts” (Milner, p. 157).
We need not pursue these French structuralist ideas towards Althusser’s “entrapment 
model” (.Faultlines, p. 39), wherein ideology is inescapable and contradiction thus 
becomes the endpoint of analysis.115 This thesis, following Sinfield and Williams (and 
Gramsci),116 prioritises a sub-clause in Marx’s definition of ideology: “the legal, political, 
religious, artistic or philosophic -  in short, ideological forms in which men become 
conscious o f this conflict andfight it out” (my emphasis).117 Ideology in this understanding 
is dialectic, as much a field of contestation as a field of coercion. For Williams it is a flux 
of “dominant, residual and “emergent” currents {Marxism, p. 121).
Just as liberal society is ridden with political contradictions (one person’s labour 
exchanged for another’s profit; imperial barbarity claimed as ‘civilisation’), so is its 
literature. Therefore, inside Western ideology -  in society, in literary texts -  is its own 
rebuttal. So dissident readings of consensus literature offer the potential for resisting 
accepted, empirical givens, and -  however forlorn a hope in an era of unfettered global 
capitalism -  for resistance. One might term the critical approach of this thesis ‘dissident 
close reading’. In this spirit, the thesis will read contradictions in le Carre’s work as they 
pertain to three telling thematic and ideological concepts: the state, the nation, and the 
political enemy. What follows is an initial outline of these concepts, which will continue to 
be nuanced in the course of the thesis.
He *
115 As seen in Peter Bennett’s thesis.
116 Gramsci writes, “a given socio-historical moment is never homogenous; on the contrary it is rich with 
contradictions”; a prevailing current “presupposes a hierarchy, a contrast, a struggle”, Antonio Gramsci, 
Selections from Cultural Writings (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1985), p. 93.
117 Karl Marx, ‘Preface to the Contribution to the Critique o f  Political Economy’ (1859) in Early Writings 
(London: Penguin Classics, 1992) p. 426.
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4. State, Nation and Political Enemy: Terms Defined 
The State
In contrast to Fleming, and most spy authors, the state -  as both workplace and institution 
-  is given particularly intensive focus in le Carre. The state is what all the protagonists in 
le Carre’s novels are working^or, directly or indirectly: and in every novel the state 
undergoes a cycle of being undermined, before being ‘saved’, secured and re-founded by 
Smiley (or another protagonist). This then is this thesis’s “dissident reading” of what is 
critically recycled as ‘anti-establishment’ in le Carre. For, as we have seen, in le Carre, the 
state is simultaneously -  and contradictorily -  upheld and distanced, while being, as it is in 
British society, imprecisely defined. Ellen Wood claims that Britain possesses “a political 
culture [...] where the concept of the state is very weak”.118 Indicative of a queasiness 
regarding the state, Britain appends terms like “royal” or “national” to its state institutions, 
as opposed to ‘State Mail’ or ‘State Opera House’ (Wood, p. 33). ‘The state’ in British 
society is normatively negative. Yet Immanuel Wallerstein claims, “liberalism has always 
been in the end the ideology of the strong state in the sheep’s clothing of individualism” 
and calls this “the great intellectual antinomy of modernity”.119 This instability of the 
concept of the state is thus a faultline, in le Carre’s Cold-War novels, wherein anti-state 
rhetoric occludes affirmation of the state.
In sociologist Max Weber’s definition, the state is: “A compulsory political 
organisation with continuous operations [central government] [whose] administrative staff 
successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in 
the enforcement of its order.”120 The legal and judicial system enforces state order within 
the domestic population; the military fulfils this role in the international sphere; the 
intelligence services depicted by le Carre occupy a hazily mandated role between:
118 Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Pristine Culture o f  Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991) p. 33.
119 Immanuel Wallerstein, Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789-1914 (University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 2011), p. 10; 13.
120 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline o f  Interpretive Sociology T19281 (Berkeley: University o f  
California Press, 1978).
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providing intelligence to police/army; pursuing investigations of their own, and sometimes 
even pursuing more active roles in destabilising or changing of regimes.
If this sanctioned violence were not sufficient explanation for liberal unease about
191the state, Weber’s definition leaves three further uncomfortable facets unaccounted for. 
Firstly, Weber leaves out imperialism: although Britain’s role in the world was shrinking, 
it still possessed colonial territories during the Cold War, often brutally repressed 
(Malaya); still involved itself, via America, in imperial conflicts (Korea, 1950), and still 
pursued commercial imperialism (any former British colony). Secondly, Weber omits the 
Western state’s management of capitalism. British queasiness regarding the state is as 
nothing compared to acknowledging capitalism as that state’s ‘system’. Yet the liberal
1 9 9  1 9 9state and the capitalist economy are synchronous, as Ralph Miliband attests, bolstered 
by social or professional ties between the two.124 Indeed in deregulated late capitalism it 
often seems that capitalism ‘manages’ the state. Nevertheless, it is the state that does the 
deregulating, and state officials who are later rewarded with lucrative business 
appointments (not least Miliband’s son, David).
Weber’s third elision is the role of ideology in securing the state, overtly through 
propaganda, but also by a subtler empiricism that naturalises liberalism and capitalism as 
commonsensical.125 Integral to this is the elision of those trickiest facets of the state just 
cited; or, in a double bluff, to reject or attack some facet of the state in order to uphold the
1 96deeper structure (Barthes’ Operation Margarine again). Consequently, left-wing 
critiques of the state focus on precisely these tricky issues -  state violence in upholding
121 For Althussser, violence and propaganda were distributed, respectively, via the Repressive and 
Ideological State Apparatuses (Althusser, Lenin, pp. 85-126).
122 Poulantzas shows the state can operate against immediate capitalist economic interests to secure 
capitalism long-term. Nicos Poulantzas, State. Power. Socialism [1978] (London: Verso, 1980).
123 Colin Leys, Politics in Britain: From Labourism to Thatcherism [1983] (London: Verso, rev edn, 1989), 
p. 274.
124 Ralph Miliband, ‘Poulantzas and the Capitalist State,’ New Left Review 82 (November/December 1973), 
84-92.
125 “Organicism” is Edmund Burke’s similar concept of a ‘naturally’ evolving society, a conservative 
“legitimating perspective [which] naturalises processes and values”, David Alderson, Terry Eagleton, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 40.
126 “A little ‘confessed’ evil saves one from acknowledging a lot o f hidden evil” Roland Barthes, Mythologies 
[1957] (New York: Noonday, 1991), p. 42.
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order; state imprisonment to uphold law; state responsibility for uneven capitalist 
distribution of wealth; imperialism -  and state ideology’s mendacity regarding all of the 
above. Le Carre’s novels, however, focus upon the state’s bureaucracy. It is primarily this 
antipathy to bureaucracy that lies behind le Carre’s anti-establishment reputation (with 
some queasiness about state violence also). Whether that antipathy emphasises, from book 
to book, bureaucratic inefficiency or bureaucratic instrumentalism, the intelligence 
bureaucracy is all the reader ever really sees of the state in le Carre. Though of course this 
spotlight on the ‘secret state’, seems inherently dissident, with Cornwell’s former 
colleagues like John Bingham suitably scandalised etc. However, in critiquing bureaucracy 
-  or rather bureaucracy’s entitled functionaries -  le Carre occludes the uncomfortable 
sections of the state (capitalism, the landed class, the military) and thus implicitly upholds 
them. However, the hidden state makes its return via faultlines in the text.
Let us look more closely at this bureaucracy. Du Gay claims, “Weber recognizes a 
close affinity between bureaucracy and democracy” because “the political demands 
typically arising within democratic states can only be met by large-scale bureaucratic 
administration” (pp. 45-46).127 This is a rather limited account. Mandel sees the steady 
expansion of the British state’s bureaucracy from the late nineteenth century as a deliberate 
attempt to regulate capitalism’s creation of a growing -  thus dangerous -  proletariat, via 
social and legal means.128 This process culminated in the post-war Welfare State, wherein, 
Hobsbawm claims, politicians “wished to save the essentials of a capitalist system, but 
realized that this could now be done only within the framework of a strong and
1 90systematically interventionist state”. This is Keynesianism, which effectively continued 
the wartime National Government as a cross-party post-war liberal consensus, to much 
initial post-war optimism: “State intervention through expert bureaucrats was supposed to 
guarantee forever full employment, economic growth, rising standards of living, social
127 Paul Du Gay, In Praise o f  Bureaucracy (London: Sage, 2000).
128 Ernest Mandel, Power and Money: A Marxist Theory o f Bureaucracy (London: Verso, 1992), pp. 154-5.
129 Eric Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire [1968] (London: Penguin, 1999), p. 224.
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peace, a real brave new world” (Mandel, Power, p. 185). This consensus was scaffolded by 
the ‘Long Boom’ in British capitalism, post-war recovery creating a period of relative 
wealth, enshrined in Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan’s 1957 claim that Britain had
1 <5 A
“never had it so good”. Contra Mandel’s sarcasm, the Welfare State improved the lives 
of ordinary people and complicated leftist opposition to the capitalist state. Conservative 
and liberal antipathy to the state had a long history -  John Stuart Mill decried, “the great 
evil of adding unnecessarily to [the state’s] power” - 131 and at the end of our time-frame, 
Conservative neoliberal, Margaret Thatcher, parodied the Welfare state as “the nanny 
state”, whilst also blurring being anti-bureaucracy with being anti-establishment,132 but 
strengthening the power of the deep state (strongly tied to the establishment).133
It is this pseudo anti-statism -  really anti-bureaucracy -  we see in le Carre, which 
focuses on “the impersonal, expert, procedural and hierarchical character of bureaucratic 
reason and action”, seen “as unethical or morally bankrupt” (Du Gay, p. 4). The 
bureaucratisation of Communist states provided a conveniently negative reference-point, 
filtered largely through the depiction of a bureaucratised Soviet/British amalgam in 
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four. This is not an especially coherent critique: an entire 
society cannot be a bureaucracy. Moreover, le Carre’s bureaucracy-focused anti-statism 
allows him to be all things to all men (useful in a popular novelist): a conservative critic of 
‘big government’ and a radical anti-establishment figure. The narrowness of this critique 
occludes and leaves unchallenged the deep state, which is defended and upheld. Because 
the state is a culturally tricky issue, normatively negative, then an inoculation with anti- 
bureaucratic rhetoric secures the health of the entire state body, as per Barthes’ equation.134
130 Schaub suggests the era’s anti-Communism was a defence o f this capitalist bounty (Schaub, pp. 58-9).
131 Mill quoted in Domenico Losurdo Liberalism: A Counter-History [2006] (London: Verso, 2014) p. 200.
132 Anti-bureaucracy is a key feature of the “liberal new right”, whereby “collectivism restricts individual 
initiative and saps self-respect” (Heywood, p. 94).
133 Strengthening the police force (Leys, p. 355); attempting to ban Peter Wright’s MI5 expose, Spycatcher, 
the GCHQ union clampdown; increased military spending “Conservatives [a]re always ready to strengthen 
the state structure to the degree necessary to control popular forces pushing for change”, Wallerstein, p. 15.
134 It is hard therefore to agree with Jameson’s appealing idea that the spy genre attempts “to think the 
impossible totality o f the contemporary world system: [the] enormous and threatening, yet only dimly
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The Nation
One way of avoiding the problem of the normatively negative state -  for governments as 
for le Carre -  is instead to emphasise the normatively positive nation: as in the National 
Coal Board or British Rail. The British nation is a potent theme in le Carre’s work, and this 
thesis presents a “dissident reading” of what critics view as his “British decline” theme. 
However the elusiveness of the concept of nation is highlighted by, for example, British 
espionage chief, Control’s briefing speech to Leamas in The Spy Who Came in from the 
Cold. ‘“We do disagreeable things so that ordinary people [...] can sleep safely in their 
beds at night’” (Spy, p. 20). The British nation is a symbolic stand-in for the state here -  
the exceptional subject (“we”) which has the monopoly of violence (“disagreeable 
things”) and is thus ‘fallen’/guilty. But the British nation is also something completely 
distinct: the “ordinary” object (them) that is innocent (in a standard synonym, they 
“sleep”), indeed ‘neutral’. But is the nation just the state in disguise, or does it have a civil 
location? The answer is somewhere between these positions.
‘Nation’, as Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner both revealed in contrasting ways 
in the 1980s,135 is a relatively modem concept, forged from the interrelated development of 
printing, capitalism and expanding education (Gellner, p. 34). Being citizens of a ‘nation’ 
provided a way for the new bourgeoisie (industrialists) to collectively ‘imagine’ 
themselves as distinct from a hierarchical, religiously ordained feudal order. This had a 
particularly evident role in the bourgeois idea of “service” to country, pursued in Britain 
via administration of Empire (including joining British intelligence). As with education 
and the vote, the bourgeoisie, the gentlemanly upper-middle class, were forced to carry the 
working classes with them on their upward journey. Hobsbawm and Ranger show how 
British nationalism inculcated the working class into ‘invented traditions’, like the cult of
perceivable, other reality o f economic and social institutions”. Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or The 
Cultural Logic o f  Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991), p. 38.
135 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities [1983] (London: Verso, rev edn, 2006). Ernest Gellner, 
Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983).
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monarchy,136 as “a way of welding together the state’s subjects against subversion and 
dissidence”;137 i.e. providing a national loyalty to transcend threatening class loyalty.138 As 
such, Victoria became Empress of India twenty years into her reign, India having been 
previously run by the East India Company: a symbolic means of securing the monarchy -  
and ennobling colonial plunder -  which also reveals the way that ‘national’ concepts are 
state-created and are overlaid onto capitalism.139
Important in peacetime, the national imaginary is essential in war, when the working 
class is required to defend the ruling class. Whether the ruling class is viewed as a 
government or an elite, it is not something to die for. A nation, the entire body of the 
citizenry, is a far better banner, and one that had functioned effectively for two World 
Wars in the twentieth century.140 A non-combatant Cold War was more abstract, but also 
more alarming, considered in terms of an international proletariat (“The workers have no 
country”)141 and an Eastern Communism that rejected and therefore threatened both British 
capitalism and British Empire -  the very things that had made Britain Great, the pillars of 
British nationalism. Invocations of a British ‘nation’ then are potentially unifying 
strategies, galvanising support against an external enemy for fictional spies and real-world 
readers alike, defining where, who and what is being fought for. But invocations of nation 
also encounter contradictions: where can a British nationalism be located that does not 
expose the faultline of British Empire, British capitalism, or British class system?
The nation is not always invoked by the state alone, in the British Empire’s mode of 
“official nationalism” (B. Anderson, p. 85). Anderson stresses the importance of the 
development of printing in creating the capacity to address a mass, simultaneous “us”.
136 The Invention o f  Tradition, edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: University Press; 
1983) p. 108.
137 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age o f  Empire 1875-1914 [1987] (London: Abacus, 2010), p. 148.
138 Tom Naim, The Break-Up o f  Britain, [1977] (London: Verso; rev edn 1981), p. 340.
139 Timothy Brennan suggests Britain’s sense of itself as a nation emanated from the English Civil War (p. 
52) and imperial conquest (p. 59). Timothy Brennan, ‘The National Longing for Form’, in Homi K. Bhabha 
(ed.) Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1990).
140 Perry Anderson, ‘Origins of the Present Crisis’, New Left Review 1/23 (January-Febmary 1964), 26-53, p. 
35.
141 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto [1848] (London: Penguin, 1985) p. 102.
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Newspapers thus play a crucial role in defining where, what and who is, in this case, the 
British nation. So too do novels, which Jameson claims can function as “national 
allegories”.142 If all novels are national allegories, or in this case, ‘condition of England’ 
novels, Hammond convincingly argues that espionage novels, where ‘Britain’ is always 
what is being protected, are more state of the nation than other fiction (Hammond, p. 110). 
Let us briefly survey how le Carre’s novels achieve this, how they define what is Britain, 
and thus what it is that is being defended.
Nationalism theorist, Anthony Smith, cites “the landscape itself [...] the peculiar 
beauty of ‘our’ hills and mountains, our rivers, lakes and fields...” as a key facet of how 
nations define themselves, and thus in this case, how le Carre defines where is archetypally 
British.143 The British landscape in le Carre’s work is a vista of windswept Cornish cliffs, 
Somerset downs, prep schools, public schools, sleepy Oxford colleges, London’s bustling 
West End and the staid suburban commuter green belt around the capital. A Britain 
therefore that excludes the North and East of England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, 
and London’s outer boroughs. With such largely working class milieus largely excluded 
from le Carre’s foreshortened Britain, we are presented with a traditional establishment 
vision of what constitutes British terrain and thus what is being defended in the Cold War.
No ethnic basis for ‘British’ nationality exists, the UK being “a composite of 
different nations” (Wood, Pristine, p. 31). So le Carre’s definition of ‘who’ is Britain 
commendably includes a Hungarian (Toby Esterhase), a Pole (Fred Leiser) and a Russian 
(Villem, aka William Craven). But neither Esterhase, Leiser, nor Craven ever achieve 
“Britishness” in others’ eyes: this might be considered a further satire of establishment 
manners did not the narrative emphasise these characters’ “foreignness” (their accents and 
style are ‘off). The phrase “British to the core” is used in bad faith of both Leiser {Looking 
Glass, p. 148) and Villem {Smiley’s People, p. 94). This latent chauvinism is enhanced by
142 Fredric Jameson, ‘Third World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism’, Social Text 15 
(Autumn, 1986), 65-88, p. 69.
143 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), p. 32.
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scarce or negative portrayals of working class characters, and by le Carre’s choice of an 
establishment figure, Smiley, as ultimate exemplar of Englishness, of who is Britain. “An 
ideological struggle over national identity, in Britain, is inseparable from the struggle over 
class identity” (Inglis, p. 202). This is all the more charged in fiction that champions 
Britain against a political enemy (Communism) that threatens those very class structures.
What is British is found in le Carre’s attention to the abstract notion of British 
character. Across the novels we might say that British character encompasses “decency”, 
individualism, humanism, War memorialisation (the Blitz spirit), high culture and the 
“reflux of imperialism” (Anderson, ‘Origins’, p. 34). These are set against the presented 
indecency, collectivisation, anti-humanism, fanaticism, philistinism and “absolutism” of 
Communism. Once again this is a distinctly elite, establishment characterisation of 
Britishness, and again, most of these national characteristics are imbued in Smiley, so 
nation functions as a “symbol” of the values that are being defended in the Cold War.144 
Nation then is a “narrative”, which, like all narratives, contains contradictory impulses, 
whereby calls to national unity also expose faultlines in the social fabric (Larsen, p. 173). 
This national discursive field asserts British decency, British geopolitical power, British 
culture and British lack of ideology, but in doing so also exposes their obverse: British 
indecency, British decline, British philistinism and British ideology.
Political Enemy
The political enemy is a rather more straightforward term to define. In le Carre’s 1960s
novels Britain’s political enemy is the GDR, in the 1970s, the USSR: more broadly,
however, the political enemy is actually Communism. As such, this thesis’s third theme is
effectively a “dissident reading” as against critics’ common “moral equivalence” trope. As
Smiley admits in Honourable Schoolboy (p. 122) Soviet Communism had struck fear into
the West since the Bolshevik Revolution (Westad, p. 25), which Britain tried to avert (le
144 Neil Larsen, Determinations: Essays on Theory, Narrative and Nation in the Americas (London: Verso, 
2001), p. 173.
Carre precursor, Somerset Maugham, documents this in ‘Mr Harrington’s Washing’ in 
Ashenden, 1928). World War II temporarily eclipsed Communism with a more immediate 
enemy, fascism, but the emergence of the US and USSR as the dominant post-war forces, 
and the latter’s creation of an Eastern Bloc of Communist states (formalised by May 
1955’s Warsaw Pact) confirmed Western fears of Soviet expansionism. “An interpretive 
framework calculated to command immediate public support was purposefully articulated: 
the necessary ideological confrontation between a fiendish Soviet scheme of world 
domination and the forces of ‘freedom’” (Sinfield, Literature, p. 107). Freedom untained 
by, for example, the continuance of US segregation. Although fear of a Soviet attack was 
genuine,145 Soviet behaviour could equally be read as defensiveness against the West’s 
overt hostility to Communism, and the US’s pursuit of global intervention to combat 
Communism, enhancing what Martin Walker calls “the besetting syndrome of military 
inferiority which gripped the Soviet leadership”.146 As such, “revisionist” Cold-War 
historians like William Appleman Williams and Melvyn P. Leffler (Hammond, pp. 2-3), 
contemporaneous with le Carre’s 60s and 70s novels, insisted the Warsaw Pact was a 
defensive response to the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO, formalised in April 
1949). In the Western consensus few recall that the USSR twice applied to join NATO in 
1954 and was rejected by the US, UK and France.147
Stalin’s death in 1953 seemed to promise a thaw. However, although Nikita 
Khrushchev outlined a policy of “peaceful coexistence” (i.e. non-expansionism), from 
1958, we see in le Carre how Western governments’ disbelief in the policy filtered into 
fiction. The only people suggesting an alternate view of the Cold War, the Labour left and 
British Communists, were smeared as Soviet stooges by the post-war anti-Communist 
consensus in media and state (Lashmar & Oliver, p. 114). Dieter Frey in Call fo r  the Dead 
and Jens Fiedler in The Spy are both Stalinists in an age of Khrushchev as Communism
145 Paul Lashmar and James Oliver, Britain’s Secret Propaganda War (Stroud: Sutton, 1998), p. 23.
146 Martin Walker, The Cold War (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 84.
147 Gaddis, p. 104; a footnote in Walker, p. 360.
41
and Stalinism became interchangeable in Western propaganda and Western cultural 
productions. Meanwhile, in reaction to the West’s hostility (and internal hardliners), a 
Soviet siege-mentality developed, and Khrushchev became more bullish, with divided 
Berlin becoming a faultline. Berlin dominated headlines as le Carre’s debut Call for the 
Dead emerged in June 1961, and Berlin would become a major setting for le Carre’s 
breakthrough, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold (1963).148 With West Germany’s 
premier Konrad Adenauer (1949-1963) pushing for a reunited Germany, Soviet fears of 
resurgent Germany were both genuine and acute.149 As were le Carre’s, given the British- 
Nazi alliance plot of A Small Town in Germany (1968). But as regards the East-West 
standoff, the old joke about paranoia -  “just because I ’m paranoid doesn’t mean they 
haven’t got it in for me” -  is salient. Was it Communism that intended to “bury” capitalism 
(as per Khrushchev’s famous threat)150 or the West to bury Communism?
Meanwhile, the rapidly decolonising peoples of former European possessions in the 
Far East, Africa and the Americas were seen by the Soviets as potential Communist allies. 
Like the Berlin Wall, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis (“the most dangerous Soviet- 
American confrontation of the entire Cold War”151) is rarely depicted as Soviet 
defensiveness, but positioning missiles on Cuba, in America’s back yard was a direct 
response to American deployment of missiles in the Soviet Union’s back yard, Turkey. In 
the event, the Soviets backed down, and the Americans quietly conceded the Turkish 
missiles’ removal, but the Soviets were left depicted as the Cold-War aggressors. The 
approach here is not to defend Cold War Eastern bloc regimes, but to move away from the 
standard, consensus for/against, friend/enemy binary that dominates Cold War discourse.
148 Observer, 11 June 1961, p.l: ‘Khrushchev -  Call Berlin talks at once: delay impossible - threat to sign 
peace treaty with East Germans.’ The Kennedy/Khrushchev summit was headline news through June 1961.
149 Jeremy Isaacs & Taylor Downing, Cold War. For Forty-Five Years the World Held Its Breath [1988] 
(London: Abacus, 2008), p. 185.
150 “We shall bury you”, November 1956, Walker, p. 6 .
151 Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
p. 90.
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Following these early 60s scares, a period of relative calm ensued, known as detente, 
marked by the superpowers’ 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and 1972 Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I). However, le Carre’s Communists during detente become 
even more hardline. Where Jens Fiedler articulated some semblance of Communist 
‘ideology’, Karla, in the 1970s, remained malevolently silent throughout the entire Karla 
Trilogy. Karla, initially, was a purely Manichaean portrait, an embodiment of unmitigated 
‘evil’. Of course, historically, the national enemy is always evil, as Jameson, historicising 
Frye’s folk myths, points out (Jameson, Political, pp. 101-5). In this sense Communism in 
Western ideology and le Carre’s fiction occupies a standard subject position for any 
national enemy. But as a political enemy, Communism presented a particular type of ‘evil’
-  one that was symbolically, revolutionarily -  opposed to capitalism, the West’s system.
In le Carre’s books, as we saw in le Carre’s critics, ‘ideology’ is negative; something 
the enemy has, not Britain. This ‘Communist ideology’ is definable as ‘repressive dogma’ 
a bureaucratic instrumentalism that is fundamentally anti-human, as we see vividly in the 
depictions of Soviet society in Smiley’s People, concurrent with the Second Cold War. 
However, Communist ideology is never understood as a coherent philosophy, or as a 
concept of political economy, let alone ever possessing any benign objective. It is only 
ever a malign, brutal ‘reality’. Therefore, without ideological rationale to its bureaucratic 
rationalism, Communism is defined as ends, not means: “‘We are not interested in the 
good of others; we are interested solely in power’” as O’Brien says in Orwell’s Nineteen 
Eighty-Four, a work that haunts le Carre’s fiction.152 In presenting Communism in this 
way, the West’s capitalist system is rendered neutral, normative, commonsensical, but 
again, a faultline is exposed. Because this portrayal of Communism -  and particularly 
Communist characters -  cannot hold: there is a huge gap, “an eloquent silence” (Macherey, 
p. 79) where the very thing that galvanises the Cold-War effort -  Communism -  should be. 
This silence is a faultline.
152 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four [1949] (London: Penguin, 2013) pp. 301-302.
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5. Roadmap: Chapter Breakdown
Chapter 1 will examine Call fo r  the Dead (1961), which introduces recurring British agent, 
George Smiley, who appears in each of the novels in this thesis. The contradictory 
relationship le Carre’s spies will have with the state is established when clashes with his 
inefficient bureaucratic boss, Maston, cause Smiley to resign to investigate the murder of 
the Foreign Office’s Samuel Fennan independently. Smiley’s nostalgia for an ‘amateur’, 
pre-bureaucratic state apparatus is nostalgia for a pre-democratic state. However, when 
Smiley reveals the Fennan case represents a spy penetration of the British state, Smiley 
secures both the state and its bureaucracy, both within its fictional realm but also 
symbolically, resolving public loss of confidence in reaction to real-life espionage 
penetrations. As well as upholding the state, via the execution of Communist GDR agent, 
Dieter Frey, Smiley upholds the violent scaffolding of the state. The British nation in Call 
functions as an ideological field which meditates upon British self-image and public 
image. In killing Frey, Smiley highlights the contradiction of a national ‘decency’ 
underwritten by violence to defend Britain’s interests. This imperialism and the associated 
elitism of British society, threatened by post-war reconstruction within and Communism 
without is defended by Smiley. The threat of the political enemy of Eastern bloc 
Communism is strongly asserted, and Communism is depicted via contradictory motifs 
that recur throughout le Carre’s work: Communism as naivety and Communism as 
ideological ‘fanaticism’ that devalues human life, both undermined by no Communist 
ideology being presented.
Chapter 2, on le Carre’s breakthrough novel The Spy Who Came in from the Cold 
(1963), claims that The Spy was -  and is -  widely misunderstood. The British state, via 
intelligence chief, Control, hatches a cynical, expedient plot, exploiting agent Alec Leamas 
and sacrificing his lover, Liz Gold, to secure British interests. Control’s “totalitarian” plot 
is the basis for the “moral equivalence” trope in le Carre criticism. Despite this, the state’s 
action is not unequivocally condemned, while the novel’s reliance on the “empirical” mode
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serves to reassert both state and status quo, whilst denying a British ideology. After Call's 
elite claim on the British nation, The Spy represents a new understanding of Britain, with 
Harold Wilson’s ‘classlessness’ explored via Leamas. The novel ultimately suggests the 
classless are powerless against the sophistry and ruthlessness of the patrician class 
represented by Control however. A shabby Britain suggests British decline, but also an 
antipathy in le Carre to democratisation at the dawn of the Swinging Sixties. Control’s plot 
reasserts both Britain’s and the patrician elite’s potency at a time when both were 
weakened by the Philby and Profumo affairs. Via GDR agent, Fiedler, the ideology of the 
Cold-War political enemy is given its most detailed depiction in le Carre’s fiction. This 
portrayal of the political enemy as parodically anti-humanist is used to outweigh the 
critique of an expedient Britain. With anti-Communism and the British class system thus 
reaffirmed, this ‘radical’ book is revealed as a resigned reassertion of the status quo.
Chapter 3 shows how The Looking-Glass War (1965) explores British decline via a 
faded Wartime intelligence Department’s attempt to reassert itself. With its intensive focus 
on the British state bureaucracy, the Cold War enemy is nigh invisible, but a warning about
• • • • 1 ^ “3British totalitarianism remains. Looking Glass evinces apparently anti-establishment 
sentiments, satirising the Department’s gentlemanly amateur class as anachronistic, but its 
state satire is undermined by the rival Circus’s asserted efficiency. The depiction of the 
British nation via the dilapidated Department and a shabbily depicted London are 
synecdoches of a declining Britain that, even more than The Spy, is anything but 
‘swinging’. Yet there is a class divide here again between the presented grimy, working 
class areas of London and the glowing presentation of elite Oxford, that suggests sympathy 
rather than satire for the Department’s nostalgia for an elite, pre-war world. Like The Spy, 
the working classes (agent, Leiser) remain expendable pawns in a corrupt patrician 
establishment’s attempts to retain power. A plot that at first appears to question the
153 Nazism is invoked in three o f le Carre’s 60s novels as unambiguous enemy, and its totalitarian spectre 
merges with Communism in Call, The Spy and A Small Town in Germany (1968), where the warning o f  
British proto-totalitarianism steps up via a British-Nazi alliance.
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Communist threat, via an assertion of illusory GDR rockets at the Western border, falls 
back upon reassertions of Communism as toxic. In all then a supposedly radical book 
ultimately asserts consensus positions.
Chapter 4 demonstrates how, after a long break from the Cold War and popular 
success, Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy (1974) returned le Carre to both. Tinker examines 
British decline via a reimagining of Soviet agent, Kim Philby’s, penetration of the British 
secret service. Smiley, retired, working secretly to identify the treacherous ‘mole’ inside 
the state, is again disassociated from the British state even as he investigates and ultimately 
reinstates that state’s security against this incursion. By defeating the political enemy, 
Smiley enacts a fictional resolution to the ‘national’ humiliation of Philby and implicitly 
‘resolves’ British decline. In this national discursive field, British decency is firmly 
identified with Smiley, but comes into complex interplay with the violence used to achieve 
British political ends: in the Empire in the real world (increasingly visible in the 1970s 
novels) and the indirect, disavowed execution of the ‘mole’, Bill Haydon, in the novel. 
Meanwhile at this time of Cold-War detente, the political enemy, Communism, assumes a 
new, even more Manichaean, shape in the form of Smiley’s inhuman, unscrupulous Soviet 
opposite-number and nemesis Karla, the ‘mole’s controller. Again neither Karla nor 
Haydon claim any political rationalisation for their murders and conspiracies, and 
consequently Communism elided in a novel about a Communist spy.
Chapter 5 examines how The Honourable Schoolboy (1977) sees Smiley become 
head of the intelligence bureaucracy, an official of the state. With Smiley controlling a Far 
Eastern operation from Britain, and Jerry Westerby the fieldman in the Far East, a tension 
between state duty and individual honour eventually prompts Westerby to split from the 
British state. Far from offering a radical critique of the state, Westerby’s actions are an 
assertion of a chauvinistic, unreflective self-interest that takes imperialism as a given. Thus 
again does an anti-state critique ultimately uphold the state. With a raft of present and 
former European colonies forming the novel’s background, imperialism is a major theme
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in the book, wherein the national imaginary juggles assertions of British potency, British 
imperial nostalgia and British imperial guilt. This finds particular focus in the tense 
relationship between the old colonial hand, Britain and the now dominant America, and the 
novel can be seen as an elegy to British imperialism. With Karla relegated to background 
and his Chinese ‘mole’ only glimpsed briefly, a complex -  and for le Carre unusually 
action-based -  plot distracts from the political enemy. Yet the book shows that colonialism 
is being replaced in all these territories by Communism, which, defined again by brutal 
means not philosophical ends, is presented as the greater evil.
Chapter 6 reveals how Smiley’s People (1979) again enacts a drama about Smiley 
saving the British state, whilst he and the state’s functionaries mutually disavow his 
connection to that state. Smiley, again retired, is brought in by the bureaucrats, to solve a 
political murder of a Russian emigre, but in doing so stumbles upon a far larger plot by his 
Soviet nemesis, Karla. Bureaucracy is again heavily critiqued, and negatively associated 
both with the Labour party and the presumed impotence of detente. But while operating 
unofficially, Smiley remains a servant of the state’s deeper interests: this is semi-ratified 
when the state deniably endorses Smiley’s entrapment of Karla by equipping him with 
former state personnel. The novel also takes national fantasy to Bond-ian heights via the 
symbolic defection of Karla, head of Soviet counterintelligence. A questioning of British 
‘decency’ returns regarding the methods Smiley deploys to achieve this: using Karla’s 
disturbed daughter as leverage. Tallying with the ‘Second Cold War’, Smiley’s People is le 
Carre’s most uncompromisingly anti-Communist novel yet, entirely in tune with Margaret 
Thatcher, in a hawkish attitude to Soviet ‘totalitarianism’, with Soviet society depicted for 
the first time in le Carre, via Parisian emigre, Ostrakova. Contradictorily, the book’s abrupt 
‘humanising’ of Karla, via his daughter, provides a second flank of attack upon 
Communism, as incompatible with essential humanity, dooming it to failure. This failure is
enacted by Smiley/Britain’s climactic defeat of Karla/Communism at the Berlin Wall.
* * *
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Chapter 1: Call fo r  the Dead
1. Calling Card: Call for the Dead in Context
Le Carre’s debut, Call fo r  the Dead, emerged at a moment of high historical intrigue in 
June 1961.154 The Portland spy-ring trial occurred in March 1961,155 while another 
Communist agent, George Blake’s, trial -  and draconian sentence -  was front-page news 
as Call was published.156 This was a telling coincidence for a book about Communist 
penetration of British government, especially with nuclear spies Alan Nunn May (1948) 
and Klaus Fuchs (1950) and MI5 defectors Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean (1951) also 
fresh in the public mind: indeed all are cited in the novel.157 Moreover, the novel’s plot- 
trigger, the vetting of government employees regarding Communist associations, was a 
live contemporary issue in British culture. Indeed, Cornwell had himself been very 
recently engaged in just such vetting interviews.158
The US was pushing Britain to improve its vetting system and the clubby atmosphere 
of its intelligence services.159 More intrusive positive vetting (interviewing associates) was 
introduced by Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, in 1952, in response to the failure of 
negative vetting (checks on MI5 and Special Branch files): Fuchs had been vetted six times 
(Hennessy, p. 95). Macmillan’s further civil service “purge” in 1955 meanwhile was a 
recent memory. However, with a characteristic queasiness regarding the state, there was 
deep British resistance to these procedures. Positive vetting’s architect A.J.D. Winnifrith 
worried about impugning “men of blameless life and unblemished reputation within their 
own departments and [...] neighbourhoods” (Hennessy, p. 99).
154 The book was published by leftist Victor Gollancz, formerly Orwell’s publisher, known for his early 
assertions of Jewish persecution in Nazi Germany.
155 ‘Three men blamed in Spy case scandal’, Daily Herald 14 June 1961 p. 1.
156 ‘40 Agents Betrayed by George Blake’, Daily Express, 20 June 1961, p. 1.
157 Soviet defector Igor Gouzenko {Call, p. 12) led to Nunn May’s exposure. Fuchs {Call p. 76); Maclean 
{Call, p. 76.)
158 Le Carre, ‘Foreword to the Lamplighter Edition’ Call fo r  the D ead  (Sevenoaks: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1992), pp. 6-7.
159 Clement Attlee’s “decency blended with a touch o f naivety” in his faith in “the traditions o f public 
service” as guarantor of loyalty Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: Preparing fo r  the Worst, 1945-2010 
[2002] (London: Penguin, 2010), p. 101).
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Call's plot establishes the complexity for which le Carre would become known. Set 
circa I960,160 “Circus” security agent, George Smiley, interviews Foreign Office official, 
Samuel Fennan about his Communist past. This is barely even negative vetting, and is 
distinctly clubby, given that the two have a walk and a coffee together, and Smiley tells 
Fennan that he has nothing to fear.161 So Smiley is shocked when Fennan apparently 
commits suicide as a result. When Smiley’s superior Mason accepts the suicide verdict 
against Smiley’s evidence, Smiley resigns from the Circus. Smiley’s suspicions rest on a 
classic detective novel trope, a dog that didn’t bark, in the form of an early morning call 
that Fennan requested the night before his ‘suicide’. Pursuing the investigation 
independently, helped by the Circus’s Peter Guillam and Special Branch’s Inspector 
Mendel, Smiley discovers Fennan was murdered because he was about to expose his wife, 
Mrs Fennan’s espionage, a plot which transpires to be masterminded by Smiley’s former 
student in pre-war Germany, Dieter Frey, now a GDR agent. Threatened with capture, Frey 
kills Mrs Fennan at a theatre, then when Smiley pursues him to the banks of the Thames, 
Frey does not attack Smiley but is himself killed in the ensuing scuffle.
Contemporary Reception of Call for the Dead
We see in the novel’s few reviews the beginnings of the hailing of a “new realism” in the 
spy genre, as against Fleming’s romances. Detective-writer, Francis Iles’s positive review 
called Call “fresh and exciting [...] with what seems to be a wholly authentic
1 fObackground” (though lies made no reference to positive vetting or Communist spy 
scandals). Maurice Richardson’s positive review called it “highly intelligent, realistic”, 
noting Call's focus on the bureaucratic institution: “a secret service now departmentalised
1 / j ' J
and hyper-obsessionally red-taped”. In another positive notice, Nicholas Blake hailed
160 Call's events (referenced as “January”) are later stated as being 1959 (Spy, p. 14). Yet Elsa Fennan’s 
claim she met Frey in January 1956, “five years ago”, would set the novel in 1960.
161 Peter Hennessy and Gail Brownfeld, ‘Britain’s Cold War Security Purge: The Origins o f Positive 
Vetting’, The History Journal, 25; 4, (1982), 965-974. (p. 967).
162 Francis lies, ‘Criminal Records’, Guardian 15 July 1961, p. 5.
163 Maurice Richardson, ‘March Past o f the Spies’, Observer, 18 June 1961, p. 25.
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Call's realism, saying it “makes most cloak and dagger stuff taste of cardboard.”164 Again 
‘realism’ did not connect with historical reality. Violet Grant’s equally positive review 
claimed Call would give “the secret service novel a shot in the arm” and described 
director, Maston as “far more unpleasant [...] than any of the agents his department hunts 
down”165 -  the first appearance of both the anti-establishment and the moral equivalence 
critical trope in le Carre commentary. Percy Hoskins echoed this anti-establishment stance 
in another positive review, claiming Smiley “has lost faith in what Security Services have 
to do”, again citing Call's ‘realism’ and claiming it, “reads more knowledgably than most 
books on the subject”.166 Again, what the basis of realism’s ‘knowledge’ is unspecified. A 
year later Anthony Lejeune served a reminder that le Carre’s work was still seen as 
‘limited’ genre fiction: “the art of knowing just how serious a writer can be in dealing with
1 A7the passions is one which few detective novelists acquire”.
Some later literary critics have regarded Call as juvenilia (Barley ignores it): yet 
although Smiley is never allowed to kill again, Call establishes all of le Carre’s staple 
themes. Critics recognise Smiley’s anti-statism,168 but not Smiley’s practical defence of the 
state. Critics take little notice of the concept of the nation, central to the argument here, 
and, sustaining an almost fan-like deference to Smiley, largely gloss over the key 
contradiction of the ‘decent’ Smiley’s execution of Frey. As regards the political enemy, 
critics mostly misread a Manichaean portrait of Frey as evidence of moral equivalence;169 
indeed several critics see the novel as pro-Communist.
This chapter will consider the novel in terms, first, of its unusually detailed 
presentation of the state. Can the novel rightly be called anti-establishment, the chapter 
asks, given that its antipathy towards bureaucracy leaves the state unchallenged, indeed
164 Nicholas Blake, Sunday Telegraph, 30 July 1961, p. 15.
165 Violet Grant, ‘Scenes o f the Crime’, Daily Telegraph, 16 June 1961, p. 18.
166 Percy Hoskins, Times Literary Supplement, 23 June 1961, p. 392.
167 Anthony Lejeune and Philip John Stead, ‘Skills and Thrills’, Times Literary Supplement, 31 August 1962,
p. 661.
168 E.g. Rothberg (in H. Bloom, p. 53); Ambrosetti, p. 101.
169 E.g. Garson (in H. Bloom, pp. 77-78).
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champions an anti-democratic elite amateurism? Secondly, the chapter examine how Call 
presents the British nation, the ‘home front’ that is being fought fo r , wherein the ‘condition 
of England’ is addressed via the character of Smiley and through the ‘neutral’ narrative 
voice. Thirdly, the chapter will examine the political enemy, and explore how far moral 
equivalence can apply when Communism is presented as a real, significant and 
unscrupulous threat to British institutions and verities.
* * *
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2. “A Symbol of Nothing at A11”: the British State
Call fo r the Dead's emphasis on the intelligence services as an institution was unusual in 
espionage fiction. Where Fleming and even Deighton focused on the “field” and the 
operational agent, le Carre focuses far more on the “desk”, the less glamorous, 
bureaucratic facets of the “spy”, bound up with files, dossiers and interviews -  and the 
espionage workplace, the institution. The MI5/MI6 amalgam that le Carre dubs “the 
Circus” (Call, p. 114) will feature in all of the novels in this thesis. The contradictory 
relationship le Carre’s spies will have with the state throughout these novels is also 
established in Call. Smiley’s boss, Maston’s bureaucratic inefficiency, and Smiley solving 
the case by operating outside of the hindering bureaucracy both appear to damn the
1 70state. Contradicting this, however, is the fact that Smiley works to secure both the state 
and the bureaucracy by solving the espionage plot.
The second section shows how Smiley’s critique of the post-war bureaucratic state 
comes from a position of a pre-war amateurism. Not only does Smiley’s position advocate 
a pre-democratic elite system, it leaves the “abstract state”171 -  capitalism, the landed 
class, military, judiciary and legislative branch -  unchanged. It is this “establishment” that 
is being protected by Smiley.172 Hugh Fairlie is credited by the OED for the first use of the 
expression in 1955; satirist Peter Cook’s nightclub, The Establishment opened in October
i1961. That the entitled functionaries (the bureaucrats) are ‘saved’ in Call is a side effect 
-  albeit one that traces a faultline. This is Barthes’ “Operation Margarine”: the strategy in 
advertising where something is decried in order, ultimately, to be upheld. “A little 
‘confessed’ evil saves one from acknowledging a lot of hidden evil” (Barthes, Mythologies,
170 Lewis calls Smiley’s relationship with the Circus “uneasy and ambiguous [...] part-outsider and part- 
insider” (Lewis, p. 23).
171 Karl Marx, ‘Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy o f Right’ [1843] edited by Joseph O’Malley (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 31.
172 “Protection not o f ordinary people but of the structure o f power”, Phyllis Lassner, ‘Paradoxical Polemics: 
John le Carre’s Responses to 9/11’ Kristine A. Miller (ed.) Transatlantic Literature and Culture After 9/11: 
The Wrong Side o f  Paradise (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014), p. 19.
173 Cook’s Beyond the Fringe team -  all largely establishment insiders -  was credited by le Carre as 
pioneering anti-establishment satire (August 1960-1964) ‘Foreword to the Lamplighter Edition’, The Looking 
Glass War (Sevenoaks: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), p. viii. Hugh Thomas’s The Establishment collection 
was published in 1962, between Call fo r the Dead  and The Spy.
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p. 41). In his characteristic fret about his role within the state, Smiley asks himself, “Duty 
to whom for God’s sake?” (Call, p. 26). This is a very good question, but in suggesting an 
anti-establishment attitude, it is actually only an anti-bureaucratic attitude. Bureaucracy is 
critiqued in order for the abstract state to be implicitly upheld, because explicit defence of 
the state is not possible within liberalism.
“The Cumbersome Machinery of Bureaucracy”
That the state had become normatively negative in the post-war era is nowhere better 
illustrated than Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) -  standard reading in schools by the 
early 1960s:174 a review of the 1956 film adaptation hailed “the bureaucracy run mad 
world which Orwell foresaw as the future”.175 We see here how the ‘state’ and 
‘bureaucracy’ have become culturally synonymous. Meanwhile, the trial of Nazi 
bureaucrat, Adolf Eichmann, was front-page news from April 1961; Hannah Arendt’s 
reports of the trial cemented her link between totalitarianism and bureaucracy, and 
Eichmann became the ultimate bureaucrat-demon: “an amoral technical expert who treats 
ends as given” (Du Gay, p. 28).176 This instrumentalism finds forceful expression in the 
speech that concentration camp survivor Mrs Fennan makes to Smiley. Such is the 
complexity of the novel that the power of Mrs Fennan’s speeches remains even once they 
are revealed to be mendacious:177
‘The mind becomes separated from the body: it thinks without reality, rules a paper 
kingdom and devises without emotion the ruin of its paper victims. But sometimes 
[...] the files grow heads and arms and legs and that’s a terrible moment, isn’t it?
174 Tony Shaw, British Cinema and the Cold War (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), p. 104.
175 Daily Film Renter 24 Feb 1956, in Shaw p. 112.
176 That these were key cultural concerns is indicated by Call's publisher, Victor Gollancz, protesting the 
death penalty for Eichmann (‘A Jew Pleads for Eichmann’s life’, Daily Herald, 9 June 1961, p.10). This is 
especially interesting given the literary death penalty dealt to both Mrs Fennan and Dieter Frey by 
Gollancz’s client.
177 Cornwell later part-relayed Mrs Fennan’s speech as his own views, “Then suddenly there comes a 
moment of crisis when all files grow arms and legs and then it isn’t funny any more,” Jordan Bonfante, ‘The 
Spy-Master Unmasked’, Life, 6 April 1964, pp. 71-73.
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The names have families as well as records, and human motives to explain the sad 
little dossiers and their makebelieve sins. It’s like the State and the People. The State 
is a dream, too, a symbol of nothing at all, an emptiness [...] But States make war, 
don’t they, and imprison people?’ {Call, p. 27).
Just as in British culture, bureaucracy here morphs into the state, but let us attempt to 
separate them. There is injustice in Smiley being accused of such bureaucratic 
“instrumental rationality” (Du Gay, p. 4). Smiley’s antipathy towards bureaucracy has 
been made clear via his regular disavowals and distancings from his institution (“duty to 
whom?”), while, soon after Mrs Fennan’s speech, Smiley will quit the intelligence 
bureaucracy’s employ altogether. Mrs Fennan’s point however is that Smiley’s interview 
with her husband was a state intrusion, a bureaucratic bulldozing of the personal.
Moreover, for all Smiley’s humanist, non-bureaucratic compassion for Mrs Fennan {Call, 
p. 37; p. 104), Smiley will keep coming back to intrude upon her home and her grief, in a 
‘private’ capacity (pp. 37-38; pp. 99-108). Smiley is not a private ‘individual’ however: he 
has, in Gellner’s felicitous definition of the state, “separated out from the rest of social 
life” (Gellner, p. 4). Investigating not a murder but an espionage penetration of the British 
state, Smiley intrudes upon Mrs Fennan in order to secure the state. Moreover, Smiley’s 
intrusion -  and thus positive vetting -  will be justified contra the anti-statists’ complaints 
(Andrew, p. 395) because Mrs Fennan is a spy, and her husband was complicit in her 
espionage. This, then, is a ratification of the state’s interests in which bureaucracy is 
actually a blind. Indeed the whole novel could be regarded as a huge positive vetting 
investigation by the true-to-life MI5-Special Branch amalgam (Smiley-Mendel), reflecting 
reservations about state intrusion {Call’s suspect, Fennan, kills himself) that are ultimately 
quelled by assertion of the extent and aggression of the Communist threat.
However, in her speech, Mrs Fennan connects the British state’s bureaucratic 
rationality to the Arendt and Orwell definition of a totalitarian system: given Mrs Fennan’s
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experiences this is the fascist state, but those capitals in State and People summon the 
Communism state too.178 Mrs Fennan will later clarify the link: “‘I have seen what human 
beings are. How could I believe in a formula for human beings?’” {Call, p. 101). Here the 
planning and social control of Communism is suggested to conflict with a flawed “human 
nature” revealed to Mrs Fennan by Nazi concentration camps, but, to leftists, by Stalin’s 
gulags (Schaub, p. 7; p. 12). However, the state is condemned in Call not for bureaucratic 
instrumentalism but for a more downbeat -  and British -  bureaucratic fumble.
Mrs Fennan’s citation of states making war and imprisoning people is worth a pause, 
as it moves beyond bureaucracy into the deep state’s military and judicial system in a 
manner unusual in genre -  or indeed any -  fiction. Far from being “a symbol of nothing at 
all” -  as unreliable a statement as any the unreliable Mrs Fennan makes -  this is how the 
liberal state would prefer to be thought of. In fact the deep state is a symbol of a material 
collective of aligned interests - the law, the military, capitalism, the judiciary, the 
aristocracy. This glimpse in Mrs Fennan’s speech is the last we see of the abstract state 
however: its utterance is a faultline, essentially, and thereafter in Call and in future novels, 
the state again becomes synonymous with bureaucracy, and continues to be decried and 
disavowed. By the end of the novel, the state has been upheld, saved from Communist 
penetration and restored. Maston will take the credit, but Smiley did the heavy lifting.
There is a radical critique of bureaucracy to be made: Mandel and Miliband both stress the 
politicised nature of the civil service bureaucracy amidst its proclaimed ‘neutrality’ 
(administrative no-man’s lands?), and its role in securing capitalism.179 Call's critique 
however, is limited, a superficial anti-establishment stance that occludes its own 
affirmation of the state. In a secondary strategy, the deep state and its structures are more 
overtly upheld, but from a classically conservative position of amateurism, which we shall 
now explore.
178 Hannah Arendt, The Origins o f  Totalitarianism, (New York: Harcourt, 1994).
179 See: Mandel: p. 187; Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 
1969) pp. 128-9.
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“Inspired Amateurism”: the Pre-Democratic British State
In Call, the state -  but really the state bureaucracy -  is critiqued from the perspective of 
‘amateurism’. “The famous amateurism of the English ‘upper class’” (P. Anderson, 
‘Origins’, p. 41) was the basis of the pre-War, pre-professionalised state apparatus, 
predicated on informal recruitment within a public schooled, Oxford-educated elite, 
requiring no training or specialist skills.180 We can trace Call's amateur anti-statism to the 
detective novel to which it is deeply indebted. But rather than taking genre as a closed 
world, as Glenn Most did with his detective/le Carre analogy (in H. Bloom, p. 99), we 
might better ask what the historical purpose of this anti-state trope was. The Great 
Detective was a freelancer, working for disinterested ‘justice’ for no pay -  an amateur.
This distance between inspired individualist hero and plodding collective denigrates the 
state, true, but only at its lowest level of functionaries. In class terms, this attitude valorises 
the aristocratic amateur detective over the plebeian police. How does this map onto Call?
Early in Call, the text declares that since the war “the inspired amateurism of a 
handful of highly qualified, under-paid men had given way to the efficiency, bureaucracy, 
and intrigue of a large Government department, effectively at the mercy of Maston” {Call, 
pp. 12/13). The amateur system was chipped away at over the centuries, by the nineteenth
I O 1
century Northcote Trevelyan reforms; and particularly by the post-war Attlee Labour 
government, which attempted to professionalise the booming bureaucracy required to 
service the Welfare State. Smiley, as no critic ever realises, is an amateur, recruited 
informally, with no professional training (p. 9), though with field experience aplenty. 
Maston by contrast, is a “the professional civil servant from an orthodox department” (p. 
13), embarked on a state career, with no field experience. As such, Maston’s function is 
said to, “integrate the brilliance of his staff with the cumbersome machinery of
180 Perry Anderson, ‘Figures of Descent’, New Left Review 161 (Jan-Feb 1987), p. 38.
181 The bourgeois likes of Smiley were allowed into the establishment via the Northcote Trevelyan civil 
service reforms (1854). This “groomed rather than displaced this gentlemanly intake [...] assuring upper- 
class privilege more modem credentials” (P. Anderson, ‘Figures’, p. 38). Anderson is summarising Peter 
Gowan’s ‘Origins o f the Administrative Elite’, New Left Review 162 (March-April 1987), 4-34.
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bureaucracy” (p. 13). Collective, professional bureaucracy thus tames but also takes credit 
for individual amateur inspiration: the irony here is that the professional is amateurish and 
the amateur professional.
We can see the Smiley/Maston clash in terms of Weber’s “specialist” (Maston) 
versus the “cultivated man” (Smiley),182 or the amateur’s common-sense empiricism the 
bureaucrat’s suspect rationality (Mandel, p. 181). Thus Maston’s rejection of Smiley’s 
view that Fennan was murdered: “‘Facts? ...What facts? [...] on the one hand we have your 
suspicions [...] against that we have the opinion of trained detectives’” {Call, pp. 42/43; 
my emphasis). Later Smiley elaborates the pair’s philosophical polarity:
Suspicion, experience, perception, common sense -  for Maston these were not the 
organs of fact. Paper was fact, Ministers were fact, Home Secretaries were hard 
fact. The Department did not concern itself with the vague impressions of a single 
officer when they conflicted with policy {Call, pp. 45-46).
Antony Easthope describes English empiricism as embodied in the following antinomies: 
practice vs. theory, common sense vs. dogma, amateur vs. professional, sincere vs. 
artificial, and masculine vs. feminine (Maston as “this obscene cissy with his greying hair
1 oo
and his reasonable smile”, Call, p. 43). We might also add individual vs. collective. We 
see all of these in the Maston-Smiley polarity. Maston’s concern with “policy” is a
separate criticism of bureaucracy, that it politicises an otherwise ‘neutral’, disinterested
1 0^1 '  
justice, so justice defers to the hierarchy’s demands. This ‘disinterest’ is crucial to the
mythos that the aristocratic-styled amateur is not swayed by financial or hierarchical
182 Weber, p. 1002.
183 Antony Easthope, Englishness and National Culture (London: Routledge, 1999) pp. 89-90.
184 The Milgram experiment of July 1961 was seen to reveal the cruelty humans could impose upon others if  
‘taking orders’. This had acute relevance to the Eichmann trial.
imperatives, already possessing all the money and power he needs.185 This is a distinctly 
conservative critique of capitalism: as vulgar, the bourgeoisie distancing itself from the 
“taint of trade” in its background.186 In the novel as in society, class, however fractional 
the distinction, is fundamental to this amateur vs. professional clash.
The salaried professional middle class expanded by 50% between 1938 and 1951 
(Sinfield, Literature, p. 60). This clearly represented a challenge to the old order.
Hobsbawm evokes: “the old ‘gentlemen’s dismay [at] their monopoly of social positions 
undermined [by new notions of] professional expertise rather than parentage and 
‘character’” (Hobsbawm, Industry, p. 264). As ever, the resistance to this very limited 
class mobility is via language, custom and manners -  a gentleman’s “quintessences” (P. 
Anderson, ‘Origins’, p. 41). Smiley, public schooled, Oxford-educated, married into the 
aristocracy, is a member of a gentleman’s club (Call, pp. 89-90), bastion of the elite of 
Britain, its numbers declining in the post-war, but its tradition upheld by Smiley. So a 
series of class putdowns culminate in Smiley’s characterisation of Maston as, “a barmaid’s
1 O H  t  t
dream of a real gentleman” (p. 19). This is the condescension of the older, aristocrat-
1 RRimitating bourgeois to the arriviste: Maston has not lost “the taint of trade”. The 
narrative sympathy is clustered intensely around Smiley: his snobbery is the narrative’s 
snobbery. But as the text implies, to anyone below the gentlemanly line, Smiley and 
Maston are socially indistinguishable. What’s more, that the plot proves Smiley right and 
Maston wrong affirms inspired amateurism over bureaucratic professionalism, effectively 
rejecting democracy and merit whilst reasserting elitism and patronage. Given that both 
Anderson (‘Origins’) and Harold Wilson were contemporaneously blaming amateurism for 
British decline, le Carre’s valorisation of amateurism in Call is a quixotic defence of the
185 Prior to his recruitment, Smiley is told the Circus “they pay badly enough to guarantee you decent 
company” (Call, p. 9).
186 Eagleton rightly connects such “genteel amateurism” with Leavisite ‘disinterested’ literary criticism 
(Eagleton, Literary, p. 186).
187 “Maston was off the peg” (Call, p. 18) not tailored; “his suit was just too light for respectability” (p. 18); 
Maston has “businessman’s cutlery” (p. 21).
188 See: Harold J. Laski [1932] The Danger o f  Being a Gentleman (New York; Viking Classic, 1972).
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state’s elite. As such, it reveals the extent to which le Carre’s antipathy to bureaucracy, far 
from being anti-establishment, actually upholds the interests and hierarchy of the state.
In conclusion, we see in Call fo r the Dead that Smiley’s apparent rejection of the 
state results in securing the state, by solving the conspiracy. This is a faultline, and results 
from the bureaucracy, the functionaries, being decried, not the state itself. The affirmation 
of the state and traditional status quo which is implicit in this complex faultline, or double- 
bluff, is meanwhile, rendered explicit in Smiley’s valorisation of an elitist amateurism as 
against Maston’s arriviste bureaucracy, an assertion of the nepotistic order, of a pre- 
democratic Britain. In tandem with this distancing from the ‘state’ is the use of the 
discourse of ‘nation’ for what is being upheld and defended by Cold War espionage.
189Smiley, when he kills his former friend, Dieter Frey, is serving his country, not the state. 
Let us explore this next.
* * *
189 “The Establishment, for [le Carre], symbolizes the State not the nation [...] Consequently betrayal 
becomes an act against [...] the entire national organism not just its unhealthy, cynical, compromising 
leadership” (Barley pp. 12-13).
3. “Deep Love of England”: Imagining the Nation
Serving one’s country was another common sense notion for the British establishment. 
Public schools provided “a training for rule” via “ideals of service” (Anderson, ‘Figures’, 
p. 41) for future administrators of the British Empire. Smiley is recruited into (the secret) 
“service” in this way {Call, p. 9),190 and is said to have a “deep love of England”, 
whereupon the novel essays a montage comprising, “Oxford[’s] beauty, its rational ease 
[...] windswept autumn holidays at Hartland Quay [...] long trudges over the Cornish 
cliffs...” (pp. 10-11). This echoes a war propaganda film -  this is the Britain that is being 
defended against the Communist threat; a threat, moreover, that in Call is located 
physically inside this British landscape. Indeed, this montage is followed by the War itself 
(pp. 11-12), the apotheosis of the British Empire, with George Smiley quietly and 
heroically doing his bit.
However, Britain had been steadily declining as a world power since the War.
Empire had been the basis of Britain’s economy: but anti-colonial movements stopped the 
flow of money into Britain and investment was required to militarily enforce that 
relationship. The Empire was thus haemorrhaging colonies yearly (Cyprus, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone and Tanganyika alone went during 1960-61). The British bungle of Suez (1956) -  
simultaneously aggressive and inept -  revealed the United States’ hegemony over Britain, 
upheld by subsequent events in the Middle East and Congo.191 So, in projecting 
Britishness, the national imaginary exposes anxieties when Britain’s two claims to 
greatness -  its industry and its Empire -  were under attack: from Soviet Communism, from 
its American allies, from nationalist movements and from the British left. This anxiety is 
found in the text: “the NATO alliance, and the desperate measures contemplated by the
190 So was le Carre: “We really were brought up to believe that we were the best and brightest, that w e’d 
inherited the mantle o f post-war imperialism, that we were the people for whom the war had been fought and 
now the earth was ours and we had a great duty to run it decently. We realized that our problem was not 
running the world but to come to terms with the fact o f the world running us.” Paul Vaughan, ‘Le Carre’s 
Circus’, Listener, 13 September 1979, p. 59.
191 See British co-operation in the Congo with the Belgian/US-backed military coup (September 1960) and 
execution of supposed Communist Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba (January 1961).
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Americans, altered the whole nature of Smiley’s Service” {Call, p. 12), linking the new 
world pecking order to social reconstruction at home.
An even stronger implication of British decline is found in the following outburst 
from Inspector Mendel as he reads the evening paper: ‘“Krauts. Bloody Krauts. God, I hate 
them! [...] Why bloody well forget, I ’d like to know. Why forget theft, murder, and rape 
just because millions committed it? [...] Krupp and all that mob’” {Call, p. 53).
Overlooked by critics, contemporary readers would have known about Nazi steel 
industrialist, Alfried Krupp. Stripped of his empire post-war, but as US priorities changed 
from de-Nazification to anti-Communism, Krupp Steel had become Germany’s fourth 
largest company, purchasing another large company in 1960 and thus plausibly in 
Mendel’s paper. It can hardly be coincidence that Frey’s espionage cover in Britain is the 
East German Steel Mission.192 The point is that victorious Britain’s “never had it so good” 
post-war Long Boom was piffling compared to that of defeated West Germany, and was 
also now showing clear signs of stagnation.
The new cynical spy novels [were] haunted by the sense that the war was really lost,
that the West German ‘economic miracle’ was not matched by a British ‘miracle’
[so] these ‘historical’ thrillers of German spies serve as compensatory tales of post-
1war decline, telling the real origins of the present crisis (Denning, p. 148).
Denning is discussing novels that revisit World War II, but his comments have broader 
currency: the conflation of the new German enemy with the old is implicit in Call (and 
explicit in Looking Glass),194 whilst the notion of the lost War can be seen in such cultural 
commentary as: “Such is the support for collectivist measures in Britain that it may yet
192 East German trade delegations were claimed by the IRD to be tools o f Communist expansionism 
(Lashmar & Oliver), p. 138.
193 ‘Cabinet’s Shock Plan to Meet Crisis. Lloyd Will Freeze Pay for Millions’, Sunday Express, 16 July 1961, 
P- L
194 The GDR was the “richest country in the Eastern bloc” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GDR (accessed 
23/5/14) and its 6% annual growth was similar to that of the UK.
61
prove the case that she won the war but lost the peace”.195 Addressing this post-War slide, 
Paul Gilroy calls the British “defeated victors”.196
It is important however not to overestimate British decline however: as against its 
former colonial satellites Britain maintained a position of economic and military strength 
via informal empire,197 and it remained the world’s sixth largest national economy. 
However, propaganda against its enemies and influence upon its allies, specifically 
America, became key substitutes for declining economic and military power.198 So fiction 
had a vital role in presenting Britain as potent in the symbolic and moral realm. Indicative 
of over-compensation for national anxieties, the sheer profusion of British Cold-War 
literature means that, as Hennessy claims, “To an extraordinary and hugely 
disproportionate extent, the world sees this clash of the secret worlds through supposedly 
British eyes” (p. 4). Hennessy references Fleming and le Carre, but he might as accurately 
cite Orwell or Koestler: this was a key propaganda success. One of the key strategies in 
this fictional shaping of the Cold War is, as suggested, a projected ‘nation’, an assertion of 
what is being fought for. Let us examine how this is achieved in Call first in terms of 
narrative voice, and then via the fictional construct of ‘character’.
Nation, Narration and Class
Following on from Anderson, Neil Larsen claims that, “‘literature’ simultaneously 
‘constructs’ the ‘national’ culture or tradition that it had formerly been assumed merely to 
embody and represent” (Larsen, p. 170). To reveal how Call ‘constructs’ the British nation, 
let us now ally formal criticism to Benedict Anderson’s concept of the novel as national 
imaginary: a political narratology. Call starts thus:
195 D. J. Manning, Liberalism (London: Dent, 1976), p. 110.
196 Paul Gilroy, After Empire (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), p. 118.
197 Perry Anderson ‘Critique o f Wilsonism’, New Left Review 2 7 :1 (October 1964) 3-27 (p. 18).
198 John Jenks, British Propaganda and News Media in the Cold War (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2006), pp. 98-99.
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When Lady Ann Sercomb married George Smiley towards the end of the war she 
described him to her astonished Mayfair friends as breathtakingly ordinary [...] 
Viscount Sawley made a special journey to his club to observe that the cat was out of 
the bag (Call, p. 7).
This is an ostentatious Dickensian flourish, signalling that Call is a “social novel”, in the 
realist tradition, as against modernism’s personal novel (Williams, Revolution, p. 332). 
Integral to this attempt to summon an entire society is the narrative mode known as 
omniscience -  or “limitless vision”.199 (Omniscience frees narration from a personal 
narrator’s limited vision.) Against both Dorrit Cohn’s empiricism and Foucauldian critics’ 
seemingly opposed idea that omniscient narration is a controlling, ideological mode (in 
Sternberg, p. 707), this thesis suggests that no narrative forms are “politically neutral 
instruments of expression” .20° ‘Neutral’, objective, narration, like ‘neutral’ criticism 
disguises subjective political slant.201 Let us examine the political effect of Call’s 
omniscience.
First, omnipresence202 (ability to ‘go’ anywhere) elides attempts to ‘document’ how 
information was obtained (the epistolary novel), ranging over locations, ‘hearing’ both 
Ann’s comments to her “Mayfair friends” and Viscount Sawley’s remarks both at his club 
and the Smileys’ wedding. As Anderson suggests, this omnipresence evokes a newspaper­
like simultaneity (B. Anderson, pp. 24-5), and thus we can see that the very narrative style 
is defining a national community. We see this as Call ranges between aristocratic clubland, 
middle-class suburbia, low-rent Battersea and politically elite Whitehall, alternately 
panned omnisciently or zoomed in on via individual close-focalisation, primarily Smiley’s
199 Meir Sternberg, ‘Omniscience in Narrative Construction: Old Challenges and New ’, Poetics Today 28:4 
(Winter 2007), 683-794, (p. 708).
200 Dorrit Cohn, The Distinction o f  Fiction (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, rev. edn. 2000).
201 Neutrality is no better achieved via first-person narration ( ‘cheating’ as in Christie’s Murder o f  Roger 
Ackroyd) or stream of consciousness (‘who’ collates Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying characters’ ‘thoughts’?). 
Gerard Genette, Narrative Discourse. An Essay in Method [1972] (New York: Cornell University Press 
1980) p, 197; Barthes, ‘Narrative’, p. 263.
202 William Nelles, ‘Omniscience for Atheists: Or, Jane Austen’s Infallible Narrator’, Narrative, 14; 2 (May 
2006), 118-131 (p. 119).
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‘thoughts’ (Sternberg, p. 708); a narrative “telepathy”.203 Brennan says that in the 
nineteenth century, “the novel brought together the ‘high’ and the ‘low’ within a national 
framework [...] for specific national reasons” (in Bhabha, p. 52). So Dickens’ omnipresent 
narration embraces the ‘whole’ of society, while in Call omnipresence depicts a very 
narrow fraction of society, the aristocratic ‘set’: society reduced to Society. The nation in 
Call then is foreshortened, reduced to an elite. But to ‘claim’ the nation for the ruling class 
is not merely snobbery, it is a reassertion of the British establishment contra Communism’s 
challenge to the class system. Because it this elite, of course, that is most at threat from a 
Communism revolutionarily opposed to it.
Given that it is the focus of Call's opening passage, Smiley’s place in Society is 
worth a pause. Via the satirised “collective voice” (Bakhtin, p. 305) of the aristocratic set, 
Smiley is said to be “without school, parents, regiment, or trade”: he “travelled without 
labels in the guard’s van of the social express” (Call, p. 7). But this is a matter of class 
fractional nuance, reflective of tensions within the establishment’s suturing of the old 
aristocracy and the new bourgeoisie, but irrelevant outside. One of the main strategies of 
this suture was bourgeois marriage into the aristocracy (Anderson, ‘Pseudo’, p. 8). So to 
posit Smiley as “breathtakingly ordinary” (Call, p. 7), therefore as British everyman, is not 
just inaccurate: it is to empirically normalise public schooling, Oxford education, informal 
recruitment, membership of a gentleman’s club, and marriage into the aristocracy (via 
Lady Ann Sercomb) -  and to again assert the establishment as the “ordinary” nation. To 
anyone outside “the set”, Smiley is simply a ‘gentleman’.
Call then is largely bereft of the web-like interconnections between disparate milieus
that was characteristic of Dickens and Eliot. However, Call's limited omnipresence does
depict two other key locales. Firstly, suburbia, whose entryist lower-middle-class world’s
attempts to combine the aristocrat’s town/country residences is derided for its pretentions
(Call, pp. 23-24), whilst its anonymity overlays a veneer of ‘respectability’ upon ‘dubious’
203 ‘Telepathy’: “The reporting of innermost thoughts and feelings, such as are usually inaccessible to human 
observers”, Jonathan Culler, ‘Omniscience’, Narrative 12; 1 (January, 2004), 22-34 (p. 26).
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origins. Indeed suburbia in Call proves to house murderous Communist spies, betrayers of 
the very Englishness for which suburbia is a synecdoche.
The novel also depicts Adam Scarr’s criminal underworld, his range of illegal 
businesses’ HQ literally squatted in an un-cleared Battersea bombsite (p. 53), suggesting 
an unpatriotic disrespect.204 When Smiley and Inspector Mendel comer Scarr, an 
archetypal, even Dickensian, rogue, at, naturally, a pub in the daytime, Mendel tells 
Smiley: ‘“You’re better out of this,”’ protecting Smiley’s gentlemanly sensibilities from 
contamination (p. 55). Waiting outside in this alien working class milieu however, Smiley 
is promptly attacked by Mundt, a Communist (p. 56), a physical and metaphysical 
manifestation of the working class’s threat: both bmtish and potentially suborned by 
international Communism.205 Indeed, it transpires that Scarr, the novel’s sole working class 
character, has (inadvertently) assisted Britain’s political enemy via Mundt -  for material 
gain (p. 57). The working classes then aren’t simply excluded from CalVs nation but a 
threat to it, the enemy within that, via Scarr, literally links with the Communist enemy 
without to threaten a prescribed ‘Britain’.
Second, omnitemporality (narrative’s ability to ‘show’ events from past or future, 
Nelles, p. 121) in Call evokes an ‘agreed’ history, what Brennan calls a “usable past”. In 
this way “the evocation of deep, sacred origins [...] becomes a contemporary, practical 
means of creating a people” (Brennan, in Bhabha, p. 68). This is found in Call's coy 
historical references. When, in 1930s Germany, watching Nazis bum books, Smiley 
“triumphed that he knew his enemy” (Call, p. 11), Smiley is established not just as anti­
fascist but as a champion of moderation, of ‘civilisation’. As such, the War is reaffirmed as 
key component in Brennan’s national “sacred origins”, a testament to British decency -  a 
standard allusion in post-war British culture: “we are still good while our uncivilized 
enemies are irredeemably evil” (Gilroy, p. 96). Then witness also: “The revelations of a
204 Le Carre’s own father, Ronnie Cornwell, was a war profiteer (Sisman, NP).
205 “For all the average middle-class citizen knew o f the working-class world [...] the ‘two nations’ might 
have been living in different continents” (Hobsbawm, Industry, p. 266).
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young Russian cypher-clerk in Ottawa had created a new demand for men of Smiley’s 
experience” {Call, p. 12). This invokes Igor Gouzenko’s 1945 defection, which defined 
Britain’s post-War enemy as the USSR and so reasserts the Cold-War imperative on which 
the novel stands. Herein we see how two brief omnitemporal passages define the book’s 
‘nation’ in ideological terms.
The result of these formal strategies is to narrate the nation as ruling class, laying 
bare the reality that “nationalism [is] the dominant political ideology of the bourgeoisie” 
(Brennan, in Bhabha, p. 54), and affirming the very social status quo that levelling 
Communism, by definition, threatens. Let us now examine how the fictional construct of 
character reveals more optimistic faultlines in the presentation of the nation.
“Who Was Then the Gentleman?” Smiley, National Decency and Violence.
Like most protagonists of British spy stories, Smiley represents Britain both literally and 
figuratively. He works ‘for’ Britain; Smiley’s love of England, his saintliness and even his 
Christian name evoke British patron Saint George. As a result of this representative role, 
Smiley’s occupation of the moral high-ground provides a symbolic counter-argument 
against national decline, asserting a British ‘way of life’ -  a system of values -  to counter 
the threat of Eastern bloc Communism. These values include individualism and decency.
“Individualism”, notes Andrew Heywood, “is the characteristic theme of liberal 
ideology”,206 the belief that “society should be constructed so as to benefit the individual, 
giving moral priority to individual rights, needs or interests” (Heywood, p. 30). This is 
heavily emphasised in Call. “Everything [Smiley] admired or loved had been the product 
of intense individualism” {Call p. 144), as against the collective imperative of 
Communism. However, an “individual” representing the collective British state is a 
contradiction. As Williams says of the very liberal rights being defended, “if the rights [...]
206 Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction [1992] (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 
28.
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may be called individual, the condition of their guarantee is inevitably social” (Williams, 
Culture, p. 291). Individualism is thus a contradiction in Western thinking.
In terms of ‘decency’, World War II’s reputation as a moral war put Smiley and 
Britain on the side of the angels, as discussed, early in Call. Shaw quotes government 
papers’ promotion of Britain “as the highest exemplar of Western civilization” (Shaw, p. 
85). However, this decency is contradicted by the violence involved in ‘civilising’ other 
countries in Britain’s imperial past. At the time of Call, moreover, the bloody Malayan 
Emergency (1948-60)207 had only just ended, as had the Kenyan Mau-Mau uprising, while 
Britain had aggravated the volatile situation in Palestine, and in 1961 became embroiled in 
protecting its oil supply via former colony Kuwait.208 Consequently, much British 
propaganda was intended to “counter Russian allegations of British imperialism” (Shaw, p. 
25).209 Violence abroad, via imperialism, and at home (usually against the working class) 
is a faultline in British liberalism, and it finds focus in the novel in Smiley’s execution of 
his wartime friend and colleague Dieter Frey. Let us now close-read Smiley’s reaction to 
Frey’s death.
Dieter was dead and he had killed him. The broken fingers of his right hand, the 
stiffness of his body and the sickening headache, the nausea of guilt, all testified to 
this. And Dieter had let him do it, had not fired the gun, had remembered their 
friendship when Smiley had not. They had fought in a cloud, in the rising stream of 
the river, in a clearing in a timeless forest: they had met, two friends rejoined, and 
fought like beasts. Dieter had remembered and Smiley had not. They had come from 
different hemispheres of the night, from different worlds of thought and conduct. 
Dieter, mercurial, absolute, had fought to build a civilization. Smiley, rationalistic,
207 The brutal British put-down o f the Communist rising, costing 11,343 Malayan casualties, ended in July 
1960. John Springhall, Decolonization Since 1945 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 56.
208 ‘British force ready for action on Iraq border’, Guardian, 4 July 1961, p. 1.
209 “British newsreels adopted a stridently anti-Soviet tone from early 1946” (Shaw, p. 32), often skewing 
Soviet politicians’ message via militarist images. By 1950 Gaumont-British news was “condemning pacifists 
as ‘Reds’ who threatened ‘the Free World’” (Shaw, p. 32).
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protective, had fought to prevent him. ‘Oh God,’ said Smiley aloud, ‘who was then 
the gentleman...?’ (Call, p. 145)
The overwrought language here is itself a faultline, indicative of the anxieties being 
worked over in this dense passage. The first point is that state violence undermines 
national decency. Smiley’s attack upon Frey is a response to Frey attacking Mendel, Frey 
spying upon Britain and being guilty of three murders (Mr and Mrs Fennan; Adam Scarr). 
Thus Frey/Communism needs to be ‘contained’ (in the language of the Truman Doctrine) 
in order to defend Britain. Yet Smiley’s summary execution of Frey is the rough justice of 
feudal not liberal Britain (Britain had abolished the death penalty in 1957). The act is not, 
gentlemanly, not civilised (both words are used contra Smiley in the passage just quoted). 
Both act and language used expose a series of faultlines.
Firstly, if Dieter acts the more ‘gentlemanly’ in not killing his former friend, then 
Dieter is more ‘decent’ than Smiley; Communism is more decent than liberalism. This 
faultline arises, arguably, because for the younger Frey (shown to be ruthless and 
murderous) to be defeated by Smiley (“too old”, p. 13) and too mild for physical 
aggression) then Frey must have forbom.
Secondly, use of the word ‘gentleman’ as a measure of conduct is a faultline. Smiley 
is referred to throughout as a “gentleman” (e.g. Call, p. 89), and we have seen that the elite 
Britain Smiley represents and defends is a gentlemanly one. ‘Gentleman’ was originally 
applied solely to the feudal aristocracy, but because the new industrial bourgeoisie were 
trained to ‘become’ gentlemen in aristocratic style, via the new public schools,210 this 
weakened the structural basis of the gentleman, as inherited landed aristocrat, and caused 
the word’s meaning to become qualitative not quantitative: an ideal of courteous or
210 “The new public schools [...] were designed to socialize the sons o f the -  new or old -  rich in a 
distinctive, uniform pattern, which henceforth became the fetichized criterion of the ‘gentleman’”, P. 
Anderson, Origins, p. 32. Chesterton called the public school system, “a factory for aristocrats”. G. K. 
Chesterton, What’s Wrong With the World(Digireads, 2009), p. 122.
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humane behaviour.2n The concept ‘gentleman’ thus becomes a faultline between the two 
definitions, its claim of humane -  ‘gentle’ -  behaviour in tension with the violence that the 
gentleman was founded on, both old (the aristocracy’s feudal repression), and new (the 
bourgeoisie’s brutal repression of working class militancy and ‘native’ populations).
212Thirdly, to complicate matters in the most interesting way, Smiley is quoting here. 
“When Adam delved and Eve span, who was then the gentleman?” comes from a sermon 
by John Ball, a Lollard preacher complicit in the 1381 Peasant’s Revolt, advocating social 
equality at feudalism’s height. “From the beginning all men by nature were created alike, 
and our bondage or servitude came in by the unjust oppression of naughty men.” I.e. in 
humans’ ‘natural’ state there were no class distinctions. In (unconsciously?) quoting this, 
le Carre undermines the very nation he has established, predicated on a gentlemanly, elite 
‘way of life’. Instead he allows in a radical glimpse of levelled, democratised Britain, a 
tradition which has nothing to do with liberalism or imperialism, wherein Blake’s 
‘Jerusalem’ trumps ‘Rule Britannia’ as national anthem and gentlemen are parasitic idlers. 
This is a home-grown British answer to European Communism. There is a Bakhtinian 
‘polyphony’ operating here (Bakhtin, p. 327) the text undermining le Carre’s stated views. 
Barthes, under Bakhtin’s influence, declared:
[A] text is not a line of words releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning (the ‘message’ 
of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, 
none of them original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from 
the innumerable centres of culture.
211 Encyclopaedia Britannica (1856), “generally accorded to all persons above the rank o f  common 
tradesmen when their manners are indicative o f a certain amount of refinement and intelligence”, in Christine 
Berberich, Image o f  the English Gentleman in Twentieth-Century Literature (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), p. 6 .
212 Recognised only by Lewis (p. 37), and William Walling, ‘The Doubleness o f Class’, Columbia Library 
Columns 2 (February 1988), p. 28.
213 Roland Barthes, ‘The Death o f the Author’, in Image, Music, Text (London: Fontana, 1977), p. 146.
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There is a fourth, final, “blend and clash” in the passage being examined. The purple 
passage, “in a clearing in a timeless forest [they] fought like beasts” does two things. It 
asserts what Schaub shows was a common post-war riposte to Communism, that it is 
unworkable due to a flawed, competitive ‘human nature’, which capitalism, crucially, 
yokes via competitiveness (Schaub, p. 7). But this Social Darwinist view was overridden 
by later liberalism and so should be anathema to Smiley’s liberal “decency”.214 In all of 
this then, we see how the execution of Frey exposes faultlines within Western liberalism, 
whereby the state’s use of violence is in tension with a proclaimed liberal mildness. Who 
indeed now is the gentleman?
However, Smiley’s actions as ‘national’ figure narratively overwhelm these 
faultlines. Smiley’s agonising about killing Dieter can be seen as a post-facto assertion of 
British decency as liberal PR gloss, an apology that does not condemn the ugly strategy, 
just the ugly consequences.215 This is Operation Margarine again: “what is this trifling 
dross of Order, compared to its advantages?” (Barthes, Mythologies, p. 41). Rebutting 
contemporary British decline, Smiley’s investigation is efficient and terminates the 
espionage plot, with all enemies eliminated (including Scarr) and no negative publicity 
ensuing. By contrast, Nunn May only served six years of his sentence and later publicly 
defended his actions; Fuchs served nine years then emigrated to the GDR and a high- 
profile science career; Maclean and Burgess were allowed to defect, while their 
collaborator Kim Philby O.B.E. stayed in place, and indeed was publicly cleared by Harold 
Macmillan (Prime Minister by Call). For all Blake’s draconian sentence, he managed to 
escape from prison, while Portland spy Gordon Lonsdale was traded for British spy 
Greville Wynne after only three years’ imprisonment. Smiley thus resolves these national 
espionage humiliations via more definite conclusions.
So the national imaginary opens up faultlines, exposing ideological
214 Hobbesianism resurfaced in Margaret Thatcher’s neoliberalism, which David Cameron’s Conservatives 
attempted to gloss over in the 2010s.
215 See David Johnson on 2010s conservative ‘apologies’ for imperial atrocities. Review o f  Bill Schwarz, 
Memories o f  Empire, Transformations 84: 1 (2014), 145-52 (p. 151).
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inconsistencies, operating as an “unconscious of the text” (Macherey, p. 92): as 
McCracken suggests, the puzzle is more powerful than the solution always, and order ever 
cannot ever be fully restored in fiction any more than culture (McCracken, p. 52). However 
for all these pulls and contradictions, in Call, the national imaginary also reasserts 
powerfully reactionary ideas of nationhood enshrined in Empire and an elite, establishment 
custody of the British nation. It is this nation that is posited as threatened by the political 
enemy of Communism. Indeed, unlike other spy fiction (e.g. Desmond Cory’s 
Hammerhead, 1963), the threat occurs inside Britain itself. Eastern bloc Communism 
invades that bastion of British respectability, suburbia (the Fennans’ home); the 
complacent citadels of middlebrow culture (Mrs Fennan passes secret files to Mundt at the 
local repertory theatre; she is murdered by Frey at a Hammersmith theatre); and the heart 
of gentlemanly government (Fennan works in the Foreign Office). Thus, the unusual 
domestic dowdiness of Call compared to Fleming’s exotic locales has a political purpose. 
Let us now explore that political enemy.
* * *
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4. “Mass Philosophy”: the Political Enemy
Call fo r  the Dead reflects the new, Cold-War understanding of conflict, whereby the 
enemy is not a country but an ideology. This is shown not just by the book’s attack coming 
from the GDR rather than the USSR, but through the claim that Communism is infiltrating 
Britain itself. Communism, Call fo r the Dead tells us, does not infect just enemies, but 
friends (Smiley and Frey), colleagues (Fennan), even spouses (the Fennans’ marriage; 
arguably the Smileys’).216 Parlaying the post-war liberal unease about “a habitual and 
dangerous innocence” about Communism (Schaub, p. 11), Call asserts that political 
naivete does not infect just upper middle class 1930s students (Fennan became a 
Communist at the same time as the Cambridge spies, but later recanted). Communism also 
suborns the suburban middle class (the naive solicitor’s daughter from the rep theatre 
fawns over the murderous Mundt, Call, p. 88) and even the intelligence services (thus 
Maston’s denial of any Communist plot). Smiley is the only one who sees Communism 
clearly. This, in part then, is the new “realism” reviewers were perceiving in le Carre, and 
which would become an orthodoxy with The Spy's reviews: but it has an epistemological 
relationship with post-war liberal retreat, which, taking its linguistic cue from George 
Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’, deployed “realism” as a synonym for anti-Communism 
(Schaub, pp. 5-13).
The ‘neutrally’ named British Information Research Department (henceforth IRD), a 
propaganda unit with strong links to MI5 and MI6 helped create the idea of the USSR as
91 Ran “ideologically driven expansionist power” (Jenks, p. 34), as against “British 
defensive virtue” (Jenks, p. 27). Indeed BBC top brass in the late 40s seemed to equate 
‘objective’ with anti-Communist, resulting in such reprimands as “false objectivity”, “too 
neutral” and “objectivity run riot” (Jenks, p. 50). Critics reflect this empiricism,
216 The lover for whom Ann leaves George Smiley in 1947 is Cuban. She returns in 1959 or 60. The Cuban 
revolution lasted froml953-1959, although it was not officially Communist until 1961.
217 Lashmar & Oliver, pp. 67-75.
218 This ‘information’ was filtered out via the likes of Malcolm Muggeridge and George Orwell (Jenks, pp. 
81-82).
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910regurgitating the Cold-War consensus: e.g. “Smiley, the vanguard of British values,
battles Dieter, a Byronic symbol of cold war ideology” (Beene, p. 35). ‘Ideology’ is again 
on one side only and the East takes sole responsibility for the Cold War. Rothberg’s 
meanwhile echoes the complaints of BBC executives: that Call doesn’t sufficiently support 
the anti-Communist consensus.220 But these are quixotic readings, and Call fo r  the Dead is 
acutely anti-Communist from start to finish. It is via character that le Carre attempts to 
resolve ideological contradictions, and thus close attention to three Communist characters 
exposes revealing faultlines.
Ideologues Without Ideology: Characterising Communism
That Communism is never given direct voice in Call is a faultline. The voice of the 
Communist ‘other’ is not so much silenced as heavily mediated. Fennan’s youthful 1930s 
Oxford Communism, contemporaneous with the Cambridge spies’ recruitment, is twice 
mediated, once via Fennan’s adult perspective and by Smiley’s memories of their 
conversation, as if to inoculate the reader against infection. The language seems initially 
neutral, even sympathetic:
Besides the party was respectable then: the failure of the Labour Party and the 
Coalition Government had convinced many intellectuals that the Communists alone 
could provide an effective alternative to Capitalism and Fascism (p. 68).
219 Smith describes IRD.’s Background Books as “innocuously factual, offering a commonsensical take on 
contemporary issues”: James B. Smith, ‘Establishing a Beachhead’, in Pressing the Fight, Print Propaganda 
and the Cold War, ed. Greg Bamhisel and Catherine Turner (Amherst: University o f Massachusetts Press,
2010), p. 116.
220 “Smiley’s last words on Dieter Frey and Mrs Fennan [...] are almost Communist slogans, and neither le 
Carre nor Smiley says anything to show the difference between dream and reality” (Rothberg in H. Bloom, p. 
54). Note the use of “reality” as per post-war anti-Communism. “Smiley’s sympathetic appraisal o f their 
motives comes close to being an exoneration” (Lewis p. 36). “Ca// [...] ends [...] without western 
democratic principles affirmed or Eastern totalitarianism seriously questioned” (Beene, p. 36).
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But this neutrality is a precursor to suggestions of naivety: Communism is “a treasure 
[Fennan] had outgrown and must leave at Oxford with the days of his youth”. The 
omniscient focalisation regards Fennan’s Communist colleagues as similarly naive:
They were not men, but children, who dreamed of freedom-fires, gipsy music, and 
one world tomorrow, who rode on white horses across the Bay of Biscay or with a 
child’s pleasure bought beer for starving elves from Wales; children who had no 
power to resist the Eastern sun, and obediently turned their tousled heads towards it 
[...] Soon [Fennan] found them comic and touching” (p. 70).
Satire veers into overwriting here and is a faultline: we remain unclear what exactly 
Communism is as an ideology -  Communists here are simply romantic, foolish, naive. But 
hinted by that “Eastern sun”, Communism is soon also ominous in “its intellectual 
ruthlessness [...] its fearlessness, its academic reversal of traditional values [...] a 
philosophy which exacted total sacrifice to an unassailable formula” (p. 70). This is the 
ideological ‘absolutism’ Smiley opposes, wherein socialism bleeds into fascism as 
‘totalitarianism’. Materialising this threat, Fennan, his wife and Adam Scarr are all 
murdered in the Communist cause.
If Samuel Fennan’s Communism is twice mediated, Mrs Fennan’s Communism is 
three times mediated. Given that Mrs Fennan will prove to be the Communist spy, not her 
husband, we can only assume the views she attributes to ‘Samuel’ are actually her own. 
Thus it was to Elsa not Samuel Fennan for whom the Soviet invasion of “‘Hungary made 
[...] not a tiny bit of difference’” (p. 105). Hungary caused an acute crisis amongst British 
Communists: some adopted the “realist” anti-Communist position Schaub describes, while 
the leftist theorists quoted in this thesis (Williams, Thompson, Anderson) differentiated 
themselves as the anti-Stalinist ‘New Left’. Because Mrs Fennan’s hardline, expansionist 
Soviet ideology is voiced only via her criticism of it, Mrs Fennan’s pretended anti-
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Communism is textually more convincing than her never-articulated Communist faith.
“The same guns, the same children dying in the streets” she says, linking Communism 
with fascism, ends with means in the patented “totalitarian” blur: “Only the dream has 
changed, the blood is the same colour’” (p. 105). This is powerful rhetoric.
Consequently Guillam’s question in the novel’s concluding scene, “‘Was she a 
Communist?”’ is an admission of textual failure. So inconsistent is Mrs Fennan’s 
characterisation, so complex the double bluffs, that the reader can be forgiven for sharing 
Guillam’s confusion. In the last pages of a novel about a Communist spy, this is a messy 
faultline, an anxious working over of unruly textual material. Smiley’s answer to Guillam 
fails to resolve the contradiction: “‘I don’t think she liked labels. I think she wanted to help 
build one society which could live without conflict. Peace is a dirty word now, isn’t it? I 
think she wanted peace’” (p. 156). Then Smiley reverts to the common claim of British 
Communists as nai've dupes of the cynical East (Lashmar & Oliver, p. 114), suggesting 
Mrs Fennan was acting against fascism (standard galvaniser of 1930s Communists) not fo r  
Communism. However why, in 1956, as a concentration-camp Jewish survivor, would Mrs 
Fennan be outraged by the prospect of West German rearmament (“the same plump pride 
returned”, p. 106), but not by Stalin’s anti-Semitic policies?
Smiley’s invocation of “peace” regarding Mrs Fennan is another faultline. To a 
decontextualized reading, Smiley means peace is unfashionable (while implying Smiley is 
sympathetic to ‘peace’). Yet, claims Jenks, “by 1953 the word ‘peace’ had been thoroughly 
debased in British political discourse” (Jenks, p. 126) by the British government’s black 
propaganda against the “Peace Partisans’” 1950 Sheffield congress (Jenks pp. 119-122). 
British propaganda also ridiculed Khrushchev’s policy of “peaceful coexistence”221 and 
Jenks even uses the same phrase as Smiley, “peace had become a dirty word” (Jenks, p. 
126). If the Peace Partisans did have Soviet connections, the CND-led peace movement did
221 “If Mr Khrushchev really wants peaceful coexistence, he must be prepared to alter the ground rules by 
giving up all support for ‘wars of liberation’ and the arming of Communist rebellions in other countries.” 
Leader, Observer, 4 June 1961, p. 10.
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not, but were still regularly smeared as Soviet dupes by the government in the late 1950s 
(Jenks, p. 126). Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell worked hard to overturn party links with 
CND via jettisoning the Party’s commitment to unilateral disarmament. The IRD made no 
distinction between hard left, Communist and pro-Soviet positions: nor indeed do even 
critical histories of the IRD (see: both Jenks and Lashmar & Oliver). As in propaganda; so 
in Call. Smiley’s last words on the Frey/Fennan case declare: ‘“ they dreamed of peace and 
freedom. Now they’re murderers and spies’” (p. 156). Nai've “dreams” of “peace” blur into 
the ruthlessness of murder and espionage. The text’s anti-Communism trips over itself in 
what will be a common contradiction between Communist frailty (naivety in the face of an 
unruly “human nature”) and Communist potency (ideology overwhelming humanity). Now 
let us examine the third -  and only overt -  Communist character: Dieter Frey.
Numerous faultlines cluster around the character of Dieter Frey. Initially the naive 
‘dupe’ trope seems to be being parlayed: Frey is Smiley’s student in Nazi Germany, and 
Frey’s Jewishness, disability (Call, p. 92) and incarceration are emphasised (p. 94). 
However, Frey is described by Smiley in terms that ‘answer’ Mrs Fennan’s earlier critique 
of bureaucratic instrumentalism (“a mind without a body”): “He used to say that the 
greatest mistake man ever made was to distinguish between the mind and the body; an 
order does not exist if it is not obeyed” (p. 96). This resonates with the contemporaneous 
Eichmann trial (“he had always acted upon “superior’s orders”),222 and suggests that Frey 
is no dupe. Only pages later, Frey has become first Britain’s enemy, organising an 
aggressively extensive infiltration of the British state, scaffolded by a series of expedient 
murders that in combination betoken an unambiguous Communist threat to Britain. By the 
time Frey is introduced in the flesh he has become, “satanic in fulfilment” (Call, p. 131), at 
which point he cold-bloodedly kills his accomplice, Mrs Fennan, at the theatre when she 
has outlived her usefulness. This lack of detailed or consistent characterisation of Frey is a 
huge hole in the book. We only have the most meagre details concerning the primary
222 Arendt, Eichmann, p. 294.
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villain and Communist ideologue, and, as mediator, we have to take Frey at Smiley’s 
word. And Smiley’s word is consistently overwrought regarding Frey:
He was the same improbable romantic with the magic of a charlatan: the same 
unforgettable figure which had struggled over the ruins of Germany, implacable of 
purpose, satanic in fulfilment, dark and swift like the Gods of the North (p. 131).
Contradictorily, the reader is invited to accept Smiley’s equally overwrought quotation 
from Marlowe (‘“my dearest friend’” p. 142) after Smiley has killed Frey, when there is 
little evidence for such depth of friendship. As Frey himself only speaks two words (p.
140) and one reported sentence (p. 93) throughout the book, we only have Smiley’s 
mediated account of Frey’s politics:
[Dieter] cared nothing for human life: dreamed only of armies of faceless men bound 
by their lowest common denominators; he wanted to shape the world as if it were a 
tree, cutting off what did not fit the regular image; for this he fashioned blank, 
soulless automatons like Mundt (Call, p. 138).
This is Frey as totalitarian, antipathetic to all that Smiley/Britain stands for: committed to 
planning, to shaping mankind beyond the dictates of ‘human nature’, to a utopian ideal that 
is left sinisterly opaque. Superficially attractive yet deformed, an intellectual giant yet 
lacking human empathy, romantic yet ruthless, Frey is a personification of ‘Communism’ 
in propaganda terms. Frey is, “larger than life, undiminished by the moderating influence 
of experience. He was a man who thought and acted in absolute terms, without patience or 
compromise” (Call, p. 131). Again note Frey’s contrast to the ‘organic’, the ‘human’ to 
“life”. Again this is the post-war liberal consensus (Schaub, p. 12). “Absolute” and 
“absolutist”, favoured terms of le Carre’s for Communists, probably derive from Attlee’s
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1948 national address -  “the absolutists who suppress opposition masquerade under the 
name of upholders of liberty”223 linking the Soviet Union and Tsarist absolutist monarchy
r) ' J A
in despotic brutality. No critics challenge the use of ‘absolutism’ in le Carre.
However, there is another contradiction in Frey’s characterisation, hinted at earlier in 
consideration of “who was then the gentleman?”. If Frey “care[s] nothing for human life”, 
why does he not kill Smiley? Just as Smiley undermines his own liberalism by murdering 
Frey, so Frey demonstrates anomalous veneration for the personal by refusing to fight 
Smiley. While this sudden humanism makes little sense following Frey’s murder of Mrs 
Fennan, it complicates Smiley’s stock assertion of Frey’s ruthless anti-humanism. Critics 
are at a loss in respect of this.
Finally then, here is Smiley’s summary of Dieter’s beliefs: “‘God knows what Dieter 
wanted. Honour, I think, and a socialist world [...] He was one of those world-builders 
who seem to do nothing but destroy’” (Call, p. 156). This collapses the notion of a 
transformed society (a ‘dream’) into abstraction (‘honour’), expansionism (“world- 
builders”), and anti-humanist ruthlessness (“do nothing but destroy”). Smiley’s emphasis 
on the destructiveness of Communism was a regular trope of British propaganda: “its 
systematic assault on civil liberties, disregard for basic human rights” (Shaw, p. 66). There 
is, notably, no sense of any ideological principle throughout the novel’s accounts of 
Communist action: means have entirely subsumed ends. Where principle should be there is 
instead what Macherey calls “a determinate absence [...] an eloquent silence” (Macherey, 
p. 79). Communism, in an insecure, defensive portrayal, seemingly cannot be allowed to 
articulate a belief system: it must be mediated, silenced and parodied, but never given a 
proper hearing.
223 Andrew Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945-53: The Information Research 
Department (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 42.
224 “Smiley objects to [Dieter] chiefly because he has forsaken personal for collective values; the dialectical 
materialism he has allegedly swallowed whole from Marx shirks the individual” (Wolfe, pp. 82-3).
225 Bennett sees the contradiction but can do nothing with it (Bennett, p. 26); Wolfe actually makes Frey’s 
death an enactment of Communist ideology: “so enslaved is [Frey] to doctrine that he merges silently with 
both the night and the river below” (Wolfe, p. 82).
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Critical Mass: “Mass” as Contradiction
There is a faultline in the novel located in the contradictory invocation of the “mass 
culture” of capitalism and “mass philosophy” of Communism. “[Smiley] hated the press as 
he hated advertising and television, he hated mass media, the relentless persuasion of the 
twentieth century” {Call, p. 138). This echoes Leavis’s views about “mass civilization” - 
capitalist mass production threatening elite high culture, and the role of an elite minority to 
uphold values.226 A dissemination of Leavis’s views on ‘mass society’ had become a 
common liberal trope in the post-war period (Schaub, p. 56). As we saw via Roger 
Bromley, and prior to that the Frankfurt School, this attitude even affected the literary left. 
Smiley, with his quotations of Goethe and Marlowe, is strongly associated with this elite
9 9 7culture as is in many ways a Leavisite figure. The Long Boom’s increase in 
consumption, the invention of the teenager, the increase in consumer goods of the 1950s
9 9 0
and early 60s, a capitalism considered to be in its ‘golden age’: these are what Smiley
objects to. This is a conservative -  indeed a Leavisite -  critique of capitalism: a critique 
that is culturally rather than materially based (Shiach, p. 181). Yet there are three 
contradictions written into this: firstly, that capitalist consumerism has a direct relationship 
to Smiley’s veneration of the ‘individual’ via liberalism. Secondly, as a spy novel, a part of 
the “popular fiction” discussed in the Introduction, Call itself is a manifestation of that 
same “mass culture” Smiley decries. Which leads to the third contradiction, which, again 
as per the Introduction, involves a collapse between ‘mass’ object (cultural artefacts like 
bestsellers) and ‘mass’ subject (the mass or the working class), which contains the 
implication that both are inferior.
226 The strong link between elites and high culture is indicated by the sheer number o f titles in my 
Bibliography published by Macmillan -  Harold Macmillan owned and then chaired the company 1964-1986.
227 Anderson cites Leavis’s “enormous nostalgia for the ‘organic community’ o f the past”, his veneration of  
Cambridge as cradle of civilisation (c.f. Smiley/Oxford) and the way “Leavis saw the new media of  
communication -  newspapers, magazines, radio, cinema and television -  as the menacing apogee of  
commercialism and industrial civilization,” P. Anderson, ‘Components o f the National Culture’, New Left 
Review 50 (July-August 1968), 3-57 (pp. 52-3).
228 Eric Hobsbawm, Age o f  Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991 [1994] (London: Abacus, 
1995), p. 6 .
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On top of this, the text also parlays a third understanding of “mass” in a passage that 
immediately follows:
Everything [Smiley] admired or loved had been the product of intense individualism. 
That was why he hated Dieter now, hated what he stood for [...]: the fabulous 
impertinence of renouncing the individual in favour of the mass. When had mass 
philosophies ever brought benefit or wisdom? (Call, p. 138).
“Mass” is now a philosophy of the socialist collective, but with a slippage into a fearful, 
conservative framing of that collective, of the working class: the ‘mass’ -  “a new word for 
mob” (Williams, Culture, p. 298). Simplistically, there is a normative antipathy to the 
working class in all of these uses of ‘mass’: it carries with it the slur of ‘common’ as 
debased, but also as threatening. However, as Williams famously pointed out: “There are 
in fact no masses', there are only ways of seeing people as masses” (Williams, Culture, p. 
300).229 This captures ruling class condescension towards, but also fear of, the working 
class. The working class and Communism were a natural alliance. “It was this 
phenomenon of mass man that [liberals] attributed to the rise of totalitarianism” via 
fascism and Communism (Manning, p. 18-19). The working class is lent a merely 
epistemological power via association with “totalitarianism” (see: Schaub p. 62), when the 
real power in the Nazi and Stalinist regimes remained with elites. Again ‘mass’ simply 
becomes a bovine herd. So liberal philosopher, J. S. Mill, on trade unionism as mob rule 
sounds remarkably similar to Smiley on Communism: “individuals are lost in the crowd 
[...] the only power deserving the name is that of masses, and of governments while they 
make themselves the organ of the tendencies and instincts of masses” (quoted in Losurdo, 
p. 199). Trade unions had been dubbed, “the peril in our midst” in a 1956 title by IRD
229 Eagleton claimed Williams’ dismissal o f ‘mass’ also dismisses ‘class’. Terry Eagleton, ‘Criticism and 
Politics: The Work of Raymond Williams’, New Left Review 95, (Jan/Feb) 1976, p. 13. Williams’ 
formulation however is a rejection o f bourgeois prejudices about the mass, sometimes regurgitated by the 
left: Eagleton, unlike Williams, showed little interest in ‘mass’ rather than elite culture.
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associate, Woodrow Wyatt (Jenks, p. 106).230 This distrust and fear of the working class 
united conservatives and liberals,231 aristocracy and bourgeoisie (Hobsbawm, Industry, p. 
264), and, in Call, it unites Smiley and the supposedly distinct aristocratic ‘set’. After all, 
Smiley’s one venture into a working class (and criminal) milieu results in his being 
clobbered on the head (itself source of Smiley’s power): the masses are dangerous, while 
working-class Adam Scarr assists -  albeit inadvertently -  in a Communist plot 232 Orwell’s 
1984 contains exactly this conflicted view of the working classes as both conformistly 
apathetic and revolutionarily powerful (“If there is hope [...] it lies in the proles”, 1984, p. 
80). How though can the ‘mass’ be simultaneously docile consumers of capitalism and 
dangerous to capitalist society? Because one meaning is a hope and the other is a fear: that 
both coexist regarding the same body of people is proof of the working class’s potential for 
power. As anti-Stalinist socialist, E. P. Thompson, pointed out at the time:
Anti-Communism has provided an apologia for paralysis, an ideological cover for 
accommodations, the main means by which orthodox social democracy (sometimes 
in active liaison with employers, the popular press, or the State) has sought to isolate 
the Left233
The Communist spectre was often invoked to attack the left. “In the red scare climate it 
was de rigeur to ascribe any organization demanding a wage increase, or taking industrial 
action [...] as the tool of Communist agitators” (Lashmar & Oliver p. 107). In a culture 
whose closed circuit of “common sense” asserted the political choice as between Stalinism 
and welfare capitalism, socialism was easily slandered as Stalinism. Indeed Christopher
230 The IRD had a large hand in 1961 ’s court case against Communist infiltration of the electricians’ union, 
ETU (Lashmar & Oliver, p. 119).
231 “Conservatism and liberalism had effectively merged after the revolutions o f 1848 with Marxist-based 
socialism now seen as the common threat” (Wallerstein, p. 17).
232 “Generations o f Englishmen had been brought up to believe that an Englishman’s word is his bond, [..] 
that never under any circumstances would he fail his King and country. The lower classes would, o f  course, 
do all these things” (Atkins, p. 180).
233 E.P. Thompson, ‘Peculiarities o f the English’, Socialist Register, (1965), 311-362 (p. 347).
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Mayhew of the IRD made this conflation clear: ‘“ Stalinism was an evil thing and certainly 
IRD’s propaganda coincided with a considerable political defeat of the extreme left in the 
Labour Party’” (Lashmar & Oliver, p. 113).
The Jewishness of the Communist conspirators is here worth a pause. Le Carre 
proclaimed: “I used Jewish people because I felt that after Stalin and Hitler they should 
particularly engage our protective instincts” (‘To Russia’, p. 6). But Jews in Call are a 
cipher for the working class, existing, like the international proletariat, outside of nation 
{Communist Manifesto, p. 102). The strong symbiosis between Communist villain and 
Jew234 is not so much anti-Semitism but fear of those not readily neutralised by ideologies 
of nation. “‘I’m the wandering Jewess, the no-man’s land,”’ claims Mrs Fennan {Call, p. 
101). The example of Dutch Jewish spy George Blake clearly haunts such a narrative; so 
too does or Italian Jewish spy Bruno Pontecorvo; but so too does non-Jewish Nazi refugee- 
tumed-British citizen-turned-Soviet spy, Klaus Fuchs.235
It is important to note that to highlight anti-Communism in Call's text is not to 
defend Eastern bloc regimes; any more than the fact that so much anti-Soviet analysis 
came from the far right,236 and was financed by the government’s IRD propaganda unit 
(Lashmar & Oliver p. 122), negates criticisms of Eastern bloc regimes. That le Carre’s 
work echoes British propaganda so closely is not just hugely significant; it overthrows a 
body of criticism that fails at its own empirical level when it declares a “moral 
equivalence” in le Carre’s novels that is perennially textually elusive.
* * *
234 Mendel undercuts this equation of Jew/villain. ‘“My Dad was a Yid’”, says Mendel o f Mrs Fennan. “‘He 
never made such a bloody fuss about it’” (p. 98). Although there’s no indication Mendel’s father was sent to 
a concentration camp, Mendel, despite his Jewishness, chooses the ‘right’ side in the Cold War.
235 David Cornwell worked for British intelligence in refugee camps in Austria at the end o f the war (Sisman, 
NP).
236 Robert Conquest (The Great Purges, 1968) later became a speechwriter to Margaret Thatcher.
82
5. Call to Account: Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen how Call fo r the Dead presents a traditional Britain, 
exemplified by Smiley, assailed from within and without. The British state is rendered 
inefficient by bureaucracy, implicitly connected with the class mobility of the post-War 
period, edging out the old, undemocratic amateur order, represented by Smiley. The 
novel’s anti-statism is actualised by Smiley’s resignation, but disguises Smiley’s continued 
defence of and ultimate reaffirmation of the state.
Similarly, Call's presentation of the nation being protected asserts the establishment 
as the essence of Britain, a gentlemanly elite to which, despite textual protestations, Smiley 
firmly belongs. The working class is not just rejected from this Britain as an active threat 
to it, collaborators with hostile Eastern bloc Communism. The text’s attempts to ‘resolve’ 
Smiley’s execution of Communist agent, Dieter Frey, creates a contradiction in the novel’s 
claims for national decency. This is largely overwhelmed by Smiley’s overwhelming of a 
graphically depicted Communist ‘threat’ however, which also reasserts British potency.
Regarding this Communist political enemy, contradictory motifs that recur 
throughout le Carre’s Cold-War work are established: Communism as naivete (Samuel 
Fennan); Communism as ideological ‘fanaticism’ that devalues human life (Dieter Frey), 
and the undermining of both tropes by a failure to depict a Communist ideology. However 
Call's polemical perception is awry: both the administration of the state and the social 
construction of the nation was undergoing very limited change; Empire was still an 
ongoing concern,237 while Soviet expansionism was exaggerated in the West. Call fo r  the 
Dead therefore is an over-assertion of traditionalist, conservative values. After a digression 
into a murder mystery -  and another elite microcosm of Britain via a public school -  in A 
Murder o f Quality (1962), le Carre would rethink this elitism in The Spy Who Came in 
from the Cold, considered next.
He * *
237 Cain and Hopkins, pp. 620-622; Leys, pp. 172-173.
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Chapter 2: The Spy Who Came in from the Cold 
Cover Story: The Spy Who Came in from the Cold in Context
9^ 8Le Carre’s breakthrough third novel, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold (September, 
1963), was a major cultural incursion into the Cold War at its most dangerous point, a 
direct response to the erection of the Berlin Wall (August 1961), the Berlin Crisis (June- 
November 1961), and laterally, the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962). It should be seen 
as a companion-piece to Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, as a key anti-Communist Cold- 
War text.239 Both books issued a warning about the state’s threat to individuals, pitting an 
archetypal ‘little man’, armed/disarmed with the love of a woman, against a monolithic 
state, with dire consequences. Both books helped define the Cold War in the popular 
imagination, being bestsellers, assisted by successful films;240 both introduced new or 
reimagined phrases to the language, and concepts to the culture: “Big Brother”, 
“Newspeak”; “in from the cold”,241 both are ambiguous and contested texts.242
To capture in snapshot an immensely complex novel: The Spy concerns an elaborate 
double bluff by the British Secret Service’s Control. Rough-hewn, classless secret agent 
Leamas’s German networks have been “rolled up” by Hans Mundt, of Call fo r  the Dead, 
former Nazi, now head of the GDR’s espionage Abteilung. The reader only understands 
belatedly that Leamas’s decline into alcoholism and his subsequent imprisonment are deep 
cover, designed to draw East German Communists to a potential ‘defector’. Unbeknownst 
to his lover, Liz, Leamas is taken to the GDR, where it transpires his Abteilung 
interrogator, Jens Fiedler, suspects that his own boss, Mundt, is a British agent. When 
Fiedler brings the case to a Tribunal, Mundt springs Liz as a witness to discredit Leamas,
238 A non Cold-War, detective novel, A Murder o f  Quality (1962), set in a public school, followed Call.
239 “The individual pitched against totalitarianism, interrogation by state machine, and the tragic defeat o f the 
hero” connect the novels (Easthope, p. 155). Notably Stanley Kubrick’s D r Strangelove, coalescing nuclear 
fears, came out this year.
240 Director Martin Ritt had recently got through US HUAC investigations into Communist associations.
241 E.g. Henry Zieger, Ian Fleming: The Spy Who Came in with the Gold (Duell, 1965); Jonathan Steele, 
Socialism with a German Face: The State That Came in from the Cold (Cape, 1977); The Spy Who Went into 
the Cold: Kim Philby, Soviet Super Spy, BBC4 documentary, broadcast 19 Nov 2013.
242 Both films starred Richard Burton and Cyril Cusack.
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and Fiedler himself is arrested. Fiedler’s theory transpires to be true however: Leamas -  
and the reader -  now discover that Leamas’s function all along was to discredit Fiedler and 
secure Mundt’s position. When Liz is killed in the same plan, as she and Leamas are trying 
to escape over the Berlin Wall, Leamas chooses to die rather than return to the West.
Contemporary Reception of The Spy
The Spy “hit the publishing world like a bolt of lightning,” declared Daily Express.243 
Indicative of the ongoing popular vs. literary standoff, Gollancz issued The Spy in a red 
‘literary fiction’ cover rather than its traditional “thriller” yellow jacket. Gollancz’s press 
release to reviewers also presented The Spy as the ‘answer’ to the 7X5” s complaint of the 
lack of a “really realistic spy novel” in a climate of spy scandals,244 The Spy's media 
reception latched onto this. Cultural pulse-monitor, Life analysed the cultural phenomenon 
of the “new-style thriller”, a post-Bond “realism” combined with a new ‘literariness’.245 
“Realistic” here seemed first to mean “plausible”, especially in comparison to Bond, 
“realism” as against romance. In a raft of almost unanimously positive notices, spy writer 
Robert Harling wrote, “here is no bogus superman stuff but what must be something like 
the real thing”;246 David Holloway declared, “The spies are not playing Bond-like games: 
they operate nastily, unspectacularly” concluding, “a brilliantly bitter novel with a deal of 
truth behind it”;247 Francis lies called it “a spy story documentary”248 -  rather than 
‘drama’. This plausibility point was regularly repeated.249
243 Daily Express, 14 Feb 1964, p. 1.
244 Times Literary Supplement, 8 February 1963; Victor Gollancz, ‘Supplementary Sheet No. 179’, p. 1.
245 Conrad Knickerbocker, ‘The Spies Who Come in from Next Door’, Life, 30 April 1965, p. 13.
By June 1964 Spy was outselling Fleming’s On Her M ajesty’s Secret Service by more than 2:1 (Anthony 
Boucher ‘There’s a Spy between the Covers’, New York Times Book Review, 7 June 1964, p. 7).
246 Robert Harling, ‘Something Near the Truth?’ Sunday Times, 15 September 1963, p. 33.
247 David Holloway, ‘Recent Fiction’, Daily Telegraph, 13 September 1963, p. 19.
248 Frances lies, ‘Criminal Records’, Guardian, 11 October 1963 p. 9.
249 “Wickedly plausible”, N.N. ‘New Fiction’, The Times, 12 September 1963, p. 13; Peter Phillips, ‘Crime 
Shelf, Daily Herald, 14 September 1963, p. 4, ‘The way things really do happen’ Maurice Richardson, 
‘Agents and Victims’, Observer, 15 September 1963, p. 22; “Authenticity”, N. N. ‘More le Carre Capers’, 
Time, 29 May 1964, pp. 62-63.
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A second interpretation of “realistic” was that the book offered inside knowledge. 
Julian Maclaren Ross noted a “stamp of authenticity seldom found in stories of this 
nature”.250 Kenneth Allsop assumed its evocation of “the murky pond-life of espionage” 
and “a dossier-like knowledge of undercover Europe” meant that le Carre himself was a 
spy.251 In the US, Orville Prescott also wondered whether the aforementioned lack of 
Bond-ish “glamour, sex, impudent daring and masterful heroics” meant le Carre was an 
espionage insider 252 Newsweek's reviewer brashly declared, “It bristles with details about 
the CIA and Britain’s MI6 and its author [...] is a Briton whose inside credentials make it 
all chillingly plausible”. The magazine even consulted CIA officers who vouched for 
Cornwell’s “bona fides”: they insisted such an operation would never have been approved; 
as did Kim Philby. Again this ‘authenticity’ was a common critical trope.
The third, least popular, interpretation of “realistic” was that The Spy offered 
negative insight into the conduct of the Cold War. Patrick Gaffney noted, “There is a 
chilling authenticity about it: one feels that here truly are the monstrous realities behind the 
news paragraphs which record the shifts and tensions of the Cold War.”255 John Clarke 
considered, “here is the trench warfare of cold war espionage and counter-espionage” 
again as against Bond 256 Allsop thought it offered, “the truth about the spy sub-world, the 
secret war between East and West”. In citing the Vassall Tribunal,257 Maclaren Ross was 
unusual in mentioning actual Cold War events.252. In fact, the Cold War remained vague in 
all three approaches: G.W. Stonier mentioned Communism,259 Knickerbocker cited
250 Julian Maclaren Ross, ‘Limits o f Control’, Times Literary Supplement 13 September 1963, p. 693.
251 Kenneth Allsop, ‘Is This the Private Nightmare of a Master Spy’, Daily Mail, 12 September 1963, p. 10
252 Orville Prescott, ‘The Brutal Business o f Espionage’, New York Times, 10 January 1964, p. 27.
253 N.N. ‘Inside Job?’ Newsweek, 3 February 1964, p. 81.
254 “Bitterly authoritative”, N.N., New Yorker, 25 January 1964, p. 112; “told from the inside” Katherine 
Gauss Jackson, ‘Books in B rief, Harpers, 1 January 1964, p. 106.
255 Patrick Gaffney, ‘Crime Calendar’, Scotsman, 21 September 1963, p. 6.
256 John Clarke ‘Not Exactly an Agent in the Bond Image’, Evening Standard, 17 September 1963, p. 10.
257 Admiralty clerk John Vassall was entrapped while working in the Soviet Union, and in 1962 was revealed 
to have sold British secrets. Thomas Hennessy & Claire Thomas, Spooks: The Unofficial History o f  MI5 from  
the First Atom Spy to 7/7 (Chalford: Amberley, 2011), pp. 136-7. British Soviet spy, Ashe, has a Dolphin 
Square flat (Spy, p. 60), like Vassall.
258 Robert M. Adams, ‘Couldn't Put it Down’, New York Review o f  Books, 3 May 1964, p. 13, “intricate and 
moving study [...] o f history and men as its active and passive agents.”
259 G.W. Stonier, New Statesman, 25 October 1963, p. 580.
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Vietnam, but only three reviewers cited the charged political location of the Berlin Wall 
that begins, ends and intersects the novel.260 The Spy’s “realistic” elements thus remained 
sealed off from historical reality.
There was relatively little sense of shock amongst reviewers at The Spy’s “realistic” 
depiction of supposed British Cold-War behaviour.261 Richardson put it most directly: “the 
homicidal wickedness and unscrupulousness of our side; sacrificing agent after agent, is 
laid on very strong”. The Times’ reviewer attested to the cynicism, but largely defended the 
actions: “it may be, suggests Mr Le Carre, that the end justifies the means, but the means 
are very terrible indeed”. Allsop suggested vague cynicism in the “prosy pipe-and-cardigan 
bureaucrats gloating over their plots”. lies declared, “once personal ethics are at war with 
national interests the ending becomes inevitable”. Peter Phillips equivocally declared, 
“Leamas realises that he has been betrayed by his own side for a “higher purpose””. By 
contrast, Coxhead claimed the depiction of “British intelligence [...] plumbing depths of 
double-dealing that would make Machiavelli look an absolute beginner [...] failed to 
convince”.262 In American reviews, Prescott stated “a spy has nearly as much reason to 
fear his superiors in his own organization as members of the opposition”, while Adams 
cited “the problem of ends and means” and Anthony Boucher called Control’s plot 
“fiendishly intricate”.263
There was little recognition of one facet of le Carre’s ‘realism’, the social realism of 
The Spy’s voguely lower class hero, Alec Leamas min contrast to the previously blue- 
blooded espionage hero. Only Maclaren Ross acknowledged this: “a consciously new-style 
hero: brusque, disillusioned, non-U”. Holloway offered a hint (“without the university 
degree essential to the young entry”), but while Knickerbocker saw Leamas posited as
260 Berlin Wall mentioned only in Daily Mail, New Statesman, TLS, Harpers and Atlantic reviews. N.N. 
Atlantic, March 1964.
261 Le Carre claimed in 1964 that The Spy was intended “to implant a feeling o f alarm [...] it was supposed to 
shock” (Bonfante, p. 42).
262 Elizabeth Coxhead, ‘Fiction of the Week’, Sunday Telegraph, 15 September 1963, p. 15.
263 Anthony Boucher, ‘Temptations of a Man Isolated in Deceit’, New York Times Book Review, 12 January 
1964, p. 5.
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“just folks, another nebbish from next door”, he felt Leamas was a traditional “hero” in an 
era of real-life bureaucratised espionage. Hill264 and Coxhead concurred.
Reflecting the way that commentary tends to ‘fix’ understandings, the state’s 
behaviour became the later literary critical orthodoxy about The Spy, which is still 
conventionally seen as anti-establishment. Again, Leamas’s class status hardly figures in le 
Carre criticism, indeed the ‘nation’ is a barely noticed thematic. With much closer 
attention to GDR agent, Fiedler, than reviewers paid, Fiedler’s portrayal was considered 
even-handed, and to evince that staple moral equivalence between East and West. Only 
a minority of critics perceived anti-Communism in the book. “He does in fact finally assert 
that, for all its faults, the British way of life is preferable to the Communist alternative” 
(Monaghan, pp. 112-113)266
This chapter will attempt to correct these lacks in both commentary and criticism. It 
considers the nation first, reconfigured here via its new, ‘classless’ hero, Leamas, in 
contrast to the establishment Smiley. What, the chapter asks, does the book have to say 
about Britain and class in the 1960s? Secondly, considering the state, the chapter will 
explore the way Western ideology is elided in The Spy, via “English empiricism”. It will 
examine how anti-establishment the book is in its ambiguous clash of individual and state. 
Third, the chapter will analyse the presentation of the political enemy. The iconography of 
the Berlin Wall, Fiedler’s characterisation and the book’s depictions of life in the GDR 
constitute Communism’s most detailed portrayal in le Carre’s work until Smiley’s People. 
To what extent is this dismal picture conceivable as equivalent to the book’s presentation 
of the West? Given the books’ aforementioned commonalities, all these questions will be 
examined with reference to Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.
264 William B. Hill, America, 9 May 1964, p. 635.
265 Ambrosetti (p. 112); Rothberg: “le Carre is saying ‘a plague on both your houses’” (in H. Bloom, p. 62); 
repeated by: Homberger (p. 56); Beene (p. 53); Powell (p. 59); Hoffman, (p. 75).
266 See also on anti-Communism: Barley (p. 28); “Tension between a monstrous utilitarianism that dismisses 
all human costs as means to a greater good and western respect for individual worth” (Dobel p. 194); 
“Although le Carre equates the methods used by both sides as equally distasteful, he maintains the 
superiority of Western ends, individualism and humanism, to the absolutism o f Soviet Communism” 
(Aronoff, p. 93).
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2. “Not Quite a Gentleman”: Classlessness and the British Nation
Concerns about British decline were, by 1963, widespread, as the Long Boom visibly 
receded at home,267 and colonies continued to haemorrhage abroad (this year Kenya and 
Zanzibar, with Aden also breaking free). Amongst the domestic responses was a series of 
“state of the nation” treatises,268 and new Labour leader (from February), Harold Wilson’s 
rhetoric of ‘modernisation’. In his “white heat of technology” speech of 1 October 1963, 
weeks after The Spy came out, Wilson declared his ambition to modernise Britain into a 
“technocratic society”. Wilson was attempting to capture votes from a new demographic 
not automatically Labour-voting, while also encouraging British workers to achieve greater 
productivity to compete abroad and reverse British economic decline.
Crucial to Wilson’s concept of a modem Britain was a new ‘classlessness’ to British 
society. This was a concept first asserted by Orwell: “a new kind of man [...] middle class 
in income and to some extent in habits” 269 Wilson himself emblematised this ‘new kind of 
man’, part of a breed of upwardly mobile grammar school boys, Wilson sported a workers’
• 270Gannex raincoat, and a regional accent and proclaimed a love of HP sauce and football. 
New Prime Minister, Lord Home, coming to power mere weeks after Wilson’s “white 
heat” speech, was derided as an “elegant anachronism” by Wilson,271 emblematising the 
patrician, amateur order that had already been discredited that year by both the Profumo 
scandal272 and Kim Philby’s defection. These two events also showed the centrality of 
espionage to British society at this moment in history. That the press ignored government
267 Leader, Guardian, 6 July 1963: “a decade of Conservative remedies has failed to cure the UK’s economic 
malaise [...] output has risen more slowly and more erratically than in almost all other countries, and our 
prices have risen faster.”
268 Anthony Howard, Listener, 29 August 1963, p. 319; ‘Suicide o f a Nation’, Encounter (July 1963), guest 
edited by Arthur Koestler; Perry Anderson, ‘Origins’.
269 George Orwell, ‘The English People’ [1943] Collected Essays, Vol 3: As I  Please (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1970), p. 36.
270 “A contemporary classless figure [...] a sort o f homespun Kennedy”, ‘Leader Without a Label’, Observer, 
17 February 1963, p. 8. Indeed Wilson’s technological emphasis was also an echo o f Kennedy (Westad, p. 
34).
271 Marcus Collins, ‘The Fall o f the English Gentleman c. 1918-1970’, Historical Research, 75: 187 
(February 2002), 90-111 (p. 105).
272 John Profumo resigned in June 1963, but the issue still ricocheted that September with the Denning 
Report front-page news, e.g. ‘In the Clear, or Very Nearly So’ Evening Standard, 17 September 1963, p. 1. 
Cornwell was present at Christine Keeler’s trial in an MI5 capacity.
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D-notices on Philby that summer indicated a decrease in traditional deference to the 
governing elite. This potentially was what Raymond Williams calls the “emergent” chafing 
against the “dominant” in British culture.
The first-ever Sunday Times colour supplement,273 helped define this cultural 
moment, via profiles of 1960s ‘classless’ types: an airline pilot, a footballer, a sociology 
lecturer, Mary Quant and pop artist Peter Blake, built-up professionals in explicit contrast 
to the informally-recruited “inspired amateur”. Even James Bond was classlessly 
reconfigured in a story in the supplement, and also in the new films (from Dr No, October 
1962), via the casting of lower-class Scot, Sean Connery as against Fleming’s choice, 
aristocratic-styled Englishman David Niven. Another le Carre competitor, Len Deighton’s 
working class hero in November 1962’s Ipcress File brought the democratised American 
hardboiled detective genre into spy fiction. Thus it is no coincidence that Smiley, patrician 
hero of le Carre’s previous two books, gives way to classless Leamas as hero at this 
‘democratic’ moment. This represented a cultural democratisation on a par with what the 
hard-boiled detective novel did to the Great Detective genre.274 Especially coming after the 
elite claim on Britishness made by Call fo r  the Dead (and Murder o f Quality, 1962), this 
parallels Wilson’s championing of classlessness.
What, however, did ‘classless’ mean? Was it, in Williams’ terms “a new class”, an 
“emergent ideology” (Williams, Marxism, p. 124)? One might suggest a threefold 
understanding: a means of ‘explaining’ the encroachment of non-aristocratic characters, 
milieus and producers upon a previously elite culture; a euphemism for the “new middle 
class” (upper-working or lower-middle); and a means of taking ‘class’, in the larger sense, 
off the agenda, as if Britain’s social inequalities had been levelled. Classlessness was a 
refutation of Communism, a logical conclusion of social democracy that removed class 
struggle from the socialist project. But it was also another untenable concept of 
‘neutrality’, a world without class: another non-existent ‘no man’s land’.
273 NN, ‘A Sharp Glance at the Mood o f Britain’, Sunday Times, 4 February 1962, p. 1.
274 Ernest Mandel, Delightful Murder: A Social History o f the Crime Story (London: Pluto, 1984), p. 36.
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Let us attempt to read The Spy as a “national allegory” or ‘condition of England’ 
novel in light of this classlessness. The first task is to establish Leamas’s ‘classless’ 
credentials. Christopher Booker adds to ‘classless’ the 60s keywords ‘sceptical’,
‘irreverent’ and ‘abrasive’:275 all apply to Leamas. The focalisation of an airhostess (a 
typically ‘classless’ occupation) suggests Leamas is ‘North Country’, which the omniscient 
voice semi-affirms (Spy, p. 15). A ‘collective voice’ suggests Leamas is Irish and grammar 
school, while the omniscient voice states he has no degree (p. 24). The omniscient voice 
claims Leamas has a “non-U” style of dress (“utilitarian”, modem) and manner (terse, 
abrasive) (p. 15). The ambiguity here is indicative of the vagueness of the concept of 
classlessness. But the key point is that Leamas is in a dormitory group, between classes, 
having left the working class but far from accepted by the upper middle: thus the small 
snobberies inflicted upon Leamas by Fawley and Control. “‘You haven’t got a pass, have 
you?”’ taunts Fawley (p. 17); “‘You’re going to find these more expensive’” Control says 
of his own cigarettes (p. 18). In terms of the Wilson project, Leamas’s sojourn in 
“technocratic” Banking Section is key, while Liz as a librarian also has a typically classless
9 7  f \occupation. Again, Leamas and Liz parallel the technocrats Winston and Julia in 1984. 
They are the “new men”, working in service industries. However, that Leamas abhors 
deskwork (p. 13) insisting he is “operational”, is a reassertion of his original class status -  
working class as manual fieldman, “classless” as technocratic deskman. This begins to 
suggest how reading Leamas as classless hero reveals problems with the concept of 
classlessness and that the national allegory is less “emergent” negative. Let us break this 
down.
Firstly, Leamas’s classlessness carries with it the ‘threat’ of the working class mass: 
“[Leamas] looked like a man who could make trouble, a man who looked after his money, 
a man who was not quite a gentleman” (Spy, p. 15). This echoes Orwell’s claim that
275 Christopher Booker, The Neophiliacs [1969] (London: Fontana, 1970), pp. 23-30.
276 Le Carre had wanted Rita Tushingham to play Liz in the film, being more working class than Claire 
Bloom: (http://www.dvdtalk.com/reviews/61660/spv-who-came-in-from-the-cold-criterion-collection-the/,
accessed 7/2/15). Burton however was the personification o f ‘classlessness’, working class boy done good.
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“classlessness” displaced “the old distinction between a man who is a ‘gentleman’ and the 
man who is ‘not a gentleman”’ (Orwell, Essays 3, p. 36). As such, to anyone above the 
gentlemanly line (Control, Smiley, Fawley) everyone below it is ‘classless’: synonym for 
‘lower’. The distinction is piquantly relayed via violence:277 a gentleman delegates 
violence (as Control and Smiley do); Leamas administers it himself; indeed enjoys it. 
Leamas is part of the feared ‘mass’: violence thus becomes associated with the fieldman- 
‘manual’ nexus.278 This then, is not a particularly positive presentation of classlessness.
Secondly, as hero, Leamas’s is “the movement of a solitary hero through a 
sociological landscape of a fixity that fuses the world inside the novel with the world 
outside” (B. Anderson, p. 30). But, as Leamas traverses a grimy, grey London, the 
landscape shown is an anything but “modernised” Britain of the Swinging Sixties: more 
the austere, monochrome Britain of the immediate post-war that inspired Orwell’s 
dystopian Airstrip One. The Spy's Britain contrasts sharply with the Britain presented in 
Call. Where in Call we have Smiley’s “unrespectable” gentleman’s club, The Spy's tawdry 
sex club (Spy, p. 63) is hardly Larkin’s anno mirabilis of the Beatles and sexual
77Q •intercourse. Contrasting even with Scarr’s fly-by-night entrepreneurialism, the working 
class simply isn’t working in The Spy, with a Labour Exchange a major focus (p. 30), 
alongside a grocer’s offering tick (p. 44) and a prison (pp. 45-47). Leamas’s flat is “Small 
and squalid, done in brown paint [...] fraying brown carpets [with] clumsy darkwood 
furniture, like something from a seaman’s hostel” (p. 27) with a gas fire. This suggests 
redundancy, itinerancy, functional decor, and is in glaring contrast to Smiley’s Chelsea 
home’s wealth, homeliness, and tasteful decor: “books everywhere [...] a pretty room; tall 
with eighteenth century mouldings, long windows and a good fireplace” (p. 54). These 
contrasts cannot but suggest that this democratic historical moment is a degraded one, a
277 Leamas assaults a grocer (Spy, p. 45); he attacks a prisoner with a hoe (p. 47); and attacks a guard in the 
GDR: “He wondered if  he’d killed the guard. He hoped so” (p. 163).
278 Leamas considers “[driving] the side o f his right hand into Peters’ throat, smashing the promontory o f the 
thorax” (p. 116).
279 “Sexual intercourse began / In nineteen sixty-three [...] Between the end o f the Chatterley ban / And the 
Beatles’ first LP,” Philip Larkin, ‘Anno Mirabilis’ [1967] Collected Poems (London: Faber, 1988), p. 167.
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shabbiness both moral and material as the “mass” moves into the mainstream. The 
classless -  increasingly figured as working class -  are thus negatively associated with the 
very decline that Wilsonian modernisation was designed to dispel.
Thirdly, Leamas may be voguely “irreverent” in speech, but in terms of his actions, 
he is entirely obedient to the dominant class hierarchy. Leamas goes to some personal 
inconvenience and discomfort to do exactly what the state, via establishment figure, 
Control, with gentlemanly Smiley in shadowy attendance, tells him to. Leamas does 
express a kind of class hatred when he fully understands Control’s plot: “‘I can see them 
working it out, they’re so damned academic,”’ (Smiley tends to conduct meetings at his 
gentleman’s club; Control is “donnish”, Spy, p. 17): “‘I can see them sitting round a fire in 
one of their smart bloody clubs’” (p. 227). But Leamas also makes a very strong defence 
of these ruling class figures’ plot (p. 231). Even Leamas’s most famous speech is more an 
assertion of ‘fallen’ human nature than of a trenchant anti-establishment stance: “What do 
you think spies are: priests, saints and martyrs? They’re a squalid procession of vain fools 
[...] pansies, sadists and drunkards, people who play cowboys and Indians to brighten their 
rotten lives” (p. 231). Classlessness here -  and in society -  is simply a contemporary 
veneer of irreverence that masks adherence to traditional class distinctions and hierarchies. 
The emergent here simply regurgitates the dominant.
Fourthly, Leamas is partly induced to accept the GDR mission by ruling-class 
Control offering him money: the “purely narcotic effects of prosperity” that created 1960s 
classlessness (Anderson, ‘Wilsonism’ p. 4).281 But as Williams claimed, “More money in 
more pockets will mean [...] classlessness” but this is “the small change of the system” 
while the system itself, “that quite different ‘money’ which is capital [...] the ownership 
and creation of the means of social life itself’ remains “unaltered in any major way”
280 Critics witnessed to this class dynamic: “The tension between the amateur and all-round attitude o f the 
gentleman and the specialist attitude o f the professional” (Sauerberg, p. 104); “A really jeering attack on the 
upper-class [...] detestation o f the [...] lower-class spy in the field for his upper-class administrative 
superiors” (Rockwell, p. 336).
281 Control tells Leamas, ‘“I think you might make a lot o f money out of [the operation]’” (Spy p. 22).
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(<Orwell, p. 24). Indeed, social mobility under Wilson proved relative: “as workers bought 
houses and fridges, so the ‘middle class’ bought second homes and freezers” (Leys, p.
173), while, despite attempted meritocratisation, the class structure tended to reproduce 
itself, especially in Leamas’s civil service (Leys, p. 81). Admitted into the anterooms of 
state power, Leamas remains economically lower class, while the real power remains with 
the elite ruling class of Fawley and Control, possessed of the passes and the capital.
Fifthly, Leamas’s classlessness in The Spy is actually disempowering, as it has 
atomised him. This atomisation has its roots in genre, “alone, competitive, sexy” (as 
Palmer calls the generic spy hero, p. 24), but the effect of the loner hero -  from the Great 
Detective, through the hardboiled “shamus”, to Ambler’s “innocent abroad” -  is to abstract 
the individual from community in the real world (even as, ironically, the individualist hero 
protects the collective community). Material improvements in working class life created by 
the Long Boom and Welfare State meant many moved up the class ‘ladder’, but became 
more individually motivated (Leys, p. 175), losing the collective motivation Williams 
defines as working class culture’s core -  and losing also its locus of resistance against the 
ruling class.282 The establishment’s investment in such atomisation is relayed by Control 
fostering Leamas’s isolation as a “cover story”: Control tells him to avoid “old friends” 
and to cultivate a loner image (Spy, p. 23). Thus classlessness is depicted as atomisation, 
even a means of manipulating the lower orders. Again, when sent to prison, “[Leamas] 
preserved from collectivisation some discernible part of his personality; he could not be 
drawn at moments of sentiment to talk of his girl, his family or his children” (Spy, p. 47). 
The individual is prized over the communal here, while “collectivization” even links this to 
Soviet Communism 283 In turn, the working class either reject Leamas (the prisoners; the 
Street) or don’t recognise him as their own: “‘he was a gent’” one character says,
282 “Improvement is sought, not in the opportunity to escape from one’s class, or to make a career, but in the 
general and controlled advance of all” (Williams, Culture, p. 326).
283 Notably, where Leamas keeps the IRA prisoner at a distance (Spy, p. 46), Communist spy George Blake 
made sufficiently strong connection with Sean Bourke that Bourke helped Blake escape.
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inaccurately (p. 106). Classless Leamas is “alone, competitive, sexy”: but also, it will turn 
out, powerless. The dominant stays dominant; the emergent doesn’t emerge.
The Spy's national allegory and suggests that, separated from community, the 
classless (Leamas) are easily manipulated to push themselves to extremes of productivity 
to secure the ruling class (Control). Then, their use over, the classless are not rewarded by 
social ascent but shot down in the very act of climbing. Classlessness then is no neutrality, 
no no-man’s land. The ‘message’ is that class is not escapable: not in the snobbish sense 
based on “accent, clothes, tastes, furnishing, food” (Williams, Orwell, p. 24), but rather the 
structures of society: the class system.284 To provide a telling parallel: power resides only 
with 1984's Inner Party: Winston and Julia’s Outer Party really have no more power than 
the proles, of whom O’Brien declares: “‘The proletarians will never revolt, not in a 
thousand years or a million. They cannot,”’ (1984, p. 100) 285 Similarly, in The Spy, ruling 
class power is entrenched and the lower classes beneath it (Leamas), after being proposed 
as heroic modem everymen, are revealed ultimately as passive pawns: deferential, 
unreflective, atomised, unable to effect change.286 Whether this national allegory is 
despairing or triumphant can only be speculative: likely it derives from competing 
anxieties: fear of the rebranded-as-classless violent, degraded “mass” on one hand -  and 
unease with the establishment’s feudal reflux on the other.
In any case The Spy’s national allegory proved inaccurate. While Wilson’s limited
9R7attempts to restructure society failed, sabotaged by establishment interests, his 
government’s attempts to push capitalist growth for the benefit of all quickly found the 
state at war with a far-from-“modemised” -  or indeed powerless -  traditional working 
class: ironic for a Labour government. The rhetoric of ‘classlessness’ quickly disappeared
284 “Class is a powerful and continuing economic relationship -  as between the owners o f property and 
capital and the owners only o f labour and skill,” Raymond Williams, Orwell (Glasgow: Fontana, 1971).
285 “[Orwell] sees the working class as a class without a voice, without an idea, without resources, it’s a class 
without consciousness” not a “countervailing popular force” (Campbell, in Samuel, p. 228).
286 “The proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class”, Marx & Engels, Communist Manifesto (p. 91).
287 Williams is only semi-correct to call Wilsonism “Newspeak” (Williams, Orwell, p. 75): there was a 
political project, even if  both technocracy and classlessness were largely semantic.
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from British politics.288 An attempt to hobble the militant working class movement (via 
1969’s anti-union In Place o f Strife proposals), also failed, and that class asserted their 
power throughout the 1970s by bringing down the governments of Heath (1974) and 
Callaghan (1979). That Thatcher effectively ‘completed’ Wilson’s project of the hobbling 
of labour and the atomisation of the working class, should not allow retrospect to cloud 
1963’s reality of a potent British working class, contra The Spy’s narrative trajectory’s 
‘message’. This is to leap ahead however: now let us make a study of the representation of 
the British state in The Spy.
* * *
288 A British Election Survey after Wilson’s 1964 win found only 5% calling themselves ‘classless’. This 
classless category had increased by only 1% by 2005. Anthony Heath, Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2009/oct/07/class-influence-british-sense-identitv, accessed 10/6/14.
2. “We are Defensive”: British State ‘Neutrality’
The contradictory disavowal and defence of the state in Call is repeated in The Spy, but 
with even greater ambiguity. While the focus is not this time on the state’s bureaucracy, 
and new hero Leamas is a mere functionary rather than a member of the establishment, 
Leamas, no less than Smiley, still works for the British state. Indeed for all his surface 
disrespect of authority, Leamas serves the state beyond the call of duty via a hugely 
demanding operation, and upholds the state -  including Control’s plot that exploits him -  
until the novel’s very last page. The deep state in Spy is a ruthless monolith, exemplified 
by Control’s cynical plot, which expands the bureaucracy theme into a sinister expediency: 
an “instrumental rationality through which technical questions become split from ethical 
[...] ones”.289 Indeed, with this fact little noticed in reviews, le Carre felt compelled to 
highlight this issue of expedient morality:
Western inhibitions spring from the Christian and humanist ethic that the individual 
is worth more than the collective. In espionage [...] Western man sacrifices the 
individual to defend the individual’s right against the collective (‘To Russia’, p. 5).
Into this gloss is wrapped the novel’s central ambiguity: if the British state is expedient 
only in imitation of, and in defence against, a political enemy that threatens Britain’s way 
of life, is the British state therefore justified? This chapter will show that, again, the 
novel’s disavowals of the state are a distraction, a faultline, and that the text implies that 
such a defence of the British state is justified. The chapter will begin by examining the 
discursive mode through which the British state and its ideology is both denied and 
ultimately asserted.
289 Paul Hoggett in Du Gay (ed.), Values o f Bureaucracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 169- 
70.
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English Empiricism and the British State
When naive young Communist librarian, Liz Gold, asks her older lover, Alec Leamas, 
what he believes in, Leamas replies: ‘“I believe an eleven bus will take me to 
Hammersmith. I don’t believe it’s driven by Father Christmas’” (Spy, p. 36). This is 
English empiricism -  Winston Smith’s ‘“It exists’ he cried” (1984, p. 283); Dr Johnson 
kicking the wall -  empiricism as subjective, experience-based ‘knowledge’. More 
correctly, Perry Anderson calls this “pseudo-empiricism”: subjective ‘evidence’ based on 
‘common sense’ rather than scientifically recordable data. Anderson calls such empiricism 
an ideology,290 neatly summarised by Buzard, “The Western ideology which proposes that
^ Q 1
the West has no ideology, that it has only its cherished ‘way of life’.” However I accept 
Anderson’s antagonist, E.P. Thompson’s nuance that empiricism is an ‘idiom’ via which
90 9Western ideology is naturalised as commonsensical.
In The Spy this empirical tradition is modernised via the American hardboiled 
detective genre and the British Angry Young Men into an abrasive, irreverent ‘nihilism’ 
via Leamas. “Leamas was not a reflective man, and not a particularly philosophical one,” 
we are told, early on (Spy, p. 13). “’Oh for Christ’s sake’” Leamas snaps to another 
question about his ‘philosophy’ (p. 133). Leamas is espousing “the tough, no-nonsense 
professionalism of a new meritocracy, recognising no loyalties of class” that this thesis has 
shown to mask a passive acceptance of the status quo (Bennett & Woollacott, p. 239). 
Critics recognise Leamas’s common sense,293 sometimes his antipathy to ideas -  or 
“theory”,294 but almost never that his non-ideological stance is disingenuous. So, that 
Leamas is, in that conversation with Liz, posing as a drunken ex-spy, at the British state’s 
behest, in order to attract Eastern Communists, distinctly troubles his own emphasis on
290 P. Anderson, ‘Socialism and Pseudo-Empiricism’,passim.
291 In Downing and Bazargan, p. 157.
292 Thompson, ‘Peculiarities’, p. 336. Thompson was defending himself from Perry Anderson’s accusations 
of empiricism (‘Socialism’, passim).
293 Dobel calls Leamas a “common sense agent” (p. 195) without recognising the anti-philosophical 
implications.
294 “Leamas’s theory-despising short-range ‘commonsense’” (Barley p. 41).
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empirical surface as transparent meaning. Moreover it renders specious Leamas’s attempt 
to establish himself as neutral, to set himself apart from the state.
In another key passage that “asserts his privacy and individuality against the state” 
(Easthope, p. 155), Leamas watches a girl feeding birds on a beach in Holland:
He knew what it was then that Liz had given him [...] it was the caring about little 
things -  the faith in ordinary life [...] It was this respect for triviality which he had 
never been allowed to possess; whether it was bread for the seagulls or love, 
whatever it was he would go back and find it; he would make Liz find it for him 
(Spy, p. 100).
This recalls Winston and Julia watching a working class washerwoman (1984, p. 250-1): 
observation of empirical “life” affirming “ordinary” love. Leamas sums up his imagined 
rejection of the political for the private, with the phrase “come in from the cold”. Indeed 
for many critics love affirming “ordinary life” is the very meaning of “in from the cold”.295 
But as Hugh Kenner complained, this reduces the novel’s meaning to a naive empiricism:
One can value nothing but immediate human relations: Leamas loves Liz, food is 
good, bed is warm [...] rendering] specious every principle of action except the one 
that carries hot beans to the gullet, or girls to the pallet. [...] The reassurance [le 
Carre’s readers] crave he amply provides: reassurance that to what really matters, the 
immediate satisfaction of modest desire, everything over which men lose sleep is 
irrelevant; discipline, reason, civilization, guff like all that.296
295 See: Lewis, p. 77; Beene, p. 58; “Leamas’s despair is mitigated by Liz’s simple trust in ordinary 
experience” (Cawelti & Rosenberg, p. 167); Woods, p. 125; Hepburn explicitly opposes “ideology” to love. 
(Hepburn, p. 170); William Boyd, ‘Rereading: ‘The Spy Who Came in from the Cold” , Guardian, 24 July 
2010, http://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/iul/24/carre-spv-came-cold-boyd, accessed 7/2/15; Yildiz & 
Durmus, p. 53.
296 Hugh Kenner, ‘The Spy Comes into the Drugstore”, National Review, 27 July 1965, pp. 655-656.
99
This is acute about the way the warm, banal and personal (see also: Winston’s cherished 
scraps of childhood memories; a girl feeding birds) is valorised over the cold, collective 
and political in empiricism. Kenner rightly links this to Leamas’s statement ‘“I don’t 
believe in anything’” (Spy, p. 231), but fails to see that Leamas’s statement is 
disingenuous, because naive empiricist “ordinary life” is itself ideological, a naturalisation 
of Western capitalist society as against Communist ‘ideological’ existence.
Just as the washerwoman scene occurs immediately before Winston and Julia’s 
arrest, this beach scene occurs while Leamas is in captivity in a Communist safe house, 
working for the British state. Like Winston and Julia in 1984 then, Liz and Leamas’s love
297is presented as empirical personal reality in opposition to the abstraction of politics. 
However, Leamas’s desire to “come in from the cold” is specifically cited as to England, 
another valorisation of the British ‘way of life’. What’s more, there is clear evidence later 
in the book that the pair’s relationship is actually far from organic; that they were brought 
together by the state. Liz complains “‘Heavens above, Alec, can they even tell when 
people will fall in love? [...] I feel dirty, Alec, as if I ’d been put out to stud’” (p. 228). This 
parallels the state’s repossession of Julia and Winston’s relationship. There are no no­
man’s lands.
Let us now examine Control’s briefing speech to Leamas, as it is the novel’s primary 
exposition of British state ideology. Control is a figure of the British establishment, the 
novel’s representative of the deep state. Control deploys an empirical, common sense 
idiom throughout (“‘do you think that’s fair?”’) with Leavisite formulations like, “‘You 
can’t [...] can you now?”’ (Spy, p. 20). This rhetorical mode helps naturalise British state 
actions as ‘neutral’. Leamas is as impatient with Control’s rationalisations as he is with 
Liz’s inquiry about belief, but only because he is eager to act on behalf of the state, not 
talk. In fact, Control’s rationale is just a sophist’s version of Leamas’s own empiricism: 
emergent and dominant merge.
297 With Julia and Winston’s affair conducted in defiance o f the state’s Anti-Sex League, “Their embrace 
[...] was a political act” {1984, p. 145).
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Control claims an equivalence of “methods” between the Soviets and the West (p.
20) which most (Western) critics take as the totality of book’s message.298 Critics miss 
Control’s three key statements that underlie -  and undermine -  this claim. Firstly, Control 
says: “We are never going to be aggressors [...] We do disagreeable things but we are 
defensive’” (Spy p. 20). This is a crucial, empirical assertion of Soviet aggression 
threatening ‘innocent’ Britain. It was also standard Western propaganda: “the Soviet 
Union, was consistently presented as expansionary and offensive in contrast with the West, 
which was presented as essentially defensive” (Lashmar & Oliver, p. 128). This assertion 
elides Western provocations like missiles in Turkey, the US nurturing European capitalism 
via the Marshall Plan, ongoing international imperialism, the US’s interference in 
Communist regimes throughout the world, West German rearmament, and indeed in this 
fictional context, Britain’s penetration of Communist intelligence services. Control’s 
pseudo-empiricism does violence to the concept of “defensive”, unless one regards 
Communism’s very existence as ‘aggressive’ (as opposed to merely ‘offensive’).
Secondly, Control declares: “‘we do disagreeable things so that ordinary people [...] 
can sleep safely in their beds at night’” (Spy p. 20). So Britain defends an innocent, neutral 
“ordinary life”, not an ideology. Thirdly, Control carefully separates “benevolent” ‘ideals’ 
(distinct from ‘ideology’), a ‘way of life’, from state ‘methods’ to protect those ideals and 
way of life: “‘You can’t be less ruthless than the opposition simply because your 
government’s policy is benevolent, can you now?”’ (Spy, p. 20). This suggests both that 
Soviet ‘ideals’ (‘ideology’) and methods (‘means’) are the same (pursuit of power), and 
that the British state, in doing ‘wicked things’ -  e.g. sacrificing Liz to safeguard Mundt’s 
position -  is simply keeping up with the Soviets. In this speech then, Control effectively 
denies a Western ideology while perpetuating it; avows Western defensiveness whilst
298 “No one system is better than another”, Grella, p. 136; See also: Gillespie, p. 58; Symons, p. 282; 
Rutherford (in H. Bloom, p. 16); “no essential differences, methodologically or morally, between East and 
West”, Alan R. Booth, ‘Development o f the Espionage Film’, in Spy Fiction, Spy Films and Real Intelligence 
ed. by Wesley K. Wark (London: Frank Cass, 1991), p. 151; “the West is no different to the East [...] in the 
ideology of the novel” (J. Thompson, p. 158); Hoffman, pp. 75-76.
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asserting Western political imperatives. This shows how pseudo-empiricism becomes 
subjectivity and sophistry. Indeed, “we are defensive” has an entirely different potential 
interpretation of ‘we are sensitive to criticism’ or even ‘we have a guilty conscience’. Yet 
most critics accept Control’s rationale:299 so does Leamas, by accepting the mission.
In a later parallel scene to Liz’s discussion of ‘belief, Leamas will again deny 
having any philosophy to his Communist GDR interrogator, Jens Fiedler: “‘What do you 
mean, a philosophy? [...] We’re not Marxists, we’re nothing. Just people” (p. 133). 
Communists have ideology, claims Leamas, whereas Westerners are (ordinary) “people”, 
thus like Leamas, “nothing”: ideologically neutral.300 By extension, Communists are not 
people. At the point Leamas claims this ideological neutrality he is operating, in great 
danger, undercover on behalf of the West, of the British state, for which he has already 
posed as a drunk, assaulted a grocer, and been to prison. Is he merely defending 
‘neutrality’ itself? This Western “neutrality” trope is popular with critics -  Beene is 
typical: “In the ensuing ideological confrontation, the West was at a philosophical 
disadvantage; it [...] had no appealing affirmative doctrine to counter Soviet ideology” 
(Beene, p. 47).301 With Orwell having cited his own venerated ‘empiricism’ as what has 
been defeated by the Party in 1984, The Spy's Fiedler/Leamas interrogation parallels 
1984's interrogation scenes, where Winston tries to cling to the empirical against 
O’Brien’s ‘ideological’ brainwashing. “‘How can I help seeing what is in front of my 
eyes?”’ Winston cries (1984, p. 287). Leamas’s neutral empiricism is thus set against 
Fiedler’s ‘ideology’ as objective ‘truth’ against subjective Ties’, as defensive against 
offensive.
299 E.g. Dobel, p. 198.
300 Le Carre said something very similar: “Western democracy seems to have only one unifying force [...]  
that individuals are more valuable than philosophies,” Le Carre, ‘The Writer and the Spy’, Sunday 
Telegraph, 29 March 1964, p. 18. “Philosophies” exist only one side. In both cases there is a denigration of  
philosophy.
301 “Leamas believes that philosophies are dangerous because they make people willing to destroy for their 
sake” (Cawelti & Rosenberg, p. 161). Hoffman, a former spy, claims a similar “ideological indifference” to 
Western spies (Hoffman, p. 12). “The innocent middle [...] caught in a cross-fire o f ideologies perpetuated 
by the political oligarchy”” (Ambrosetti, pp. 103-104), which suggests ideologies o f East and West, located 
to left and right o f ‘neutral’ Liz and Leamas.
302 “The empirical method of thought [...] could not survive in a strictly regimented society” {1984, p. 218)
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Leamas’s admission of an ideological position only occurs after his discovery that 
the entire purpose of the operation has been to secure the hated Mundt as a British agent. 
He snaps at Liz:
‘They need him so that the great moronic mass that you admire can sleep soundly in 
their beds at night [...] They need him for the safety of ordinary crummy people like 
you and me’ (Spy, p. 231).
We should not be distracted by the bogus nihilism of “moronic” or “crummy”: these are 
rhetorical synonyms for the novel’s venerated “ordinary”, and Leamas includes himself 
and Liz (again, Communist citizens are not “ordinary”). The point is that Leamas is 
parroting Control’s briefing: “We do disagreeable things so that ordinary people [...] can 
sleep safely in their beds at night” (Spy, p. 20).303 The emergent ventriloquises the 
dominant. Given that Leamas switches his loyalties like the state redefines the enemy a la 
1984,304 is this satire, whereby Leamas, like Winston is a passive dupe of British 
totalitarianism (the novel’s Nazi alliance being a suitably totalitarian marker)? Unlike 
O’Brien’s gleefully irrational rationales however, Control’s logic is empirically sound, 
within its own parameters of defending British Cold War interests.305 The following 
Leamas speech is not simply Leamas loving Big Brother: there is logic here.
‘This is a war [...] It’s graphic and unpleasant because it’s fought on a tiny scale, at 
close range; fought with a wastage of innocent life sometimes, I admit. But it’s 
nothing, nothing at all beside other wars -  the last or the next. [...] W e’re a tiny 
price to pay’ (Spy, p. 231).
303 This assertion o f the political imperative is noted only by Panek (p. 252) and Goodman (p. 168).
304 C.f. an IRD member’s insistence, “this paper [‘Foundations of Stalinism’] was not propaganda, it was 
simply a collection o f facts” (Smith, in Bamhisel and Turner p. 114).
305 The recent exposure of British-run Soviet agent, Col. Oleg Penkovsky and associate Greville Wynne, in 
May 1963, revealed the kind of ‘interest’ Britain might be protecting inside the Iron Curtain.
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It is however British state logic. We might ask why is this War’s killing of civilians worse 
than, say, the British massacre at Hola, Kenya (1959), or indeed Britain’s fire-bombing of 
Dresden during World War II (Call, pp. 119-126)? Because the citizens are British? But in 
war, states routinely sacrifice their citizens. Le Carre’s gloss suggests there is something 
aberrant in the Western state’s expedient sacrifice of the individual: “the humanist ethic 
that the individual is worth more than the collective” (‘To Russia’, p. 5). But we recall 
Wallerstein’s point that liberalism is “the ideology of the strong state in the sheep’s 
clothing of individualism” (Wallerstein, p. 10). This is an unsolvable contradiction within 
liberal society. Liberalism’s claim on humanist value of the individual is undermined by 
intrinsic anti humanist propensities, be-that workforce alienation, the violence used to 
maintain the system, or the brutal enforcing of that system abroad. This tendency Fiedler 
quite correctly calls “shrouded in a kind ofpudeur Anglaise” (p. 124). But these shrouded 
anxieties make their return. Control’s expedient alliance with a Nazi could be seen as 
reflective of anxieties about contemporary British support of far-right regimes in Greece, 
or British support of rightist Suharto in Indonesia against Communists (Lashmar & Oliver, 
pp. 1-10), or indeed former Nazis in power throughout West Germany.306 The Spy's 
simultaneous satire and endorsement of the British state shows Western ideology coming 
into conflict with itself: empirical “ordinary life” in conflict with empirical “defence” of 
the British liberal capitalist system against Communism. This is a faultline in the book and 
its reception: thus, for instance, the polarity between le Carre’s anti-state gloss and the 
critical minority report that asserts The Spy condones Control’s plot, and the logic of 
Control and Leamas’s rationales just cited.
306 Former Nazi, Heinz Felfe, in the BND (West German intelligence), was later exposed as a Soviet spy. 
Many ex-Nazis retained positions o f power in the GDR, Feiwel Kupferberg, The Rise and Fall o f  the 
German Democratic Republic (Piscataway: Transaction, 2002), p. 166.
307 “Despite its critical tone, the story [...] seems to defend the sacrifices as sometimes necessary” (Aronoff, 
p. 93). “A defence of values which make the sacrifices of Leamas [and] Liz [...]  necessary” (Sauerberg, p. 
54). “The fact that [securing Mundt’s position] condemns them both to death does not dispose o f [Control’s] 
contention” (Rutherford in H. Bloom, p. 17).
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This faultline in liberal thought is further indicated by the contradictory role of 
Smiley throughout the book. Smiley is said to “disapprove” of the Leamas operation (Spy, 
p. 56), yet he “sees the necessity”; lends his house to the plot; colludes in Leamas’s 
deception by ‘briefing’ him on Mundt; (deliberately?) sets up Liz by visiting her; then 
oversees the operation’s conclusion at the Wall.308 Deploying Smiley, intertextually 
associated with the compassionate state, is an attempt to resolve these contradictions: to 
simultaneously assert an empirical need to defend Britain alongside an empirical assertion 
of Britain as liberal, decent and neutral. That this attempt fails is indicated by the fact that 
some critics still see Smiley as endorsing the operation'.309 Thus is empiricism in Western 
liberalism in conflict with itself: there are no no-man’s lands.
We can conclude then that empiricism represents no material resistance to a despotic 
state, such as we see in 1984 or The Spy, because its individualistic subjectivism can 
process only what it observes, a superficiality that will almost always reassert the status 
quo.310 Empiricism can conceive no transformative agenda, no way out. Winston’s 
ultimate acceptance of Big Brother and “2+2=5” is the logical endpoint of naive 
empiricism. Appellations of “empiricism” such as this chapter’s are usually a prelude to 
Althusserian anti-humanism. While Althusser’s revelation of how much Western 
“common sense” is ideological has been useful, countering the idea that ideology is on the 
Soviet side only, for Althusserians, ironically, the state is equally inescapable, the status 
quo as impossible to reconceive. Easthope is so anti Winston Smith’s empiricism that he 
ends up valorising O’Brien’s rejection of a stable reality (“2+2=5”),311 and thus embracing
308 Radio 4 ’s The Complete Smiley (adapted by Robert Forrest) furthered this ambiguity by giving Smiley 
both a more central role in the “ghastly trick” and also telling Leamas not to accept the operation.
309 Smiley “carries out a vicious double-cross o f his own agent,” Pearl K. Bell, ‘Coming in from the Cold 
War’, New Leader, June 1974, pp. 15-16. “Smiley [...] sets up the betrayal o f the hero's mistress” ( ‘The 
Incongruous Spy’, Time, 1965, p. 62). Lewis views Smiley as “a shadowy and sinister figure” (p. 65) who 
“has helped to engineer her fate” (Lewis, p. 71). When Smiley shouts, “‘where’s the girl’” what he “wants to 
know is not whether the girl is safe but whether the girl is dead” (Boyd, Guardian).
310 O’Brien: “‘You believe that reality is something objective, external, existing in its own right. You also 
believe that the nature o f reality is self-evident, but I tell you, Winston, that reality is not external. Reality 
exists in the human mind and nowhere else’” (1984, p. 285).
311 Easthope, pp. 158-9. See also: Christopher Norris, ‘Language, Truth and Ideology: Orwell and the Post­
war Left’ in Norris, pp. 243-44.
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despotism. This is a philosophical Stockholm Syndrome, whereby, transfixed by the 
Gorgon gaze of ‘power’ -  the state, the system -  Althusserians are rendered as passive as
i n
empiricists. But this is a closed circuit: we do not have a choice only between credulous 
empiricism and playful pessimism, both of which leave the system unchallenged. Cultural 
materialism shows that while it is important to understand the power of state ideology, 
state brainwashing is never entirely complete: thus the emphasis on faultlines. While it is 
important to understand the power of the state, the state is rarely as efficient as O’Brien’s 
or Control’s plots.313 Indeed le Carre later regarded The Spy as “like a fan letter to the 
British secret establishment”.314 Indeed MI5 ‘cleared’ The Spy for publication (Sisman, Ch. 
12, NP), and we only have to compare 1963’s real-life espionage cases to see this: the 
Profumo affair and the Philby defection hardly betokened an almighty, efficient British 
state. This is Operation Margarine again.
So does Leamas finally escape the state in The Spyl Alas not. At the very end when 
Liz is killed and Leamas finally realises the extent of the “tiny price” he and Liz represent, 
he finally rejects the state by choosing to die in no-man’s land. Critics claim Leamas thus 
prioritises the personal over the political: either as an assertion of individualism,315 or of 
love against the collective, monolithic state.316 Suicide is not much of an assertion of 
anything other than romantic morbidity however. Moreover, the individual and the state 
are not so readily separable, particularly not a secret agent o f the British state. Leamas has 
already fulfilled his mission, has secured the state, so his death is just collateral damage in 
achieving the overall objective, “a small price for a big return” as he himself says (Spy, p.
312 Orwell’s is “a politics of pessimism”. Beatrix Campbell, ‘Orwell Revisited’, in Samuel Vol. Ill; a point 
made also by Williams (Orwell, p. 61) and Inglis (p. 106).
313 “Orwell [...] underestimated [...] the sheer incompetence o f the state” (Inglis, p. 106). Le Carre conceded: 
“I don’t think The Spy [...] could happen, because I don’t believe that it’s ever possible to operate such a 
clean conspiracy, where all the pieces fit together [...] if  you have to choose between conspiracy or cock-up, 
my instinct is to go for the cock-up every time.” Miriam Gross, ‘The Secret World o f John le Carre’, The 
Observer, 3 February 1980, p. 33.
314 Le Carre, ‘Foreword’, Lamplighter edition, Looking Glass, p. vii.
315 Leamas “eventually chooses [...] love over professional standards, and by this act he affirms 
individualism over institutional tyranny” (Beene, p. 51); Leamas “wishes to regain his lost sense o f  human 
feeling” from “dehumanizing forces o f twentieth century society” (Woods, p. 125).
316 Leamas’s suicide is a “humanly courageous protest against the code of expediency and in support o f  Liz’s 
rival code of love” (Lewis, p. 77).
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230). In conventional war Leamas’s name might feature on a plaque -  erected by the state. 
Empiricism is again in conflict with itself. Leamas dies for love as an expression of 
empirical Western values; but Leamas also dies for the asserted empirical political 
necessity of ‘defending’ Britain. This contradiction cannot be solved: the liberal state is 
inevitably violent and, like all states, sacrifices individuals in pursuit of its collective 
needs. Wedded to the promotion of its decency and neutrality, liberalism cannot admit this, 
and so we have seen a whole series of strategies to deny and occlude this reality. An 
equally potent strategy is to deflect the violence and expediency onto the political enemy, 
to present the British as guilty only of imitation and defending their legitimate interests. 
“We are defensive”.
* * *
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4. “Party Terms”: Political Enemy Ideology
By beginning and ending with citizens gunned down by the GDR at the Berlin Wall,317 The 
Spy Who Came in from the Colds very iconography suggests an intransigent Eastern 
Communism. The erection of the Berlin Wall by the GDR in August 1961 was presented 
in the West as aggressive. Le Carre later claimed the Wall made espionage “more 
clandestine, more perilous, more questionable” and called the Wall “a perfect symbol of 
the monstrosity of ideology gone mad”.318 For Western propaganda already presenting the 
Soviet Bloc as a prison incarcerating its citizens (Shaw, pp. 74-5),319 the Wall’s 
fortifications and armed guards were perfect ammunition: this was ‘ideology’ militarily 
enforced on a citizenry divorced from empirical “ordinary life”. Leamas’s focalisation 
calls the Wall, “A dirty, ugly thing of breeze blocks and strands of barbed wire, lit with 
cheap yellow light, like the backdrop for a concentration camp” (Spy, p. 10). 
“Concentration camp” emphasises the Eastern Europe-as-prison theme and invokes 
Arendt’s links between Communism and fascism. We see these prisoner/captive 
population images throughout The Spy.320 Few Western critics challenge this presentation 
of the Berlin Wall: “built to quarantine West Berlin and seal desperate East Germans from 
freedom” (Beene, p. 49). In such formulations, the ‘ideological’ East is empirically hostile 
to the ‘neutral’ West, which is straightforwardly synonymous with ‘freedom’.321
The idea that ‘ideology’ is the dominant motor of totalitarian society is found in 
Arendt: “the difference between ends and means evaporates [...] and the result is the
317 East credits le Carre as the first writer to use the Wall: Andy East, ‘The Spy in the Dark: A History of 
Espionage Fiction’, Armchair Detective 19:1 (1986), 35. Life declared a “Berlin setting” key feature o f the 
“new-style” spy thriller (Knickerbocker, p. 13). Len Deighton followed with Funeral in Berlin (1964), 
filmed, like The Spy in 1965; which also featured an expedient British state alliance with a Nazi, and several 
Berlin Wall scenes, culminating in a shooting at the Wall.
318 Le Carre, ‘Foreword to the Lamplighter Edition’, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold (Sevenoaks: 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1990), p. 6.
319 “Our Western propaganda was [...] entirely true: the East German regime was indeed hated by those it 
governed” (Spy, ‘Lamplighter’, p. 7). This was written in December 1989; the Wall was opened in 
November.
320 The Wall intersects the book at the middle too, when, Leamas will observe, “dragons’ teeth, observation 
towards and double aprons of barbed wire” (Spy, p. 117). The GDR safe-house Leamas is held in is described 
as “like something from a prison camp” (Spy, p. 126).
321 “The Wall [...] is a barrier to prevent East Germany’s own citizens from escaping to the West,” 
(Rutherford, in H. Bloom, p. 17).
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monstrous immorality of ideological politics” (Arendt, Totalitarianism, p. 249). ‘Ideology’ 
morphs in the course of a sentence from a political principle into a mechanism of pure 
power, while the West (like le Carre criticism), is exempt from “ideological politics”. This 
is particularly striking regarding The Spy, as the “ends and means” theme is emphasised 
via Communist subordination of individual to state (Fiedler’s speech; Prison Wardress).
Let us briefly try and balance this assertion of an ideology-driven GDR. It was true 
that, “the East German economy was being bled to death” by emigration to the West 
(Isaacs & Downing, p. 191), and Eastern methods of dealing with defectors were summary. 
But both the USSR and GDR felt their political system was under threat from the West. 
“Anti-Fascist Protection Rampart” was not mere rhetoric: the Wall actualised genuine 
Soviet fear of a reunified Germany: the deterrence to defectors was a bonus (Isaacs & 
Downing, pp. 184-188). Consequently the Wall was a Cold-War faultline, highlighted 
when the opposing side’s tanks faced each other off at Checkpoint Charlie on 27 October 
1961 (Isaacs & Downing p. 200; Sisman claims Cornwell was present, in a diplomatic 
capacity). Indeed, in The Spy's opening scene, there is direct reference to the Berlin crisis 
when the checkpoint guards tell Leamas, “‘We can’t give covering fire [to Leamas’s agent 
as he crosses the Wall] they tell us there’d be war if we did’” (Spy, p. 9). With new US 
President Kennedy raising defence spending sharply and the Soviets having developed the 
thermonuclear bomb, such a war would be total war: annihilation?22 Kennedy admitted 
the Wall actually lessened the danger of military conflict over Berlin.323 So while the Wall 
in history may have helped keep the Cold ‘peace’, in The Spy the Wall is a symbol of 
Communist ‘ideology’ and aggression.
The Spy offers some rare scenes in le Carre’s work of a Communist country. Despite 
her Communist sympathies, Liz Gold’s visit to the GDR also evokes this 1984 vision of 
‘ideology’ controlling ‘ordinary life’. GDR citizens “talked politics at every meal [...] it
322 Evening News, 26 July 1961, p. 7, ‘President Orders Defence Build-up to Meet Berlin Threat: Kennedy 
Warns Krushchev ‘W e’ll Fight If We Have To’.’
323 Frederick Taylor, The Berlin Wall: 13 August 1961 - 9 November 1989 (London: Bloomsbury, 2007).
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was like living in a religious community” (Spy, p. 175), a cult. There are, as in 1984, 
endless shortages, lack of the sensual “ordinary things” of life -  “The little house she 
stayed in was dark and meagre, the food was poor [...] you felt the world was better for 
your empty stomach” (p. 175).324 The Spy presents a lack of popular support for the 
regime, thus the poor attendance at the branch meeting (pp. 176-7); the bunting around the 
picture of Lenin is “dusty” (p. 177), a Communist icon neglected, unloved. The regime is 
maintained under coercion -  witness Frau Ebert’s fear of the Party official (p. 178), akin to 
the fear of officialdom in 1984. So for all this ‘ideology’, the dreariness and fearfulness of 
life in the GDR offers no “greater good” only elite power for its own sake.
We witness a powerful presentation of the ‘ideology’-driven GDR state in the secret
' i j c
Tribunal where Leamas is tried. Leamas sees the Tribunal’s President with her “small, 
cruel eyes” (p. 217) as grotesque, acknowledging her gender with a “shiver” (p. 179). The 
President has a commonality with Fleming’s Communist grotesque, Rosa Klebb (From 
Russia With Love, 1957). There is little more subtlety in le Carre’s Manichaean portrait: 
the powerful elite is driven by cruelty, not principle, and delivers a travesty of 
‘ideologically’ driven ‘justice’, acquitting Mundt and arresting and probably executing 
Fiedler (p. 228). Fittingly, the Tribunal scene is leeched of colour, bar the saturated red of 
a suspended Red Star, “ordinary life” eclipsed by ‘ideology’: ‘ideology’ that only spells 
power not philosophy. That Liz and Leamas’s personal relationship is exposed in this 
political context is further illustration of the trampling of empirical values by Communist 
ideology (as Winston and Julia’s relationship is exhibited in 1984).
Emphasising the “party terms” outlined here -  an ideology-driven expediency -  The 
Spy gives far more space than any other le Carre novel to Communist ‘philosophy’, what 
Carre called “the Communist evaluation of the individual’s place in society (‘To Russia’, 
p. 5). Again a study of the literary construct of character is revealing in this respect.
324 Similarly, Leamas is told of “a temporary shortage o f potato” (p. 125) and given “black bread and ersatz 
coffee” (Spy, p. 126).
325 MI6’s Soviet plant, Oleg Penkovsky’s 1962 show-trial may have had input into The Spy's trial scene 
(Hennessy, p. 44).
Characterising Communism
Jens Fiedler is the most sympathetic Communist character in le Carre’s 1960s and 70s 
novels. Personable, thoughtful, patient with the truculent Leamas, Fiedler however, is also 
The Spy's O’Brien -  an ideologue of totalitarianism.326 Prior to meeting him, Leamas calls 
Fiedler “‘a savage little bastard’”. Leamas’s focalisation terms Fiedler, “remorseless in the 
destruction of others”, and Leamas claims later that Fiedler tortured Guillam’s agent (Spy, 
p. 118). Moreover, Fiedler, we are told, was “anxious to take part, whatever the personal 
cost, in the construction of Stalin’s Germany” (p. 121). If that were not damning enough, 
Fiedler approvingly quotes Stalin in the main exposition of his ideology to Leamas. This is 
an anachronism at this historical moment: Stalin was discredited in the Eastern Bloc by his 
successor, Khrushchev, who was ubiquitous in the early 1960s Western media. In tandem, 
Walter Ulbricht was temporarily taking a gentler, post-Stalinist approach in Fiedler’s
9 7 7GDR. Let us examine this speech of Fiedler’s, as it is the book’s core exposition of 
Communist ‘ideology’:
‘It is not fashionable to quote Stalin -  but he said once ‘half a million liquidated is a 
statistic, and one man killed in a traffic accident is a national tragedy.’ He was 
laughing, you see, at the bourgeois sensitivities of the mass. He was a great cynic. 
But what he meant is still true: a movement which protects itself against counter­
revolution can hardly stop at the exploitation -  or the elimination, Leamas -  of a few 
individuals. [...] I myself would have put a bomb in a restaurant if it brought us 
further along the road. Afterwards I would draw the balance -  so many women, so 
many children; and so far along the road’ (Spy, pp. 133-134).
326 Fiedler wears an insufficiently black hat for some critics; “he has retained a conscientious concern for 
human life” (Tracy, p. 23). However, Cobbs observes: “to see Fiedler as anything but a ruthless ideologue is 
to misunderstand the character completely.” Cobbs however goes considerably further: “self-professed 
Stalinist who clearly understands the viciousness not only of Communism’s means but also o f  its ends” 
(Cobbs, p. 53, my emphasis).
327 Anthony Kemp-Welch, ‘Stalinism to Solidarity’, in Leffler & Westad (eds.) Cambridge, p. 219.
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Fiedler here rejects the value of the individual as against the needs of the collective. The 
bomb in the restaurant recalls O’Brien condoning throwing sulphuric acid in a child’s face 
in the name of the ‘cause’ (1984 p. 199): both are carefully chosen images for their 
alienating anti-humanism, their extremes of instrumental bureaucratic accounting logic (‘“ I 
would draw the balance’”) is totalitarian. However where is the greater good in Fiedler’s 
speech? What is the objective: “the road” that the bomb gets his state further along? The 
only motive Fiedler cites is preventing “counter-revolution”, easily equated in Western 
sensibilities with Communism retaining undemocratic power. Thus, again the idea of 
power for its own sake, as per O’Brien’s “‘Power is not a means, it is an end’” {1984 p. 
302). Ends and means have merged in Fiedler, but contrary to Arendt’s assertion (Arendt, 
p. 249), it has nothing of ‘ideology’ left in it.328
The text pushes the idea of the parallels between Control and Fiedler’s ideologies. 
Fiedler asks: “‘would you kill a man, an innocent man [...] suppose it were me they 
wanted to kill: would London do it?”’ Leamas replies, ‘“It depends.. .it depends on the 
need’”. Fiedler responds, “‘Ah [...] it depends on the need. Like Stalin, in fact. The traffic 
accident and the statistics’” (p. 173/4). Indeed, we will later find that this, effectively, is 
what London does do. But the presentation of this debate as a defeat for Leamas is 
disingenuous. Because the British “need” has been established to contain “ideals”, a “way 
of life”, a comprehensible “greater good” (to Western readers), Fiedler and Communism’s 
approach by comparison is nihilistic, a pursuit of pure power with no discernible, 
articulated, “greater good”. What’s more, Control has already asserted that Britain only 
imitates Communist methods (“we do disagreeable things, but we are defensive”), methods 
that originate with Communism, which is implicitly offensive. This then is not “moral 
equivalence”.329 The novel may not condone Control/Britain, but in the novel’s terms, 
Fiedler/Communism is worse.
328 In this Western consensus is contained a concept o f a base human nature, to which Stalinism gave full 
rein, but capitalism reins in (Schaub, pp. 7-10).
329 “Fiedler’s arguments are really the same as Control’s” (Beene, p. 53).
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Other Communist characters serve to reassert this anti-individualist expediency 
theme. Leamas focalises GDR agent, Peters, “for whom the end and the means were 
identical” (Spy, p. 81), though Peters -  barely characterised -  does and says nothing to 
support this assertion. The GDR prison wardress who incarcerates Liz after the Tribunal, 
declares: “‘We cannot build Communism without doing away with individualism [...]
They are reactionaries who call themselves progressive: they defend the individual against 
the state”’ (Spy, p. 219). This is another 1984 characterisation, an ‘ideology’-spouting 
automaton, who also now tars Khrushchev as Stalinist by quoting him at his most bullish, 
on the 1956 Hungarian uprising: “‘He said it would never have happened if a couple of 
writers had been shot in time”’ (p. 220).
Compared to such caricatures of Communism, Liz Gold is a more complex case. 
Indeed her characterisation is a further faultline, tracing key contradictions in liberal 
thought. Leamas laughs at Liz when she first declares herself a Communist (p. 36), and 
this condescension pervades her characterisation throughout. In Liz alien Communist 
‘ideology’ is in contradiction with her native British empiricism. After a moment of doubt, 
for instance:
She was suddenly filled with a feeling of warmth and gratitude towards the Party. 
They really were decent people and she was proud and thankful to belong [...] 
Centre was such a wonderful thing -  stem, benevolent, impersonal, perpetual. They 
were good, good people. People who fought for peace (Spy, p. 157).
Although this is presented as close-focalisation, as Barthes points out, ‘objectivity’ always 
smuggles in judgement, and Liz’s thoughts here are being parodied.330 “Warmth and 
gratitude” suggest Liz’s insecure need to belong, even, in a sexist slur, to be controlled;
330 Roland Barthes, ‘An Introduction to the Structural Analysis o f Narrative’, New Literary History (Winter, 
1975), 237-272 (p. 263).
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“stem, benevolent, impersonal, perpetual” ominously suggests Big Brother. Even Liz’s use 
of “peace” mingles naive empiricism (peace as neutral ‘good’) and the ideological 
perversion of language (the discredited Peace Partisans). Thus Communism is, as we saw 
in Call, ominous and threatening whilst also naive and unworldly.331 The reason for this 
faultline in Communist characterisation lies in contradictory ideological desiderata: Liz is 
required both to represent Communism as hardline antihuman ideology and also 
Communism’s antipathy to humanism via her own humanity. But Liz’s naivete as a result 
becomes both a negative and a positive: the reason for Liz’s Communism and what 
ultimately undermines it: Liz’s path to salvation. We will see this again later, with the 
Karla of Smiley’s People.
So, after the GDR party Branch Meeting, Liz is again beset by doubt in the face of 
the empirical ‘reality’ of Communism:
Peace and freedom and equality -  they were facts, of course they were. And what 
about history -  all those laws the Party proved? No, Alec was wrong: truth existed 
outside people, it was demonstrated in history, individuals must bow to it, be crushed 
by it if necessary (Spy, p. 177)
This is another “(s)he loved Big Brother” moment,332 conveying the sterile creepiness of 
‘ideology’. Yet the faultline reappears: Liz’s nai've empiricism struggles with ‘ideology’s 
anti-humanism and her assertion of expediency has a ring, again, of self-persuasion. The 
very inconsistency of Liz’s characterisation then has an ideological anti-Communist logic.
This battle in Liz is effectively won, by the novel’s end, by empiricism, her 
Communism apparently overwhelmed by the ‘reality’ of the GDR. Now this Communist
331 Cornwell had been involved in surveillance o f the CPGB only a few years before (Sisman, NP) and thus 
knew that Liz’s Communist Party o f Great Britain was by this stage riddled by government surveillance and 
thus had very little independence of manoeuvre (Andrew, p. 404).
332 “Everything was all right, the struggle was finished. He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big 
Brother” (1984, p. 342).
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suddenly articulates liberal humanist sentiments wherein individuals’ “love” is pitted 
against the “wicked” state (Spy, p. 229). Leamas upbraids Liz’s inconsistency, and imputes 
the origin of such expediency to Communism. “‘Your Party’s always at war, isn’t it? 
Sacrificing the individual to the mass [...] I never heard that Communists preached the 
sanctity of human life’” (p. 229). Leamas concludes: “‘They’re party terms - a small price 
for a big return. One sacrificed for the many’” (p. 230). Again no principle exists behind 
this Communist expediency: what is the “big return”? But although Liz has previously 
asserted a version of this expedient argument, now she simply reasserts empirical 
humanism, “It’s far more terrible, what they are doing: to find the humanity in people [...] 
and use it to hurt and kill... ’” (p. 231).
The contradictions in Liz’s characterisation are compounded by her death. Leamas’s 
dying vision is of “a small car smashed between great lorries” -  the lorries are the 
opposing Cold War state, he and Liz, the children, the ‘innocent’ victims caught in the 
crossfire (p. 240). The image of the lorries may be an effective rhetorical device for 
suggesting large powers in conflict and the loss of citizens’ life in ideological struggles 
those citizens do not fully understand. But in the context of The Spy's plot the image is as 
disingenuous as the suggestion that Control and Fiedler’s moralities are equivalent. The 
equivalence of the image actually slurs the GDR with an action it is not party to. Because 
Liz is sacrificed by the expedient morality of her own state, not that of the Communist 
GDR. The text is ambiguous, but the most likely interpretation is that Mundt -  or possibly 
Control -  gives the order for Liz’s death, because she is a threat to Mundt’s continued 
security (Liz: “’It seems odd that Mundt let me go [...] I ’m a risk now, aren’t I?” (p. 229). 
Is the GDR equally to blame for the -  critically overlooked -  deaths of the British spies 
that Mundt shoots to maintain his cover? Only by the original sin of being Communist: or 
of building the Berlin Wall -  which is where we came in.
* * *
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5. Means to an End: Conclusion
The Spy gives a highly cynical appraisal of social and political attempts to recalibrate 
Britain as a classless nation. Contra contemporary events like the Philby defection, the 
establishment represented by the novel’s Control has its potency reasserted over the 
passive, manipulable, ultimately powerless ‘classless’ Leamas and Liz. Thus The Spy 
depicts a society in which resistance is impossible and again resignedly, if critically, 
reasserts the social and political status quo.
However, the British state is attacked in The Spy more strongly than in Call, due to 
an operation that apparently involves the sacrifice of Liz to British strategic political gain. 
It is therefore possible to see Control as being as much a proponent of bureaucratic 
accounting logic, on the Western side, as Fiedler is on the Eastern side. However, The 
Spy's anti-state implication is ambiguous and is contradicted by several strategies, 
including the role of a sidelined but surely significant Smiley. Furthermore, the anti-state 
theme is strongly subverted via the novels’ discursive mode of English empiricism, which 
denies a British ideology whilst affirming the British political status quo and thus the state.
As regards the political enemy, Communist Fiedler -  and others’ -  articulation of an 
expedient Stalinism is the most specific delineation of ‘Communist’ ideology in all these 
novels. That this ‘ideology’ lacks any tangible ‘greater good’ rationale makes nonsense of 
critical claims of East-West equivalence made of the novel. Both West and East are shown 
to exploit their citizens for political purposes: the difference, crucially, is that Control’s 
claim of the West’s “benevolent” ‘policy’ is set against the depiction of a malevolent 
ideology of pure, nihilistic power in Eastern bloc Communism.
* * *
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Chapter 3: The Looking Glass War
1. Reflected Glory: The Looking Glass War in context
Following the huge international success of The Spy Who Came in from the Cold, The 
Looking Glass War was highly anticipated, securing major advances from new UK and US 
publishers prior to publication in June 1965.333 It was serialised in the Daily Express (“the 
fictional event of 1965”) and the US Ladies ’ Home Journal: two middlebrow 
endorsements of popular success. The international hit The Spy film came out the same 
year, further enhancing le Carre’s work’s popular profile. However, following poor 
reviews, lesser sales and a less successful film adaptation, Looking Glass's currency 
quickly depleted, retaining a cultural half-life as a title (e.g. Episode 2 of Dominic 
Sandbrook’s 2013 BBC Cold War documentary) and is now little discussed.334
Looking Glass War is among the simplest of le Carre’s complex plots. Leclerc, head 
of a defunct intelligence Department, feted in the War, gains intelligence that suggests the 
GDR is installing rockets near the Western border, an Eastern version of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. First, Department member Taylor is mysteriously killed whilst in Finland 
attempting to obtain a pilot’s aerial photographs of the rockets. Second, Leclerc’s aide 
Avery fails to retrieve the film whilst in Finland. Third, Fred Leiser, a middle-aged Pole 
who worked for the Department in the War, is sent to the GDR to investigate. Although 
Leiser’s training in Oxford takes up most of the book, this training is slipshod and hurried, 
and Leiser is saddled with out-dated equipment. As the Department listen in via radio near 
the border, Leiser kills a border guard, and finding out nothing about the rockets, is quickly 
intercepted and captured by the GDR authorities. The Department’s intelligence rival 
Circus, which has been watching the operation, sends Smiley to shut the operation down.
333 Le Carre switched from Gollancz to the more ‘literary’, Heinemann, selling UK paperback rights to Pan 
for £50,000, and US rights to Dell for $400,000. ‘Where the Money Lies’ Time, 12 March 1965. This 
maintained a foot in ‘literary publishing’ and the bestseller market.
334 See also: Frank Beddors, Looking Glass Wars series (2004); G. Edward White, Alger H iss’s Looking 
Glass Wars: The Covert Life o f  a Soviet Spy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
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Contemporary Reception of Looking Glass War
Contemporary reviewers largely condemned The Looking Glass War for its perceived 
attempt to ‘transcend’ the thriller genre. Anthony Curtis complained: “He has stopped
' I ' j r
writing straight thrillers; he has not started writing novels”. Most reviews echoed this. 
There were frequent complaints of “dullness”: “There are grindingly dull sequences -  the 
refresher course for the rusty spy notably among them,” declared Patrick Gaffney.337 Alex 
Campbell made negative comparison to the very writer to whom le Carre had previously 
been deemed superior: “maybe fun died with Fleming”.338 In all this, the established 
literary class system reasserts ‘entertainment’ as popular fiction’s purpose.
Julian Symons’ rare positive review recognised the book’s key component: focus on 
the intelligence services themselves: “the subject of the book is really the Department”, 
which “reversed the Buchan formula that “we” are nice and “they” are nasty”. This 
negative view of the state was acknowledged in a small number of reviews,339 with Saul 
Landau’s positive review even invoking the state’s expedient morality, calling Leiser and 
the border guard “expendable pawns” and “cannon fodder”.340 Newsweek declared the 
book, “a legacy of scorn and anguish directed [...] at the system, the Establishment” which 
challenged its “redeeming escutcheon of Country, Queen and God” (Newsweek, p. 65). 
However The Times (negative) and Eric Ambler (positive)341 deemed the Department’s 
incompetence unconvincing.
335 Anthony Curtis, ‘Work Out for a Keen Spy’, Sunday Telegraph, 20 June 1965, p. 19.
336 On genre limits: Maurice Richardson, ‘Le Carre tries too hard’, Observer, 20 June 1965, p. 27; Hilary 
Corke, Listener, 24 June 1965, p. 949; Richard Mayne, ‘Carre on Spying’, New Statesman, 25 June 1965, pp. 
1013-1014; Peter Dickinson, ‘Blood Count’, Punch, 12 July 1965, p. 99; George P. Elliott, New York Times 
Book Review, 25 July 1965, p. 5; Orville Prescott, ‘The Smell o f Failure and Incompetence’, New York 
Times, 23 July 1965, p. 27; N.N. ‘Spy to the Slaughter’, Newsweek, 26 July 1965, pp. 64-65.
337 Patrick Gaffney, ‘Spy Time’, Scotsman, 26 June 1965, p. 3. See also, on “dullness’: A.C. Cockbum, 
‘Twenty Years After’, Times Literary Supplement, 24 June 1965, p. 533; Howard Enzenberger, ‘Up the 
Circus’, Spectator, 25 June 1965, p. 827; Richard Bury, ‘Fiction’, Books and Bookmen, August 1965, p. 35; 
P.L. Buckley New Review, 2 November 1965, p. 995; Andrew Leslie, ‘The Spy Who Went Out’, Guardian, 
25 June 1965, p. 9; N.N. ‘New Fiction’, The Times, 24 June 1965, p. 15; Ernest S. Piske, ‘More Mist Than 
Mystery’, Christian Science Monitor, 29 July 1965, p. 6; Alan L. Otten, ‘Thrills and Chills’, Wall Street 
Journal, 2 August 1965.
338 Alex Campbell, ‘Thrillers for Eggheads” New Republic, 3 July 1965, p. 26.
339 Bury (p. 35), Mayne (p. 1014).
340 Saul Landau, ‘Alice in Bondland’, Ramparts (December 1965), 74-78 (p. 74).
341 Eric Ambler, ‘John le Carre Escapes the Follow Up Jinx’, Life, 30 July 1965, p. 8 .
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Reviewers largely disregarded Cold War politics in favour of office politics. Robert 
Ostermann suggested the state was simply an employer: “ambition and its corrosive effects 
[...] is the theme [...] making its intelligence-work setting of secondary concern.”
William Barrett saw only “querulous civil servants”, and big government, “the spy 
becomes merely a pawn of the bureaucracy, [...] just like the ordinary citizen in our 
society, a victim of excessive organization.”343
While the patriotic The Times' reviewer complained that Looking Glass “exposed the 
falsity of British patriotism, public school camaraderie, and Free World ideology” (p. 15), 
most British reviewers ignored the novel’s theme of British decline (the Department’s 
preoccupation with the War is barely mentioned): only Elizabeth Berridge hinted: “Mr le 
Carre writes with cold anger at the folly and pride of men so romantically and dangerously 
embalmed in their heroic dreams”.344 It was left to US reviewers to be specific: “The 
aristocratic leftovers from Kipling have convinced [Leiser] that he is doing this for the 
Empire” (Landau, p. 74). Marcus even suggested that “the Empire [Britain] served and the 
class system it embodied [...] has all gone to pot; it is irrelevant to the contemporary 
world.”345
Reviewers concluded that the political enemy was absent in Looking Glass. Curtis 
saw the Department as “creating artificially a private emergency of their own” (Curtis, p. 
18), an idea echoed in many other reviews.346 While some reviewers suggested the rockets’ 
existence was politically unimportant,347 Steven Marcus uniquely noted that “the political 
implications of such a possibility are of course staggering”, as did Ostermann (p. 19); 
while Ambler mentioned “a Cuban situation in Europe” (p. 8), while a hint by Granville
342 Robert Ostermann, ‘In the Looking Glass War, Some Sharp Reflections o f Characters’, National 
Observer, 26 July 1965, p. 19.
343 William Barrett, ‘Tradition of the Spy’, Atlantic (August 1965), 124-125. Also on Looking Glass as office 
politics: “prissy and incompetent bureaucrats” (Campbell, p. 26):; N.N. ‘Giving Up the Game’, Time, 30 July 
1965, p. 82; “bureaucratic interdepartmental bickering” (Bury, p. 35); N.N. Kirkus, 15 June 1965, 
https://www.kirkusreviews.com/book-reviews/iohn-le-carre/looking-glass-war/, accessed 21/8/2014;
344 Elizabeth Berridge ‘Losing Heart in South Africa’, Daily Telegraph, 24 June 1965, p. 23.
345 Steven Marcus, ‘Grand Illusions’, New York Review o f  Books, 5 August 1965, p. 20.
346 Ostermann, p. 19; Newsweek, p. 64.
347 Elliott (p. 5); Newsweek (p. 64), Otten; Landau (p. 74).
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Hicks about “CIA activities” suggested another Cuban connection, the US’s CIA- 
organised Bay of Pigs invasion.348
Like reviewers, subsequent critics have tended to overstate Looking Glass as a novel 
of “work”.349 Barley treats the novel as manifestation of “transactional analysis” (Barley, 
pp. 48-65), a study of “corporate behaviour” little connected to Cold War. However, critics 
hail Looking Glass as le Carre’s most anti-establishment novel: “more biting and 
condemnatory toward the Cold War intelligence industry” than The Spy (Hoffman, p. 77); 
Homberger sees a condemnation of “the paralysis of the British official class itself’ 
(Homberger, p. 57). Curiously, critics focus on Smiley as locus for negative state activity, 
Richard Locke calling him, “a member of the evil but realistic modem espionage 
Establishment, effective but devoid of honor and idealism.”350 Unlike reviewers, critics 
largely acknowledge the national decline theme. Sauerberg claims all le Carre’s 60s novels 
are “an effort to place responsibility for the national decline” (Sauerberg, p. 170) but fails 
to do so himself. The novel “satirizes Britain’s unwillingness to face the reality of its 
diminished role in world affairs” (Aronoff p. 65).351 Lewis even suggests a national 
allegory in the Jamesonian sense: “the Department is in some ways emblematic of postwar 
and postimperialist England, a country living not in the present but in its collective 
memory of greatness” (Lewis, pp. 90/91). There’s a vagueness to these critical analyses of 
decline however, and it will be one objective of this chapter to be historically specific in 
its analysis of the novel’s British decline theme.
348 Granville Hicks, Saturday Review, 24 July 1965, pp. 39-40. Le Carre made the Bay o f Pigs connection 
himself, claiming both JK Galbraith and Allen Dulles, former CIA director, had done so also (Foreword, 
Lamplighter, Looking Glass, p. viiii).
349 See also: Cawelti & Rosenberg (p. 171); Neuse on ‘bureaucratic personality’ (Neuse, p. 302).
350 Richard Locke, ‘The Spy Who Spied on Spies’, New York Times, 30 June 1974, p. 1. Also on Smiley as 
negative state, see: Aronoff (p. 21); Pearl K. Bell, ‘Coming in from the Cold War’, New Leader, 24 June 
1974, p. 16.
351 Homberger calls Looking Glass “a sustained examination o f the inner decay of British intelligence, 
romantically imagining that England had an independent role still to play on the world stage” (Homberger, p. 
58).
352 E. g. “an allegorical and cautionary tale intended to call attention to the dangers of contemporary British 
governmental thinking” with its “backwards-looking, ultimately dangerous British world-view” (Goodman, 
p. 67)
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So this chapter will first examine the presentation of the Department as emblem of 
an anachronistic British state, then analyse how this satire becomes a faultline via the 
competing representation of the Circus-as-state. Second, the chapter will explore what 
Looking Glass has to say about the British nation in the midst of the Swinging Sixties in 
the dawn of detente and the twilight of decline, and how the nation, in turn, becomes a 
faultline via competing, contradictory representations of Britain. Thirdly, the chapter will 
examine the political enemy and examine a faultline wherein an implicit questioning of 
Communism’s threat is countered by a reassertion of consensus anti-Communism.
* * *
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2. “That Secret Elite”: the Department and the British State
The intelligence bureaucracy is even more central to Looking Glass than le Carre’s 
previous books. There is none of the outsider-insider push and pull of Smiley’s role in 
Call, while The Spy's depiction of the espionage field is largely replaced by an equally 
vivid depiction of the espionage desk, the bureau.353 However, reviewers, critics and le 
Carre himself all interpreted Looking Glass's focus as general office-work:
‘The kind of chaps you meet in my books are the kind of people you work with in the 
office. Intrigue, treachery, loyalty, these are the things you can find. Anywhere. [...] 
That’s simply what I do. Make observations on ordinary people, and then put them 
straight into the high-tension situation of espionage.’354
This is a rather disingenuous statement: most office workers are not risking their lives -  or 
others’ -  or impacting upon the power- or information-balance of the Cold War in the 
course of their daily work. The Department is an organ of the state, involved, in 
however subsidiary a role, in the defence of the realm, possessed of some facet of 
legitimate violence (Leiser kills a border guard), and with a political implication to its 
every action, however inept.
This insistence on office politics over real politics is an indicator of Jameson’s 
analysis of the “radical split between the private and the public”, the opposition of “Freud 
versus Marx” (‘Third World’, p. 69) in liberal thinking, particularly in regard to its 
literature. Several of le Carre’s glosses make just this private/public distinction: “The 
ideological deadlock [of] The Spy [...] is replaced by the psychological deadlock of men
353 “The shift away from the individual agent to the organization behind him is a more radical departure from 
literary convention than anything in The Spy” (Lewis, p. 80).
354 Mandrake, ‘Why Author John le Carre Believes James Bond is the Ideal Defector’, National Observer, 26 
July 1965, p. 19.
355 Denning’s claim that spy novels are fantasies for classless white-collar workers makes sense regarding the 
glamour and heroics in Buchan or Fleming (Denning, p. 35), but the dowdiness and dullness o f espionage in 
le Carre is anchored in realism not fantasy, whilst the novels’ more dramatic elements -  the fates o f lower- 
class Leamas or Leiser -  are hardly empowering.
122
whose emotional experiences are drawn from an old war” {Looking Glass Letter, p. 4). Le 
Carre continues: “The “motor” of their energy lies [...] not in the Cold War [...] but in 
their own desolate mentalities” {Looking Glass Letter, p. 7). In this, le Carre contradicts 
himself; these ‘desolate mentalities’ cannot be both personal and fused in the social and 
political crucible of the old war. This reveals the point that the private and the public 
realms always co-exist. As Herbert Marcuse puts it: “The sickness of the individual is 
ultimately caused and sustained by the sickness of his civilization”.356 Indeed both 
Marcuse and Althusser deployed Freud and Marx in tandem, Marcuse drawing on Freud’s 
analysis of groups to suggest they possess “a sort of collective mind”.357 Certainly the 
behaviour of the Department suggests a collective mind, indeed a collective madness in the 
Leiser operation, or perhaps a collective “cure” for the sickness of society: for British 
decline. Let us look further at this ‘civilisation’ in Looking Glass, and what the focus on 
the state achieves.
The Department and the Establishment
Unlike The Spy's ambiguous attitude, Looking Glass's anti-establishment attitude is 
apparently both overt and specific. The book’s is not a veneer of irreverence towards the 
elite, like Leamas’s, but a tangible antipathy towards the very amateur class that was once 
valorised in Call. “That secret elite” is how Leclerc’s aide, John Avery, describes the 
Department, a phrase le Carre also used of MI6 {Philby, p. 36), and this readily embraces 
the increasingly fashionable concept of ‘the establishment’. In this vein, Perry Anderson 
had recently argued that the “amateurism and nepotism” of the aristocracy’s continued grip 
on power had led to an enervated capitalism that couldn’t match the innovation and 
productivity of its rivals and a state apparatus ill-fitted to manage it (P. Anderson,
‘Origins’, p. 51). Anderson blamed British decline on the amateur elite; so did new Prime
356 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (London: Routledge, 1956), 
p. 245.
357 Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis o f  the Ego (1921), p. 99.
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Minister Harold Wilson (from October 1964), whose attempts to modernise both state and 
nation were well underway as Looking Glass was published (Leys, pp. 79-81), usefully 
illustrating the complexity of the ‘state’, in that Wilson headed the state’s legislative 
branch. If Looking Glass initially seemed a fittingly bracing, radical counterpart to 
Wilson’s first hundred days then both would prove disappointing.
Again using characterisation to expose contradictions and complexities, let us 
examine Department director, Leclerc. Leclerc sharply recalls Anderson’s analysis of the 
amateur class (P. Anderson, ‘Origins’, p. 41). Anderson cites an aristocratic styling: 
whatever Leclerc’s real economic status, he wears brogues on Friday to suggest he is en 
route to the country like an aristocrat {Looking Glass, p. 24), and belongs to a gentlemen’s 
club, however shabby (p. 70). Anderson also cites “a coagulated conservatism” (‘Origins’, 
p. 40): the local cafe isn’t good enough for Leclerc {Looking Glass, p. 35), and he won’t 
queue for a bus (p. 36). Anderson speaks of “traditionalism”: “tradition demanded that the 
junior staff arrived at half past nine; officer grades at ten or quarter past [...] a gentleman, 
Leclerc would say, never watched the clock” (p. 86). Anderson also cites a “mystagogy 
(towards institutions)” (‘Origins’, p. 40): this is seen in the reverent invocations of the 
Department, especially with regard to its war record (e.g. “their custom dated from the 
war”, p. 86) justifies a fussy hierarchical order. Finally, Anderson says the amateur is, 
“defined not by acts which denote skills but by gestures which reveal quintessences” 
(‘Origins’, p. 41): thus Leclerc “had the illusionist’s gift, whether he spoke of rockets or 
wireless transmission, of cover or the point at which the border was to be crossed, of 
implying great familiarity with his subject” {Looking Glass, p. 205). Leclerc suggests “in 
the unchallenged authority of [the Department’s] judgments an unearthly, oracular 
immunity” (p. 208).
Leclerc, as representative of an amateur establishment is literally amateurish, being 
bumbling and inept. So Carre claimed, the state/establishment here is less monolithic and 
unstoppable than in The Spy (Gross, p. 33). However Leclerc also retains power over life
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and death -  the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence. The combination makes for a 
chilling charge sheet: Leclerc risks children’s lives via illegally deploying a domestic flight 
from Finland to the GDR for surveillance photography: the pilot believes he was strafed by 
Soviet MIGs {Looking Glass, pp. 12-14). Leclerc puts untrained bureaucrat Taylor in 
danger to collect the resultant film from the Finnish pilot, costing Taylor’s life (pp. 3-17). 
Leclerc sends his untrained aide, Avery, into presumed danger in Finland without adequate 
cover, to retrieve the film.358 Leclerc sends working-class Fred Leiser into enemy territory 
with outmoded equipment whilst symbolically unmanning him by depriving him of his gun 
(pp. 220-273), then abandons him to his death when the operation goes awry (pp. 264-66).
All told, Leclerc and his nostalgic department of outmoded war relics are anything 
but the modem technocratic, professional ‘new men’ of Wilson’s vision: they are leftovers 
from what le Carre would later call “the thousand year sleep of Eden and Macmillan”
{Philby, p. 41) -  he could equally have added “ .. .and Home”, Wilson’s defeated 
predecessor. Intriguingly, Ralph Richardson’s portrayal of Leclerc in the Looking Glass 
film adaptation (Frank Pierson, 1969) physically and sartorially recalls Lord Home. 
However, while Wilson had derided Home as “an anachronism”, Home remained powerful 
and was Foreign Secretary when Wilson was defeated at the polls by Edward Heath (1970- 
74). Home’s re-ascent to power was representative of the failure of Wilson’s “wide range 
of institutional reforms designed to modernise the structure of the state” (Leys, p. 80). 
Reform of the Civil Service’s tiered ‘class’ system -  echoed precisely in the Department’s 
organisation -foundered with the Fulton Report: internal resistance meaning it took years 
to even partially implement. Wilson’s attempt to break the status monopoly of the older 
universities via the Open University etc. brought more into higher education without 
unseating Oxbridge’s hegemony. Whilst Wilson introduced key social legislation on 
divorce, homosexuality, abortion and capital punishment, the gentlemanly redoubt of the 
City derailed his government altogether via a series of financial crises.
358 Looking Glass, pp. 73-77; pp. 82-85; pp. 89-92.
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Similarly then, while Leclerc is out-manoeuvred by Control and Smiley’s rival 
department in Looking Glass, this is firstly a ‘defeat’ at the hands of Leclerc’s own 
amateur class, a “night of the long knives”, and secondly, it is not clear, by the novel’s end, 
as he makes deals and forges strategic alliances, that Leclerc is defeated. His last words are 
“we’re still operational, you know”, speaking “like a man intent upon appearances, 
conscious of tradition” (.Looking Glass, p. 266). This narrative trajectory is considerably 
closer to a depiction of -  and criticism of -  the abstract state than le Carre had come 
previously. Whilst capitalism remains invisible, the state’s monopoly of violence is 
emphasised, as is its rarefied social composition, its links with the landed interest, and its 
lethal disregard for those not defined as gentlemen. The establishment then is defined as 
essaying a kind of British totalitarianism. Let us examine this.
After only hints in Call, and suggested more of Fiedler than Control in The Spy, le 
Carre evoked this totalitarianism in Looking Glass as an entirely bureaucratic 
phenomenon:
‘It seemed to me that the western dilemma of the small man is that the institutions we 
create to combat the ideology to fight the Cold War are getting so big that the 
individual himself is losing his identity in our society, just as he is in eastern 
society.’359
Leiser is the “small man” (i.e. working class) crushed by the monolith of the (elite) 
bureaucratic state Department. If this seems like a less ambiguous take on The Spy's 
treatment of state expediency versus the individual, there is a further corollary between the 
romanticism of the crushed lovers in The Spy and the ‘love’ between Avery and Leiser. 
Love is ever the liberal marker of individuality, freedom and humanity, the empiricist’s 
touche to totalitarianism: see also Winston and Julia against the Party. The narrative
359 Leigh Crutchley interview, Listener, 14 April 1966, in Broccoli and Baughman, p. 7.
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expends considerable energy on semi-ironic, yet still homoerotic, suggestions of agent 
Leiser and agent-runner Avery as lovers. They walk arm in arm in the rain, in Oxford, 
during Leiser’s training, Avery “holding Leiser’s hand captive” {Looking Glass, p. 161); 
Avery is “a guilty lover” (p. 180); Avery gives Leiser a token with which to go, 
effectively, to war, when Leiser crosses into the GDR on his mission. Later, in the GDR, 
Leiser thinks of Avery via two romantic cliches: “Avery’s young face in the rain” and the 
conceit that, “like divided lovers, they were looking at the same star” (p. 242).
By ironic contrast, Leclerc’s implicitly homosexual deputy, Adrian Haldane is 
defined -  and condemned -  by his inability to love: “‘Do you know what love is’” Haldane 
cynically asks Avery: ‘“It is whatever you can still betray’” {Looking Glass, p. 224). At the 
end, to Haldane’s bureaucratic sneers, a weeping Avery complains of the Department’s 
abandonment of Leiser in the field, and demands they listen to his last transmission “‘for 
the sake of [...] love’” (p. 265). This narrative arc is a broadside against bureaucratic 
instrumentality’s opposition to the ‘human’. However, this is hardly a coherent critique.
Du Gay convincingly claims that consideration of the emotional realm is entirely 
impractical as a means of institutional organisation (Du Gay, p. 25).360 Indeed, compared 
to the critique of the state’s social composition, this anti-bureaucratism is a conservative 
critique, especially given the extensive state “planning” of the Wilson regime. Such 
competing radical-conservative impulses are typical contradictions in liberal thinking, 
and highlight what will now be analysed as the limitations of the anti-establishment motif 
in le Carre. Similarly, Sinfield argues that Wilson’s aims, anchored only in anti­
establishment sentiment, were not ambitious enough (Sinfield, Literature, p. 281).
360 Sinfield characterises such strategies as, “There is a flaw in the state: it fails to accommodate the 
particular consciousness of the refined individual” (Faultlines, p. 107).
361 It is worth noting that le Carre quit the UK c. May 1964-May1965, writing Looking Glass in Crete. 
Probably aiming to avoid the hike in Income Tax associated with Labour governments, it is indicative o f his 
contradictory politics that he apparently rethought this position by returning.
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The Circus and the Establishment
Looking Glass's critique of the establishment is fatally compromised by its Circus subplot. 
Interestingly, Leclerc’s Department’s rivalry with Control’s Circus was not present in an 
earlier MS;362 le Carre later credited the change to the advice of his new American editor 
and regretted the resultant teeth-drawing.363 The Circus subplot muddies the metaphor of 
the British state, because the Circus, as a rival department becomes a rival synecdoche of 
that state. In three respects then this subplot undermines the satire. Firstly, if  one of 
Looking Glass's main criticisms of the Department as state is its elite social composition, 
as per Anderson’s critique, then the class composition of this alternate state is not so 
different to the Department’s. Efficient Smiley is of the same generation and amateur class 
as inept Leclerc. Smiley was an Oxford contemporary of Haldane’s: Haldane’s health 
prevented him from joining the Circus (p. 61), so Smiley is effectively a morally healthier 
Haldane. Smiley is also a member of a rather better gentleman’s club than Leclerc (p. 139), 
a location Smiley continues to choose for his work meetings in this modem democratic 
moment of the Swinging Sixties (pp. 140-144). Control’s membership of the amateur class 
was established by The Spy, but is affirmed here by his gentlemanly distaste for the 
‘modem’ telephone (p. 249)364 and consolidated in his criticism of Leclerc not at the level 
of morality but at the level of manners (“‘Leclerc’s so vulgar. I admit, I find him vulgar 
[...] What a silly man. Silly, vulgar man’” (p. 249). In this respect Control is just as much 
of an anti-Wilsonian anachronism as Leclerc (or indeed Home): Control is a figure of the
362 JLC1, The Looking Glass War, le Carre Archive, Bodleian Library, Oxford. In a revised complete draft, 
JLC2, there is rivalry with but not deceit o f the Circus; Smiley only makes two appearances; Control is 
entirely absent; Smiley does not shut down the operation: it founders solely on Leiser’s slowness o f  
transmission. What’s more, it is made clear that the Department itself was responsible for its own relegation 
to ‘research’ (JLC 2, p. 74).
363 “I should not, as I see it now, have bothered with the Circus or George Smiley at all [...]  I should not have 
pulled my punches [...] I should have let the Department exist where [...] Britain herself existed [...] in a 
vapour o f self-delusion and class arrogance, in a gung-ho world of w e’ve-never-had-it-so-good’”,
‘Foreword’, Lamplighter, Looking Glass, p. viii.
364 “A dislike o f certain comparatively modem inventions such as the telephone, the cinema, and the wireless, 
are still perhaps marks of the upper class” Alan S. C. Ross, ‘U and Non-U: An Essay in Sociological 
Linguistics’, in Noblesse Oblige, edited by Nancy Mitford (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1956), p. 13.
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old world not “modernity Britain”.365 In this way, even the limited satire of the state’s class 
composition collapses. Secondly, the Circus is more efficient than the Department:
Smiley’s wise spycraft is regularly contrasted to the ineptitude of Leclerc, Taylor, Avery 
and Leiser. Control is one step ahead of the Department throughout, handicapping, 
possibly even sabotaging the operation {Looking Glass, p. 251), certainly ultimately 
ensuring that it is wound up.
Thirdly, the novel’s sharper critique, of bureaucratic instrumentalism, is also blunted 
by the Circus subplot. Smiley’s function in his limited role in Looking Glass is to 
repeatedly warn the Department against the dangers of “technique”: Smiley does this to 
Avery (p. 6), to Leclerc (p. 141) and finally to Haldane: “‘you’re a very good technician 
[...] You’ve made technique a way of life.. .like a whore, technique replacing love’” (p.
264, my emphasis). ‘Technique’ has caused some critical confusion,366 but is clearly 
abstract planning, bureaucracy that expediently prizes results over human needs. “Love” 
then is bureaucratic instrumentalism’s compassionate other: if Haldane is a whore, then 
Smiley is a lover. And, we already know, a faithful one in the face of his wife’s 
inconstancy. From this we can deduce then that Smiley represents the gentle state,367 a 
Marcusian embrace of the maternal and the erotic. But Smiley is only the deputy chief of 
the Circus, he is complemented by -  and crucially checks -  Control’s ruthless efficiency 
and expedient morality (p. 251). So when Smiley is sent to Germany on Control’s orders, 
essentially to kill off the Department, “there was nothing in his face but compassion” (p. 
261). Thus Smiley somewhat counterbalances the less palatable fact that Control’s orders 
abandon Leiser in the field and condemn him to death. Smiley and Control combined, 
therefore make up the liberal state: ruthless efficiency and capitalistic dynamism (Control) 
complemented and balanced by compassion and decency (Smiley). However, in Looking
365 See: David Kynaston, Modernity Britain, Book Two: A Shake o f  the Dice, 1959-62 (London: Bloomsbury, 
2014).
366 See: Monaghan, p. 38-39; Neuse, p. 301-2; Barley, p. 60.
367 Smiley is the “organization man [who] is capable o f superimposing a holistic philosophy o f  life upon the 
fragmentation o f his twentieth century specialization” (Ambrosetti, p. 96).
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Glass, the Circus is only one competing version of the state. But it is a counterargument to 
the depiction of the Department, and whatever satire was intended is lost inside these 
competing, contradicting state synecdoches, while somewhere out of sight, the abstract 
state remains abstract.
These competing accounts of the state then are faultlines that indicate unresolvable 
contradictions in liberal thinking. As with The Spy unease with the class-system produces 
what appears to be a satire of the state, but unease about the alternative creates a failure of 
nerve. So Looking Glass’s treatment of the state transpires to be remarkably similar to that 
of Call and The Spy. Again a facet of the state is decried and disavowed via Operation 
Margarine -  in this case the amateur class, for its social insularity, its coagulated 
traditionalism and its bureaucratic instrumental rationality. But by negative focus on this 
“contingent evil” (Barthes, Mythologies, p. 41), and the insertion of a competing 
synecdoche of the state, the deep structures of the state disappear from view and are left 
unchallenged and thus effectively endorsed. So again we see how le Carre’s anti­
establishment theme actually upholds the establishment, how satire, via a convoluted 
strategy, actually scaffolds the state.
* * *
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2. “The Mystery of England”: the British Nation
While working as a teacher at Eton during the 1956 Suez crisis, le Carre claims an old
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school servant said: ‘“wonderful to see the old country on the march again’”. These are 
the exact words le Carre puts in the mouth of Department factotum, Pine, regarding the 
Leiser operation -  but with “Department” significantly substituted for “country” (Looking 
Glass, p. 34). With British colonies still haemorrhaging annually (this year, Rhodesia; next 
year Guyana and Barbados) British decline was an increasingly unavoidable issue for 
British citizens, governments, and novelists alike. Looking Glass is then pondering 
national identity for a citizenry adjusting to a changing Britain on the world stage but also 
a changing Britain on the home front, a time of -  at least attempted -  social reconstruction 
under Wilson. Looking Glass is thus a condition of England novel,370 a “national allegory” 
pondering the nature and extent of British power in that Cold War and positing who, where 
and what is being defended in that war.
The Department and the British Nation
The Department functions as a national allegory, with the connection between the 
Department and ‘England’ made repeatedly, if enigmatically: “[The Department’s] 
survival was like the mystery of England” {Looking Glass, p. 24); “Their faith in the 
Department burnt in some separate chapel and they called it patriotism” (p. 72). The 
Department building is “a crabbed, sooty villa”, “a house eternally for sale”, of “controlled 
dilapidation”, its “fa9ade stained black” with “grimy windows” (p. 24). The imagery is 
suggestive of debt-ridden, US-dependent Britain in the post-war period, near bankrupted 
by the war, exacerbated by the strain of hanging onto colonial possessions on one hand, 
and loss of colonial revenues on the other. So when Leclerc emphasises the threat the
368 John le Carre, South Bank Show interview 1983, quoted in Lewis (p. 94).
369 Even Fleming felt compelled to address national decline at this time. In You Only Live Twice Bond’s 
completion of the assignment is equated with disproving Britain’s “impotence” -  loss o f Empire, Suez 
“bungle”, plus “debilitating” Welfare State and Trade Unions. You Only Live Twice (1964), in The Blofeld 
Trilogy (London: Penguin Classics, 2009), p. 491.
370 “As much a ‘condition of England’ novel as an example o f spy fiction” (Lewis, p. 81).
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putative GDR rockets pose to Britain, the blurring between Department and Britain is 
found in the plucky phrase, “we still have one or two teeth of our own” (p. 56). Near the 
Department, “there are warehouses with barbed wire across their gates, and factories which 
produce nothing” (p. 107) evoking an enervated British capitalism that can’t compete with 
its former enemies, Japan and Germany. No wonder the Department seems confused about 
who the enemy is, e.g.: “‘We’re having a spot of trouble with the Germans’” (p. 48); they 
are going to “‘take another crack at the Jerries’” (p. 95). This returns to the idea of the 
‘lost’ war, a Britain that won the war but lost its international standing.
In this context, the Department’s operation is a mirror-image of Wilson’s 
modernisation, a project to reverse the Department’s/nation’s decline but by looking to the 
amateur past rather than the Wilsonian technocratic future.371 Just as the Department 
recalls the Macmillan/Home era’s aristocratic manners, patrician attitudes and traditional 
hierarchies, so the Department rejects ‘modem’ and Wilsonian technological solutions.
The Department’s emphasis on “putting a man in” to the GDR emphasises the human over 
the technological, and we see throughout Looking Glass's plot the failure of technology -  
fuzzy photographs, botched aeroplane overflights, car accidents, malfunctioning Morse- 
coding machines, cutting-out radios. In ignoring Britain’s cultural vitality and the early 
promise of Wilson, le Carre was suggesting more sympathy with the Department’s anti- 
modernising nostalgia than the straightforward satire of the Department he claimed and 
that most critics perceive.
London and the British Nation
Lest we get too preoccupied with the Department-as-Britain allegory, the Department is 
only one in a series of dilapidated London landscapes. Leiser’s neighbourhood is “like a 
row of pink graves in a field of grey”, “dying without violence and living without success”
371 Frank Pierson inserted a speech into his 1969 film adaptation o f Looking Glass where Avery (Antony 
Hopkins) says: “We’re fighting a very lonely battle. We’re in the dark. Nobody thanks us for it, but my God, 
they sleep at night, don’t they? That’s pretty bloody unswinging, isn’t it?”
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{Looking Glass, p. 99); the grass is like “grass on a grave” (p. 100). The trouble with 
allegory is that it appears to suggest that decline is simply symbolic, metaphorical, a matter 
of geopolitical prestige and diplomatic power, rather than being rooted in the economy, in 
declining wages, unemployment, cheap prefab housing, the price of bread. This is 
precisely the mistake that most critics make, e.g. “Descriptions of London [...] define the
372social and spiritual malaise of a nation experiencing its decline and fall” (Lewis, p. 91). 
Critics also fail to notice that all of these are firstly, only London landscapes, including the 
Blackfriars domicile of the Department, and secondly, working-class areas, of the kind 
little seen in the elite England of Call. Let us now analyse one key scene of London 
dilapidation, as it tells us much about Looking Glass’s presentation of the British nation.
When Avery and Leclerc go to break the news of Taylor’s death to Taylor’s wife, in 
working-class Kennington, they are disconcerted by the bleak working-class environment 
of the aspirational, ‘classless’, Taylor.
They stood at the top of a rise. It was a wretched place. The road led downward into 
a line of dingy, eyeless houses; above them rose a single block of flats [...] A string 
of lights shone on to the glazed tiles, dividing and redividing the whole structure into 
cells. It was a large building, very ugly in its way, the beginning of a new world, and 
at its feet lay the black rubble of the old {Looking Glass, p. 38).373
This “new world” is democratised post-war Britain, modernist flats newly built to replace 
bomb-damaged property and house the urban poor, a utopian scheme of Wilsonian 
“technocratic optimism” (Hatherley, p. 36). Hatherley asserts this project’s relationship
372 See also: “Britain [...] is filled with decaying [...] broken [...] and disintegrating [...]  objects and 
buildings” (p. 46) which “provide visual equivalents of [Britain’s] spiritual and moral condition” (Monaghan, 
p. 48). “The particular smell o f national decline [...] equivalence between secret service and the health o f the 
society as a whole” (Homberger, p. 58).
373 Leclerc and Avery literally looking down on the working classes, is reminiscent o f Wyndham Lewis’s 
obituary o f architect, Edward Wadsworth: “we arrived on a hill above Halifax [...] and gazed down into its 
industrial labyrinth. [...] ‘It’s like Hell, isn’t it’ he said enthusiastically’” (Hatherley, p. 19).
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both to the Welfare State (p. 40) and to ‘classlessness’ (p. 30), creating “little palaces” for 
the working classes. Taylor’s building is a combination of the artificially modem (Bakelite 
numbers, Looking Glass, p. 39); and the municipal (“the smell of that liquid soap [...] in 
railway lavatories” p. 39). Hatherley claims such buildings are the British landscape’s “the 
most persistent reminder of British socialism”, of the kind of collectivism and planning to 
which the traditionalist amateur class was opposed: the rapid dilapidation of the buildings 
would soon enough give licence to the anti-utopians. However, such projects only had 
limited validity: architecture does not solve poverty, a point Looking Glass muddies by 
blurring the ugliness of the architecture with the ugliness of poverty. The shops are filled 
with “the sad muddle of useless things which only the poor will buy” (p. 39), while “cell” 
as a description of the block, suggests a prison, invoking working class criminality as 
much as repression. Again subject and object get conflated when it comes to the ‘mass’.
As Leclerc examines Taylor’s neighbourhood, he is focalised by Avery as feeling:
“This was not the society they protected, these slums with their Babel’s Tower: they had 
no place in Leclerc’s scheme of things” (.Looking Glass, p. 38). This is unusually specific: 
Leclerc is presented as rejecting the working class (and via that Babel reference, 
immigrants) from the Britain his Department is defending. Leclerc’s reaction to the estate 
is a rejection of the working class and also of the planning of modernising Wilsonian 
Socialism. After visiting Taylor’s flat, Avery sees in Leclerc “a deep sadness, like the 
bewilderment of a man betrayed” (p. 42). This is the “betrayal” of the amateur gentlemanly 
class through loss of prestige at home via post-war meritocracy, and loss of prestige 
abroad, via the crumbling of the Empire they were raised to administrate. The Department 
experiences both. Avery’s focalisation of Leclerc is sympathetic: “Somebody had been 
there, and gone; perhaps a whole world, a generation; somebody had made him and 
disowned him” (p. 37). In this respect Taylor’s estate functions not as a condemnation of 
British class inequality but as an image of declining British geopolitical prestige. This was 
a contemporary conservative view, the aforementioned Larkin, for instance, blaming the
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Welfare State for the collapse of British international power.374
As the Long Boom had not properly ended, however, and the economic recession not 
properly commenced, there was a contemporary optimism about Harold Wilson’s 
modernising new government, and so this is a rhetorically gloomy portrait of Britain. True, 
Britain had once been the world’s largest economy, but it remained one of the world’s six 
largest national economies. The Welfare State, meanwhile, had achieved some reduction in 
inequality and poverty. So it is also striking that in Looking Glass there is no hint that 
London might be swinging, that the Beatles were at number one, that The Avengers was 
spicing up monochrome British television with sex and spying, or that Mary Quant and 
Twiggy were setting the international fashion agenda. There is only gloom.
If this manipulation’s purpose is to enact the national allegory of British decline, then 
why the novel’s competing, contradictory, and positive presentation of Oxford? If the 
London scenes make the link: British decline-London-working class-modemity, what is 
the impact of the Oxford scenes?
Oxford and the British Nation
Paralleling the way the introduction of the Circus rendered the novel’s apparent class and 
bureaucratic instrumentalist critique of the state more equivocal, a faultline, so does the 
introduction of Oxford one-third of the way through the book trouble an understanding of 
Looking Glass as depiction of British decline via a competing alternative.375 It also 
provides a pointed contrast to the class associations of the London scenes, and offers a 
competing vision of what constitutes Britain, of what is being defended in the Cold War.
The Department’s choice of Oxford for their safe house for Leiser’s training is 
indicative of their veneration of traditionalism over modernism. “It was a place they could 
understand” {Looking Glass, p. 134), as several Department members attended Oxford
374 Graham MacPhee, Postwar British Literature and Postcolonial Studies (Edinburgh: University Press, 
2011), p. 56.
375 Monaghan, Lewis and Homberger all miss this contrasting depiction o f Oxford as against London.
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University. As such, “Oxford represents the privilege of the governing elite, reinforcing 
links between the spy and the preservation of British power,” (Goodman p. 69). Key here, 
however, is a wistfulness that critics miss: “Leiser was pleased when he heard it was 
Oxford” (Looking Glass, p. 134). Leiser is a working class Pole who wishes to be British: 
yet the aspirational Britishness he craves is specifically represented by Oxford, crucible of 
the ruling class (p. 174). For Avery, “It was a world he had known about once; for a time 
he had almost fancied he was part of it; but that was long ago” (p. 138). A few rungs below 
the gentlemanly class, Avery has never quite fitted in. The Tack’ essential to desire recalls 
Lacan’s gloss on Freud’s Group Psychology. Oxford is something the Department aspires 
to -  a particular version of Britishness that is heavily class-imbued with the amateur, 
gentlemanly tradition. It is not open to new applicants.
The text lingers over descriptions of Oxford interiors, itemising potpourri, 
chandeliers, bible table, Cupid statue, and fireplace blackamoors {Looking Glass, p. 199). 
This is the gentlemanly bourgeois’ ideal home, replete with imperial booty. From the 
street, Avery “glimpsed grey-haired figures moving across the lighted windows, velvet- 
covered chairs trimmed with lace, Chinese screens, music stands and a bridge four sitting 
like bewitched courtiers in a castle” (p. 138). “Bewitched” is magical, mythic. The sheer 
volume of detail (“first lace and then brocade” p. 146) overwhelms any satire: “The houses 
were of a modest stateliness; romantic hulls re-decked, each according to a different 
legend. Here the turrets of Avalon [...] between them the monkey-puzzle trees” (p. 146). 
The gentler tone deployed for the Oxford locations compared to the dreariness and sarcasm 
in the London locations suggests that traditionalism here is being endorsed. In Oxford is 
“the mystery of England” realised. “[Leiser’s] eye ran fondly over the heavy furniture, the 
tallboy elaborated with fretwork...” (p. 174). “The whole house gently asserted an air of 
old age” (p. 139). Consequently, the recurring twilight imagery offers a soft-focus rather 
than gloomy perspective. This is the society that the Department is defending. Walter 
Benjamin here is apposite on the home of the bourgeois: “the traces that his relatives had
136
left in photos, and that his possessions had left in linings and etuis and that sometimes 
made these rooms look as overcrowded as halls full of funerary urns”.376 The pictures and 
bric-a-brac are anti-modernist, what Hatherley calls the “stifling pile-up of historicist 
detritus that made up the bourgeois aesthetic” (Hatherley, p. 3). This is the ‘heritage 
culture’ of Oxford that would be posited against British decline in 1970s and 80s films and 
television (Chariots o f Fire, Brideshead Revisited, Maurice, Tinker miniseries) (Oldham, 
p. 740). Wilson, by contrast, was “hostile to heritage” (Hatherley, p. 5).
In contrast then to the London scenes’ nexus of British decline-London-working 
class-modemity, here is an association of British potency-Oxford-mling class-tradition. 
Oxford is being offered as both the where of the British nation and, as landscape is always 
political, this embraces a who -  the English upper middle classes; the establishment. By 
this strategy is implicitly declared what is Britain: an older Britain of empire, tradition and 
high culture. This is a contradictory, conservative rejection of the reality of British decline 
based on a dead, venerated past rather than a living, despised present. We see a similar 
strategy at work in the Department’s preoccupation with the War.
The War and the British Nation
The Department’s members constantly refer back to its glory days in World War II. This 
was a live issue in British culture: those who had and had not experienced the War created 
the opposing sides of the 1960s Generation Gap, a clash between traditional conservative 
conformist currents and modem radical countercultural currents. Leftist views of the War 
as a democratic moment get elided in this discourse. Moreover, for a nation experiencing a 
now impossible-to-ignore geopolitical decline, the War represented the apotheosis of 
British world power, something for which an older generation -  and a particular class -  
represented by the Department, felt an inevitable nostalgia. This is actualised neatly in the
376 Walter Benjamin, ‘Short Shadows’, in Selected Writings Volume 2, Part 2, 1931-34 (Cambridge: Harvard, 
1999), p. 701.
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novel by the Department’s own glory days having been left behind with the War.377 
However, even the historically minded Goodman never quite posits nostalgia for the War 
as nostalgia for British imperial power (Goodman, pp. 60-61).
So Leclerc has a cigarette case given by a dead war comrade {Looking Glass, p. 26), 
war photographs dominate his office (pp. 27-28) and he recalls informing relatives of 
wartime deaths (p. 38). Haldane, who served with Leclerc, recalls the Department’s glory 
days of being “operational” not administrative (field not desk): “‘Rubber boats on a 
moonless night; a captured enemy plane’” (p. 67). Haldane notes that via the Leiser 
operation, Leclerc hopes to repeat Britain’s discovery of V2 installations at Peenemunde in 
World War II (p. 69). Indeed the whole Leiser operation has an air of War re-run about it: 
Leiser is a wartime colleague; he is trained by both Leclerc’s wartime combat specialist 
and wartime wireless operator; Leiser is even given war-era equipment. The aim is to 
regain the Department’s wartime prestige -  with a ready translation to “Britain’s wartime 
prestige”. In fact all these wartime throwbacks will prove the operation’s undoing: Leiser 
himself (too old), the radio system (too cumbersome), even the hierarchy (no one 
challenges Leclerc’s gentlemanly disinterest in detail). This is key to how the 
Department’s version of War memorialising does not just reassert British political potency, 
it also defines, again, which class was being fought for.
If critics are imprecise about the geopolitical meaning of Looking Glass's War 
invocations, they are utterly silent about their social meaning. Following the 
democratisation of the War, wherein, for instance, the Officer class was dislodged during 
the North African campaign, the post-war Labour government attempted to create a more 
democratic, meritocratic society. Thus the War is a faultline. All the Department’s 
members, even Avery (too young for the War), and Woodford (lower middle class), are
377 Critics are incredibly imprecise about the relationship o f the War to national decline: “The betrayal felt by 
the World War II generation, that they have been bypassed and forgotten” (Aronoff, p. 42); “a country living 
not in the present but in its collective memory of greatness” (Lewis, pp. 90-91); “[the war] brought together 
elements of male camaraderie, risk, a clearly defined sense of purpose and acclaimed success” (Bennett, p. 
49). Looking Glass “provides ample evidence, for the psychological effect o f acting without a substantial or 
satisfactory philosophy” (Barley, p. 60).
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nostalgic for the social hierarchy that existed before the post-war. Woodford relishes the 
Department’s actualisation of that hierarchy, whose “custom dated from the war” {Looking 
Glass, p. 86). When Woodford visits the Alias club where Department war veterans 
congregate, it is revealed that officer-class Leclerc never visits the club (p. 96). Also, 
despite Woodford’s enthusiasm that “‘The Department is working as [...] one man [...] 
And what a spirit [...]! And no rank [...] We’re just a single team’” (p. 184) evoking the 
common democratic image of the war, Woodford’s own lower social status (p. 42) is 
emphasised when Haldane pulls rank won’t let Woodford meet Leiser (p. 185). There isn’t 
much sense of the “people’s war” here: the War-memorialising reasserts a traditional class
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hierarchy: Oxford fought for by London.
However, although Leclerc excludes the “other ranks” {Looking Glass, p. 28) from 
the Britain that is being fought fo r , it is clear, as it was in The Spy, who the ruling class, 
emblematised by Leclerc, expect to do the actual fighting. Goodman usefully suggests that 
Leclerc memorialises the war in terms of sacrifice (Goodman, p. 67), but fails to specify 
the class distribution of this sacrifice. Leclerc says, nostalgically of the War, “‘You get 
instructions: find a man, put him in. So we did. And many didn’t come back’” {Looking 
Glass, p. 114). On his way to memorialise the Cold War sacrifice of Taylor, Leclerc says, 
with chilling wistfulness, ‘“It was simpler in those days [...] we could say they’d died for 
their country’” (p. 38). Even in the People’s War, there was a bureaucratic accounting 
logic at work that relied on the ‘people’, the working class, laying down their lives for a 
‘greater good’. Leclerc nevertheless persists in trying to live out his World War II fantasy, 
returning to see Mrs Taylor and suggesting her husband was just such a national sacrifice. 
Mrs Taylor responds abrasively, “‘What do you mean [died] gallantly? [...] We’re not 
fighting a war. That’s finished, all that fancy talk. He’s dead’” (p. 73). Thus the working 
class reject the ruling class’s apportioning of their sacrificial role. Mrs Taylor’s is a key
378 Le Carre later wrote of MI6 in similar terms: “The Empire may be crumbling; but within our secret elite, 
the clean-limbed tradition of English power would survive. We believe in nothing but ourselves’” (Philby, p. 
36).
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puncturing of this class claim on Britishness, suggesting that the Department’s attitude is 
being satirised. Nevertheless, such is the centrality and vividness of Leclerc that the 
Department’s attitudes are never entirely distanced (just as Peter Cook’s caricature of 
Macmillan was as affectionate as it was satirical). To examine one final instance of 
national identity, let us see how Leclerc manages to enact a “ritual sacrifice” {Looking 
Glass Letter, p. 2) from working class, foreign Leiser.379
Leiser and the British Nation
Leiser is a middle-aged Polish immigrant garage owner who fought with the Department in 
the War. Leiser is twice removed from the Department’s gentlemanly elite by being 
foreign as well as working class. It is Leiser not Leclerc who is “a man excluded; a man 
without a card” {Looking Glass, p. 32) (recalling the ‘pass’ that Fawley reminds working- 
class Leamas he doesn’t have). In order to “put a man in” to investigate the putative rocket 
installations in the GDR, the Department persuades Leiser to give up his garage, train in 
intensive physical combat and radio transmission, without contacting friends or family for 
a month; then risk his life to go into East Germany. Where Leamas accepts a similar 
mission from a naturalised ideology he accepts as his British ‘duty’, Leiser, who 
“‘considers himself integrated, naturalised British’” (p. 131), accepts the mission because 
he apparently wants others to accept him as British:
“Expressions like ‘not to worry’, ‘don’t rock the boat’ [...] came to [Leiser] 
continually, as if he were aspiring after a way o f  life which he only imperfectly 
understood, and these were the offerings that would buy him in” (p. 165; my 
emphasis).
379 Looking Glass Letter, p. 2.
380 Historically, many Poles volunteered to help Britain fight the Nazis. Wendy Webster, ‘Ethnicity in 
Second World War Britain’, forthcoming 2016.
The text makes it clear, however, that this acceptance will never occur. Particularly not 
from an elite that regards itself as the essence of Britain, from which, as we have seen, the 
working class, let alone the immigrant, is excluded. Haldane can hardly bear to be in the 
same room as Leiser, calling him, ‘“common, in a Slav way [...] He dresses like a bookie, 
but I suppose they all do that’” (p. 131). So Avery’s words to Leiser flatter to deceive: 
“‘You’re one of us, Fred. You always were’” (p. 218), while Haldane’s “‘remember he’s 
British: British to the core’” (p. 148) is either manipulative or simply sarcastic.
So it is a piquant irony that Leiser harbours an even more impossible desire: not just 
to be English, but to be an English gentleman -  like Haldane and Leclerc. In another 
telling scene, the four strands of the nation traced in this chapter come together: the North 
Oxford house representing the gentlemanly tradition, and Leiser combining the other three 
- the working class, the immigrant and the War:
Lovingly [Leiser] revisited the handsome women at croquet, handsome men at war, 
disdainful boys in boaters, girls at Cheltenham; a whole long history of discomfort 
and not a breath of passion {Looking Glass, p. 174).
Not only will Leiser never achieve this dream, its pursuit destroys him: far from being 
accepted by the Department, he is exploited by them: like Leamas, the role of the working 
class -  and the immigrant -  is, via sacrifice, to sustain and secure the ruling class, in this 
case by restoring the fading fortunes of the Department.
As Inglis says, “an ideological struggle over national identity, in Britain, is 
inseparable from the struggle over class identity” (p. 202). Class informs all Looking 
Glass's representations of the British nation: Leclerc’s association of the London working 
class with British decline; upper-middle-class Oxford asserted as emblematic of a decline- 
refuting Britishness; War memorialisation as nostalgia for traditional class hierarchies, and 
finally, immigrant Leiser’s inclusion in the Department’s Britain only as working class
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cannon-fodder, the “poor bloody infantry of the Cold War” personified. As national 
allegories go, this is not a pretty picture of Britain, but it is ambiguous whether or not it is 
satirised. With the working class characters held at a distance -  Leiser barely comes alive 
as a character before he is killed -  and the ruling class characters’ manners and voices 
depicted with such loving detail, at the very least, sympathy competes with satire in 
Looking Glass War's presentation of the Department’s narratives of nation.
* * *
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4. “A Sort of Cuba Situation” : Political Enemy in the Looking Glass War 
The political enemy in Looking Glass could be seen as the West’s own paranoid reflection: 
no Communist plot is ever revealed; no Communist rockets are ever proved to exist at the 
border; while far from Communism being the aggressor, it is the West who ‘invade’ the 
East and the ‘Western’ Leiser who kills the Eastern border guard. For good measure, 
Communism isn’t even mentioned throughout the novel’s 273 pages. This would be a 
fairly radical stance for a Cold-War novel, overturning both Call and The Spy's assertions 
of a clear and present Communist threat, and chiming with contemporary revisionist 
historians’ claim of Western misconception of Eastern aggressive intent. However, just as 
Looking Glass's satire of the establishment is undermined by the Circus subplot and 
Oxford/London binary, so is its satire of Cold War paranoia undermined by, first, an 
empirical depoliticisation and, second, an upheld Cold-War consensus prejudice.381
Let us examine this idea of enemy as reflection. This can be seen as the obverse of 
nationalism: just as Britain creates its imagined community, so it creates an imagined 
enemy. Buzard suggests how such imagined enemies fulfil a ‘national’ need: “[The 
Rostock photograph] is for Leclerc a dialectical guarantee of the Department’s continuing 
importance: the photos must be seen to show the efforts of a ‘live enemy’ in order to 
support this Western collective subject”.382 The evidence of the enemy’s threat is flimsy. 
There is no real evidence that Taylor was killed; his death may have been a drunken traffic 
accident, as le Carre himself later claimed {Looking Glass Letter, p. 6). Towards the 
book’s end Haldane discovers possible proof that the rocket-launcher story is fake 
(Looking-Glass, p. 192), but keeps it to himself, being too heavily invested in the idea of 
the enemy which, as Buzard suggests, confirms the Department’s importance. “Britain” 
here readily substitutes for “Department” as needing the “dialectical guarantee” both of its 
importance and, one might say, of the point of its engagement in an ongoing Cold War.
381 Le Carre’s next novel, A Small Town in Germany (1968) would take this idea further, reversing the 
trajectory o f Call fo r  the Dead: what appears to be a case of Cold War espionage actually turns out to be 
related to World War II.
382 Buzard, in Downing and Bazargan, p. 161.
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But Buzard does not pursue this political analogy: ultimately he presents the book as 
concerning private psychologies rather than public politics,383 in effect Freud trumping 
Marx (Jameson, ‘Third World’, p. 69). Yet Looking Glass isn’t incidentally set in a Cold- 
War context, the Cold War is the book’s -  and Department’s -  raison d ’etre. This 
approach risks reducing geopolitical conflict, casualties and all, to private psychological 
dramas. This is an approach that Schaub highlights as typical of liberal retreat from the 
political to the personal in the post-war period (Schaub, p. 21). As the Cold War was as 
much about ideology as combat, counterintelligence as intelligence, disinformation as 
information, even a fantasy is a political fantasy, even paranoia is political paranoia -  and 
as the Cuban Missile and Berlin crises demonstrated, can still be extremely dangerous.
In fact, the invocation of missiles poised at the East/West German border offers a 
fairly precise Eastern reflection of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Leclerc says:
‘The Ministry believes it is conceivable we are dealing with Soviet missiles under
East German control.. .if they are right [...] we would have on our hands [ ] a sort
of Cuba situation all over again, only [...] more dangerous’ (.Looking Glass, p. 54).
The Ministerial Under-Secretary correctly declares, the existence of the rockets “alters 
[Britain’s] entire defence position” (p. 79). The book’s government officials’ readiness 
to believe the flimsy evidence of Leclerc’s “dodgy dossier” is entirely credible, having 
some notable contemporary analogues, but, in the context of the Cold War, the Western 
conviction that the Soviets had aggressive intent was a pseudo-empirical given, lent 
‘properly’ empirical illustration by the Cuban missile crisis. Belief or paraded belief in a 
Communist threat also had side-benefits for Britain, a useful cover story for its informal
383 An approach echoed by Bennett (p. 48).
384 Both Lewis (p. 84) and Noland (p. 60) cite the Cuban Missile Crisis connection, while Aronoff cites the 
Bay o f Pigs (Aronoff, p. 65).
imperialism through exploitation of former colonies in tandem with its Cold Warrior 
partner, the US.385
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Another Cuban political connection, the CIA’s Bay of Pigs invasion bears some 
similarity to the action of Looking Glass: government agency mounts covert operation 
using anti-Communist exiles (Polish Leiser has voted with his feet against the Eastern 
Bloc), ending in fiasco and government embarrassment and denial. Le Carre later declared: 
“the Bay of Pigs [...] really was the result of men who had generated a collective 
perception of their own heroism and, drawing from that romantic past, were engaging in
'ion
something that was almost fantasy.” Compare this to his description o f Looking Glass, 
““committed” men who are committed to nothing but one another and the dreams they 
collectively invoke” (Looking Glass Letter, p. 7).
Despite this link to reality, le Carre’s framing in the Letter serves, like Buzard and 
Bennett’s analyses, to depoliticise both Looking Glass and the Cold War. Might one not 
perceive quite a strong ideological component to the Bay of Pigs: a virulent anti- 
Communism? To suggest that Looking Glass reveals a self-serving readiness to believe in 
the Communist threat is not the same as suggesting there is no ideological dimension to the 
Cold-War; that its proponents are simply obeying the imperatives of entirely private 
psychologies. To repeat Marcuse’s line, “The sickness of the individual is ultimately 
caused and sustained by the sickness of his civilization”. The sickness here is the anti- 
Communism of the Western “collective mind”, and le Carre is essentially denying its 
existence -  in his book, in the West.
A second point here regards the Western Cold-War consensus. For once we examine 
the depiction of the GDR in Looking Glass, the fact that the rockets may not be real 
becomes merely a minor point in a typically anti-Communist exegesis. As Leiser watches
385 Mark Curtis, Web o f  Deceit: Britain’s Real Role in the World (London: Vintage, 2003), p. 243.
386 Looking Glass’s grounding in history is not confined to Cuba: the Department’s o f espionage overflights 
into the USSR, strafed by MIGS, echoed the U S’s Gary Powers’ U2 spy-plane being shot down by the 
Russians in 1960, which rocked US-USSR relations.
387 David Streitfeld, ‘Debriefing le Carre’, Book World, 8 November 1992, p. 15.
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from the border, prior to entering the GDR, “the East German guards seemed to fear that 
one of their own number might slip away unseen” (Looking Glass, p. 207): here again the 
idea of a regime maintained under coercion. Next, an apparently balanced set of images of 
the opposing sides at the GDR border is subtly biased. Although “those who look eagerly 
for dragon’s teeth and substantial fortifications will be disappointed” (p. 211) by the 
Eastern side, the image of the Western side suggests detente as defeat: “adorned with the 
grotesque statuary of political impotence: a plywood model of the Brandenburg Gate, the 
screws rusting in their sockets” (p. 211; my emphasis).
Once inside the GDR, the imagery is uniformly bleak, as per standard Western 
presentations of the Communist East. The villages are all “empty of life” (p. 225); a block 
of flats has no name (p. 268); the inn is unstaffed, with no customers (p. 233). Leiser’s 
hotel room is “large and bare” (p. 238) although “damp had spread [...] in dark shadows” 
(p. 239). The entire country is deserted, neglected, unloved:
There were no signposts and no new buildings [...] that was where the peace came 
from, it was the peace of no innovation -  it might have been fifty years ago, a 
hundred [...] There were no street lights, no gaudy signs on the pubs or shops. It was 
the darkness of indifference (p. 225).
This is an interesting passage, given that its list could be interpreted as positive facets of a 
non-corporate society: no “gaudy signs” (Smiley’s “relentless persuasion”) for capitalism’s 
endless “innovation” -  the constant creation of new products. The fact is that empty bars 
and hotels are empty businesses. Yet that final “indifference” nails the negative judgement. 
The indifference comes from above, the functional expedience of a monolithic state; but it 
also comes from below, a system in which no one has any investment and thus a country 
unloved by its citizens.
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The citizenry has ironically withdrawn from the social, collective sphere of 
Communism and retreated into (capitalist) privacy. This has a clear link with the fear that 
pervades all conversations Leiser has with GDR citizens -  the social is dangerous. There is 
the fearful old man who gives Leiser food (p. 229), a suspicious railway official (p. 230), 
an elderly guard who informs on Leiser (p. 232); the “frightened” girl (p. 235) with 
“deceitful eyes” (p. 238) at the inn: “he knew she suspected him” (p. 235). Repeatedly 
Leiser’s -  presumably “Western” -  speech and manners provoke a negative reaction. An 
elderly train guard tells him he is mad (p. 232); the girl says “don’t you know it’s 
forbidden to ask that?” (p. 234); the old woman at the workers’ hostel says, “Don’t you 
know it’s forbidden, staying in a town and not reporting your presence to the police?” (p. 
252). An official tells Leiser “the granting of lifts is forbidden” (p. 230). Individual speech 
and behaviour are regulated, repressed. By the last few pages, there are Russian soldiers 
and tanks everywhere in the town, inevitably reminiscent of the news photographs of 
Soviet invasions of Poland and Hungary (1956) and an anticipation of the crushing of the 
Czech Prague Spring (1968).
The Looking Glass War then may not depict quite such an active Communist threat 
as either Call or The Spy: indeed it even tentatively suggests the threat may be over-stated. 
However this deviation from the Western anti-Communist consensus is rapidly 
overwhelmed by the depiction of the ‘reality’ of East Germany, wherein we witness a 
fearful, joyless regime, maintained under military coercion, in which the populace has no 
investment.
* * *
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5. Upon Reflection: Conclusion
Looking Glass focuses more than ever on the workings of the state, now encompassing 
both the new Department, and the established Circus. In doing so, Looking Glass evinces 
apparently anti-establishment sentiments, satirising the Department’s gentlemanly ruling 
class as anachronistic, whilst a British totalitarianism is suggested via a bureaucratic 
instrumentality that sends Leiser, without adequate training or equipment, into the GDR. 
However this anti-establishment theme is not ultimately anti-state, being undermined by 
the Circus sub-plot, wherein the Circus is seemingly a preferable version of the state, and 
also affirms the existing social structure.
In terms of the nation, a whole series of textual strategies serve to affirm the 
Department/ruling class as the heart of Britain, whilst excluding the working class: this is 
enshrined in the contrast between a dreary, dilapidated, social-housing dominated London, 
and private, affluent, cultured Oxford.388 Working class Leiser is exploited as Cold-War 
cannon fodder to secure the ruling class’s position. The Department’s nostalgia is, like 
Smiley’s in Call, a nostalgia for an elite, pre-war, un-democratic world, a world in which 
British (imperial) power still existed, a world that the Department attempt to recreate.
The political enemy is considerably de-prioritised in Looking Glass, but this does not 
justify reading the novel as unconnected to the Cold War, or as a refutation of the reality of 
the Communist enemy. In fact, the presentation of GDR society, however cursory, is, once 
again, an articulate condemnation of the Soviet Communist system.
* * *
388 “From Plato to Nato”, the West posited itself in the Cold War as the source o f humanism and culture.
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Chapter 4: Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy
1. Cambridge Companion to le Carre: Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy in Context
Published in June 1974, Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy brought le Carre back to the Cold War 
and to public popularity. A non-Cold War ‘political’ novel, A Small Town in Germany 
(1968), followed by a venture into literary romance, The Naive and Sentimental Lover 
(1971), had received poor reviews, while his sales had been in -  relative -  decline since 
The Spy. Tellingly, Tinker reimagines a case from The Spy era, the long-term penetration 
of British intelligence by Soviet agent Kim Philby, but eclipsed The Spy in terms of 
sales,389 and ultimately in terms of profile, via successful television and film versions.
Upper-class Philby rose to head of British counter-intelligence, came under suspicion 
when his friends Burgess and Maclean defected to the Soviet Union in 1951, but with MI5 
unable to make charges stick, Philby was publicly cleared by Foreign Secretary,
Macmillan, in 1955. Kim Philby, O.B.E. finally defected to the Soviet Union in 1963, to 
acute British embarrassment. If, as Tinker's Philby character, Bill Haydon, tells Smiley, 
“secret services [a]re the only real measure of a nation’s political health, the only real 
expression of its subconscious”390 (Tinker, p. 379) then MI5’s tail-chewing late 60s and 
early 70s investigations into a “fourth man” indicated how the Cambridge spies haunted
• O Q 1the British political unconscious. Novels too are an expression of a nation’s 
unconscious:392 le Carre had already written a 1968 essay and a 1970 teleplay about 
Philby,393 while Tinker was not the only Philby-related work to arrive at this moment;394 
nor was it the last.395 Why did such an ancient case have such contemporary currency?
389 The Spy hit no. 1 on the US bestseller lists; Small Town managed 7; Tinker was 4 (Sauerberg ‘Popularity’, 
pp. 102-103).
390 John le Carre, Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy [1974] (London: Sceptre, 1999). Future references in parentheses.
391 Wolfe erroneously references, “Sir Roger Hollis, the Kremlin spy who served as Director General o f  
MI5” (Wolfe, p. 188): indicative of how Communist mud stuck in the Cold War. Former MI5 D.G. Roger 
Hollis and his former deputy Graham Mitchell were investigated and cleared.
392 See: Jameson, Political Unconscious.
393 End o f  the Line, BBC2 Armchair Theatre, broadcast 29 June 1970.
394 Joseph Hone, The Private Sector (June 1971); Dennis Potter, Traitor (BBC Play fo r  Today, October 1971, 
John le Mesurier winning a BAFTA); Alan Williams, Gentleman Traitor (January 1974).
395 Dorothea Bennett, The Jigsaw Man (1977); Graham Greene, The Human Factor (1978), which Philby 
hated (Hoffman, p. 127); Julian Rathbone, A Spy o f  the Old School (1982); Frederick Forsyth The Fourth
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Since Looking Glass War in 1965, the crisis in British capitalism appeared to have 
broadened into a world capitalist crisis. The US ending the Bretton Woods gold standard, 
aggravated by the Arab-Israeli war, triggered the 1973 oil crisis, which engendered a 
worldwide recession. Right-wing regimes fell in Portugal, Greece (both 1974) and Spain 
(1975), while Communist nationalist movements flourished worldwide, and in Britain the 
left was in ascendance, with trade unions and the energy crisis bringing down the Heath 
government. Left-winger Tony Benn took control of Trade and Industry in the new Labour 
government from March 1974, and a panicked MI5 investigated returning premier, Harold 
Wilson, as a possible Communist ‘mole’.396 The tale of a Communist plot penetrating the 
heart of British government then has numerous resonances with contemporary events -  
fear of the socialist ‘enemy within’; fingering the Communism enemy without for the 
capitalist crisis -  whilst the resolution of a Communist plot against Britain was clearly an 
reassuring device at a time of acute public anxiety.
The Bodleian MSS reveal that le Carre spent a year working on Tinker with different 
protagonists,397 before deciding Smiley was a “consoling” guide through its plot’s 
complexity (Gross, p. 35), though we might substitute contemporary politics’ complexity. 
So to hugely oversimplify that plot: cabinet linkman, Oliver Lacon, brings Smiley out of 
retirement to investigate which of a Circus cabal of four -  Percy Alleline (codename: 
Tinker), Toby Esterhase (Tailor), Roy Bland (Soldier) and Bill Haydon (Sailor) -  is a 
longstanding Soviet ‘mole’ or penetration agent. Smiley has to operate secretly, outside the 
Circus, reading files, conducting interviews, before ensnaring the mole, Haydon, who is 
arrested and interrogated. In a subplot, Haydon’s friend and colleague Jim Prideaux has 
been invalided out of the Circus after the mole compromised a Czech mission. When 
Prideaux, now a prep-school teacher, discovers the mole is Haydon, he tracks him down 
and kills him.
Protocol (1984). See: Margaret Scanlan, ‘Philby and his Fictions’, Dalhousie Review, 62 (1982), 533-553; 
Jeanne F. Bedell, ‘The Fictional Kim Philby’, Armchair Detective, 26:4 (1993), 22-29.
396 Wright says MI5 planned a coup against Wilson (Wright, Spycatcher, pp. 369-70).
397 The MSS begin in Sept 1971 (JLC 23); Smiley’s first appearance is J L C 18, 13-15 September 1972.
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Contemporary Reception of Tinker.
Despite Tinker's subsequent reputation, its initial press reception was mixed. Both Graham 
Lord398 and Julian Symons deemed it “a sad disappointment”.399 Typical of many 
complaints of complexity and length,400 Maurice Richardson called it “far too long [...] 
hard to follow,” with Roger Sale declaring it, “Really dull and really pretentious [...] 
plodding and gloomy.”401 This negative reaction connects to the widespread approbation 
expressed at le Carre’s return to what Peter Prescott called “straight [...] entertainment”.402 
Benjamin Stein called Tinker a comforting “cocoon” against the “real world”,403 while 
Pearl K. Bell dismissed the idea le Carre’s novels had any relationship to “Larger 
Issues”.404 This then was the established Leavisite separation of the political and the 
literary, with the ‘genre’ novel still seen as an enduringly escapist, trivial form.
Even so, the lack of any reference to Philby in sixteen British reviews of Tinker and 
twelve American reviews is still arresting.405 Anthony Troon’s positive review called a 
mole “the bad and entirely possible nightmare of politicians and espionage agencies [...] 
the damage such an agent could wreak would be phenomenal”. Troon was seemingly 
unaware that just such a “nightmare” had already occurred 406 In fact the novel’s 
descriptions of Haydon as a promiscuous, aristocratic, Middle East and Sovietologist T.E. 
Lawrence figure (Tinker, pp. 28/140/166) gave ‘whodunit’ away early on for anyone with
398 Graham Lord, Sunday Express, 30 June 1974, p. 6 .
399 Julian Symons, New Review, 4 July 1974, pp. 60-62.
400 Maurice Richardson, ‘The Spy Circus’, Observer, 30 June 1974; Maurice Edelman, ‘Spy Gone Cold’, 
Sunday Telegraph, 30 June 1974, p. 14; Edmund Crispin, ‘Moling Away’, Sunday Times, 30 June 1974, p. 
41; Michael Maxwell Scott, Daily Telegraph, 4 July 1974, p. 9; C.P. Snow, ‘Smiley Comes Back’ Financial 
Times, 19 July 1974 p. 19; Derek Mahon, ‘Dolls within Dolls’, Listener, 4 July 1974, p. 30; N.N., ‘Hunt the 
Sleeper’, Times Literary Supplement. 19 July 1974, p. 10; Symons; John R. Coyne Jnr, ‘Twentieth Century 
Heroes’, National Review, August, 1974, p. 880; William B. Hill, America 16, 1974, p. 300.
401 Roger Sale, Hudson Review, Winter 1974-75, p. 626.
402 Peter Prescott, ‘Smiley vs. the Mole’, Newsweek, 17 June 1974, p. 104. On genre, see also: N.N., ‘Crime 
Compendium’, Spectator, 5 July 1974, p. 21.
403 Benjamin Stein, ‘Fireside, Armchair, Secrets, Smiles’ American Spectator, January 1975, p. 21.
404 Pearl K. Bell, ‘Coming in from the Cold War’, New Leader, June 1974, pp. 15-16.
405 No mention of Philby in Crispin; TLS; Maxwell-Scott; Edelman; Lord; Coady; Spectator, Symons; 
H.R.F. Keating, ‘Life Without Roots’, The Times, 4 July 1974, p. 10; Prior; Timothy Mo, ‘The Human Spy’, 
New Statesman, 12 July 1974, p. 52; Andrew Hope, Evening Standard, 3 July 1974, p. 25; John Robbins, ‘I 
spy...a red herring’, Evening News, 4 July 1974, p. 5; George Thaw, ‘A Winner from the Spy Master’, Daily 
Mirror, July 4 1974, p. 23; Mark Kahn, ‘Le Carre’s on the Spy Trail Again’, Sunday Mirror, 30 June 1974, 
p. 27; N.N. ‘Books, Briefly Noted’, New Yorker, 22 July 1974, p. 83; N.N., Kirkus, 1 June 1974; Dick 
Datchery Critic, October 1974, p. 91.
406 Anthony Troon, ‘Gathering of the Spies’, Scotsman, 29 June 1974, p. 3.
151
any historical knowledge. There are also clear connections between the novel’s Irina 
episode, which launches the mole-hunt (pp. 45-76) and the real-life Volkov incident, where 
Philby stalling over a Soviet defector incriminated him. Tinker's image of bandaged and 
sedated would-be defectors (p. 62), stretchered onto a plane by KGB ‘nurses’ is drawn 
direct from Cold-War history (Andrew, pp. 344-345).
Amongst the small minority of reviewers who did cite the Philby connection,407 its 
relevance to contemporary events was dismissed,408 with Allan Prior’s negative notice’s 
complaint that “as far as our Intelligence Services are concerned [...] the Cold War is still 
on” widely echoed.409 Reviewers saw Tinker reducing high politics to office politics. 
Matthew Coady claimed Tinker was “a portrait of the secret agent as bureaucratic man [...] 
the power battles, the detailed organization and the tedium”, and this was a popular 
view 410 Crispin claimed Tinker's spies were, “less concerned with defeating the Kremlin 
than with interdepartmental bickering”, while the conservative National Review's John 
Coyne observed: “structure with no centre. There seems to be no real reason for espionage 
and no one cares what the Russians know or don’t know, except [...] that knowledge 
affects one’s place in the hierarchy.”411
There was now a muted recognition of the theme of British decline amongst British 
reviewers: Derek Mahon perceived in Tinker a nostalgia for empire; “to shut up shop 
would be to concede victory in the power game to the United States or the Soviet
407 Philby cited by four UK reviewers: Snow; Mahon, Gadney and Richardson (implicated in the Cambridge 
Spy Ring). Philby cited by five US reviewers: Miller; Locke, N.N. Atlantic, August, 1974, p. 88; Washington 
Post, 8 December 1974, p. 1; Burke Wilkinson, ‘Tumcloak in the Dark’, Christian Science Monitor, 3 July 
1974, p. 11.
408 For Cold War and Philby’s irrelevance to 1974, see also: Snow; Edelmann (“the Cold War spy story [...]  
is really old literary stuff’);
409 Allan Prior ‘When Mr Le Carre Came in From the Cold’, Daily Mail, 4 July 1974, p. 7; George Grella, 
‘Murder and Loyalty’, New Republic, 31 July 1976, pp. 23-25; Reg Gadney, ‘Triple Agents’, London 
Magazine, October/November 1974, pp. 73-77. Ironically, Gadney would invoke Philby in his 1987 novel, 
Nightshade.
410 Matthew Coady, ‘Our Sort’, Guardian, 4 July 1974, p. 9. On office politics, see also: TLS, “the internal 
struggles in the office rather than power politics at large”; Lord; Symons; Timothy Foote, Tlaying Tigers’, 
Time, 24 June 1974, p. 108; Prescott; Helen R. Stephenson, ‘Betrayal at the Foreign Office’, Wall Street 
Journal, 24 July 1974, p. 10.
411 John R. Coyne Jnr, ‘Twentieth Century Heroes’, National Review, August 1974, p. 880.
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Union”;412 Spectator noted Smiley’s “hatred of his country’s decline” and a Buchan-esque 
patriotism. Karl Miller also made a link with imperial spy fiction: “as Ian Fleming’s 
ebullient Bondage once did, le Carre’s tales, for all their disenchantment, seem to be trying 
to make Britain great again by feigning a situation in which she still has secrets that the 
world covets.”413 American reviewers addressed British decline more bluntly: “any 
illusions of greatness and glory, for England and the Circus have disappeared,” declared 
Stephenson, while Locke claimed, “[Smiley] is the sorry witness of national decline [...] 
the glamour of the Empire has faded”. However, echoing the imperial spy fiction theme, 
Locke saw Smiley as “a somewhat reduced and saddened but good old British Daddy,” 
rebutting decline.414
By contrast to reviewers, most of le Carre’s subsequent literary critics cite the Philby 
connection 415 Critics also focus on the anti-bureaucracy theme: “Bureaucracy is, in [Le 
Carre’s] view, the reification of endless inaction” (Woods, p. 129); bureaucracies “enslave 
and neuter the human spirit” (Panek, p. 253).416 Critics tend to reproduce Tinker's 
suggestion that Haydon is “as much betrayed by England as he has betrayed England” 
(Noland, pp. 64-65),417 generally dismissing Haydon as a Communist.418 As ever, these 
views have tended to ‘fix’ readings of the novel and this chapter will consequently, firstly, 
challenge le Carre’s contradictorily conservative presentation of bureaucracy. Secondly, 
the chapter will challenge critics’ acceptance of le Carre’s equally unstable theme of 
British national “decency” as invested in Smiley. Thirdly, the chapter will draw out the 
textually submerged -  and critically elided -  characterisation of Communism in the book.
412 Le Carre himself claimed he wrote o f “British nostalgia for power”, Michael Dean, ‘John le Carre: the 
Writer Who Came in from the Cold’, Listener, 5 September 1974, p. 306.
413 Karl Miller, ‘Gothic Guesswork’, New York Review o f  Books, 18 July 1974, 24-27, p. 25.
414 See also: Prescott; Foote; Atlantic', Grella (.Murder, p. 25).
415 Philby is not mentioned by Noland, Everett, Hughes, or Crispin Jackson {Book & Magazine Collector,
115, 1993), but Bennett, (p. 62), Halperin (p. 230) and Hoffman (p, 135) even cite the Volkov connection.
416 See also: Sauerberg, p. 172; Holtmann, pp. 66-67.
417 See also: Masters; Bennett (p. 25); Lewis (p. 134); Holly Beth King, ‘Child’s Play in John le Carre’s 
Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy’, in H. Bloom, p. 69.
418 Lasseter (p. 109); Beene (p. 91); Rothberg (p. 57); Cobbs (p. 119). Furthermore, Sauerberg (p. 59), 
Rutherford (p. 21), Beene (p. 89), all impute Haydon’s motivation to “evil”.
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2. “The Vast Army of Bureaucrats”: State as Faultline
Bureaucratisation, as we saw in Call and Looking Glass, was a key facet of the post-war 
professionalisation of the British state. However the presentation of bureaucracy in Tinker 
is riven with contradictions. First, the implication of Tinker's plot is that bureaucracy’s 
specialisation means detail eclipses whole; wood not seen for trees. Thus, rather than 
merely being oblivious to treachery, as in Call, bureaucracy now produces treachery.
Circus chief, Percy Alleline’s bureaucratic cabal, which ousted Control and his deputy, 
Smiley, is centred upon Bill Haydon, and thus the mole, because the secret information 
Haydon possesses (the bogus Witchcraft material) impresses the state hierarchy.
Treachery, bureaucracy and British decline are thus linked. As in Call, therefore, Smiley 
has to operate outside the treacherous, discredited bureaucracy, overtly outside the toxic 
state, in order, contradictorily, to save the state from the mole and from bureaucracy. 
Smiley’s solving of the case and culminating ascent to power is textual flagged as a 
reassertion of British greatness.
Paul Hoggett suggests that bureaucracy is where the public stores its anxieties, 
connecting to Haydon’s remark about secret services as their nation’s subconscious and 
accounting for the antipathy the public feels to bureaucracy.419 This chimes with Marx’s 
“the bureaucracy has the [...] spiritual essence of society in thrall, as its private property”. 
Marx highlights this in the notion of the secret, which is “the universal spirit of 
bureaucracy”, and “secures internally by its hierarchy”.420 This is the Witchcraft material 
again. But the repressed -  secrets, anxieties -  must make their return. This, in Tinker, is the 
function of Smiley, in his recurring guise as the Great Detective: Smiley exposes the 
secrets, analyses the clues offered by tiny, psychologically revealing details, dogs that 
don’t bark. Somewhat quixotically, amateurism is again presented, via the reassuring 
figure of Smiley, as the ‘better’ professionalism, as opposed to bureaucratisation. For
419 Hoggett in Du Gay, Values, pp. 179-80.
420 Karl Marx, Critique o f  H egel’s Doctrine o f State (in Early Writings), p. 108.
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despite his bureaucratic focus on detail, searching for anomalies in the bureaucrats’ files, 
Smiley, unlike the standard bureaucrat, also sees the big picture.
Smiley’s position outside the state bureaucracy is carefully presented from the 
novel’s start: we find him first in uneasy retirement, running into Whitehall gossip, Roddy 
Martindale, who describes Alleline’s secretive, bureaucratic regime of “‘Little reading 
rooms at the Admiralty, little committees popping up with funny names’” (p. 28). When 
Smiley’s former colleague, Peter Guillam, takes up the story, Guillam reveals the cabal’s 
bureaucratic jargon: “lateralism” (p. 38), a consolidation of departments which shores up 
the cabal’s power and unaccountability, particularly Haydon’s as Head of “London 
Station”. “‘They’re a service within a service,”’ says Guillam, “‘they share their own 
secrets and don’t mix with the proles’” (p. 28). Alleline is a Maston protegee (p. 140), thus 
in le Carre negative terms, a natural bureaucrat (Panek, p. 249) and an imnatural spy. A 
“striver” in contrast to Smiley’s inspiration, Control says of him: “‘Percy Alleline would 
sell his mother for a knighthood and this service for a seat in the House of Lords’” (Tinker, 
p. 142). Adeline is gauchely frank about his ambition to sit at the “top table” (p. 142). 
Albeit from a different context, Marx’s remark is pertinent, “as for the individual 
bureaucrat, the purpose of the state becomes [the bureaucrat’s] private purpose, a hunt for  
promotion, careerism” (Marx, ‘Hegel’, Early Writings, p. 108). By contrast, Control and 
Smiley have the amateur ethos o f ‘disinterested’ ‘service’: thus Smiley’s regular 
resignations and all-hours work. Tellingly, Adeline is, away in the country -  the aspirant 
aristocrat’s affectation -  when the novel’s key Czech debacle occurs (pp. 245-6).421 There 
is the implication here of bourgeois indolence, of complacency, compared to Smiley and 
Control’s amateur engagement. Adeline is also, says Smiley, “‘the Minister’s man’” 
{Tinker, p. 80), a compromising executive branch chumminess, while the aristocratic 
Minister in question is also, fatally, a relative of Ann and Haydon’s, defined by “lolling 
mendacity” (p. 359) and a concern to minimise “scandal” (p. 319).
421 This echoes the 1947 Albanian operation that was undermined by Philby, and the Venlo incident (1939), 
where SIS officers were lured into captivity by the promise of a defecting General.
Therefore, that the Adeline cabal’s success, testified by Martindale (p. 28) and Lacon 
(p. 80), is with Whitehall (the executive) renders it suspect. Moreover, that it is the 
Witchcraft material that, in Guillam’s fieldman perception, “accounts] for the Circus’s 
inertia at working level and the esteem it enjoyed in Whitehall” (p. 90) puts the Adeline 
Circus on the negative side of the desk/field polarity. The bureaucratic Circus only 
passively receives intelligence (Witchcraft); it is not operational, working in the field, as in 
the Control/Smiley amateur regime’s day. That the Witchcraft material is recognised by 
Smiley as “suspect” (p. 145) is indicative of his exemplary spread of skids: deskman, 
fieldman, and resolving ‘caseman’.
The State and Class in Tinker
Heightening the amateur/professional class divide, Adeline, seemingly, like Maston, is no
gentleman. “‘Damn Caledonian street-merchant, no shadow of class’” (p. 169) says
Haydon of Adeline, ventriloquising Control’s gentleman amateur perspective. Control
notably codenames Adeline ‘Tinker’. Of the other members of the cabal, Bland (Soldier) is
working class; Esterhase (Poorman) is working class and foreign.422 Haydon, the mole,
despite being from the gentlemanly class (Tailor), is the centre of this bureaucratic cabal: it
is Haydon’s ‘chickenfeed’ Witchcraft intelligence that has secured Adeline’s regime. That
Haydon is socially out of place in this company is the point: he is a spy. Like his amateur
comrade Smiley, Haydon is the ideal combination of field and deskman: a caseman.
“[Haydon] had a dazzling war [...] he was unorthodox and occasionally outrageous. He
was probably heroic” (p. 166). Yet Haydon is head of bureaucratic London Station. That
Control snobbishly favours Haydon is part of Haydon’s ‘cover’ (Tinker p. 168), as is
Haydon’s membership of Ann’s aristocratic ‘set’. Le Carre elsewhere commented on the
insulation provided by Philby’s class credentials: “S.I.S. [Secret Intelligence Service, MI6]
quite clearly identified class with loyalty” {Philby, p. 35), and asked, shortly after Philby’s
422 “Redbrick Don” Bland’s fieldwork resulted in a nervous breakdown, thus his seeking bureaucratic power 
(“‘I’ve paid...I want some back’”, p. 162).
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exposure, “Do our security services believe that Etonians are a better risk than grammar 
school men?” (‘Writer’, p. 18) But this is a submerged theme in Tinker and arguably, class 
is seen as a better safeguard than merit in le Carre. For all that class connections produce a 
Haydon, they also produce a Smiley to neutralise him. Merit provides Mastons and 
Adelines, preoccupied with self-preservation and small-picture specialisation, who at best 
fails to witness and at worst nurture corruption. Significantly, bureaucrat Oliver Lacon, has 
to bring in an anti-bureaucratic amateur, Smiley, to solve the mole case.
Smiley as Anti-Bureaucrat
In Tinker we see a glimpse of the deep state, but it is still largely presented in terms of 
bureaucracy. Lacon is, crucially, the link to the state’s legislative branch, but is seen 
always in terms of bureaucratic self-advancement (c.f. Adeline as “striver”). Smiley 
attributes to Lacon, “a sense of Christian ethic that promises him no reward except a 
knighthood, the respect to his peers, a fat pension and a couple of charitable directorships 
in the City” (p. 79). These sentiments are echoed by Sam Collins (p. 240). Smiley scorns 
Lacon’s bureaucratic propriety: and Lacon’s preoccupation with accounting (“[Lacon] 
made it clear he detested the irregularity” of ‘borrowing’ fdes overnight, p. 135); 
accountability (Lacon’s horror at the suggestion that Smiley should read the Witchcraft 
fdes, p. 137; “‘you’re not family any more, you know’” p. 138). Thus Connie Sachs posits 
Lacon as the bureaucratic barbarian invading the inspired amateur world, asking Smiley, 
“‘How could you let a Lacon in?”’ (p. 108) (with a subliminal suggestion again of the 
bureaucrat as socially inferior). Again the emphasis is on bureaucratic functionaries, rather 
than the state itself.
Professionalism via ideological investment in bureaucratisation is thus denigrated.
By contrast to both Adeline and Lacon, Smiley is nationally rather than career-motivated: 
Smiley, like Control, was alert to the possibility of a mole whilst Lacon was dismissing the 
idea (p. 77). Now Smiley’s investigation is given its character and structure by its
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avoidance of the state bureaucracy: Guillam photographing files (p. 90); Guillam stealing 
Circus files (pp. 179-186); Smiley and Guillam kidnapping bureaucrat Toby Esterhase (pp. 
323-339). In the logic of the novel, this approach is so as not to frighten the horses (or the 
mole), but it also usefully functions to keep Smiley at arm’s length from the taint of the 
bureaucracy or the state. Instead Smiley’s investigation valorises amateurism, and he 
defeats the bureaucrats on two fronts -  fooling the cabal to pursue the investigation; 
ousting the cabal at investigation’s end. Critics, however, are rather too quick to accept 
bureaucracy as the guilty party and thus fail to detect the contradictions in Tinker's 
presentation of bureaucracy.423
The major contradiction is Smiley being rewarded by Lacon with the reins of the 
very system Smiley supposedly disdains. The contradiction is captured in Smiley’s “surge 
of resentment against the institutions he was supposed to be protecting” (p. 359), another 
rare hint of the deep state -  what are these plural institutions? Superficially then Smiley’s 
accession to power creates a resolution: Britain, has symbolically been rendered ‘great’ 
against the depredations of traitors and bureaucrats, by the triumph of this exemplar of 
Britishness. But how can Smiley command where previously he has always countered? 
Even in his most integrated state role, in Looking Glass, Smiley provided a moral brake to 
Control’s expediency. In fact, Smiley’s promotion simply highlights an extant 
contradiction: for all his avoidance of the hierarchy and his anti-state rhetoric, Smiley has 
been working for the state all along. Smiley is an employee of Lacon of the Cabinet Office, 
he has the endorsement of Lacon’s Minister, and is all too willing use this as a weapon 
when required.424 ‘“I have to report all this to Lacon, you see. He's being awfully pressing 
just at the moment. He seems to have the Minister on his back‘” (Tinker, p. 332).425 In
423 See: Anatole Broyard, ‘Le Carre’s People’, review o f Quest fo r  Karla, New York Times, 29 August 1982, 
p. 23; “the reification o f endless inaction” (Woods, p. 129); “in the Cold War novels the ultimate evil is the 
system, against which friendship stands out as a sacrificed ideal” (Paulson, p. 325).
4 4 To Connie, p. 108; to Esterhase, p. 327; to Prideaux p. 291.
425 Beene captures Smiley’s in/out relationship with the state: “though uncomfortable with its ambiguous 
ethic, [Smiley] continues to hold himself out as his profession’s proponent” (Beene, p. 93). She correctly 
calls it “his quest to revive the status quo” (Beene, p. 99).
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mythic terms, the questing knight is rewarded with the control of the kingdom. The point 
of such myths are dissolution/sacrifice in order to regenerate. But the kingdom is 
essentially unchanged by the process. The ascendance of Smiley simply restores the state 
to its status quo ante bureaucratisation.
A second contradiction is that while le Carre may not regard Smiley as a bureaucrat, 
he is easily mistaken for one.426 As Denning says, “Smiley’s success comes from 
accumulating information” (Denning, p. 136). As within the Alleline cabal, so without: 
(secret) knowledge is bureaucratic power. We see Smiley wielding this power over Toby 
Esterhase, for instance (Tinker, pp. 324-338). Denning concludes that Smiley is: “on the 
one hand a throwback to an earlier notion of knowledge as the possession of an amateur 
who uses it to serve the Empire”, but also “a figure for the collective activity of all those 
disconnected [...] bureaucrats [...] whose fragments of knowledge are unified by Smiley 
to bring forth the whole fantastic secret” (Denning, p. 137). The resolution of ‘deskman’ 
vs. ‘fieldman’ via Smiley as ‘caseman’ occludes the deeper problem of the ‘state’.
Moreover, surveillance, a faultline in le Carre, as in Western liberal democracy, is 
key to Smiley’s methodology, to his very ability to identify and ensnare the mole. 
“Bureaucracy involves forms of surveillance activity [...] Administrative power enters into 
the minutiae of daily life and the most intimate of personal actions and relationships” 
(Giddens, p. 309). Smiley thus is implicated in the very bureaucratic processes he purports 
to reject.
The third contradiction regarding the state is that figuring bureaucracy as locus of 
British problems highlights, in this post-war period of Keynesian consensus, an 
unwittingly reactionary nostalgia. In a 1977 article, le Carre decried:
426 E.g. Thomas J. Price, ‘Spy Stories, Espionage and the Public in the Twentieth Century’, Journal o f  
Popular Culture, 30: 3 (Winter 1996), 81-89 (p. 86).
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.. .a supposedly Socialist party cutting public spending427 [...] while maintaining 
unchanged the vast army of bureaucrats who made these very services so costly in 
the first place. To rule the whole of India and a third of the world to boot, we never 
needed half of this impossible, self-consuming structure 428
Le Carre rather lets the cat out of the bag by linking Empire and anti-bureaucratism here. 
Not only does he channel traditional conservative suspicion of “big government”, but he 
cites Empire as an unalloyed positive, and ultimately again suggests that bureaucracy 
‘caused’ British decline.429 However, Giddens shows that bureaucracies have tended to 
increase in tandem with social liberalisation (Giddens, p. 309). Administering the Welfare 
State vastly increased bureaucracy, which in turn increased social mobility. Given le 
Carre’s critique of cutting public spending, presumably no rejection of the Welfare State or 
post-war democratisation is intended. But just such a view, with its class emphasis on 
Empire vs. welfare state, is a powerful implication in Tinker's anti-bureaucratic theme.
We have seen then how Smiley is a fundamentally reassuring figure in Tinker, his 
inspired amateur brilliance defeats the bureaucrats, and ensnares the state-undermining 
mole, superficially ‘resolving’ British anxieties focused on the state. But Smiley is 
contradictorily disavowed as a state functionary, posited instead as a ‘national’ saviour, 
wherein his English decency is key. With the construct of character, as ever, revealing 
philosophical faultlines, let us now examine how Smiley’s exemplarity of British national 
decency is contradictory.
*  *  *
427 I.e. James Callaghan’s Labour government’s economic meltdown.
428 Le Carre, ‘In England now’, New York Times Magazine, 23 October 1977, p. 34; p. 86 .
429 The reality was that it was the very imperial bureaucracy le Carre commends that was proving to be cost 
ineffective.
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3. National Decency and National Violence
A chapter might easily be filled with critical testimonials to the decency of George 
Smiley:430 e.g. amongst Tinker reviews: “Smiley is one of the last English gentlemen [...] 
an honorable, decent fellow [...] humanity at its decent English best” (Locke). Smiley 
“provides a sense of a moral center [...] the embodiment of British decency” (Grella, 
‘Murder’, p. 25). Amongst Tinker's critics: “[Smiley’s] deep sense of human decency [is] 
the product of the best in the liberal and individualistic tradition [and] English culture” 
(Sauerberg, p. 60). The crucial point is that this ‘decency’ of Smiley’s is not simply 
personal: a semantic collapse usually occurs between Smiley’s character and national 
character. Noland makes a link with Buchan: “Like Mr Standfast, [Smiley] is the spirit of 
England” (Noland, p. 63); Lewis sees Smiley as “national savior and rescuer of Britannia” 
(Lewis, p. 149). Rothberg claims, “le Carre wishes us to consider George Smiley the 
epitome of the best England has to offer” (Rothberg, p. 49). The invocation of imperial spy 
fiction here is revealing, reaffirming that, for all the vaunted le Carre ambiguities, Smiley 
is, at this stage in his career, an unambiguously affirmative emblem of the British nation.
Let us consider this notion of the nation again. Giddens, a Marxist en route to the 
political centre, describes nationalism as: “attachment to a homeland associated with the 
creation and perpetuation o f certain distinctive ideals and values, traceable to certain 
historically given features o f ‘national’ experience” (Giddens, p. 214, my emphasis). In 
this centrist liberal idea of nation -  at odds with Benedict Anderson or Gellner’s anti­
idealist versions -  it makes perfect sense that Smiley embodies and defends British “ideals 
and values”: the more romantically for the sense that they are embattled. In a Freudian
430 “An intensely decent man who also happens to be a professional secret agent” (Ambrosetti, p. 99); “A  
man o f conscience” with “a code o f loyalty, o f fidelity, o f obligation” (Rutherford, pp. 24-25); “Compassion 
is the driving-force which activates Smiley” (Hughes, p. 278); “That emblem o f British decency, probity and 
fairness, George Smiley” (Rothberg, p. 55); “stubbornly intelligent and unshakably moral, Smiley represents 
humanism” (Broyard); “The custodian for certain positive values” (Homberger, p. 83); “Amid tawdriness, he 
stands for honor, duty, and decency” (Wolfe, p. 67); “a moral exemplar, Smiley embodies the western respect 
for individuality” (Dobel, p. 209); “the sole figure o f conscience in a culture [of] underlying corruption” 
(Tracy, p. 22); “Loyalty [...] idealism [...] honesty and compassion” (Lasseter, p. 107); “Reconciles the 
ideological fight for the more humane system with his personal fight for decency” (Holtmann p. 66); “intense 
compassion for decency, patriotism and humanity” (Beene, p. 90); “Decency, integrity, kindness, sympathy, 
and compassion are Smiley’s [...] character traits” (Aronoff, pp. 15-16).
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fort/da common to imperial spy fiction, the reader gets to be horrified by the gloomy 
picture of a treachery-riddled, declining Britain, but then relieved and reassured as Smiley, 
through his nationally decent methods, restores order, and symbolically reverses national 
British decline. Let us now explore this notion of British decency.
The Public School Ethos
Public schools played an integral ideological role in the dominant version of British -  
properly ‘English’ -  nationalism. All the major characters in Tinker attended public 
schools, including Smiley. A prep school -  ruling class antechamber to public schools and 
public life -  is a major setting in Tinker. It is where the novel begins; it establishes what 
follows.431 Public schools blossomed in tandem with the British Empire (Hobsbawm, 
Empire, p. 73). The nine public schools established as “nurseries of the nobility and 
gentry” expanded by the early 1900s to 160 public schools “deliberately training their 
pupils as members of a ruling class” (Hobsbawm, Empire, p. 178), and designed to 
produce imperial and government administrators.432 Public schools were thus integral to an 
elite, ruling class vision of British national character, which Denning sketches as “Newbolt 
man,433 with his mystical loyalty to school, nation and Empire” (Denning, p. 33). By taking 
the “celebrated playing fields of Eton as a figure for social life” the public school ethic 
suggested, “social and political conflict was a game, to be played in a sprit of fairness, 
amateurism and manliness” (Denning, p. 33). British national “decency” and national 
“service” are thus intertwined, underlying imperialist spy fiction, mildly satirised in 
Maugham,434 but also imbued in Smiley. It is worth repeating that le Carre had taught at
431 In the multitude o f drafts in the Bodleian MSS, Tinker always commences at the school, with Prideaux as 
lead character. Linking spy establishment and public schools, one character says to Jim, “Trust you to swap 
one crummy English institution for another” JLC 24, 4 December 1971, p. 5.
432 David Powell, Nationhood & Identity: The British State Since 1800 (London: Tauris, 2002), p. 113.
433 Henry Newbolt’s poem ‘Vitae Lampada’ (1897) relates sportsmanship to imperial duty “The river o f  
death has brimmed his banks/And England's far, and Honour a name/But the voice o f a schoolboy rallies the 
ranks:/”Play up! play up! and play the game!””
434 Ashenden’s boss says, “He hasn’t the advantages of a public school education. His ideas o f playing the 
game are not quite the same as your or mine,” Somerset Maugham, Ashenden, [1928] (London: Vintage, 
2000), p. 56.
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Eton, citing his “ambivalence towards the institutions of the establishment, loving them 
and criticizing them simultaneously”.435
Thursgood’s prep school is, ostensibly a comfort-zone refuge for former public 
schoolboy, refugee spy and Buchan-eer Jim Prideaux, the place where Prideaux escapes 
the knowledge that his friend Bill Haydon is a Communist spy: a kind of national 
unconscious. Prideaux is an inveterate denier -  of British decline, of the collapse of the 
public school code, of his ‘knowledge’ of his friend Haydon’s treachery, all of which are 
thus linked throughout436 Prideaux compares himself to Rip Van Winkle (p. 13), recalling 
le Carre’s phrase “the thousand year sleep of Eden and Macmillan”, satirising both 
gentlemanly dreams of past national glories and unfounded complacency about 
Communist penetration (.Philby, p. 41). There is something defensive then in Prideaux’s 
inculcation of his “passionate Englishness” into his pupils: “‘Best place in the whole damn 
world’ he bellowed” (Tinker, p. 17), reading them Biggies, Percy Westerman (p. 18) and 
Buchan (p. 286), the hegemonic propaganda of British empire, of British greatness. The 
private school as a redoubt of secure gentlemanly traditions of fair play and British power 
is thus insecure, as both Prideaux having been shot in the back, and Thursgood’s economic 
depredations reveal: the Dip where Prideaux parks his caravan was dug for a planned 
swimming pool before the school ran out of money (p. 11). Pursuing this idea of the school 
as a national unconscious, the Dip is below ground, and is a focus of mythologising 
amongst the schoolboys (p. 11): buried, hidden, repressed. Prideaux also buries his gun in 
this Dip, a gun which observing schoolboy Bill Roach will in the novel’s final sentence 
decide was a dream (p. 282). Prideaux’s caravan is out of true, with Prideaux working hard 
to level it, another image of correcting, fixing, denying, with ready national overtones. 
Moreover, Prideaux drives a barely-functioning, out-of-production British Alvis car, a nice 
distillation of nostalgic, inefficient, reality-denying Britishness. Goodman certainly sees all
435 Letter to Ann Sharp, August 1957, (Sisman NP).
436 “Neither Control’s warning that there is a traitor in the ranks of the Circus nor the evidence of betrayal 
provided by [Prideaux’s] own capture during Operation Testify, does anything to lessen his faith in British 
decency” (Monaghan, p 18).
163
this in terms of British decline, “The reference to the red of the car, the blue of the caravan 
and the white steam in the rain is an alignment of the image with the Union flag, here 
apparently coming apart at the seams” (Goodman, p. 206).437 Certainly the sense of 
repression is strong in the text: “Sometimes [Jim] thought of the wound as a memory he 
couldn’t keep down. He tried his damnedest to patch over and forget it” (p. 282). This 
ostensibly refers to Jim’s unconscious knowledge that Haydon is the mole, but with this 
knowledge linked to Britain’s greatness, the repression also has a national function. In line 
with Hoggett’s idea of the national unconscious as cache of cultural anxieties, it is Smiley, 
bureaucratic bearer of unwelcome secret knowledge, who suddenly appears at the school to 
materialise Jim’s unconscious fears (p. 286). We might however link this to Gilroy’s more 
recent analysis of “postimperial melancholia” (Gilroy, p. 98), whereby the traumatic loss 
of power is accompanied by an amnesia, a repression of what that power was founded on, 
the brutal history of imperialism (Gilroy, p. 108). We will return to this.
Let us now however explore that link between Circus penetration and national 
health. Haydon is a supposedly exemplary product of this public school ethos. The T.E. 
Lawrence citation suggests Haydon, like Philby, epitomised two strands of the aristocratic 
gentlemanly ideal: the muscular Christian athlete and the aesthete.438 Consequently 
Haydon betrays not just state but national (but specifically elite) interests. Haydon’s 
unmasking troubles all these established, traditional associations of public school, 
imperialism and decency; what Grella calls an “almost tribal sense of aristocratic 
fellowship” (Grella, p. 87). Haydon here is a Buchan character to kill the Buchan 
character. The violence Haydon does to this public school/decency/Englishness ethos is 
ultimately what leads Prideaux (its exemplar) to kill Haydon 439 Similarly Smiley’s helper, 
another Buchan character, Peter Guillam’s adherence to “plain, heroic standards” (Tinker,
437 In one MS Roach sees Prideaux’s nickname ‘Rhino’ as testament to “the dignity o f a dying breed” JLC 
24, 8 February 1972.
438 Berberich, English Gentleman, p. 122.
439 Schwarz reveals how Buchan’s ethos has a surprisingly enduring afterlife, Buchan’s reputation relatively 
unsullied by its colonial connotations. Bill Schwarz, Memories o f  Empire. Volume 1: The White M an’s World 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 213.
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p. 360) and “a notion of English calling” (p. 361) are both invoked immediately after 
Haydon’s unmasking. As a result, Guillam feels “orphaned”, because Haydon is “of his 
own kind” (p. 365). Guillam’s is a class anger that Haydon has betrayed and thus destroyed 
the public school English gentlemanly ethos, couched as a national anger,440 and that 
Haydon has in effect, metaphorically ‘caused’ British decline. Thus is Communism subtly 
blamed for economic problems that were of British capitalism’s creation. So in the novel, 
even a prep school is an uneasy refuge, where Smiley or guns may resurface as reminders 
of the repressed reality; venerable Oxford University is the very site of Haydon’s 
recruiting; socially unacceptable Martindale invades Smiley’s Manchester Square 
gentleman’s club; while Haydon wrecks the beloved Circus. However all this only 
intensifies the wistfulness with which these establishment institutions are depicted.
That wistfulness permeates Smiley’s former colleague, Connie Sachs’, absolutely 
key speech about the state of the nation: “‘Poor loves. Trained to Empire, trained to rule 
the waves. All gone. All taken away. Bye-bye world’” (Tinker, p. 122). Denning 
characterises the post-imperial class as: “Rulers with nothing to rule, servants with nothing 
to serve” (Denning, p. 130). Connie speaks nostalgically of a time “‘before Empire became 
a dirty word’” and “‘when Englishmen could be proud’”. Now “‘all over the world beastly 
people are making our time into nothing’” (p. 121). Moreover, Connie connects all this, a 
la Brideshead Revisited, with the destruction of her childhood home, Millponds, for a 
motorway (p. 122): the democratic modem world destroying the institutions of a past 
imperial, aristocratic Arcadia. Why do critics not challenge Connie on this, rather than 
uncritically recycling this nostalgia for an imperial, elite society?441 “Poor loves”, deprived 
of the aphrodisiac of power, of the ability to exploit ‘lesser’ peoples, of the booty upon 
which stately homes like Millponds were built. “Beastly people” are either leftists or post­
colonial rebels: another return of the repressed (as rights-less “beasts”). This is Gilroy’s
440 Brady sees Haydon/Philby as “the death of the gentleman” (Brady, p. 291); “This is what Philby 
desecrated: the sense o f decency” (Hoffman, p. 113).
441 E.g. “A way of life based on Empire, a functioning class system and a creed o f service, which seemed so 
secure before the Second World War, has been swept away” (Monaghan, p. 4).
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“postimperial melancholia”: “the morbid culture of a once-imperial nation that has not 
been able to accept its inevitable loss of prestige in a determinedly postcolonial world” (p.
117). We see a similar trope in late 1970s/early 80s heritage drama: nostalgia for a class- 
riddled, elite, imperial England even as that England’s death rites are apparently read. The 
1979 televisation of Tinker, with its obsessive focus upon Oxford via each episode’s end- 
credits, is an early example of this heritage trend (Oldham, p. 740).442
However, this nostalgic strain in the novel and in British culture can also be 
deceptive. For if the British ruling class was shaken by the Philby affair, it soon reasserted 
itself. Prep school, public school and Oxbridge remain the antechambers to the intelligence 
services, to the state, to power, to this day. What’s more, in the novel Smiley emerges from 
this very class background to save Britain (Connie links Smiley and Haydon overtly, 
“‘You’re the last, George, you and Bill’” (Tinker, p. 122), while the very same class’s 
Prideaux ‘solves’ the problem of both mole and British decline in muscular Christian 
manner, by killing Haydon. The public school/Oxbridge ethos is clearly alive, well and 
indeed valorised in Tinker. Equally, if Britain had shrunk from its former domination of 
the world,443 it was still amongst the world’s richest countries, and informal empire 
continued via a reorganising global capitalism which responded aggressively to the left and 
anti-imperialist movements of the 1970s.444 It is to this theme of Empire that we shall now 
turn.
“I W on’t Have Bloodshed” : National Violence as Faultline in Tinker 
The British Empire, submerged in le Carre’s 1960s fiction, but still underlying it, asserts 
itself in Tinker, ironically as an absence (both literal and figurative), before moving centre- 
stage in Honourable Schoolboy (1977). Although the Empire is barely mentioned as such,
442 Tinker's BBC producers’ original choice, BridesheadRevisited, was pipped by Granada’s pioneering 
production (1979), where the heritage theme was overt in the original text.
43 Under Wilson’s previous administration the British Empire had supposedly withdrawn “East o f Suez” 
(another Kipling reference).
444 Ernest Mandel: Late Capitalism [1972] (London: Verso, 1980).
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alongside the imperial associations of the public school ethos, the novel’s mood of 
postimperial melancholy (Gilroy), and Tinker's multiple references to imperial spy fiction, 
the novel ranges between several former or current British colonies -  Malaya, Hong Kong 
and India. But this imperial invocation also exposes a faultline within both the public 
school ethos and the ideology of English decency: the base violence that undergirds the 
imperial superstructure. The repressed returns again.
David Powell writes, “the idea that Britain, because of its own inherent qualities, had 
a unique, civilizing, imperial mission carried genuine conviction in many Victorian minds 
irrespective of any more rapacious economic reality” (Nation, p. 105). Indeed, ideologies 
of Empire used the ‘superior’ civilisation of Britain as justification for colonising less 
‘civilised’ peoples. Imperial ideologue, Joseph Chamberlain, declared England “the 
predominant force in the future history and civilization of the world” (in Schwarz, p. 89), 
linking it to “national character” (in Gilroy, p. 68). Lord Milner declared in 1903 that “the 
white man should rule” on ‘the ground of superior civilisation” (in Schwarz, p. 98).
Looking back, Graham MacPhee shows how, “the attributes of British civilisation were 
presented as the attributes of civilisation per se” (MacPhee, p. 30). Stanley Baldwin in 
1924 gave this national ‘civilisation’ a specific moral character: “[the British] go overseas, 
and take with them what they have learned at home: love of justice, love of truth and the 
broad humanity that are so characteristic of English people” (in Schwarz, p. 101).445 This 
‘disinterested’ face of imperialism then is the “white man’s burden” of Kipling, an 
imperial writer whose influence peppers Tinker. Le Carre recalls the same reading aloud of 
imperialist fiction at his own prep school as Prideaux performs in Thursgood’s {In 
England, p. 34): training for future imperial administrators.
445 The imperial spy novel “satisfied a national need for justification. They invariably show the absolute 
victory o f all traditional British beliefs, particularly the sentimental platitudes about the Briton’s natural 
superiority” (Grella, p. 93).
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However, Walter Benjamin claims: “there is no document of civilisation which is not 
at the same time a document of barbarism,”446 for the British Empire was a repressive and 
brutal regime. As Gilroy says, this was not due to unfortunate ‘mistakes’: it was written 
into the imperial system of “governmental terror creatively and legally applied as a mode 
of political administration and economic exploitation” (Gilroy, p. 51). For all the “ethnic 
mythology that projects empire as essentially a form of sport, [it is] necessarily a violent, 
dirty and immoral business” (Gilroy, p. 102). Joseph Chamberlain himself conceded the 
centrality of “the use of force” in “the cause of civilisation” (in Gilroy, p. 68). Looking 
back nostalgically to the Philby case via Tinker Britain could also look back at its brutal 
behaviour in Aden (1963-7), Malaya, or Borneo (1963), in the last two of which Tinker's 
Ricki Tarr was involved (Tinker, p. 42). Looking back to the 1930s, as the novel does -  
“all gone; all taken away” in Connie’s words -  Britain could look back at its brutal 
behaviour in India and the Arab world. Robert Young declares: “The trace of violence is 
the primary semiotic of the colonial apparatus, its means of communication”.447
Like Empire then, Smiley as exemplar of British civilisation, of “British decency”, 
stands astride a faultline of violence. This is almost entirely overlooked by critics, for 
whom Smiley remains nationally “decent”, even saintly 448 Let us then examine Smiley’s 
use of violence as it is a metonym of that deeper national violence. The secret services, as 
part of the state, participate in the state’s monopoly of violence, but there is perennially in 
liberal culture, a queasiness about this, every bit as deep as the queasiness about the state. 
So the liberal state’s violence is occluded, as Foucault depicts in Discipline and Punish, in 
contrast to the overtly repressive feudal state. Thus the end to the stocks and public 
hangings and the substitution of the modem prison and ‘objective’ jury system. The 
‘decent’ liberal nation fulfils its purpose here as the PR of the capitalist state, within which
446 Walter Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy o f History’ in Illuminations (London: Fontana Collins, 1973) 
p. 258.
47 Robert C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), p. 295.
448 Sauerberg at least acknowledges the problem while justifying Smiley’s actions: “Smiley is given 
absolution for his employment o f foul means by reminding the reader constantly that English culture has 
values which make such sacrifices worthwhile” (p. 51).
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bureaucracy, as Hoggett showed, compartmentalises tricky aspects of the social structure.
In both real life and in spy fiction, spies subvert the bureaucratic structure and operate as 
jury and executioner: thus Bond’s “license to kill”. However, in Tinker, violence is 
distributed in deference to the Circus’s (aka the state’s) bureaucratic, hierarchical 
structure.449 The lower-class, strong-arm Scalphunters, specialists in “murder and 
kidnapping and crash blackmail”, are segregated in what Alleline calls “‘hateful Brixton’” 
(p. 192), a working class -  and immigrant black -  area, out of sight from elite West End 
(Alleline’s “‘the Palace’” p. 192) and Whitehall, and disavowed by all: “There to handle 
the hit and run jobs that were too dirty or too risky for the residents abroad” (p. 38). Thus, 
the British state’s upper echelons are structurally distanced from violence: so is Smiley, 
sustaining the appearance of British national decency.
Significantly, the initial information about the existence of the mole comes from a
Scalphunter. Ricki Tarr, empire baby, lower-middle-class child of colonialism, patronised
and brutalised by his British ‘superiors’, is likely another Kipling reference (Ricki-Ticki-
Tavi, 1894). Protecting a British colonial family, Kipling’s ultimate trusty retainer’s
protection is based on brutal violence to the threatening snakes (natives?). As befits this
imperial heritage, and Tarr’s carefully described involvement in British venality and
violence in Malaya (pp. 41-42), Tarr is himself brutal in his defence of Britain against the
mole. Smiley himself, significantly, inducted Tarr into British intelligence (p. 41). So
Smiley letting out a “shudder’ when he discovers Guillam is now head of the Scalphunters
(significantly, a demotion, p. 37), is a kind of cosmetic liberal queasiness. Because the
entire mole investigation is set upon the structure of Scalphunter violence and venality. So,
in another return of the repressed, Tarr will turn that violence against his own aristocratic
‘superior’, Steve Mackelvore, in Paris (Tinker, pp. 342-3). Young attests that “the agent of
violence becomes subjected to it as much as the violated recipient” (Young, p. 295).
Again, this violence is at Smiley’s behest, designed to flush out the mole. So while Tarr’s
449 In 1976 le Carre acknowledged how policy becomes “two guys in grey flannel suits and they say, ‘Shall 
we just cut his throat for you?’” Bragg, ‘Things’, Listener, p. 90.
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violence both initiates and concludes the plot, Smiley relies upon it, but stays untainted by 
it - like the liberal state; like the ‘decent’ ‘nation’.
So despite Smiley’s avowed distaste for the Scalphunters, Smiley still avails himself 
of Guillam’s intemperance and more significantly, Guillam’s vicious Scalphunter, Fawn, 
on behalf of the nation. This distribution of violence means that when Tarr is insolent 
during Smiley’s first interview, “Guillam, with an angry exclamation, rose to his feet. But 
Smiley seemed quite unbothered” {Tinker, p. 75). Smiley can afford to be “unbothered” 
with Guillam at his back and Fawn at the door. At the second Tarr interview, at an Essex 
safe house, “left to himself [Guillam] would have been tempted to beat the daylights out of 
Tarr” (p. 199) but Smiley twice talks Guillam down (p. 206). This asserts the hierarchic 
distribution of violence. But when Tarr later attacks Smiley, Guillam “selected Tarr’s right 
arm and flung it into a lock against his back, bringing it very near to breaking” (p. 205).
The serfs cannot attack the gentlemen.
Violence nevertheless is the mechanism upon which power rests, in Tinker as in the 
state. The role of Fawn, who lurks in the background of these interviews, is crucial. That 
Fawn is ironically named a “Babysitter “indicates the text’s awareness of this violence 
faultline. Fawn is two hierarchical rungs removed from Smiley, and his violence is always 
creepily invisible. In the Essex safe house, Fawn appears “from nowhere” and how and 
when he hits Tarr is mysterious. “There was blood in [Tarr’s] mouth, a lot of it, and 
Guillam realised Fawn must have hit him but he couldn’t work out when” (p. 206). When 
Toby Esterhase, under suspicion as the mole, is held at gunpoint in a London safe house, 
Guillam’s hostility erupts: “‘for God’s sake, let me sweat the bastard’” (p. 332). Smiley 
ignores him. Again he can afford to: with Fawn in the background Smiley’s decency’s 
undergirding of violence is clear: he is scrupulously polite to Esterhase throughout. In the 
mole-unmasking scene, in which Smiley significantly carries a gun (p. 359), Guillam again 
erupts: “Guillam had Haydon by the collar. With a single heave he lifted him straight out 
of his chair. He had thrown away his gun and was hurling Haydon from side to side,
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shaking him like a dog, shouting” (p. 361). Mendel now restrains Guillam, whose anger is 
carefully framed as national, coming from the betrayal of the public school ethos of 
“English calling” (p. 360). Shortly afterwards Haydon’s co-conspirator Polyakov abuses 
“Fawn for hitting him, heaven knows where, despite Mendel’s vigilance” (p. 363). Fawn’s 
invisible violence is again a bureaucratic distribution of violence: it has nothing to do with 
Smiley, but Smiley clearly relies upon it.
Similarly, Smiley and Lacon express disapproval of the violence visited upon 
Haydon at the Sarratt ‘Nursery’ -  another country house -  after his arrest, yet it is allowed 
to occur. In this most regimented situation, the Sarratt guards “professed mystification” (p. 
369) at Haydon’s bruises. Which brings us to the murder of Haydon. The text shows 
Smiley taking some trouble to set up an agent exchange with the Soviets (pp. 367-368) and 
worrying about Sarratt’s security arrangements (p. 369). How then can Haydon be killed? 
This is an absolutely central contradiction in the novel and perhaps best understood via 
Macherey’s “unconscious of the text”. Critics, blinded by Smiley’s decency, cannot quite 
articulate that Smiley, as representative of the nation, and stand-in for the (British) reader, 
unconsciously desires Haydon’s death.450 Let us examine this.
From his interview with Esterhase onwards, Smiley worries that he is being 
followed: he has a sense of a shadowy figure just beyond perception -  an effective image 
for the unconscious. Smiley’s language -  “Peter, I want you to watch my back” (p. 338) -  
suggests unconscious knowledge of his follower’s identity: Prideaux was shot in the back 
as result of Haydon’s political treachery; moreover, when Haydon is held at Sarratt, Smiley 
will reflect, “Jim was watching your back for you right till the end” (p. 376). Guillam also 
unconsciously knows the follower is Prideaux: “not till days afterwards did he realise that
450 Scanlan claims, “Haydon’s death provides the rough justice we want in our thrillers” (Scanlan, p. 540). 
Most claims Haydon’s death satisfies “the reader’s sense o f justice [...] given the enormity o f Haydon’s 
betrayal”; adding that “for the English Service to kill Haydon would taint Smiley in a way le Carre is 
elsewhere at pains to avoid” (Most, in H. Bloom, p. 98). Wolfe suggests it is “nearly as if  le Carre helped 
Prideaux kill Haydon by weakening the wall o f security around him” (pp. 197-198).
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the figure, or the shadow of it, had struck a chord of familiarity in his memory” (p. 339). 
Smiley thus unconsciously draws Prideaux to Sarratt.
In his final interview with Haydon, Smiley suddenly “had had enough, so he slipped 
out without bothering to say goodbye” (p. 378): then there is a lacuna, while Smiley kills 
time, and in which Prideaux kills Haydon. Lewis claims, “the obvious ease with which 
Prideaux gains access to Haydon without being detected is puzzling” (Lewis, p. 136). 
Perhaps not. Lacon is complacent about the security arrangements (p. 367); the “head of 
Nursery” is mysteriously “unavailable” when Smiley faint-heartedly follows up the 
deficiencies in Sarratt’s security (p. 369). The Minister has already expressed doubts about 
how the government will look should Haydon in Moscow “leap on a soapbox and laugh his 
head off about all the people he’s made fools o f ” (p. 319). Indeed now we begin to see 
that the entire state unconsciously desires Haydon’s death. Involving the (British) reader, 
we might say it is the entire nation's unconscious desire: past and present, fictional and 
real world. Prideaux, emblem of a particular Britishness, acts as the nation’s unconscious, 
the Establishment tidying up after itself. If burying his gun was repression, then his 
digging it back up is a return of the repressed. Prideaux’s efficient, neat killing of Haydon, 
like the silent, invisible violence of Fawn, is hidden from sight in the manner Foucault 
described.
We could also come at this generically. The Great Detective genre does not 
traditionally depict the villain’s punishment but ends with his unmasking or arrest (Porter, 
pp. 122-3). This has a clear relationship to capitalism’s sublimation of violence in the 
Foucauldian sense and investment in English ‘decency’ (Porter, p. 124). That the American 
hardboiled detective genre does show the criminal’s punishment (Porter, p. 122) is 
indicative of a more expedient US morality, of a nation that still has the death penalty, and 
is less invested in PR spins such as “decency”. But not only is Haydon violently ‘punished’ 
(albeit offstage), we observe his corpse (Tinker, pp. 378-9), like a gruesome eruption of 
feudal “punishment-as-spectacle” (Giddens, p. 188) in the midst of a bourgeois country
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house detective story. This is where the host of critics who see Prideaux’s action as a 
purely personal revenge are misguided.451 For Paulson, Tinker is “a thriller about 
geopolitical hostility that is in fact a story of friendship; where the ‘mole’ Bill Hayden 
(sic)’s real evil lies not in his betrayal of the British Empire but in his betrayal of his best 
friend” (Paulson, p. 324). The personal is irretrievably intertwined with the political in 
Tinker, patriotic ‘characters’ blur into ‘national character’ via the public school ethos of 
Britishness and decency (both qualities undergirded in the cases of Smiley, Guillam and 
particularly Prideaux, by violence). Moreover, a personalised reading is hardly upheld by 
the text’s lack of interest in Haydon and Prideaux’s friendship: even in flashback, we never 
actually see them together.
Subsequent events hardly trouble reading Haydon’s death as the nation-state’s 
unconscious desire. Neither Lacon nor the Minister seems perturbed by Haydon’s death.
No inquest is held, while Smiley declines to betray Prideaux as the killer (Tinker, p.
379) 452 can coincidence that Prideaux, the British patriot, escapes punishment 
while Haydon, the British traitor, does not? Does a fictional betrayer of Britain not need to 
be punished, as Philby never was in real life? Unlike the book’s Irina incident, the real-life 
Volkov case did not result in Philby’s unmasking, it was an inept fudge. Despite general 
suspicion, Philby was never exposed by a clever colleague; instead, he was given an 
O.B.E. Philby was not caught in the act of selling Britain’s secrets to Russia and arrested, 
as Haydon so satisfyingly is. Philby was shunted from MI6’s highest echelons, but 
continued to have contact with both the Russians and MI5 and 6 until, at his leisure, he 
defected to the Soviet Union. Philby was not properly interrogated: back in the 50s he 
defeated MI5’s real-life Smiley model, Jim Skardon (Andrew, p. 427); a week before he 
defected he fooled both Roger Hollis and SIS head Dick White, with a highly curtailed
451 See also: Scanlan (p. 541); Sauerberg (p. 198); Homberger (p. 83).
452 Lewis claims Smiley does not accuse Prideaux o f Haydon’s murder because Smiley “recognises that 
justice, albeit o f the rougher sort has been done” (Lewis, p. 126). In the BBC miniseries, Smiley tells Lacon, 
Guillam and the Adeline cabal, “We all need to account for our movements last night” after Haydon’s 
murder, implicating them all implicitly, while later Smiley tells Ann he wanted to shoot Haydon.
173
‘confession’ (Andrew p. 436)453 Unlike Haydon, Philby was never silenced but rather 
wrote his self-justifying memoirs My Silent War in Moscow. The Philby affair was a 
British failure, while Tinker is the story of a British success, plucked from failure, a 
restoration of “national” efficiency and dignity with Haydon’s death the elegant apex of 
that resolution. The British nation-state thus gets to punish Haydon without getting blood 
on its hands: its representative Smiley can retain his role as exemplar of British decency. 
Only Stafford amongst all le Carre’s critics recognises this 454 But Stafford misses the 
extent to which Smiley -  and the British nation -  emerges with hands clean. However, the 
contradictions emerge, the repressed returns, and “unconscious of the text” reveals the 
faultline of national violence upon which the novel’s vaunted national ‘decency’ rests.
* * *
453 Wrongly seeing Dick White as hero o f the Philby affair, Halperin calls White the model for Smiley (p. 
233).
454 “[Tinker] with all its outward verisimilitude, constructs a potent and appealing myth for the class-ridden 
and post-imperial Angst of Britain the 1970s. [...] Tinker is a fantasy; George Smiley a myth” (Stafford, p. 
206).
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4. Fanaticism and “Mindless Treason”: Political Enemy Characterisation
Character as a fictional construct reveals ideological faultlines, as we have seen. Let us 
now examine two key Communist characters in Tinker, first Karla, Head of Moscow 
Centre (le Carre’s term for the KGB), mastermind of the mole plot; then the mole himself, 
Bill Haydon. Smiley’s set-piece interviews with these characters are two of only a handful 
of direct East-West confrontations in le Carre’s Cold-War fiction. We might regard them 
as Cold-War summits, but they are more correctly Cold War battles -  there is not even any 
attempt at agreement. Previously, Dieter Frey’s attractiveness and former friendship with 
Smiley were stressed in Call, but he was under-characterised, while Jens Fiedler was 
presented as personable in The Spy, if contradictorily characterised. Crucially, Fiedler was 
also given space to parlay a Communist philosophy, however parodic. Looking Glass War 
meanwhile even tentatively suggested that the Communist threat might be overstated.
Karla however is a reassertion of that Communist threat, and a return to Communist 
characters as straightforward villains in the imperial spy novel mode. Karla is given no 
personal details, we do not even know his real name, and he never speaks throughout the 
novel. Being thus characterised by actions, the brutality of Karla’s methods and his 
grotesqueness (inhuman silence) make him a Communist villain not much distinct from 
Fleming’s Rosa Klebb {From Russia With Love). Karla’s Communism is thus synonymous 
with political brutality, not with political principle. Such political foreshortening results in 
an aesthetic foreshortening: as a character Karla is simply a cardboard device, a symbol not 
a character, and thus also a “breaking point” {Faultlines, p. 78).
If Haydon as a character is initially more personable (when perceived to be on “our” 
side), he becomes unsympathetic after his unmasking, while crucially again never 
espousing Communist principle. The welter of alternative explanations proffered for 
Haydon’s treachery again suggests a faultline. Moreover, that both these Cold War 
encounters occur in a prison cell, with Smiley the interrogator, wielding the power, has 
strong political connotations.
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Karla: Communism as Fanaticism
Smiley’s interview with Karla, arrested by the Americans, about to be repatriated to the 
USSR, in a Delhi prison in 1951, can be seen as a symbolic enactment of the Cold War. 
Smiley even says, ‘“I felt that the entire responsibility for fighting the cold war had landed 
on my shoulders’” (pp. 216-217). Within this, the characterisation of Karla -  mute, hostile, 
inhuman -  suggests dialogue is not possible between the Cold Warring sides, that detente 
is naive, thus briefing the reader for a successively more trenchant anti-Communism in 
every novel of the Karla trilogy, each returning to this interview.455 If to view Karla as a 
‘symbol’ of Soviet Communism is a crude device, then so is his one-dimensional 
characterisation.
Le Carre’s supposed theme of moral equivalence is thus revealed again to be 
inaccurate. Smiley demands of Karla, “‘Don’t you think it’s time to recognise there’s as 
little worth on your side as there is on mine?”’ (p. 221). Smiley clearly does not, as he is 
representing the British state and persuading Karla to defect to the West. Soon after, 
Western Cold War ideology reasserts itself more directly when Smiley suggests Karla 
should “question the integrity of a system that proposed cold-bloodedly to shoot him for 
misdemeanours he had never committed” (Tinker, p. 222). Smiley’s opinion of Karla’s 
likely fate is proved incorrect: instead Karla will ascend the Soviet hierarchy. Smiley urges 
Karla, “to consider whether [...] faith in that system was honestly possible” (p. 222) based 
purely on self-preservation, insisting that Karla’s “life [...] was more important -  morally 
[...] than the sense of duty [...] or commitment” (p. 222). How can Smiley be so blind to 
his own “sense of duty [...] or commitment”? Smiley reflects later to Guillam:
455 The location has an interesting resonance -  by the 1970s ex-colony India was firmly associated with the 
non-aligned movement, though since the 50s regarded as more inclined to the Soviet than the West, via a 
series o f nationalisations.
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‘I believed, you see, that I had seen something in his face that was superior to mere 
dogma, not realising that it was my own reflection. I had convinced myself that 
[Karla] ultimately was accessible to ordinary human arguments’ (Tinker, p. 221).
Smiley’s “human” arguments are supposedly distinct from Karla’s “dogma”. But in 
suggesting that the financial blandishments of the West (p. 215) or individual self- 
preservation trump collective political principle, Smiley derogates Communism in post­
war Western terms of fallen human nature. In denigrating “grand designs” (p. 222), Smiley 
is still proselytising for the unacknowledged Western grand design, the Western “system”.
Much of this anti-Communism is achieved via disavowal, professions of political 
neutrality and apparent self-critique. This is Operation Margarine again: criticising 
something in order to uphold it. Smiley castigates his failure to persuade Karla to defect, 
he calls himself “‘a soft fool. The very archetype of a flabby Western liberal’” (Tinker, p. 
223) and mocks his having talked too much (p. 219) and sweating (p. 215) in the interview. 
However these “flaws” actually do propaganda work for the West in this Cold War 
confrontation. As Smiley, the moral exemplar, is overweight, flabbiness suggests the good 
living of the capitalist economy. Karla by contrast is “wiry”, “priest” like (p. 214) “tiny”
(p. 215) and has a “prison” look (p. 215), again invoking the Communist society-as-prison 
trope, complete with poor food. ‘Flabbiness’ is also the West’s claimed lack of ideology: 
Smiley says ‘“I lacked philosophic repose. Lacked philosophy’” (p. 216). This is English 
empiricism: whereby even ‘liberalism’ is simply common-sense neutrality. By contrast, 
and to his discredit, Karla has philosophy: Communism. Smiley does not even need to 
conclude ‘“I would rather be my kind of fool than his for all that’” for the pro-Western 
textual judgement to be clear (p. 223). Also, Smiley talking too much surely represents the 
freedom of speech of an ‘open’ society, while Karla’s silence is indicative of a closed 
system that prohibits free speech. Even Smiley’s sweating can be seen to represent the 
expressive humanity of liberalism, seen again in Smiley inadvertently revealing to Karla
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his human ‘weakness’: Ann, when he lends him a lighter inscribed by her. Karla by 
contrast, does not sweat (p. 215), faces down his physical needs (refusing the cigarettes 
Smiley proffers, p. 221) and reveals nothing of his own emotional attachments. Indeed 
Karla will later use Ann against Smiley (Tinker, pp. 213-223). The West/Smiley is weak, 
human, “soft”, anchored in compassion; the East/Karla is strong, inhuman, hard “like a 
promontory of rock” (p. 216), anchored in ‘ideology’. Karla then is the anti-Smiley, a 
negation: and this is really the extent of his characterisation.
When Karla opts to return to the USSR rather than defect, Smiley concludes that 
Karla is a “fanatic” (Tinker, p. 224) because “[Karla] would rather die than disown the 
political system to which he was committed’” (p. 222). However, Karla doesn’t die, so this 
is a stretch on Smiley’s part. “Karla is nothing more than his fanaticism”, complains 
Homberger (p. 77): but lacking any other characteristics, Karla’s fanaticism is opaque 
because, as Barley says, “le Carre can offer no explanation of fanaticism; it is 
“incomprehensible” (Barley p. 95). Barley misses that this opacity is contrived, because 
Karla’s fanaticism is never defined politically. Because Karla never speaks, there is a huge 
gap where Karla’s “ideology” should be. Sinfield follows Macherey in this: “Characters 
[...] fall silent at the moments when their speech could only undermine the [...] attempt at 
ideological coherence” {Faultlines, p. 74). Were Karla to speak he would, as “fanatic”, 
articulate that political Communist “grand design” (Communist ends) as justification for 
his actions (Communist means). Thus would the text’s conflation of means as ends, of 
power as Communism’s only principle be destabilised. As it is, Karla -  thus Soviet 
Communism -  is defined as: conspiratorial (conceiving the mole operation); brutal 
(torturing Prideaux) and ruthless (murdering Prideaux’s Czech networks). Karla is not a 
character: he is a political symbol. He is also, in this Delhi scene, morally defeated by 
Smiley, ‘contained’, as precursor to a more material defeat, when Smiley foils the mole 
plot. Let us see now whether Karla’s protegee, the Communist mole, Bill Haydon, fares 
any better in his Cold-War confrontation with Smiley.
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Bill Haydon: “Mindless Treason”456
Like the meeting with Karla, the second Cold War summit/confrontation of the novel 
occurs with the Communist character imprisoned, and so sees again the 
Communism/Eastern Europe-as-prison motif being subtly relayed. Bill Haydon is held 
captive at Sarratt, named the “Nursery” in the novel’s ongoing play with its elision of 
Western violence. Smiley, as Western representative, is again reinforced by guards and the 
threat of violence in his interviews with Haydon. Haydon is a far more convincing 
character than Karla, at least when conforming to his initial Buchan/T. E. Lawrence type. 
But once exposed, Haydon’s explanations of his treachery are half-hearted, contradictory, 
and simply too profuse. Smiley admits as much himself, “The more he tried to make sense 
of Haydon’s rambling account, the more the contradictions become obvious” (Tinker, p. 
380). There is here a “superfluity of meaning” in Sinfield’s terms {Faultlines, p. 77). Let us 
examine each of these explanations of Haydon’s motivation in turn.
The first explanation is Haydon’s own reprise of Smiley’s earlier suggestion that 
Haydon’s treachery was a disappointed response to British political decline (p. 359): “The 
Suez adventure in fifty-six finally persuaded [Haydon] of the inanity of the British 
situation and of the British capacity to spike the advance of history while not being able to 
offer anything by way of contribution” (p. 374). Le Carre later made the same claim of 
Philby:
[Bom] as an Empire baby, to rule: and he entered a world where all his toys were 
being taken away by history. It seems to me that for that kind of Establishment 
person this is much more cogent motive for betrayal than any half-cock pro-Stalinist 
Marxism which could not be seriously sustained after University (Gross, p. 35).
456 “[Smiley] wondered whether there was mindless treason in the same way, supposedly, as there was 
mindless violence” (Tinker, p. 354).
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Critics tend to affirm le Carre’s interpretation here, that “the traitor is ’the other’ of a faded 
imperialism” (Hempstead, p. 240).457 However, this dismisses Communist ideology as a 
valid motivation in itself, as if a choice in favour of Communism were only 
comprehensible as a negative reaction to the collapse of that empirical positive: the British 
Empire. This is contradicted soon after, when Haydon declares a “lifelong relationship 
with Karla” (p. 373). If Haydon was recruited at university in the 1930s, like many of his 
class (p. 380), his relationship with the Soviets would predate significant British decline by 
a decade and Suez by two decades. A Communist explanation thus makes a brief return:
“He tried at first to see Haydon in the romantic newspaper terms of a Thirties intellectual, 
for whom Moscow was the natural Mecca. ‘Moscow was Bill's discipline,’ he told himself. 
‘He needed the symmetry of an historical and economic solution.” But Smiley finds this 
“too sparse” (p. 380) and moves on to psychological rather than political explanations.
This invocation of the 1930s is worth a pause however. Karla was in Britain in the
1930s for six months (Tinker, p. 210) when he recruited Haydon. The 1930s is always a
point of return in liberal assessments of Communism. The rise of fascism and the Great
Depression radicalised society at large, leading to the first, ill-fated Labour government of
1929-31. It also galvanised the upper classes, like the Auden Group, Orwell and
Churchill’s relative, Esmond Romilly, into fighting in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) in
which Philby was a reporter. This moment also spawned the documentary movement of
Humphrey Jennings et al. The thinness of that return in Tinker is interesting. Spain is a
major feature of the early Tinker MSS, specifically claiming that the mole fought in Spain
alongside Romilly. This is absent from the finished MS, possibly to prevent the
protagonists being too elderly: the two references to Spain both now connect only to Karla.
However, alongside Haydon’s “eloquent silence” on this very subject and Smiley’s lack of
pursuit of the topic (p. 273), the end result is to strip Haydon -  and thus British
Communism -  of 1930s historical context, removing any sense of principle or
457 See also: Noland (pp. 64-65); Lewis (p. 134); Holly Beth King (in H. Bloom, p. 69); Bennett (p. 67); 
William Boyd, http://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/sep/16/tinker-tailor-a-z-william-boyd:
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‘honour’ from Haydon’s Communism, and leaving it unconvincing.
The second proffered explanation for Haydon’s betrayal is anti-Americanism. 
“[Haydon] spoke not of the decline of the West but of its death by greed and constipation. 
He hated America very deeply, he said and Smiley supposed he did” (p. 370). Note both 
the paraphrasing and Smiley’s own intervention: Smiley is mediating Haydon’s 
justifications throughout this Sarratt interview. We are rarely allowed Haydon’s words in 
the raw, reminiscent of the British government edict in the 1980s that Irish Republican 
speech had to be voiced by actors. As it is, Haydon’s account isn’t so far away from his 
patriotic friend Prideaux’s assessment of America: “full of greedy fools fouling up their 
inheritance” (p. 18) or indeed Control’s: “[Control] like most of the Circus, despised [the 
Americans] and all their works, which he frequently sought to undermine” (p. 141). We 
should note, by contrast, that Alleline has a “fatal reverence for the Americans” (p. 140). 
This anti-American ‘explanation’ therefore is one to which Smiley can relate as a British 
nationalist, (implicitly) resenting the usurping power to which Britain is now lesser client. 
But a negative anti-American choice also elides a positive pro-Communist choice. Indeed 
Haydon explicitly claims the “East” is simply the lesser of two evils (p. 370). A minority 
of critics note this textual faultline of Haydon’s Communism, including Hoffman:
“Haydon never satisfies by confessing a resolute ideological creed [...] his is hardly an 
expression of ideological fervour” (Hoffman, p. 132). In doing so, Hoffman reveals his 
own prejudices: “Today more than ever, it is hard to accept that anyone engages in grand 
gestures for the sake of ideology, lofty visions of truth, or noble principles of human 
betterment” (Hoffman, p. 116).458
Even after Haydon’s death, however, Smiley continues to rehearse different theories 
of Haydon’s motivation, in what amounts to a lengthy, anxious (and ungeneric) postscript. 
As Sinfield claims, “When a part of our worldview threatens disruption by manifestly
458 “Haydon’s contempt for Americans and his hurt Little England patriotism make for a strange comparison 
with the 30s spies” (Barley, p. 90). “Haydon’s treachery derives not from mendacity or venality or even from 
a sense of commitment to any morality or ideology” (Cobbs, p. 102). “Haydon never mentions Communism; 
he’s simply anti-American in the Cold War” (Denning, p. 128).
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failing to cohere with the rest, then we reorganize and retell its story, trying to get it into 
shape” {Faultlines p. 46). Smiley posits several psychological explanations:459 namely “the 
ghost of Bill’s authoritarian father -  Ann had called him simply the Monster”. Le Carre 
would also later speak of Philby’s “rather horrendous father” (Gross, p. 33) in the same 
vein. Smiley also “imagined Bill’s Marxism making up for his inadequacy as an artist” (p. 
380). But Smiley is not done yet. “Standing at the centre of a secret stage, playing world 
against world, hero and playwright in one: oh Bill had loved that all right” (p. 380) 460 
Similarly, le Carre spoke of Philby’s “overwhelming vanity” (Gross, p. 33). However, 
these psychological explanations contain a fundamental flaw: Haydon is not enough of a 
fictional character to possess a convincing psychology 461 As such, Smiley, “distrustful as 
ever of the standard shapes of human motive” {Tinker, pp. 380-381) comes up with another 
of le Carre’s motiveless crimes: “treason is very much a matter of habit,” (p. 380). Most 
critics accept these textual contortions to avoid attributing political principle to Haydon, 
for example Lasseter: “We are not to mistake Haydon for an ideological hero” (Lasseter, p. 
109)462
This has a very potent interplay with history. For le Carre had earlier declared, “I do 
not much believe in the political motive of Kim Philby” {Philby, p. 29). Yet, Philby 
himself refuted le Carre’s statement in his memoirs,463 and in interviews (“only a fool
459 “Le Carre carefully attributes Haydon’s motives to psychology rather than to politics” (Lasseter, p. 109). 
Sauerberg makes much the same point “rather than a political offence [Haydon’s betrayal] becomes the arena 
of a psychological struggle” (Sauerberg, p. 199).
460 There is a connection to Soviet spy Richard Sorge here, o f whom le Carre had written: “not the first spy to 
be recruited from the ranks o f failed artists”. He also attributes to Sorge the desire for a “stage”, ‘The Spy to 
End Spies’, Encounter, November 1966.
461 As Scanlan says “there is no attempt to portray [Haydon’s] mental processes from the inside” (Scanlan, p. 
540). Bennett rightly says: “the novel scarcely concerns itself with [Haydon’s] personal history or the interior 
aspects o f his character and motivations” (p. 63).
462 “The nature o f Bill Haydon’s treason is defined [...] largely in terms of its personal implications” 
(Rutherford, p. 23). Tinker “translates the ideological treason o f Philby into a story about the betrayal of  
personal relations” (Homberger, p. 74); Beene references, “Haydon’s ideological excuses” (Beene, p. 91); 
Rothberg references, “Haydon’s harangues [...] all sorts o f excuses” (Rothberg, p. 57); “Haydon has only a 
collection o f agitprop slogans and chic leftist jargon to offer when he finally tries to explain his empty 
ideology” (Cobbs, p. 119).
463 Greene’s introduction declared, “He was serving a cause and not him self’, Kim Philby, My Silent War (St 
Alban’s: Granada, 1969), p. 9.
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would deny me my faith”).464 Moreover, le Carre’s assertion of the lack of political 
principle in Philby’s actions terminated le Carre’s friendship with Graham Greene, who 
complained of “wild Philips Oppenheim speculations and the vulgar and untrue portrait of 
Philby” (Greene, Moscow, p. 282): another return to imperialist spy fiction. Indeed, in 
Tinker's welter of explanations of Haydon’s treachery, Communism is not mentioned: 
never by name, nor by any real discussion of its political content. Communism is the “not 
said” of the novel. Indeed the word “Communism” only appears twice throughout the 
book; “Marxism” three times.
In fact, the Communist ‘explanation’ is present in the text, but is easily missed, as it 
is not presented by Haydon or by Smiley, occurs very early in the book, and is abruptly 
and overtly ‘silenced’. Tarr is reading aloud to Smiley and Guillam a letter from Soviet 
agent, Irina, the novel’s first proof of the as-yet-unidentified mole’s existence. Irina writes: 
“‘Most of the English moles were recruited by Karla before the war [...] others, 
afterwards, disappointed that the War did not bring Socialism to the W est... ’ It kind of 
dries up here’” says Tarr to Smiley (Tinker, p. 68). This sudden breaking off prevents any 
further exploration of “socialism”. Macherey amplifies his notion of the “not said” in a 
way that is highly applicable here: “In its every particle, the work manifests, uncovers, 
what it cannot say. This silence gives it life” (Macherey, p. 84). In a way this is the very 
motor of Tinker: a silence on the subject of Communism in a book about a Soviet 
penetration agent during the Cold War.
*  *  *
464 Philip Knightley, The Master Spy (New York: Knopf, 1989), p. 257.
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“Holding the World Together”: Conclusion
Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy possesses three major faultlines. Firstly, there is a faultline in the 
negative presentation of the British state, with bureaucracy effectively being blamed for 
the Communist ‘mole’. This critique of the state however is troubled by Smiley working 
for and securing the state. When Smiley takes over the Circus/state and ousts the 
bureaucrats in turn, the deep cultural anxieties that the novel has invoked are resolved not 
by renewal or structural change, but by restoration of the state’s status quo ante.
Secondly, there is a faultline in the presentation of the British nation as civilised and 
decent. This is located in the public school ethos, parlayed at length via the prep school 
subplot, and also invested in the characterisation of Smiley. However that this British 
‘decency’ is based upon imperial verities and certainties, founded upon barbarous,
‘indecent’ imperial violence, is a faultline. We see this in the novel in Smiley’s own 
reliance upon violence -  delegated, distanced, disavowed -  to defend and uphold Britain.
Thirdly, the treatment of the political enemy is a faultline because the construct of 
character is contradicted by the exigencies of politics, creating cardboard cutouts of a 
‘fanatical’ Karla, while denying that fanatic his ‘faith’. Similarly, Bill Haydon, in a 
confused, contradictory characterisation, is presented as a non-ideological villain, thus 
stripping the Cold War of definitional struggle between Communism and capitalism. 
Moreover, although Smiley presents his Delhi meeting with Karla as a defeat for himself, 
for Britain, not only does it stand as a moral victory in the book’s overall context, whereby 
Karla’s Haydon/mole plot is foiled by Smiley, but both Haydon and Karla are ultimately 
defeated. The ideological implication is clear: the West will triumph over the Communist 
East in the Cold War, while the novel also provides a symbolic resolution to British 
decline: Smiley’s ascent to the head of the Circus/state. “One, fat, middle-aged spy is the 
only person capable of holding the world together” {Tinker, p. 83) as Smiley self- 
mockingly, but accurately says.
*  *  *
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Chapter 5: The Honourable Schoolboy
1. “There’s a Book in the Middle, Actually”: Honourable Schoolboy in Context.
The Honourable Schoolboy (1977) has a curious history: following Tinker, it was an 
instant bestseller, with le Carre granted the rare writer’s accolade of a Time cover story,465 
yet the mixed reviews of this middle volume of The Quest fo r  Karla prefigured its negative 
subsequent profile. Dismissed by literary critics, twice passed over for screen 
adaptation,466 even le Carre has since appeared to apologise for Schoolboy. “Be warned. 
You are reading an historical novel, written on the hoof’. 467 It is precisely the historical 
aspect le Carre disparages which makes The Honourable Schoolboy a key post-War text: 
its trans-Southeast Asian setting in the dying days of the Vietnam War addresses key 
postcolonial and Cold-War concerns as adroitly as Graham Greene’s The Quiet American 
(1955) a generation before. The Honourable Schoolboy's putative flaws are also 
significant: its sheer length and complexity suggest Sinfield’s “When [...] a key concept is 
structurally unstable, it produces endless textual work” {Faultlines, p. 74).468 Indeed the 
novel enacts a constant pull-and-push between acknowledgment of and denial of British 
decline, and a push-and-pull between emphasis on postcolonial and Cold-War concerns.
Honourable Schoolboy recounts Operation Dolphin, Smiley’s attempt to ensnare 
Soviet kingpin Karla’s mole inside Red China, Nelson Ko. Smiley is now head of the 
Circus, masterminding the operation from London, whilst agent, Jerry Westerby, does the 
legwork from Hong Kong, across Southeast Asia. Inspired by love for Drake Ko’s 
mistress, Lizzie Worthington, Westerby turns rogue and tries to help the Ko brothers 
escape: Westerby is shot and the American allies snatch Nelson away from the British 469
465 Stefan Kanfer, ‘The Spy Who Came in for the Gold,’ Time, 3 October 1977, pp. 48-53.
466 The BBC serialised Tinker and Smiley’s People but left out Schoolboy; Tomas Alfredsson directed Tinker 
(2011) and was reported to be filming Smiley’s People (Guardian, above). This section’s epigraph is Gary 
Oldman (who played Smiley) on the films, Guardian, 29 Nov 2011.
467 Le Carre, ‘Foreword to the Lamplighter Edition,’ The Honourable Schoolboy (Sevenoaks: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1990), p. 7.
468 As the 37 boxes o f Schoolboy drafts at the Bodleian testify (JLC 37-73).
469 Westerby, son of an ennobled newspaper magnate, is “the Honourable Gerald Westerby”.
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Contemporary Reception of The Honourable Schoolboy
Honourable Schoolboy produced a divided response to le Carre’s perceived ambition to 
create literary spy fiction. ‘Literary’ reviewers tended to be negative: novelist Clancy Sigal 
claimed le Carre had “stumbled this time because he’s bent on creating “serious literature” 
a la Graham Greene”;470 Clive James judged, “outwardly aspiring to the status of literature, 
le Carre’s novels have inwardly declined to the novel of pulp romance”;471 novelist 
Anthony Burgess asked, “Does it have anything to do with literature? [...] The answer has 
to be no.”472 Crime specialists however tended to be positive: T.J. Binyon judged le Carre 
had “triumphantly succeeded in [...] writing a thriller which is [...] a substantial novel in 
its own right” 473 Having recently turned to spy fiction, Thomas Hinde claimed Schoolboy, 
“is not merely a splendid example of the genre but offers more in the way of characters, 
setting [and] relevance to life than the majority of ordinary novels” 474 Given the 
similarities with Greene’s Quiet American (colonial Eastern setting; journalist hero; love 
triangle), it became a measure of this genre/literary division:475 ironic, given this was 
where Greene ended his own distinction between “novel” and “entertainment”.
Many reviewers treated Schoolboy's Eastern setting, which le Carre spent 18 months 
researching, as incidental: mere “exotic settings” for Anthony Curtis 476 For James, le 
Carre’s “mysterious East” was nothing but “inventories [...] of flora and fauna”. Eliot 
Fremont Smith bemoaned, “Local color sometimes yawns into travelogue”, the setting 
merely “structure, scaffolding”.477 For Maurice Richardson, “Hong Kong [...] is a mass of
470 Clancy Sigal, ‘Smiley’s Villains’, Guardian, 8 September 1977.
471 Clive James, ‘Go Back to the Cold!’ New York Review o f  Books, 27 October 1977, p. 29.
472 Anthony Burgess, ‘Peking Drugs, Moscow Gold’, New York Times Book Review, 25 September 1977, pp. 
9;45. Similar points were made by Finger, Fenton, Holloway, Hope and Cox.
473 T.J. Binyon, ‘A Gentleman Among Players’, Times Literary Supplement, 9 September 1977, p. 1069. 
Similar positive claims were made by crime writer H.R.F. Keating, quiz book writer George Thaw, film critic 
David Ansen and bestselling novelist Mollie Panter Downs, ‘Briefly Noted’, New Yorker, October 1977, p. 
163.
474 Thomas Hinde, ‘Spy Story Plus’, Sunday Telegraph, 18 September 1977, p. 14.
475 Negative comparisons to Greene featured in Stem, Fenton; Sigal, West, Curtis, Vaizey; positive 
comparisons in Prior, Ansen and Holloway.
476 Anthony Curtis, ‘Yellow Mole’, Financial Times, 8 September 1977, p. 14.
477 Eliot Fremont-Smith, ‘Thriller o f Dignity’, Village Voice, 24 October 1977, pp. 103/105.
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topographical detail”.478 Louis Finger decried, “Research thrusts itself from almost every 
page in the form of huge, inert slabs of topography and local colour.”479 Consequently, 
Vietnam, despite being recent headline news, was cited merely as “exotic” setting, not a 
war - 480 or else it went unmentioned 481 Only David Holloway hailed, “the picture of 
Southeast Asia in disarray as the Vietnam War comes to an end”,482 while Hinde declared 
“that wretched war-torn comer of Asia [...] often becomes the book’s true subject” and 
Keating uniquely cited the “Cambodia war”.484
Intriguingly, a number of reviewers bemoaned the book had “no politics” (Sigal): 
Laurence Stem claimed, “le Carre eschews the larger issues of political combat between 
the competing systems”. Several foreign correspondents were commissioned to review
4 0 ^
the book, with James Fenton calling Schoolboy's details “inaccurate and unconvincing”, 
as did Richard West,487 while fellow correspondents Fenton, West and H.D.S. Greenway 
all disagreed about what was and wasn’t “accurate”.488 In this narrowly defined ‘political’ 
approach, colonialism and Communism both went unmentioned.
Britain’s decline in favour of America was acknowledged in British reviews only by 
Holloway and Richardson. Vaizey bemoaned le Carre’s “tired cynicism” regarding British 
power. Grosvenor, in the patriotic Daily Express, asked: “is the British Lion, beaten at last, 
finally pulling in its claws? Not a bit of it. [Smiley is] a match for the Russians in counter­
espionage.” US reviews were blunter about British decline (Fremont Smith: “Smiley’s job
478 Maurice Richardson, ‘Our Man in a Maze’, Observer, 11 September 1977, p. 25.
479 Louis Finger, ‘The Manly One’, New Statesman, 23 September 1977, p. 414f.
480 Examples included: John Leonard, ‘Books o f the Times’, New York Times, 22 September 1977 (surprising 
from a reputed leftist); David Ansen, ‘Out of the Cold’, Newsweek, 26 September 1977, p. 84; A. J. Cox, 
‘Crime’, Morning Star, 22 September 1977.
481 Peter Grosvenor, ‘The Circus Goes To Town ...Just for Laughs’, Daily Express, 8 September 1977, p. 20; 
Allan Prior, Daily Mail, 8 September 1977, p. 7; George Thaw, ‘Success for a Spy Man’, Daily Mirror, 9 
September 1977, p. 17; Andrew Hope, ‘I Spy a Long Trip’, Evening Standard, 13 September 1977, p. 21; 
Eddie Cain, ‘Spies’, Scotsman, 15 October 1977, Weekend, p. 2.
482 David Holloway, ‘Spying, le Carre’s Way’, Daily Telegraph, 8 September 1977, p. 14.
483 Thomas Hinde, ‘Spy Story Plus’, Fiction, Sunday Telegraph, 18 September 1977, p. 14.
484 H.R.F. Keating, ‘With Sweep and Vision’, The Times, 8 September 1977, p. 10.
485 Laurence Stem, ‘The Secret World of George Smiley’, Washington Post, 9 October 1977, pp. 1/6.
486 James Fenton, ‘Le Carre Goes East’, New Review 4 (1977), pp. 31-34.
487 Richard West, ‘Local Colour’, Spectator, 10 September 1977, pp. 19-20.
488 Fenton cites a near-ambush by the Khmer Rouge as inauthentic: Greenway, who accompanied le Carre to 
Cambodia, says this incident was described “just the way it was” (H.D.S. Greenway, ‘Travels with le Carre’, 
Newsweek, 10 October 1977, p. 49).
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is to patch [the Circus] up (like England)”). Similarly, Australian James was blunt:
“Smiley has also become the author’s fantasy about his beleaguered homeland. [...] the 
Circus can hope to make up in [...] Smiley’s cunning [...] what it lacks in physical 
resources”. US reviews were also more alert to the book’s negative presentation of 
America: Leonard’s phrase “the greedy Cousins from Langley” suggests both British 
jealousy and American imperial gluttony. Fremont Smith saw “lethal” Circus competition 
with “the truculent and despised American “Cousins””.
To summarise, in reviews the political themes of le Carre’s work were again often 
occluded by preoccupation with genre. The colonial, Eastern setting was little 
acknowledged as important; US hegemony was touched upon, but the political enemy of 
Communism was ignored. These same tendencies occurred in later critical approaches: 
while the genre preoccupation is lesser, critics also treat the book as an ‘exotic’ diversion 
from the ‘real’ Cold War. Barley calls his Schoolboy chapter ‘Sideshow’; Cobbs calls his 
‘Cold War in the Wings’; Lewis sees the East simply as background “colour” of 
“destruction and desolation” (Lewis, p. 141). In reality, the Cold War was hottest at the 
periphery and coolest at the centre. Critics tend, like reviewers, to elide the political 
realities of the novel and reduce it to personal conflicts.
This chapter will first examine how the colonial setting affects the presentation of the 
British state, with le Carre’s individual vs. state faultline resulting in a plot-line split 
between Westerby and Smiley, the latter now part of the state. Secondly, the chapter will 
explore how the colonial setting creates faultlines pertaining to the British ‘nation’: 
stylistic instability, proclaimed colonial innocence, and justification. Still exploring 
‘nation’, the focus on Cold War ally reflects Britain’s uneasy transition from colonialism 
under US hegemony. Turning to the political enemy, this chapter will show how 
emphasising colonialism risks obscuring the political enemy of Communism, and how,
contrary to the le Carre consensus, anti-Communism suffuses The Honourable Schoolboy.
*  *  *
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2. Colonialism and the British State
Colonialism undergirds all le Carre’s Cold-War fiction, just as it undergirded the Cold War 
itself. Colonialism was largely subtextual in Call or Tinker's backwards-looking, Britain- 
based, defensive operations, but Schoolboy's present-day, aggressive operation on a world 
stage makes colonialism hard to avoid. The novel is, to quote Lord Jim, “in the destructive 
element immerse[d],”489 resulting in a welter of textual faultlines.
Circus insiders are said to call events subsequent to Bill Haydon’s exposure as Soviet 
mole, “after the fall” (iSchoolboy, p. 63) and the Circus building is reduced to usefully 
symbolic rubble by the post-Haydon clean-up. “Fall” implies collapse alongside Biblical 
loss of innocence. “Innocent”, we recall, is both Control and Ambrosetti’s term for 
ordinary citizens, while Communists, conspiratorial, fallen, take advantage of innocence. 
Bill Haydon’s treachery is said to have “brought the British so low that they were forced 
into a fatal dependence upon their American sister service” (p. 15). As ever, the Circus is 
conflated with Britain.490 However it is striking that fiction does not so much reflect as 
refract history here. It was the fall of empire, not the work of Haydon’s real-life 
counterpart Kim Philby -  thus the Soviets -  that forced Britain under US hegemony post­
war. Blame for British decline is thus covertly reassigned here from West to East, from 
colonial capitalism’s inherent contradictions to the machinations of international 
Communism. Consequently anti-Communism merges with postcolonial preoccupations 
and is often eclipsed by them in the novel: viz the long elegiac description of the closure of 
Britain’s Hong Kong intelligence HQ (pp. 27-38). As head of the Circus, Smiley’s speech 
to his troops as he launches Operation Dolphin again conflates Britain/the Circus: “not to 
produce was not to trade, and not to trade was to die” (,Schoolboy, p. 69). Britain’s trade 
was in a parlous condition in the mid 1970s, so Smiley’s speech is a reassertion of British
489 Joseph Conrad, Lord Jim [1899] (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), p. 164.
490 Le Carre: “the parallels [with Britain] were irresistible to me” Michael Barber, ‘Le Carre, an 
Interrogation’, New York Times Book Review, 25 September 1977, 9/44, p. 44. Wolfe is typical o f critics in 
reproducing this fictional distortion of history (Wolfe, p 199).
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potency whose language even hints at informal imperialism.491 Schoolboy is a working- 
through of a threefold British anxiety therefore: how to justify a British world role without 
an Empire; how to sustain Cold-War rhetoric of “democracy and freedom” against Soviets 
and anti-colonialists without being tainted by Britain’s colonial past; and the degree of 
room for manoeuvre for Britain within the ‘special relationship’ under US hegemony.
Smiley vs. Westerby: State Duty vs. Personal Honour
The split between Schoolboy's two protagonists, George Smiley and Jerry Westerby, 
emanates from that first postcolonial anxiety: how to justify global British power without 
Empire. If anti-Communism provided a new rationale for British power, imperial concepts 
of British superiority and exemplarity kept slipping through the Cold-War syntax. We see 
this in the choice of Hong Kong as Schoolboy's base. Having previously controlled India 
(until 1947), Ceylon (1948), Burma (1948), Malaya (1960) and Singapore (1963) in the 
East, by 1977 Britain still held onto Brunei and much-prized Hong Kong. Thus Hong 
Kong as location both asserts British power (artificially) and inadvertently reveals the 
imperial foundation of that power. Equally, while British political and cultural language 
shifted from a colonial dialectic of ‘civilisation’ vs. ‘savagery’ to a Cold-War dialectic of 
‘freedom’ vs. Communism (MacPhee, pp. 18-19), colonial concepts kept slipping through. 
Thus Churchill’s 1946 “iron curtain” speech implied democracy and freedom were white- 
owned commodities of the “English-speaking world” (MacPhee pp. 30-34), much as 
‘civilisation’ had previously been. “The canonical view [was] that Orientals had no 
tradition of freedom” (Said, p. 241). This despite the lack of democracy in most colonies 
(including Hong Kong), and continuing racial segregation in the US. “Freedom” was, as it 
is today, a euphemism for capitalist liberal democracy, pitted against Communist 
“totalitarianism”. But as Arendt pointed out, totalitarianism owed much to British
491 Sauerberg’s is a rare recognition of this: “Smiley seems to [...] wish to reconstruct national pride” 
(Sauerberg, pp. 175-176).
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imperialism (Arendt, Origins, pp. 175-184), meaning liberalism, capitalism, empire -  and 
violence -  were always historically conjoined.
We see this colonial slippage in Smiley’s briefing speech to Westerby, quite as 
ideologically important as Control’s speech to Leamas:
‘Our present war began in 1917, with the Bolshevik Revolution. It hasn’t changed yet.
[...] I still feel strongly that I owe. Don’t you? I’ve always been grateful to this 
service, that it gave me a chance to pay. Is that how you feel? I don’t think we should 
be afraid o f . . .  devoting ourselves. Is that old-fashioned of me?’ {Schoolboy, p. 122).
Here Smiley apparently claims beneficiaries of liberal democracy have a debt to fight 
against the Communism that threatens it. But with the Bolshevik ‘threat’ left unexplained, 
the link between colonialism and Cold War becomes not one of principle but only of 
power. Certainly Smiley’s implicating interrogatives go unanswered (“don’t you?”), by 
Westerby, who exhibits impatience: “‘Sport [...] For Heaven’s sake. You point me and 
I’ll march’” (p. 123). This impatience is attributed by most critics to Westerby’s 
operational-man lack of reflectiveness.492 Westerby however is nicknamed “the 
schoolboy” (p. 403): and with his cries of “sport” and “super”, he is clearly inculcated in 
the public school imperial ethos noted in the previous chapter. “The public schools became 
[...] intertwine[ed] with patriotic and imperialist endeavour. The games field came to be 
seen as a preparation for war” (MacKenzie, pp. 5-6). Thus Westerby tellingly answers 
Smiley in terms that acknowledge power rather than moral mission.
The novel’s title suggests that Westerby deserts his post, and rejects 
Smiley’s/Britain’s authority, out of ‘honour’ towards Lizzie Worthington and her 
protector/lover, Drake Ko (whom Westerby connects with his father, p. 300). This is 
certainly how le Carre parlayed it: “[Smiley] faces a fearful moral defeat in the book
492 See: Homberger, p. 84; Aronoff, p. 24.
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because personal loyalty can’t be reconciled with loyalty to the service or to a cause. So 
the book ends up with a big question mark. Is what they are doing worth while?”493 
However Westerby’s rejection of Smiley’s orders in Schoolboy seems less a rejection of 
British power than a convoluted expression of postimperial nostalgia. With violence 
always the contradiction in ennobling ‘service’, Westerby’s faith in the British project 
(“the sticky little matter of just why we climb the mountain”) founders on “the selfless and 
devoted way in which we sacrifice other people” (p. 528) -  i.e. the death of the banker, 
Frost and Smiley’s exploitation of Lizzie as a source.
With Lord Jim lurking in Schoolboy's wake, with its own emphasis on ‘honour’, we 
can see the Westerby/Smiley split as a Conradian conflict:494 “a guilty, lawless Romantic 
individualism which struggles to subject itself to communal discipline” (Eagleton, 
Criticism, p. 134). This untrammelled individualism is solved by ‘service’ in Conrad 
(Eagleton, Criticism, p. 135) as it was within liberalism (Williams, Culture, p. 325). In 
rejecting Smiley’s invocation of ‘service’ in a postcolonial world but without any political 
rationale (Westerby never mentions Communism nor antipathy to the ‘sacrifice’ of non­
whites), Westerby’s actions are a reaffirmation of that “guilty lawless Romantic 
individualism”, the ‘personal’ -  otherwise known as self-interest. Westerby has trouble 
with all three of Eagleton’s definitions of Conradian “communal discipline”: “work, duty, 
fidelity” (Eagleton, Criticism, p. 134). Westerby is disobedient as an employee, fails in 
duty to his daughter, mentor (Smiley) and country (Britain), and is unfaithful to Lizzie 
even as he dedicates himself to her {Schoolboy, pp. 482-487). In the final scene, Westerby 
attempts to undermine British objectives by foiling the very capture of Karla’s Red China 
mole, Nelson Ko, that the entire plot has led up to. Westerby offers up his life to provide
493 Daily Mail, 8 September 1977, p. 10.
494 Smiley calls himself ‘Mr Standfast’ (after John Buchan’s 1919 novel) when visiting Control’s mistress 
{Schoolboy, p. 243). The name Craw is in Buchan’s Castle Gay (1930). Lord Vaizey made the Buchan 
connection: ‘Futile Jerry’, Listener, 29 September 1977, p. 409.
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‘service’ and ‘devotion’: but to what? “For what linked them, and what linked him to 
Lizzie” (p. 566) -  the familial, the personal: self-interest over state duty.495
Previously we have seen this honour/duty conflict within Smiley (albeit always 
resolved): with Smiley now unambiguously part of the state, the conflict splits into two -  
Westerby vs. Smiley. A critical split reflects this plot split, opposing factions facing off 
about whether individual or state, Westerby or Smiley, personal “honour” or state “duty”, 
are the moral winners. One faction claims established exemplar Smiley is the moral 
victor 496 A surprising number however champion Westerby: “in [his] ethical decision [he 
is] superior to Smiley”;497 a view widely echoed among critics 498 Smiley is even 
implicated by critics in Westerby’s death. “Smiley becomes Westerby’s executioner as he 
takes on the role of the uncaring bureaucrat who steals people’s anima and exploits their 
humaneness” (Beene, p. 104). But to debate which ‘wins’ -  individual honour (Westerby) 
or state duty (Smiley) -  is sterile for neither individual nor state in Schoolboy is especially 
honourable: both ruthlessly pursue self-interest, be that personal or national. So if satire of 
Smiley or Westerby is intended, as Goodman suggests, it is highly ambiguous, leavened 
with sympathy via Smiley’s role of established avatar and the novel’s titular tribute to 
Westerby. Moreover, if a broader satire is intended of what le Carre called the “shambles” 
of postimperial British policy, “now when we have no ideology” (Bragg 1976, 90), this 
rests heavily on postimperial nostalgia, a yearning for a ‘simpler’ time of clear national 
purpose and prestige. Such postimperial nostalgia blurs into the common claim of Western 
Cold-War non-ideological ‘neutrality’ highlighted throughout this thesis, and contradicted, 
as we shall see, by The Honourable Schoolboy itself. It also subtly ennobles imperialism.
In fact Westerby’s personal selfishness recalls what Williams called the “larger 
selfishness” of the British imperial project (Culture, p. 329), less ‘civilising’ mission than
495 “The elevation of the personal over the professional” (Barley, p. 115); Holtman (p. 67) and Dobel (p. 194) 
make similar points.
496 Aronoff, p. 127; Dobel, p. 209; Barley, p. 122.
497 Edwards, in Bold, pp. 53-54.
498 Panek, p. 254; Wolfe p. 208; Bennett, p. 80; Lewis, p. 161; Wallace, p. 12
193
“enterprise [...] run for profit” (Conrad, Heart o f  Darkness, p. 39). So colonial-class 
Westerby, representative of Britain on a world stage, acts as imperial Britain had:499 
buying and selling the colonized -  Charlie Marshall, prostitutes on the Mekong, even 
Lizzie in Westerby’s barter with Drake Ko -  for reasons of self-interest, justified via 
ennobling abstractions like ‘honour’ (c.f. ‘civilisation’, ‘service’). Both Smiley and 
Westerby, state and individual, ultimately express the very British colonial attitudes of 
superiority and exceptionality that anti-Communism was intended to eclipse.
A second British postcolonial anxiety was how to sustain the righteous Cold-War 
rhetoric of “democracy and freedom” against the Soviet Union and anti-colonial nationalist 
movements without being undermined by Britain’s brutal colonial past. But during the 
War, the wind had changed: the 1945 United Nations Charter “enshrined freedom from 
colonial rule as an ideal” (Springhall, p. 10), while a 1960 UN Declaration demanded “a 
speedy and unconditional end to colonialism” (Brendon, p. 539). “‘Empire’ became a dirty 
word in many languages,” writes Piers Brendon, echoing Connie Sachs’ postimperial 
melancholia in Tinker (Brendon, p. 53 9).500 As Connie’s association of postcolonial 
nationalists with subhuman ‘beasts’ attests, attempts to assert British imperial decency 
contra the history of colonialism was a fraught and inadvertently revealing strategy: a 
faultline. Colonial attitudes kept slipping through. Nevertheless, this is what The 
Honourable Schoolboy attempts to do via its themes of imperial innocence and colonial 
sacrifice.
*  *  *
499 “The questions raised [...] about personal motives become questions about the condition o f a postimperial 
England” (Buzard, p. 155).
5°° «After I960, certainly, British governments found the prospect o f defending colonial rule against 
vociferous international criticism tiresome and unrewarding” (Springhall, p. 209).
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3. Colonialism and the British Nation
“Trivial Critics of George Smiley”: Unreliable Omniscience
The Honourable Schoolboy's unusual narrative style of unreliable omniscience is Etienne 
Balibar and Pierre Macherey’s dictum in operation: “it is this displacement of 
contradictions which [is] ‘literary style’”.501 This thesis claims ‘neutrality’ is a mirage, and 
consequently that omniscient narrators always smuggle in opinion. Yet Schoolboy's 
narrator’s overt, even controversial opinions upset the conventions of both omniscience 
(omniscient narrators do not have ‘characters’, Culler, p. 28) and of unreliable narration 
(“unreliability always requires characterization”, Walsh, p. 511), which destabilises the 
authority of the narrative and undermines the ‘objectivity’ of its judgements.
Most critics see this omniscient strategy as mythologisation of Smiley, citing, for 
instance: “The case history has no other moment like this. In the trade it goes under
various smart phrases, ‘The day George reversed the controls’ is one” (Schoolboy, p. 301). 
Critics miss that these narrative incursions crucially reveal that Smiley’s reputation is 
disputed: e.g. “It has been laid at Smiley’s door more than once”; with this being rebutted 
by the jarring: “They are talking simplistic nonsense” (p. 231). Barley calls the narrator a 
“Smiley apologist [...] correcting interpretations [with] barely maintained patience” 
(Barley, p. 111). Lewis adds that the narration is “dogmatic, in vindicating [Smiley’s] 
decisions” (Lewis, p. 144). Both miss that the tone is increasingly defensive. “It has been 
whispered once or twice by certain trivial critics of George Smiley that [...] he should 
somehow have seen which way the wind was blowing with Jerry” (,Schoolboy, p. 328). 
“What is certain that nobody, neither Smiley nor Connie [...] can be seriously accused of 
failing in their duty” (p. 433); again, “Once more they look for ways of blaming Smiley, 
but there is no evidence of a lapse” (p. 480).
501 Pierre Macherey and Etienne Balibar, ‘On Literature as an Ideological Form’ [1974] in Contemporary 
Marxist Literary Criticism, ed. by Francis Mulhem (Harlow: Longman, 1992), pp. 34-55 (p. 44).
502 Lewis, p. 144, Monaghan, pp. 162-4, Hempstead (in Samuel, p. 235); Barley, pp. 111-112; Crehan, p. 
113.
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Given that Operation Dolphin’s failure is known (p. 16), the omniscient narration 
undermines its own pro-Smiley assertions. That the narrator offers questions rather than 
answers adds to this “floating uncertainty” (Lewis, p. 144): “Did Smiley know of the [US] 
conspiracy deep down? Was he aware of it, and did he secretly welcome the solution?”
(<Schoolboy, p. 574). Where Smiley was previously beyond criticism, now he is doubtable: 
given the equation between Smiley/Britain established, thus so is Britain. The defensive 
style of Schoolboy is a revelation of uncertainty regarding previous British certitudes:
British ‘decency’, British service and British power. Let us now examine how other textual 
strategies attempt to assuage these anxieties.
British Imperial Innocence
The Cold War offered useful cover for the fallout from decolonisation, from its testimony 
to British decline to Britain’s pursuit of a new, informal imperialism,503 but most of all to 
its exposure of the brutalities of the colonial past. “Refracted through a ‘quasi-existential’ 
conflict between freedom and totalitarianism, the former colonial powers could reinvent 
themselves as colonially-innocent, democratic nation-states” (MacPhee, p. 26).
“Innocence” was always part of the imperial project however, present in imperial 
ideologue, John Seeley’s speeches,504 John Buchan’s novels, and in the very concept of 
disinterested ‘service’. As Hempstead asks of Schoolboy, “How do you write the history of 
imperialism as something other than exploitation? You construct it not as ‘an enterprise 
[...] run for profit’ [Conrad, Heart o f Darkness] but as a ‘chance to serve’” (in Samuel, p. 
239). We see this also in Schoolboy’s presentation of Hong Kong’s British intelligence 
HQ: “built by the Royal Navy in the Twenties in all the grand innocence of that service, to 
receive and impart a sense of power” (<Schoolboy, p. 27). No contradiction is suggested
503 Cabinet documents recommend moves towards, “Stable self-government or independence [...] in such a 
way that these [successor] governments are willing and able to preserve their economic and political ties with 
the West” (quoted in Louis, p. 492).
504 For Seeley “the colonies merely operated an organic extension o f the home nation. Thus imperial England 
differed from all previous empires in that it had avoided conquering subservient lands, and [...] exhibiting an 
absence of ‘violent military character’” (Schwarz, p. 82).
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between “innocence” and “power” as if imperial institutions of domination arose 
organically, without bloodshed. This is “imperial denial” (Gilroy, p. 158).
We see this same innocence characterised in Jerry Westerby, who has strong kinship 
with John Buchan’s imperialist spy fiction’s heroes.505 Buchan’s novels reflect the 
“schoolboy’s dream of physical courage, high adventure, and the victory of the good” 
(Grella, p. 91), where “notions of foreign policy reflect the grand simplicity of an innocent 
mind, untroubled by ideas, fully in agreement with general cultural beliefs” (Grella, p. 91). 
We see this in Westerby initially giving himself over to Smiley/the state (“‘you call the 
shots and I ’ll play them’” he declares p. 123), and then later in the unthinking colonial 
behaviour of his sex tourism.506 Both actions trouble any notion of “innocence”.
Let us now deploy intertextual comparison with Greene’s The Quiet American to 
explore this idea of imperial innocence. Firstly, in Quiet American, set circa 1953, during 
the French-Vietminh conflict, the novel shows Fowler’s vaunted imperial innocence -  or 
“disinterest” -  becoming untenable as the novel progresses (MacPhee, pp. 28-30). Greene 
carefully gives political competition between old (Britain) and new colonialists (America) 
over possession of Vietnam an analogue in personal competition between British Fowler 
and American Pyle over possession of a Vietnamese woman, Phuong. Leaving aside the 
unexamined sexual politics of both novels, Schoolboy separates the personal struggle from 
the political conflict, so British Westerby competes with Chinese gangster, Drake Ko, for 
the British Lizzie Worthington. Greene’s political parable about colonialism has been 
personalised in le Carre, thereby implicitly asserting British imperial innocence.
Secondly, after a Vietnamese guard is shot by the Vietminh, as a result of Fowler and 
Pyle’s presence, Fowler reflects, “I was responsible for that voice crying in the dark. I had 
prided myself on detachment, on not belonging to this war, but those wounds had been 
inflicted by me just as though I had used the sten” (Quiet American, p. 113). When Drake
505 As claimed by Binyon {TLS)\ Monaghan (p. 76); Holtmann (p. 67).
506 Powell claims Westerby as ‘neutral’: “an operational man who is detached from political credos” (Powell, 
p. 91).
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Ko’s banker, Frost, is murdered due to links with Westerby, Westerby opines, “I killed him 
[...] Give or take a little, it was me who gave him the shove. It’s not just the generals, it’s 
every man who carries a gun” {Schoolboy, p. 353). The crucial difference in these 
remarkably similar lines in Greene and le Carre is that the guard in Quiet American is 
Vietnamese: Frost is British. Colonial British guilt in Greene becomes a generalised 
distaste for war in le Carre, rendering Britain imperially innocent.
Thirdly, Fowler comes to see that in the conflict, “the sacrifices were all paid by 
others” {Quiet American, p. 62), specifically the Vietnamese (pp. 185-6). When Westerby 
splits from Smiley, he answers to Smiley’s briefing’s invocation of ‘service’ -  “a chance to 
pay” -  using remarkably similar language to Fowler: “Trouble is, sport, the paying is 
actually done by the other poor sods” and cites “the selfless and devoted way in which we 
sacrifice other people” {Schoolboy, p. 528). But this potentially political point is utterly 
undermined by Westerby citing British banker, Frost, American journalist Luke, and 
British adventuress, Lizzie, as those exploited by Britain: all three victims are white 
Westerners -  all are contemporary colonialists, exploiting the East. No critic notices 
this.507 Furthermore, Frost and Luke are also killed -  and Lizzie ‘purchased’ -  by a 
colonised Chinese, Drake Ko. The narrative overwrites history with an imperial innocence, 
removing colonial exploitation and violence while reassigning that violence from 
exploiters to exploited. However Schoolboy's self-conscious echoing of Greene exposes its 
own ideological stratagem, and is thus a literary faultline.
British Colonial Sacrifice
The colonial concept of ‘service’ always contained an ambiguity: who is the service to, the 
colonisers or the colonised? Civilisation ‘cured’ savagery in colonial ideology (Brendon, p. 
62) and colonialism is still often presented in terms less neutral than glorifying: a
507 Lizzie represents “a symbol o f the countless people who have truly paid for the British Empire” (Brady, p. 
67); “all those who had given themselves for the good o f the Empire” (Noland, p. 67). No one uses the word 
‘white’.
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Wikipedia sentence like “Later, the British took their democratic ideals to their 
colonies”508 turns brutal imposition of ‘representative’ government into an act of 
generosity, while occluding the contiguous suppression of vaunted ‘freedom’, not to 
mention the profits attendant. We see a similar strategy in Schoolboy, as pertains to Eastern 
characters, where again characterisation reveals ideological faultlines.
In this ‘Eastern’ novel, the Eastern ‘other’ is barely seen or heard. Westerby’s 
interactions are primarily with other Western journalists, Western diplomats, even Western 
writers (Conrad) rather than the native people.509 But it is notable that the four main 
Eastern characters are all either orphans or parentless. Dobler, with a third of his thesis 
devoted to “children in le Carre”, misses this. Crucially, a concept of parent/child was part 
of colonial justification. “The British [insisted] their colonial subjects were Tike children’ 
and ‘required a long process of tutelage before they could participate in the governance of 
their country” (MacPhee, p. 26; Mamdani, p. 4). That such notions were hardly obsolete by 
the 1970s is revealed in Vaizey’s Schoolboy review opining Britain should “train a few 
Africans in the elementary principles of good government”.510 Yet the question begged 
here is what makes the colonised childlike, in need of firm but nurturing ‘parenting’?
Journalist/British spy Phoebe Wayfarer is a mixed race, needy, insecure and child­
like fantasist. Phoebe’s British colonial adventurer father, essentially purchases a Chinese 
wife but is killed “honourably” fighting against the Japanese (,Schoolboy, p. 217). Phoebe’s 
controller, Craw, suggests Phoebe sees the British as emblematic of her father, but her 
father is actually emblematic of the British here: his standing by his wife and child 
represents Britain’s imperial self-image -  “the British stand by their commitments” as 
Craw puts it (p. 217). This British justification of colonial exploitation via paternalist
508 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protestantism, accessed 8/3/14
509 Sabine Vanacker, ‘A desk is a dangerous place from which to watch the world’: Britishness and 
Foreignness in le Carre’s Karla Trilogy’ in The Foreign in International Crime Fiction: Transcultural 
Representations, edited by Jean Anderson Caroline Miranda and Barbara Pezzoti (London: Bloomsbury,
2012), p. 28.
510 Having contributed to Hugh Thomas’s Establishment collection, Vaizey, ennobled by Harold Wilson in 
1976, would take the Conservative whip in 1978. From this, the move should have been no surprise.
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nurture has a long tradition, from Rudyard Kipling’s 1899 poem ‘The White Man’s 
Burden’ to “I am your mother and your father”, “the missionary rhetoric whose standard 
slippage in India, Africa, and the Caribbean was from God to Queen Victoria and the 
British government”.511 But the British sacrificing themselves as surrogate parents elides 
Wayfarer being initially orphaned -  and infantilised -  by colonialism. It also elides which, 
in the parent-child relationship possesses the power, whilst implying that this ‘obligation’ 
to former “commitments” has a moral imperative to continue in the postcolonial world.
Pilot/mercenary Charlie Marshall comes from another union of colonial (French) and 
colonised (Chinese); rejected by his Chinese nationalist father as a kwailo (‘white devil’, p. 
415), Marshall also is child-like, enfeebled by opium which he takes “like a baby’s feed”
(p. 414), weeping in Westerby’s colonial, surrogate parental arms, with Westerby 
alternating maternal gentleness and paternal discipline (p. 422). Given that the British 
introduced opium into China (attested on p. 16), colonialism is arguably the cause of 
Marshall’s dependency. Again this Eastern orphaning is overwhelmed by generous 
Western nurturing: Marshall finds a home with Western bandit Ricardo and his British 
lover, Lizzie Worthington, Westerby calling Lizzie “Charlie Marshall’s big sister and earth 
mother” (p. 485). “We’ve all got to hold on to each other tight or we fall off the crazy 
mountain top” Marshall says of this grotesque ‘family’ (p. 415), recalling “we must love 
one another or die” (Auden 1940,105), from ‘September 1 1939’, the poem which gives 
Schoolboy its epigraph, colonialism again disappearing into universalised agape and 
distaste for war.
Chinese brothers Drake and Nelson Ko are also orphans, their mother “killed by the 
guns” (p. 264) thus probably refugees of imperial strife, taken in by the British Hibberts’ 
Christian Mission in 1930s colonised Shanghai, with the Hibberts again providing 
surrogate parents. Hibbert’s Christian forgiveness of Nelson’s Communist-inspired sacking
511 Helen Tiffin, ‘The Body in the Library: Identity, Opposition and the Settler-Invader Woman’ in The 
Contact and the Culmination, edited by Marc Delrez and Benedicte Ledent (Liege: University o f Liege 1997) 
213-228 (p. 34).
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of the Mission conies close to an apology for colonialism (p. 274). ‘“We were enemy [...] 
Europeans, capitalists, missionaries: all of us carpet-baggers who were there for their souls, 
or their labour, or their silver. [...] Exploiters. That’s how he saw us. Right, in a way, too’” 
(<Schoolboy, pp. 268-269). For Crehan this “betray[s] a forgiving, almost ludicrously 
indulgent paternalism” (Crehan, p.l 12), but it is precisely Hibbert’s saintly paternalism 
that undermines Hibbert’s avowed sympathy for Nelson’s colonial critique. Hibbert’s 
daughter Doris highlights Nelson’s behaviour as the ingratitude of child to sacrificing 
parent: “‘Didn’t stop him from eating your food, did it?”’ (p. 272). In this strategy again 
we see attempts to cleanse the stain of British colonialism in a post-colonial world: another 
form of “imperial denial”.
“A Bunch of Wolves” : America as Cold-War Aliy
Despite the split with Smiley, it is not actually Westerby’s actions that scupper Operation 
Dolphin, but the CIA’s. So it is time to explore the new theme of Britain’s Cold War ally, 
America, a relationship as key to Honourable Schoolboy as it was to British Cold-War 
history. This is a variation on the theme of the British nation, the ideological field wherein 
national identity is formulated and adapted in response to geopolitical developments. With 
its colonial base eroding exponentially post-war, Britain had been forced, after the US 
refused to support British military action over the “imperial lifeline”512 of the Suez Canal 
to operate internationally under US hegemony.513 But Suez also alarmed the Americans 
about potential Soviet influence in the global south as colonies imploded. “The colonial- 
nationalist conflict provides a fertile field for subversive Communist movements,” 
declared a National Security Council report (quoted in Leffler & Westad, p. 286), 
specifically citing Southeast Asia. With this Cold-War alliance only previously hinted at in
512 Little in Leffler & Westad, p. 310.
513 W. Roger Louis, Ends o f  British Imperialism: The Scramble fo r  Empire, Suez and Decolonization 
(London, IB Tauris, 2006), p. 485.
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le Carre (Alleline’s “fatal reverence for the Americans”; Control’s hatred of same, Tinker, 
p. 140), it now comes into central focus, and would be an enduring motif of future work.
The phrase “shotgun marriage” (,Schoolboy, p. 16) is indicative of this Special 
Relationship’s uneasiness in British culture. What were the implications of becoming 
deputy after once being head? How much independence of manoeuvre would the British 
have? We see this unease in Greene’s Quiet American where “the Old-Hand of Empire is 
irritated at the naivety of American interference in colonial matters and seeks to reassert 
his position” (Goodman, p. 245). We see it also in the Bond industry where “in a quaint 
reversal of the real balance of power, it is the American Leiter who is the subordinate 
partner to the British Bond.”514 By contrast, Smiley’s assessment of Operation Dolphin 
proffers realism about British status: “‘If we cut [the Americans] in they’ll swamp us. If 
we don’t, we’ve no resources. It’s simply a matter of balance’” (Schoolboy, p. 108).
There is early warning that this balancing strategy will be problematic when Smiley 
tells civil servants that cooperation with the US “will get us back to the top table” 
following Haydon’s treachery (Schoolboy, p. 204). Smiley’s Churchillian rhetoric515 
prompts a bureaucrat to respond, “‘Top table! [...] Sacrificial altar, if you ask me. We’ve 
already burned the Middle East and half of Africa on it. All for the special relationship’”
(p. 204). Referencing US takeover of British command (and British oil) in the Middle East 
and Africa (Louis, p. 485) the implication is that the Special Relationship is a cover story 
for Britain ceding power to America. Smiley makes a robust assertion of British pre­
eminence in Hong Kong however, telling the Americans, “‘Steal our thunder and get 
yourselves thrown off the Colony into the bargain’” (p. 300). However, unmentioned,
Hong Kong was only regained by Britain in 1945 from China via US diplomatic support 
and military threat (Louis, p. 351, 375). Moreover, at the Circus’s very first meeting with 
the Americans, the Drug Enforcement Agency’s Sol Eckland humiliatingly describes the
514 J. Chapman, ‘A Licence to Thrill’ in The James Bond Phenomenon: A Critical Reader ed. by C. Lindner 
(Manchester: University Press, 2003), p. 96.
515 In 1954 Churchill told cabinet that nuclear weapons were “the price we pay to sit at the top table,” 
(Hennessy, p. 46).
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US/UK relationship as: “‘you ride our wagon, we tell you where to get off and where to 
stay topsides’” (<Schoolboy, p. 298). Ultimately the novel’s plot trajectory appears to ratify 
a realistically downbeat assessment of the Special Relationship, when the CIA finally 
snatches Smiley’s/Britain’s artfully ensnared intelligence prize, Nelson Ko, at the island of 
Po Toi. Britain’s attempt to establish pre-eminence on its own territory is outflanked by 
US hegemony.
Undercutting this plot realism however is a subliminal strategy, suggesting British 
moral superiority to its Cold-War ally, the old elect nation asserting itself over the new. 
Firstly, there’s an aesthetic superiority, contrasting British sophistication with American 
philistinism. This is seen linguistically in Smiley and Guillam’s affected bemusement at 
the use of the expression “meet with” (Schoolboy, p. 282) or their amusement at CIA man, 
Martello’s use of the phrase “meat and potatoes” for their own “modalities” (p. 478). It is 
seen gastronomically in the claim Americans “wouldn’t know the difference” between 
Spanish and South African sherry (p. 283). It is seen decoratively when Guillam perceives 
a “Howard Johnson” (America’s biggest hotel/restaurant chain in the 1970s), tackiness to 
American offices (p. 489); while Martello’s rosewood walls are, to Guillam’s eye, “fake”
(p. 298), as is, to Westerby’s eye, a US airbase door (p. 470). With the ersatz, hollow and 
‘modem’ contrasted to the genuine, solid and traditional, such comparisons are clearly 
national and political.
Secondly, there is a critique of what Hempstead calls “C.I.A. gun-barrel ethics” (in 
Samuel, p. 238), American strategic expediency. Where Britain, via the scmpulous Smiley, 
parlays a subtle espionage game, courteously collecting intelligence, America rides in with 
“too much hardware and overmanning” (Schoolboy, p. 543). Eckland’s interjections form a 
fugue: “‘What’s holding everyone up? [...] Somebody ought to go out and shoot that 
bastard’” (p. 287). “What [the Brits] been doing all the time? Rubbing soap into their 
pretty faces? So when do they get to shave, for God’s sakes?” (p. 296). “‘And do we go for 
his jugular? [...] do we hell. We pussyfoot. We stand on the sidelines. ‘Play it delicate, it’s
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a British ballgame’” (p. 297). The difference between crew-cut good oP boy Eckland and 
glossy, Yale-groomed Martello turns out to be purely presentational. By the time Westerby 
disobeys Smiley and becomes a “rogue elephant” on Po Toi, attempting to save the Ko 
brothers, Martello exhibits similar impatience with Smiley’s/British caution, suggesting 
shooting Westerby, reframing the difference between US and UK methods from delicacy 
versus expediency to “‘the conspiracy or the fuck up’” (p. 560). Held at bay during the 
intelligence-collecting stage, the Americans finally break free of British -  literal and 
figurative -  restraint when they snatch Nelson Ko from British hands on Po Toi. So when 
this dishonourable act turns out to be the first part of a political Circus putsch, replacing 
Smiley with the more US-friendly Saul Enderby, the moral impact of these anti-US 
strategies if anything increases. Suggestive of US ‘dishonor’, Guillam calls the Americans 
“a bunch of wolves” (p. 527). Let us next examine a third anti-American strategy in 
Schoolboy, which now begins to suggest British hypocrisy.
“One Vanishing World”: American and British Imperialism
Westerby’s trip around Southeast Asia on adventurers Tiny Ricardo and Charlie Marshall’s 
trails takes up fully half of Schoolboy's length yet advances the plot only marginally. It 
does however do a great deal of ideological work, this tour of imperial fallout offering both 
an elegy for European colonialism and a critique of American imperialism. But this 
ongoing assertion of British superiority over America increasingly creates a faultline, 
whereby altogether different truths to these strategies can be discerned.
When Westerby visits former French colony, Cambodia, recently subjected to 
intensive US carpet-bombing along its Vietnam border, the language suggests imminent 
collapse into chaos: “With the end so close” (p. 361); “the Indians stay to pick the carcass” 
(p. 362); Cambodia is “bleeding to death” (p. 367). Amplifying the Orientalist slurs, 
Westerby escapes the present by retreating into Conrad, a nostalgic reassertion of 
European imperialism (p. 360). On a trip to the front-line, Westerby’s focalisation opines
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of an ignorant female American photographer, “when the Pentagon thinks of civilisation 
[...] it thinks of you” (p. 374). If the implied critique is that, for the US, ‘civilisation’ 
equates with ‘white’, this overlooks Britain’s pioneering work in this field: the subject of 
Bill Schwarz’s entire Memories o f Empire (2012). Indeed the travails of war occur, fairly 
consistently in Schoolboy, only to white Westerners: the journalists escaping the Khmer 
Rouge, above, the diplomats in Phnom Penh continuing their dinner party while the bombs 
drop (pp. 380-386). One British diplomat expresses “satisfaction” that the Americans 
“‘boobed’” in a military (over) reaction (p. 383), and pages later complains, ‘“Yank[s] 
seem to want to run the world single-handed these days’” (p. 386). The hypocrisy of the 
critique is revealed: the old hand of empire resenting the new, while ignoring Britain’s own 
bloody imperial “boobs” such as, at random, the partitioning of India. No textual sympathy 
is suggested for the native victims here: just a turf war between allies. The textual tone of 
tragedy is retained for the death of colonialism, not the death of colonials.
Next, Westerby visits Saigon, in another former French colony, Vietnam. “C’est 
termine” shrugs a French priest of the “final act” in the American war (p. 430). With 
everyone attempting to leave Saigon, when a British Vietnamese agent begs, “‘The British 
are my friends! [...] Get me out!”’ Westerby says, “‘Try the Americans’” (p. 431) and cuts 
off the phone call. The implication is that Vietnam is solely America’s problem, again 
evincing a total lack of sympathy for the victims of war whilst occluding the fact that the 
British held Vietnam for the French from 1945-6, supporting a pan-European principle of 
imperialism (Springhall, pp. 35-36). This helped create, with the French, both the problems 
and the template for the Vietnam War (Springhall, pp. 40-41). Moreover, Britain was 
considerably more complicit in the Vietnam War than its lack of provision of troops 
suggested.516
Westerby twice stops off in former French colony, Laos, where again in the capital,
Vientiane, there is also a tragic sense of imminent end to the colonial era. The deserted
516 Marc Tiley, ‘Britain, Vietnam and the Special Relationship’, History Today Vol 63, Issue 12 (December 
2013). http://www.historytoday.com/marc-tiley/britain-vietnam-and-special-relationship
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French hotel’s concrete bar “could do duty as a bomb shelter or firing position” (p. 432); 
nationalist Pathet Lao soldiers occupy the town (p. 432). Westerby remembers that 
Vientiane was a base for Lizzie Worthington, Tiny Ricardo and Charlie Marshall’s 
colonial adventuring. That adventuring included dropping explosives on Laos’s Plain of 
Jars during the US’s brutally intensive bombing campaign from 1964-73 (p. 404). If this 
does not damn the US enough (overlooking British expedient actions like the firebombing 
of Dresden), Laos was also the location for the CIA’s farcical strategy of bringing local 
tribes onside via opium growing (referenced in the novel, pp. 288-98). If here the new 
imperialists are inefficient as well as expedient, Westerby’s postcolonial complacency 
overlooks Britain forcing the opium trade on China via the Opium Wars (1839-41; 1856- 
60).517 Again a literary apartheid reigns here: there is no sense of the effect of war on the 
native population, only on whites coming to the end of a glorious era.
Throughout Westerby’s trip are regular returns to Thailand -  apt in that although
_  ^ 1 Rnever colonised, French and British empires perpetually worried at Thai territory. Here 
again is a sideswipe at the Americans, via Westerby’s “inkling” that a Thai colonel’s 
“American-English” expression “Communist Terrorist” “was originally a British phrase” 
(p. 438). It was: in Malaya, thus the reader is offered a subliminal reminder of Britain’s 
‘success’ in Malaya as against American failure in Vietnam. So, shortly afterwards, at a 
Thai US military base, when US major Masters tells Westerby of final American defeat in 
Vietnam: “‘The United States of America has just applied to join the club of second class 
powers, of which I understand your own fine nation to be chairman, president and oldest 
member’” (p. 474) -  Westerby is insulated against the insult. “This is how they tried to 
win, Jerry thought: from inside sound-proof rooms, through smoked glass, using machines 
at arm’s length. This is how they lost” (p. 472).519 Goodman rightly calls Westerby’s
517 Christopher Hill, ‘History and Patriotism’, in Samuel, Patriotism 1, p. 4.
518 Schoolboy, pp. 355-359; pp. 434-466; pp. 469-474; pp. 482-486.
519 Le Carre: “And then there are the gray men, who should be feeding computers with information from the 
satellites [...] figures one saw around the edges o f the Vietnam War, who had all sorts o f pretty words for 
‘kill’. They’re scary” (Godfrey Hodgson, ‘The Secret Life o f John le Carre’ Washington Post, 9 October
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attitude “imperial self-congratulation” (Goodman, p. 252), the smug tone of the Old Hand 
towards the new boys on the imperial block but wrongly assumes Westerby is being 
satirised. For American deployment of what Mamdani calls the “bifurcated state” (1996, 
16) was no different to Britain’s latterday imperial methods. Unlike the French empire, 
which favoured direct rule, British imperial governance came to favour indirect rule via 
local proxies (Arendt, Origins, p. 130), as developed by Shepstone in Natal and Lugard in 
West Africa, which Mamdani calls “decentralised despotism” (Mamdani, p. 37). Apartheid 
was a development of this strategy. So if Martello feels he is in “enemy territory”
(,Schoolboy, p. 508) upon leaving US institutional premises, with their American decor and 
symbolic lack of windows (p. 280), equally Westerby has almost no contact with the 
“native” population in any of the countries he visits, beyond purchasing information and 
purchasing sex on the Mekong Delta (p. 344; pp. 482-487). This is entirely consistent with 
British imperial “aloofness” (Arendt, Origins, p. 212).
In fact, only the success of the British Malayan campaign distinguished it from the 
American Vietnam campaign, right down to its scale of civilian casualties (11,343 
Malayans killed), its brutal “new village” approach (putting the peasantry in concentration 
camps, reconfigured as “strategic hamlets” in Vietnam, 1962-3) and chemical defoliation 
(Springhall 2001, 56). Indeed British Malayan Permanent Secretary, Robert Thompson, 
advised the US government during Vietnam. “If anything the British were more ruthless” 
than the US (Springhall, p. 56), while with Britain also fighting bloody campaigns in Aden 
and Borneo (Louis, p. 573) concurrent with a Vietnam they covertly supported, the British 
had little to be imperially superior about. Again, the sense of the Vietnam War is of losses 
to America (the Major consoling himself with drink) and to Britain (the airbase sound
1977, p. 1).
520 Two years later, le Carre appeared to suggest overt (British) colonialism was better than “covert” (US) 
imperialism, “such adventures have done more to discredit the Western cause than they have ever done to 
advance it” John le Carre, review o f The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA by Thomas 
Powers, New York Times Book Review, 13 October 1979, p. 48.
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system playing “end of the world music”, p. 473): the Vietnam War is a tragedy for the 
colonizers not the colonized.
Comparison between Schoolboy and The Quiet American is again telling. Fowler is 
critical of American imperialist methods {Quiet American, p. 162) but slowly recognises 
his kinship with Pyle: “Was I so different from Pyle, I wondered?” Fowler references an 
incident when he pushed Pyle’s foot in the blood of an explosion Pyle himself had ordered. 
“Must I too have my foot thrust in the mess of life before I saw the pain?” {Quiet 
American, pp. 185-186). This is effectively an admission of British colonial guilt.521 In 
Schoolboy however, Westerby makes no such recognition of kinship with his American 
“cousins” -  his tone is one of casual superiority: “the Cousins’ [...] presence made it a 
much rougher ball-game” (,Schoolboy, p. 486).522 In Schoolboy's imperial ideology of good 
sports and bad eggs, the Americans do not play fair: they are ‘dishonourable’.
But what use is such a “moral victory over [Britain’s] American allies” (Sauerberg, 
p. 175), as against military victory? What use rhetorical power as against political power? 
Yet Raphael Samuel claims that “Britain was thought of as setting an example to other 
countries [...] a stable and traditional society”.523 Fiction, especially bestselling fiction, 
serves a key function here. Louis cites a British “system of influence [...] converting 
discontented subjects into loyal allies” (Louis, p. 485), and, more importantly, business 
partners in this postcolonial world. Britain in Schoolboy is posited as the brains behind 
America’s brawn, and the more ‘honorable’ business partner than the slippery US in the 
transition to informal empire via trade. We have already noted Britain’s over­
representation in Cold War cultural production, thanks to Fleming, le Carre et al: 
consequently, Britain as an ideological ‘nation’ often eclipsed its Cold-War ally. The point 
throughout this thesis is that ideology, in politics and in fiction, is a highly effective
521 Eagleton claims Fowler is accusing the Americans, not accepting British blame, Terry Eagleton, Exiles 
and Emigres: Studies in Modern English Literature (London: Chatto & Windus, 1970), pp. 125-8.
522 Westerby should know, having been in the Congo, (c.f. Heart o f  Darkness) during the Belgian/US-backed 
1961 military coup and murder of “Communist” Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba {Schoolboy, p. 366) in 
which Britain was complicit (Louis, p. 498).
523 ‘Introduction’ in Patriotism I, ed. Samuel, p. xxvii.
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weapon (albeit one that can implode on the wielder). In testament to this, clutching his 
Time cover story, le Carre would shortly recommend himself to Yasser Arafat as “an 
opinion former”.524
Finally then, in this consideration of postcolonial currents in Schoolboy, Westerby, 
leaving Hong Kong, has a vision of “the Colony’s last day [...] Peking has made its 
proverbial telephone call, ‘Get out, party’s over’” (Schoolboy, p. 528). His vision expands:
For a moment it was all one vanishing world -  here, Phnom Penh, Saigon, London, a 
world on loan, with the creditors standing at the door and Jerry himself in some 
unfathomable way a part of the debt that was owed (p. 528).
Here we have condensed the thematic tensions contained by The Honourable Schoolboy: 
postimperial nostalgia, with a sense of tragic end (“one vanishing world”); the tension 
between colonial guilt (“creditors standing at the door”) and protestations of imperial 
innocence (the imperial debt is “unfathomable”). Most of all however there is a lack where 
the new world replacing that “vanishing world” should be: China, in this case, but more 
generally across the postcolonial frontier, Communism. For while le Carre declared The 
Honourable Schoolboy was about “the evanescence of the Western presence in southeast 
Asia” (Barber, p. 9), his statement, like The Honourable Schoolboy itself and the critical 
discourse around it, elides what was replacing that Western presence.
*  *  " k
524 Le Carre speech, Hay Festival, 31/5/2013, author’s transcription.
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4. “A Spreading Plague”: Communism and Southeast Asia
Under-written in The Honourable Schoolboy, and unremarked by critics,525 is that all the 
territories Westerby visits on his tour of Southeast Asia are not just about to be lost by 
colonialism, but to shift control from colonial to Communist powers. So in order to avoid 
anti-Communism becoming merely a “cover story” for postcolonial concerns, I will now 
“reverse the controls” of this chapter, just as Smiley does midway through Schoolboy (p. 
301) and look more closely at Communism, by returning to the locations Westerby visits 
on his Southeastern tour and re-examining their contemporary and historical context.
Westerby’s first stop, Cambodia is about to fall to the Communist Khmer Rouge. 
Phnom Penh is described as “a city about to be given back to the jungle” (p. 422, my 
emphasis). Reviewing Schoolboy, foreign correspondent James Fenton complained, “there 
was no jungle around Phnom Penh” (New Review, p. 34). Contra Fenton, this manipulation 
is irrelevant to textual ‘quality’, but does ideologically suggest the barbarian at the gate. In 
US-held Saigon, under acute siege from the Communist Vietcong, “the rot this time was 
irreversible” (p. 431, my emphasis); “the panic was everywhere, like a spreading plague”
(p. 432, my emphasis). Communism is here decay (“rot”) and disease (“plague”): 
destruction, clearly posited against European colonial construction.
In Laos, the occupying Pathet Lao are again Communist, signalled by their Mao 
caps, and their December 1975 takeover is imminent.526 Like the Cambodian “jungle” slur, 
the Pathet Lao are inaccurately described as “not long down from the hills”, suggestive of 
tribal primitivism (p. 432) when it was US-trained a/7/z-Communist forces that were 
recruited from hill tribes. This serves reminder that while Ricardo and Marshall’s bombing 
raids on Laos’s Plain of Jars was a profiteering adventure, they also served an anti- 
Communist purpose. However flippant, Marshall’s shirt flaunts a patch reading, “Kill a 
Commie for Christ” (p. 399). Colonialists and Communists are antagonists.
525 Crehan (in Bold, p. 124) is the sole exception.
526 While the West spumed assistance for the Cambodian people during the Khmer Rouge regime 1975-79, 
backed by China, it was Vietnamese invasion that defeated the Khmer Rouge in 1979, pushing Cambodia 
and Vietnam to the Soviet side of the Sino-Soviet split.
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In Thailand, the link Westerby makes to the victorious British Malayan anti- 
Communist campaign (p. 438) is premature: in 1975 the Thai Communist insurgency was 
thought likely to succeed.527 After Westerby is told by US Major Masters of the end of the 
Vietnam War at a US airbase, Masters is described, as “suffering the stab of defeat at the 
hands of unintelligible savages'’ (p. 474; my emphasis), another conflation of colonial and 
Cold War vocabulary. Finally, Hong Kong, a post-war “capitalist showroom” (Louis, p. 
349), perennially under threat from Communist China, is described in apocalyptic terms in 
Westerby’s vision of final capitulation to Communism: “the looted shops, the empty city 
waiting like a carcass for the hordes” {Schoolboy, p. 528; my emphasis). Again we have 
the merging of colonial and Cold War language, with Communists the barbarian at the 
postcolonial gate, the othering here combining criminality, destruction and mass hysteria. 
Communism is thus contemporary savagery, “the hordes” reclaiming the postcolonial city 
for the atavistic ‘jungle’, where the ‘tribes’ will ensure that the ‘carcass’ of civilisation will 
‘rot’. Despite the novel’s W.H. Auden epigraph, “those to whom evil is done, do evil in 
return” (from September 11939), the text cannot conceive that colonialism created 
Communism. Many commentators believe the main recruiter to the Khmer Rouge’s
c o o
vicious distortion of Communism was the US carpet-bombing of Cambodia (1969-73).
There is a problem with emphasis in postcolonial considerations of the East. In 
following revisionist historians such as William Appleman Williams and convincingly 
arguing that European decolonisation in the East was overstated and disguised the 
transition from formal to informal imperialism, MacPhee allows the Cold War to recede 
from view, anti-Communism becoming simply a cover story for capitalist reconfiguration 
(MacPhee, pp. 22-23). While it is important to assert that Western exploitation of 
Southeast Asia was not and is not “evanescent”, it was by no means clear in 1974-77 that 
the informal imperialism Mandel described in Late Capitalism (trans. 1975) would be
527 Odd Ame Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: University Press, 2007), p. 191.
528 Historians William Shawcross {Sideshow. Kissinger, Nixon and the destruction o f Cambodia, 1979) and 
Ben Kieman (various) and journalist John Pilger {Heroes, 1986).
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successful in the East. For all Schoolboy's hostility to the Americans, the beneficiaries of 
decolonisation looked more likely to be the Soviet Union or China. Consequently, the key 
fact that most anti-colonial nationalist movements were Communist deserves more pause 
than given by MacPhee or Neil Lazarus, in their compelling accounts of postcolonial 
literature or by Goodman in his specific study of The Honourable Schoolboy (Goodman, 
pp. 243-256), which does not mention Communism once. World Communism offered both 
an explicit philosophical critique of and a physical threat to expansionary global 
capitalism. From the Second Congress of the Communist International onward, 
colonialism was specifically rejected as the tool of capitalism (Young, p. 132-3). So it is 
not a question of either a philosophical anti-Communism to which capitalism is incidental 
or an expedient anti-Communism which masks capitalist imperatives. ‘Containing’ a 
Communism explicitly hostile to capitalist interests was America’s purpose in Korea 
(1950-53) and Vietnam (1955-1975), “to make the world safe for capitalism” (Westad, p. 
31). The results were an expensive and bloody stalemate (Korea), and a global military, 
capitalist superpower being soundly defeated by peasant Communist guerrillas (Vietnam). 
The viciously anti capitalist Khmer Rouge would take over in Cambodia in the same 
month Saigon fell and declare 1975 “Year Zero” before exterminating 1/5 of the 
population, largely due to perceived ‘Western’ corruption, Pol Pot’s regime backed by 
enduringly Communist China. As mentioned, even un-colonised Thailand was at threat 
from Communist takeover.
Anti-Communism was not, contra Logevall, simply the US’s preoccupation 
(Logevall in Leffler & Westad, p. 282): in Malaya the British made considerable attempts 
to nurture a non-Communist succession (Louis, p. 566) more sympathetic to enduring 
British commercial ties. Most British post-war interventions in Southeast Asia shared the 
American objective of keeping out Communism: in Vietnam in 1945-6, where Britain 
suppressed the elected Communist government (Springhall, pp. 38-43); in Malaya; and in
529 Neil Lazarus, The Postcolonial Unconscious (Cambridge: University Press, 2011).
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The Honourable Schoolboy's axis Hong Kong, which came “to symbolize resistance to 
Communist expansionism” (Louis, p. 374).530
So in Westerby’s “vanishing world” rumination -  “[Hong Kong], Phnom Penh, 
Saigon, London” -  the reason London should appear in a list of vanishing colonial 
territories now becomes clearer. Westerby is invoking the barbarian at the gate of the 
colonial ‘centre’ -  the working class -  as kin to the barbarian at the colonial ‘periphery’ -  
Southeast Asian Communists. British imperialism had previously functioned as distraction 
from class strife, both ideologically (“Patriotism became [...] a vital counterweight to 
class-consciousness [...] the labour movement was ‘bribed’ by the economic benefits of 
imperialism” (MacKenzie, p. 7) and practically (exporting unemployed, potentially 
troublesome, members of the working class to the colonies). This symbiosis is 
demonstrated in the renewed post-war imperialism that financed the Welfare State and is 
the basis for the conservative view that the Welfare State cost Britain its imperial power
q  i
(MacPhee, p. 56). A declining empire had few sticks or carrots to offer its restive 
working class. So the struggles of ex-colonies for national liberation were -  for elites -  
frighteningly paralleled by the militant struggles of the British working class in the 1970s, 
struggles which brought down the government of Edward Heath in 1974, and would 
shortly bring down that of James Callaghan in 1979, before Thatcherism launched a 
counter attack. The domestic ‘other’ thus combines with the colonial ‘other’ as a threat to 
the safety of capitalism.
Alan Nadel describes how the US’s political strategy of “containment” of 
Communism led to “a rhetorical strategy that functioned to foreclose dissent, pre-empt 
dialogue and preclude contradiction” (Nadel, p. 14). One key facet of this was a politicised
530 “The whole common front against Communism in Siam, Burma and Malay [a] was likely to crumble 
unless [we] resisted] this threat to Hong Kong,” Attlee, May 1949 Cabinet minutes (Louis, p. 371). The 
Chinese Communist revolution finally attained victory in 1949.
531 As well as the aforementioned Larkin, Fleming parlayed this view in his own East Asian espionage novel, 
You Only Live Twice (1964). “Our Welfare Sate politics may have made us expect too much for free, and 
liberation o f our colonies may have gone too fast” (Blofeld Trilogy, p. 491). Both it and Schoolboy contain 
characters inspired by foreign correspondent Dick Hughes, Dicko Henderson and Craw.
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stabilisation of that which cannot be stabilised: “the distinctions between Other and Same” 
(Nadel 1995, 20). Much the same occurred in the UK, used particularly against an 
established socialist tradition, even if never producing a homegrown McCarthyism. 
Perhaps because of the deepening domestic crisis and the sense of imperial international 
fracturing, The Honourable Schoolboy is even less ambiguous about Communism than 
previous le Carre novels. Smiley moves a long way from being “a little embarrassed by 
professions of anti-Communism” (Tinker, p. 160) to “Our present war began in 1917, with 
the Bolshevik Revolution” (,Schoolboy, p. 122). Critics tend to deny Smiley political 
motivation in Schoolboy, attributing his briefing’s forthrightness to simplification for the 
unreflective Westerby.532 Indeed many critics insist on a personal, non-political reading of 
Smiley’s quest for Karla. Aronoff is typical: “Smiley’s patriotism has become distorted by 
a personal vendetta against Karla,” (Aronoff, p. 96).533 For Barley, “Duty and devotion 
stop Smiley thinking politically: Karla no longer substantially represents Communism. He 
is a ‘a left-over legend” ” (Barley, p. 119). The passage Barley references, is one of few 
moments we access Smiley’s thoughts in Schoolboy:
Smiley perceived in himself the existence of a darker motive [...] one which his 
rational mind continued to reject. He called it Karla, and it was true that somewhere 
in him, like a left-over legend, there burned the embers of hatred toward the man 
who had set out to destroy the temples of his private faith, whatever remained of 
them: the service that he loved, his friends, his country, his concept of a reasonable 
balance in human affairs (,Schoolboy, p. 126).
The suggestions of personal motivation here are rhetorical rather than substantial: there is 
no mention of Karla’s use of Haydon to seduce Ann (despite Haydon being mentioned in
532 Homberger, p. 84; Aronoff, p. 24.
533 Other critics that make the same point include: Sauerberg (p. 179); Hoffman (p. 143); Cawelti & 
Rosenberg (p. 182). In the text, Lacon (Schoolboy, p. 67) and Martindale (p. 59) make similar suggestions. 
An arch bureaucrat and a buffoon are hardly founts o f wisdom in a le Carre novel however.
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the preceding paragraph). “Private” here is not synonymous with ‘personal’ but with an 
ideological individualism, contradictorily affirmed by Smiley via a series of collective 
ideologies like “the service”, and “country”. Moreover, “a reasonable balance in human 
affairs” is a typical Smiley-ism, laying claim to an empirical decency outside political 
ideology which simply affirms British geopolitical objectives. Sauerberg’s gloss is a 
typical surface reading that affirms Western consensus: “a shared balance only to be 
reached against the background of the Western tradition” based on “restraint and common 
sense” (Sauerberg, p. 62).534 Similarly in another, much-quoted, passage, Smiley says Ann 
calls his “quest for Karla” “his black Grail” {Schoolboy, p. 540). Here Ann’s own quest, 
for love, “her own Grail” (p. 540) is implicitly linked with Westerby’s quest and his love 
for Lizzie. In pursuit of their personal quests for gratification (e.g. Westerby visiting 
prostitutes during his courtship of Lizzie), Ann and Westerby both betray Smiley/Britain. 
Ultimately, in a novel about British representatives on a world stage, the grail is pursued 
for the collective good, to heal the nation, wherein Smiley becomes both Gawain and 
Arthur. Were anyone in any doubt about le Carre’s position, an accompanying interview 
published on both sides of the Atlantic was unambiguous: “When we look at the heathen, 
we run back and take new faith. However liberal and doubtful we may be, there is 
absolutely no doubt that world Communism is not something I wish my children to be 
subjected to” (Hodgson, p. 1: reprinted in the Daily Telegraph). These lines notably 
conflate colonial and Cold-War language (“heathen”) in their insistent othering of 
Communism.
534 See also: Noland, who separates “British values” from “the political” (p. 65); Homberger, who claims the 
same neutrality: “Smiley is also the custodian for certain positive values, not [...] any Cold War ideology o f  
anti-Communism, but [...] compassion” (p. 83).
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Characterising Communism
All that said, Communism is largely notable for its absence in The Honourable Schoolboy. 
Karla, the ideological enemy, is reduced to a blurry picture on Smiley’s wall -  again, in 
this second volume of The Karla Trilogy we neither see nor hear him. But this strategy 
itself is ideologically effective: “the looming presence of Karla’s image reminds the British 
spy of the threatening object against which his own function and identity are measured 
(Buzard, p. 173). As for the other major Communist character, we never hear Karla’s Red 
China ‘mole’, Nelson Ko, speak. We hear Nelson’s critique of the West only via the 
mediation of the missionary, Hibbert (<Schoolboy, pp. 268-269) and only see Nelson briefly 
on the closing pages of the novel, before he is snatched away from the British and the 
reader alike. The Soviet Union and Red China are thus almost entirely invisible in this 
Cold-War text. Consequently Communism is not a political philosophy, or even a political 
system in The Honourable Schoolboy, it is a mode of behaviour: a brutal anti-humanism 
that resembles colonial depictions of ‘savagery’. Karla methodically murders the agents 
exposed by Haydon. Attempts to save two Ukrainian agents are scuppered, resulting in 
Smiley “weeping silently” (pp. 65-66). Nelson Ko sacks the Christian mission that gave 
him and his orphaned brother succor: Hibbert forgives him in saintly Smiley style. When 
Smiley orders Westerby to try “shaking the tree” to expose Drake Ko (p. 307), the 
enactment of this colonially loaded metaphor, rendering the other primitive, animalistic, 
prompts Drake Ko to respond in suitably ‘savage’ style, with a spate of brutal murders. 
Drake Ko’s brutal actions, as the ‘enemy’ in a Cold-War novel, blur with Communism’s, 
whereas Drake Ko is a capitalist, a businessman, a recipient of the Order of the British 
Empire (like Philby). This association of the ‘other’ with the savage is a faultline which, 
again, inadvertently invokes British as much as Communist brutality. This confirms 
Nadel’s point that the “Other” is not a stable identification (Nadel, p. 20). Nevertheless, the 
murder of the banker, Frost, by Drake Ko’s thugs is notably painful for Smiley and gives 
rise to just such a declaration of stability from Connie Sachs:
‘Karla wouldn’t give two pins, would he, dearie? [...] Not for one dead Frost, not for 
ten. That’s the difference really. We can’t write it much larger than that, can we, not 
these days? Who was it used to say ‘we’re fighting for the survival of Reasonable 
Man’? Steed-Asprey? Or was it Control? I loved that. It covered it all. Hitler. The new 
thing. That’s who we are: reasonable. [...] We’re not just English: we’re reasonable’
(<Schoolboy, p. 353).535
Britain is here characterised as a bastion of reason, moderation, compassion and 
humanism. But more importantly, Communism is characterised as simply the negation of 
these immanent qualities: un-reasonable, immoderate, cruel and in-human.536 But for 
Connie, Communism is only the most recent manifestation of the inhuman other (“the new 
thing”), of the ‘savagery’ to which British ‘civilisation’ will always be innately superior. 
Even if Britain is physically, militarily less potent, the moral centre will hold. Karla’s 
indifference to human cost in pursuit of political ends is also Fiedler’s in The Spy, Dieter 
Frey’s in Call: it is, in le Carre’s world, Communism’s. Communism’s inhumanity and 
savagery, indecency and lack of civilisation thus blur with colonial conceptions of the 
colonised: a “spreading plague”.
* * *
535 These lines prompt former intelligence officer Hoffman to declare as empircal truth: “We [the West] 
never subscribed to the grand ideological crusade [...] we always [...] maintained a sense o f reason, a 
cognition of excess. [...] But then, we did defeat Hitler as well as the new thing, didn’t we? That was 
because true strength derives from a moral wellspring [...] we never deviated from our commitment to 
democracy, the rule o f law, and respect o f human beings” (Hoffman, p. 148).
536 Revealingly, however, two ‘indecent’ Soviet tactics in the novel, buying up civil aviation companies for 
political purposes (Crehan, p. 124) and flying opium into China, were documented CIA tactics (Lashmar & 
Oliver, p. 3).
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5. Communism and Colonialism: Conclusion
In conclusion, The Honourable Schoolboy's, colonial setting prompts a welter of 
contradictory textual strategies that reveal a raft of cultural anxieties about Britain’s past, 
present and future role in the world. The book shifts uneasily between assertions of 
imperial innocence and testaments to colonialism as self-abnegating sacrifice. Schoolboy 
focuses strongly on Britain’s uneasy alliance with Cold War ally, America, apparently 
accepting political realities, but fighting a rhetorical rearguard action to assert British 
superiority. All these strategies tend to be contradictory: imperial innocence actually flags 
up imperial guilt; proclamations of colonial sacrifice signal the colonially created need for 
that sacrifice; criticising America highlights commonalities as much as differences betwen 
Britai and its Cold-War ally.
However, while these postcolonial elements are key to understanding The Honourable 
Schoolboy, it is an error to overlook the Cold-War enemy, Communism. At the time of The 
Honourable Schoolboy's writing and publication, Communism still represented a clear and 
present danger not just to colonialism but to its ontological root, capitalism. This 
connection was put stringently by one radical during the countercultural high-water mark 
of 1968: “It was in the world of capital that SIS had its traditional heart, in the preservation 
of trade routes, in the defense of foreign investment and colonial wealth”. That radical was 
John le Carre (.Philby, p. 35). Thereafter it seems le Carre, as Williams said of Orwell,
“was never able to see [capitalism], fully, as an economic and political system" {Orwell, p. 
25).537 ‘Capitalism’ occurs in The Honourable Schoolboy even less frequently than 
‘Communism’: as such it is the “not said”, the invisible, unheard link between the book’s 
colonial and anti-Communist preoccupations.
A fascinating consequence of reconfiguring The Honourable Schoolboy to balance its
anti-Communist subtext with its overt postcolonial preoccupations is that the political
implication of the plot begins to look distinctly different: more like a Western success than
537 Ironically, Orwell accused Dickens of the same myopia. George Orwell, ‘Dickens’, The Collected Essays, 
Journalism and Letters o f  George Orwell, Vol. 1: An Age Like This (London, Penguin, 1976), p. 457.
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a British failure. Operation Dolphin’s purpose -  checkmating the Soviet Union by 
neutralising its Chinese mole -  is achieved. The plot performs a ‘containment’ of 
Communism that is of equal advantage to the US and the UK in their joint defense of 
Western capitalism. At the time, after American defeat in Vietnam, with Eastern 
Communism resurgent in the region, such a Western strategic victory against Communism 
was a political fantasy. But such fantasies are ideological, and however forgotten now, The 
Honourable Schoolboy was widely read at the time. As it transpired, the 1970s Communist 
threat to capitalism dissipated: some Communist takeovers never occurred (Thailand); one 
‘Communist’ regime was effectively neutralised by another (Cambodia by Vietnam), while 
many Communist regimes slowly changed their policies to be more capitalist-friendly 
(Vietnam from 1986; Cambodia; even Laos). If Communist opposition to capitalism is 
telescoped now to a 25-year blip in a 70-year reconfiguration of capitalism, this does not 
justify writing it out of history. So a forgotten text like The Honourable Schoolboy 
deserves reinvestigation for its inadvertent revelation of the forgotten material realities and 
forgotten discursive frame of British postcolonialism and British anti-Communism in the 
1970s.
* * *
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Chapter 6: Smiley’s People
1. Blunt and Detente: Smiley’s People in Context
Smiley’s People did not have quite the cultural endurance of Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy, its 
1982 televisation being less popular, while the mooted Thomas Alfredson’s film of
r - i o
Smiley’s People, follow-up to 2011 ’s Tinker, is still delayed as of this writing. Yet, at its 
publication on 12 November 1979 (US) and 4 February 1980 (UK), Smiley’s People 
represented the peak of le Carre’s cultural platform in the Cold War. The book emerged a 
few months after Margaret Thatcher came to power (in May 1979), ushering in the Second 
Cold War, and shortly after the BBC’s hugely popular Tinker adaptation (September- 
October 1979), which brought le Carre a new mass audience (c. 11 million). Then, on 16 
November, Thatcher exposed Anthony Blunt as the Cambridge spy-ring’s “fourth man”, 
and Kim Philby’s collaborator.540 Blunt’s exposure chimed both with anti-statist and anti­
detente currents in Thatcherism -  as does Smiley’s People.
Detente, the gentler, post-Cuban Crisis approach to the Cold War, had culminated in 
June 1979’s SALT II nuclear arms limitations agreement but ended soon after with the 
December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.541 Afghanistan plus Soviet crackdowns on 
human rights activists were Western front-page news during Smiley’s People's PR 
campaign.542 While proxy Cold Wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua, US President Carter’s 
refusal to recognise Vietnam-occupied Cambodia, his funding of Afghan anti-Soviet rebels 
since July 1979,543 and the GDR’s reinforcing of the Berlin Wall suggest detente had been
538 http://www.screendailv.com/news/europe/fiennes-mikkelsen-close-in-on-our-kind-of- 
traitor/5051535.article: accessed 18/10/2013
539 http://www.newstatesman.com/film/2011/09/smilev-Carre-novel-british; accessed 30/9/13
540 Thatcher pursued the hints in Andrew Boyle’s Climate o f  Treason (5 November). Thatcher’s exposure of 
Blunt was “highly symbolic of [...] the new order of Conservatives [...] overthrowing the niceties o f the old 
Establishment”, Joseph Oldham, “ Disappointed Romantics’: Troubled Heritage in the BBC’s John le Carre 
Adaptations’ Journal o f  British Cinema and Television 10: 4 (2013), 727-745, (p. 739).
541 Afghanistan was Telegraph front page, 31 Jan 1980; Peregrine Worsthome, ‘A Cold War Begins at 
Home’, Daily Telegraph, 27 January 1980, p. 16, cited “new Cold War” and “world crisis”.
542 Stephen Pile, ‘What boycott, comrade?’ Daily Telegraph, 2 January 1980, p. 8; Richard Beeston, ‘Soviet 
Dissidents Left Leaderless by Persecution’ Daily Telegraph, 24 January 1980, p 4.
543 Hawk, Ronald Reagan replaced Carter in January 1981. Left-wing ‘dove’ Carter had already raised the 
Cold War stakes via Presidential Directive 59, which emphasised the threat of US nuclear aggression.
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in decline for some time,544 Thatcher’s hawkish attitude -  soon to chime with Ronald 
Reagan’s -  caused detente’s death. Resulting public anxiety paralleled its early sixties’ 
peak, indicated via hugely increased CND membership. Thatcher’s hawkishness signalled 
her determination to reverse British decline, culminating in the 1982 Falklands War.545 In 
tandem, Thatcher portrayed union militancy -  and by implication socialism -  as 
“unpatriotic”.546 The Tinker TV adaptation’s use of Oxford’s Radcliffe Camera and the 
‘Nunc Dimitis’ presaged a televisual “heritage industry” (Chariots o f Fire; Brideshead 
Revisited, 1981) which chimed with Thatcherite patriotism (Oldham, p. 740). Adding to 
the Thatcher parallels, le Carre chose Smiley’s People’s PR campaign to make his most 
unambiguously anti-Communist statements yet: “I do believe, reluctantly, that we must 
combat Communism. Very decisively” (Gross, p. 33).547
Smiley’s People is the final part of the trilogy begun with Tinker, later published as 
The Quest for Karla. The plot sees the Cabinet Office’s Oliver Lacon pulling Smiley out of 
retirement to investigate the murder of an elderly Russian emigre, General Vladimir, on 
Hampstead Heath. Smiley eventually discovers Vladimir’s and other murders are an 
attempt by Karla, Smiley’s Soviet nemesis, to protect Karla’s disturbed daughter, Tatiana. 
Smiley traces Tatiana to a sanatorium in Berne, Switzerland, and mounts a ‘sting’, with the 
help of former Circus personnel, against Karla’s factotum, Grigoriev, using Tatiana as 
leverage to persuade Karla to defect. Having failed to effect Karla’s defection in Tinker, 
Smiley’s People can be seen as fictional and ideological resolution of issues left unresolved 
in Tinker. Karla’s defection occurs at the Berlin Wall, symbol of Communist intransigence 
and endurance.
544 From 1975-80, the ‘Grenzmauer’ was reinforced by mesh-fencing, anti-vehicle trenches, barbed wire, 300 
watchtowers, and 30 bunkers.
545 “We have ceased to be a nation in retreat” Speech to Conservative rally, Cheltenham, 3 July 1982, 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=l 04989, accessed 19/2/15.
546 In the book a sympathetic German echoes this: ‘“You English are poor these days. Too many trade 
unions’” Smiley’s People (London; Pan, 1980), p. 202. Future references are to this edition and are included 
in parentheses in the text.
547 Le Carre later suggested he “might even vote for Mrs Thatcher [...] even her leadership is better than no 
leadership at all,” Nicholas Wapshott, ‘Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Novelist’, The Times, 6 September 1982, p. 7.
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Contemporary Reception of Smiley’s People
Both the Tinker televisation and the Blunt affair informed reviewers’ reading of Smiley’s 
People. George Thaw’s positive review claimed that via Blunt, “reality has overtaken the 
fiction;548 Ian Hamilton’s negative review noted how “le Carre’s appeal is supported by 
actual recent history”;549 while John Coleman’s positive review observed how such fiction 
“tidied” history.550 However the Blunt citations sometimes treated politics as by-product of 
art: Melvyn Bragg’s glowing review declared, “Reality sponges more off le Carre than 
vice versa. Fiction rules,”551 while S.S. Prawer’s negative review stated, “ever anxious to 
imitate television serials, life threw up the Anthony Blunt affair to make Smiley the mole-
t o
hunter a national institution”. A. Alvarez’s positive review suggested, “nature seems to 
have been imitating art in the most vulgar way”.553 Andrew Boyle’s positive review554 
asserted the “world of difference between spy-fiction and spy-fact”, but made no 
comparison between the two. Christopher Booker’s negative review attributed both 
Haydon’s and the Cambridge Spies’ motives to “individual reasons” not ideology.555 In the 
US, only Stefan Kanfer556 and Julian Moynahan’s lukewarm reviews mentioned Blunt.557 
Indeed fully half the reviews failed to mention Blunt at all.558
The book’s detente theme was highlighted by only a handful of reviewers.559 
Hamilton noted, “much of the point of this new book is to take a swipe at detente 
merchants who [...] are contemptuous of the old Circus assumption that Moscow would 
never abandon its original designs” (Hamilton, p. 15). Other reviewers simply affirmed the
548 George Thaw, ‘Smiley Spins his Deadly Web Once More’, Daily Mirror, 4 February 1980, p. 23.
549 Ian Hamilton, ‘Smileyfication’ London Review o f  Books, March 1980, pp. 15-16.
550 John Coleman, ‘A Crafty le Carre: Smiley springs the Trap’, Sunday Times, 3 February 1980, p. 42.
551 Melvyn Bragg, ‘Pawns in Smiley’s Game’, Evening Standard, 5 February 1980 p. 19.
552 S.S. Prawer, ‘The Circus and its Conscience’, Times Literary Supplement, 8 February 1980, p. 131.
553 A. Alvarez, ‘Half Angels versus Half Devils’, The Observer, 3 February 1980, p. 39.
554 Andrew Boyle, ‘A Man for all Treasons’, Evening News, 4 February 1980, p. 7.
555 Christopher Booker, ‘Spymasters and Spy-Monsters’, The Spectator 9 February 1980, p. 16.
556 Stefan Kanfer, ‘New Act for the Circus Master’ Time, 31 December 1979, p. 70.
557 Julian Moynahan, ‘Smiley’s People’, New Republic, 19 January 1980, p. 31-32.
558 Cosgrave; Prior; Grosvenor; Snow; Robert Kee, ‘Dangerous Mudlands’, Listener, 7 February 1980 p.
191; Coady; Barkley; Prawer; Pritchett; Rickenbacker; Kirkus, Hudson Review; Jack Sullivan, Saturday 
Review, 1 March 1980, p. 44; Henri C. Veit, Library Journal, 1 December 1979; Karl O’Lessker, ‘Le Carre’s 
People’, American Spectator, March 1980, pp. 17-18.
559 V.S. Pritchett, ‘A Spy Romance’, New York Review o f  Books, 7 February 1980, pp. 22-24; Harry Reid, 
‘Self -Effacing Superspy’, The Scotsman, 2 February 1980 p. 3; Kirkus, 1 January 1980; also cited by Kanfer.
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book’s anti-Communism: Peter Grosvenor’s positive review referenced “the assassin 
Karla”, thus taking the politics out of political murder;560 similarly V.S. Pritchett’s positive 
review saw Karla merely as “a murderous absolutist” (Pritchett, p. 22). Amongst British 
reviewers, only David Caute’s positive review challenged Karla’s portrayal, complaining 
that in le Carre, “the only good Russians are those uncontaminated by Communism”.561 
American reviewers echoed this: “since [Karla] is Red his motivation must be fanatical and 
‘absolutist’, his methods merciless; whereas Smiley’s motive and method are always 
described as ‘reasonable’ and ‘decent’” (Moynahan p. 32). Michael Wood’s tepid review 
concurred: “The Russians are monsters [...] because they don’t care about killing and we
Cf f )
do”. In fact, Karla is humanised in Smiley’s People, a characterisation that Hamilton, 
Matthew Coady563 Patrick Cosgrave,564 alongside Americans Rickenbacker565 and Kanfer, 
in a clutch of negative notices, found contradictory: “Karla [...] turns out not to be 
inhuman after all [...] although in all previous appearances he has been nothing but an 
arachnid” (Kanfer, p. 70).
Other reviewers saw Karla’s humanisation as indicative of Smiley's People's 
personal rather than political meaning. Alvarez declared, “the great battle of Secret Service 
titans [...] hinges finally on paternal guilt” making the novel “about character and [...] 
human weakness”. As such, Prawer and William H. Pritchard saw the novel as merely 
“sentimental”.566 C.P. Snow’s glowing review excluded politics altogether,567 while 
Booker saw only a psychic “battle with the inner monster which lies in each of us”.568 
Walter Clemons was typical in finding “Karla’s secret is personal, familial” not
560 Peter Grosvenor, ‘I Spy Another Side to Smiley’, Daily Express, 7 February 1980, p. 10.
561 David Caute, ‘It was a Man’, New Statesman, 8 February 1980 p. 209: Caute authored The Great Fear 
(1978) about Communist witch-hunts in the US and The Dancer Defects (2003).
562 Michael Wood, ‘Spy Fiction, Spy Fact’, New York Times, 6 January 1980, p. 16.
563 Matthew Coady, ‘Spy Story’, The Guardian, 1 February 1980, p. 9.
564 Patrick Cosgrave, ‘Smiley’s Final Bow’, p. 14, Daily Telegraph, 7 February 1980. That day’s headlines 
included ‘Bolshoi Stars Defect’ and ‘Russians in Snow Battle’, on Afghanistan (p. 1).
565 William F. Rickenbacker, ‘Missing in Action’, National Review, 8 August 1980, pp. 974-5.
566 William H. Pritchard, ‘Fictional Fixes’, Hudson Review  33; 2 (Summer 1980), 261-262.
567 C.P. Snow, ‘Estonian Connection’, Financial Times, 2 February 1980, p. 10.
568 Booker was an interviewee on 60s leftists who’d turned rightwards, in ‘The Light that Failed’, Daily 
Telegraph, 27 January 1980, pp. 8-9.
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“political.”569 Only Tom Paulin’s favourable review suggested that Karla’s humanisation 
was itself a critique of Communism: “le Carre is saying that deep down we are all squashy 
liberals, and the central inspiration of Smiley's People is [...] to assert the superiority of 
Western to Eastern values” (Paulin, p. 60).570
Smiley's People's anti-statist theme found approbation via reviewers’ contrast 
between principled, “human” Smiley and what Prior called “public school 
apparatchiks”,571 and Boyle called “time-servers” -  echoed by many reviewers.572 
Regarding Smiley's People's defeat of Soviet intelligence chief Karla, US reviewers 
Kanfer, Moynahan and Clemons saw this as British political fantasy. Amongst British 
reviewers, only Coleman (p. 42) and Thaw concurred: “If there had ever been a real 
Smiley we would have won the spy war years ago” (Thaw, p. 23).
Smiley’s moral ambiguity in the new novel was little noted by critics. Grosvenor, 
Reid and Paulin saw only affirmation in the ending: “An unequivocal victory for good”, 
with Smiley “a saintly confessor, a divine, a human absolute whom we can trust [...] a 
complex and hard-won assertion of English superiority” (Paulin, p. 60).573 Pritchett, 
Coleman and Reid actually found Smiley too “saintly”. Of British reviewers only Hamilton 
(“a bit of a monster”, p. 16) and Alvarez (p. 49) recognised any ‘corruption’ in Smiley. It 
was left to American reviewers to make the political parallel: “We just don’t believe that 
the dirty tricks of one side are OK because they were ordered up by a decent little English 
guy” (Moynahan, p. 32). “Smiley and his people are fighting for decency, but there is more 
blood on their hands than they [...] care to contemplate” (Wood). For Robert Lekachman, 
“[using] tactics imperceptibly less nasty than the KGB’s [...] Smiley is able, but barely, to 
reassure himself that he cheats and deceives on behalf of the better society.”574
569 Walter Clemons, ‘The Old Dependables’, Newsweek, 24 December 1979, p. 71.
570 Tom Paulin, ‘National Myths’, Encounter, June 1980, 58-63.
571 Allan Prior, ‘Spymaster with the modem touch’, Daily Mail, 4 February 1980, p. 7.
572 Caute, Michael Ratcliffe, ‘George’s Black Grail’, The Times, 7 February 1980, p. 12 (positive). Richard 
Barkley, ‘Smiley’s Final Showdown’, Sunday Express, 3 February 1980 p. 6 (negative). Joseph McLellan, 
‘George Smiley's Revenge’, Washington Post, 23 December 1979, p. 1; 4 (positive); Clemons.
573 This was echoed by American J. Roger Lee, ‘The Spy W ho...’ Reason, August 1980, pp. 49-50.
574 Robert Lekachman, ‘Good Boys, Bad Boys, Old Boys’, The Nation, 26 April 1980, pp. 504-506.
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This de-politicising tendency continued with literary critics. Smiley’s People is 
regarded by Barley as an apolitical novel that “excludes even the acute, topical historical 
observations of its predecessor” (Barley, p. 127). Sauerberg concurs: “the importance of 
international relations is reduced to almost nil [...] Smiley’s assignment is [...] a purely 
personal crusade” (Sauerberg, p. 186). Bennett similarly states, “[Smiley’s People] 
contains many more signs of psychological rather than moral or political interest”
(Bennett, p. 85).
This chapter argues to the contrary that, given Smiley’s People’s timing and its 
strong anti-Soviet theme, this was le Carre’s most overt political intervention, a conscious 
cultural front in the ‘Second Cold War’. In doing so, this chapter will examine first the 
familiar faultline of Smiley’s relationship with the state, focused, as previously, on 
bureaucracy. Then the chapter will explore how, under the rubric of the ‘nation’, such 
issues as Britain’s role in the world and how to marry political expediency to a national 
investment in ‘decency’ are explored. Finally, the chapter will turn to the political enemy, 
and explore how these novels’ most Manichaean depiction of Soviet Communism yet is 
complicated by an abrupt switch in the trilogy’s characterisation of Karla. In each case, we 
will return to the novel’s key event and climax: the politically laden defection of Karla at 
the Berlin Wall.
* * *
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2. “Malevolent Bureaucracy”: Smiley and the British State
The British state is always a faultline in le Carre. In contemporary discourse on the Tinker 
TV series “an emphasis on the workings of institutions” (Oldham, p. 736) was seen as le 
Carre’s identifying style. “Smiley is the spy as super-professional, not a James Bond 
daredevil, more a Sherlock Holmes of the files and dossiers” declared Robert Cushman in 
the popular Radio Times.515 “Adventure becomes bureaucratized” as Cawelti & Rosenberg 
(p. 181) characterised both le Carre’s espionage fiction and espionage reality. For all his 
avowed antipathy to bureaucracy therefore, Smiley has always been easily mistaken for a 
bureaucrat himself, with his belief that “the file was the only truth” {Smiley’s People, p. 
253). Yet Smiley is presented as quite distinct from the bureaucrats in Smiley’s People, 
indeed, in stark contrast to Schoolboy, where Smiley was chief of the Circus, Smiley, now 
retired, is placed outside the state -  operating independently, indeed against the specific 
instruction of the state’s bureaucrats, expressing antipathy to the state. Smiley’s actions, 
again in contrast to Schoolboy, are now that of operational fieldman rather than 
bureaucratic deskman. All this is contradictory however, as Smiley is brought into the plot 
as a state employee, and even when he departs his state brief, he works to defend and 
secure the state. Let us see how this is done.
“Caesar’s Due”: Smiley against the State
Following the murder of Soviet emigre, General Vladimir, on Hampstead Heath, Smiley is 
summoned to a bureaucrats’ briefing in a safe flat in Hampstead. Oliver Lacon, “Cabinet 
Office factotum” (p. 42), comes anticipated, from previous novels, as the arch-bureaucrat, 
concerned to preserve state and status quo, prioritising appearances and continuity (e.g. 
issuing D-notices, p. 64). However, it becomes clear that Lacon and “Circus fixer” (p. 43) 
Lauder Strickland, both deskmen, have failed to care for former fieldman, Vladimir (p.
82). The Circus have botched an operation (pp. 55-60), resulting in Vladimir’s murder, and
575 Robert Cushman, ‘Sir Alec’s assignment’, Radio Times, 8-14 September 1979, 84-93. p. 87.
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are now forced to bring in ‘caseman’, Smiley, because -  implicitly -  they cannot solve it 
themselves. Indeed it will take all of Smiley’s ‘field’ skills to ‘solve’ the mystery: we see 
far more physical investigation/action in this novel than previously. By contrast, the 
bureaucrats’ myopic, PR-orientated vision can conceive little more from Smiley than a 
cover-up, culminating in Lacon’s Orwellian injunction to Smiley to “‘temper truth’”. This 
is derided by Smiley as Lacon’s “declaration of personal faith” (p. 47), truth moulded to 
minimise inconvenience to the state’s suspect legislative branch.576 We see then that 
despite Smiley paraphrasing Orwell’s Animal Farm (“emigres in, emigres out. Two legs 
good, two legs bad”, Smiley’s People, p. 138), the critique of British bureaucracy here is 
not, as in The Spy or Looking Glass, about ‘totalitarian’ instrumental rationality, but about 
bureaucracy’s self-preserving “endless inaction” (Cawelti & Rosenberg, p. 186), shuffling 
paper on a desk, a perspective that echoes Thatcher’s contemporaneous attitudes,577 and 
her systematic attack on the civil service.578
Looking more deeply, it is clear that considerable textual effort is expended to put 
distance between Smiley and the state -  clear evidence of a faultline. “When [such] a key 
concept is structurally unstable, it produces endless textual work. The awkward issue has 
continually to be revisited, reworked, rediscovered, reaffirmed” (Faultlines, p. 74). This 
faultline is indicative of unease in British society about even fully acknowledging -  as 
opposed to endorsing -  the state.
We see this first in the intelligence bureaucracy distancing itself from Smiley. In the 
safe flat, Strickland insists: “‘that’s a confidential matter [...] Mr Smiley may be a 
distinguished ex-member, but he’s no longer family’” (p. 57). Lacon confirms this: 
declaring that Smiley will act, in tidying/covering up after Vladimir’s murder, as “a private
576 Lewis glosses that “the tension between Smiley and Lacon is that between an individualist, often uneasy 
within an institution, and a bureaucrat, primarily concerned with preserving the institution” (Lewis, p. 168). 
“The displacement of the real goals o f the organization for self-interest and organizational survival” (Dobel,
p. 201).
577 “The slow but certain route to national suffocation under a blanket o f bureaucracy and State control”, 
Thatcher, ‘The Britain I Want’, The Sun, 2 May 1979. http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104066
578 Thatcher launched a series o f anti civil-service initiatives, abolishing the Civil Service Department 
(1981), Financial Management Initiative (1982) and Performance Related Pay (1984), removing the brake on 
politicians (Du Gay, In Praise, pp. 121-122).
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citizen, Vladimir’s Executor, not ours”, i.e., the state’s. Smiley puts just as much distance 
between himself and the state as vice versa, e.g. “Against stupidity, the gods themselves 
fight in vain, thought Smiley: but Schiller had forgotten about the bureaucrats” (p. 63). 
What’s more, Smiley responds to Lacon’s assertion, “‘You have a duty, as we all do. A 
loyalty’” with precisely the question Smiley himself previously deployed in Call fo r  the 
Dead: “‘Duty to what? [...] Loyalty to whom?’” {Call, p. 63). The parallel is telling: as in 
Call, Smiley will disobey the state’s brief in order to save the state from a rather deeper 
danger than bad press.
There are also deeper political ramifications here than mere anti-statism. As part of 
the distancing strategy, Lacon bids Smiley remember, “you are of the past, not the present” 
(p. 64). However with Vladimir “‘a total hangover from the worst days of the cold war’”
(p. 62), Smiley and Vladimir are thus positioned as wati-detente, indeed, ante-d&tentQ. 
Detente is negatively associated with the novel’s “current” Labour government (Labour 
lost power in May 1979), which has imposed a new layer of (socialist) bureaucracy, the 
“Wise Men”, as a “brake” upon the intelligence services (p. 49) and declared “‘certain 
types of clandestine operation [...] anti-detente, inflammatory’” (pp. 50-51). Strickland 
satirically lists the strictures: “‘No honey-traps. No doubles. No stimulated defections. No 
emigres. No bugger-all’” (p. 50). Lacon pointedly links such methods with Smiley: “‘in 
your day the very meat and drink of counter-intelligence’” (p. 51). Again the distancing is 
mutual: Smiley, as ‘caseman’, offers an unusually direct rejection of this bureaucratic 
muzzling of action: “‘What utter nonsense’” (p. 52). We can link this with Thatcher 
damning Labour ‘naivety’ about Soviet aggression and her equation of detente’s with
579impotence.
Thus it is also crucial that, despite Lacon and Strickland’s complaints about the 
legislative branch’s detente decrees, these bureaucrats are strongly associated with detente
579 “Hesitancy and lack o f spirit has been the distinguishing mark o f what has passed under Dr Owen for 
British foreign policy”, speech to Conservative Rally in Birmingham, 19 April 1979, 
http://www.margaretthatcher.Org/document/l 04026
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themselves. Strickland deleted from the Circus’s tapes of Vladimir’s alarm-calls the key 
reference to “the Sandman” (Karla) (p. 65), removing the murder’s association with the 
Soviet state. This is an association that Lacon also rejects when Smiley accuses “Moscow 
Centre” of the murder (p. 63), long established as synonymous with Karla.580 Later, Connie 
will remind Smiley that new Circus Chief Saul Enderby (another desk rather than field 
man) first obstructed and finally quashed Connie, Smiley and Vladimir’s previous anti- 
Karla operation (p. 164; 169). Connie deploys strikingly similar language to Strickland: 
“‘no honey-trap, no dividend, no bugger-all.’” (p. 182). The Circus’s sacking of Smiley 
and Connie, and distancing from Vladimir followed. Lacon will later complacently assert 
detente attitudes at a drunken dinner with Smiley, thinking the Vladimir affair concluded, 
blissfully unaware that Smiley is about to set off in hawkish pursuit of Karla’s 
‘containment’ (p. 258).
The link between socialist bureaucracy (the Welfare State) and Soviet bureaucracy 
(characterised here as “malevolent bureaucracy”, p. 11), between socialism and 
Communism, is implicit in both Thatcher’s speeches and in Smiley’s reactions to the 
bureaucrats,581 and is seen as appeasement.582 By contrast, Smiley’s actions will be a 
triumphant reassertion of aggressive, fieldman, anti-detente methods -  essentially, 
‘containment’ of Communism. In this we see more clearly the central contradiction. For all 
Smiley’s criticism and disavowal of the state, Smiley’s ultimate purpose is to defend the 
state, to secure it, indeed, as we shall see, to glorify it via Karla’s defection. Paulson’s is 
thus a typical but inaccurate assessment of le Carre’s supposed anti-establishment trope:
“It is the state -  the flimsy, bungling, ruthless system of MI5 -  which betrays its own 
operatives [...] In the Cold War novels the ultimate evil is the system” (Paulson, p. 325).
580 Lacon: ‘“By Karla you mean Moscow Centre? [...] I think it safer to stay with institutions if  you don’t 
mind. In that way we are spared the embarrassment of personalities. After all, that’s what institutions are for, 
isn’t it?”’ {Schoolboy, p. 67).
581 E. g. Thatcher’s speech to Christian Democratic Union Conference, 25 May 1976, 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103034
582 “This Government will never go the way of appeasement, although any Government formed by the 
Labour Party might”, Thatcher, 30 October 1980, PQs, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104438
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Let us explore, in dissident spirit, quite how integrated Smiley is with the state, how 
Smiley’s People enacts yet another Operation Margarine.
Smiley responds to Lacon’s/the state’s early-hours summons without question 
(/Smiley’s People, p. 34), and accepts Lacon’s commission to investigate Vladimir’s 
murder for the sake of “his” “service” the Circus (p. 62). What’s more, while Smiley’s 
relationship to Vladimir is considerably warmer than the bureaucrats’, it is hardly one of 
personal friendship: it is a political relationship. When Smiley asserts, “‘Vladimir was one 
of the best agents we ever had’” (p. 52) the “we” is unquestionably the British state. 
Nevertheless there is a running textual personalisation of Smiley’s motivation, e.g. “As 
with his marriage, so with his sense of public service”; Smiley then says to himself: ‘“I 
invested my life in institutions [...] and I am left only with myself’ (p. 138). When Smiley 
pursues his investigation beyond Lacon’s restrictive brief, the text suggests Smiley thereby 
distances himself from the state, by repeatedly lying to Lacon (pp. 128-9; 259). But 
Smiley’s decision to pursue a larger Cold-War agenda, against Karla -  still synonymous, at 
this point, with “Moscow Centre” (p. 252) -  is a curious take on the ‘personal’. It is a 
political decision to aggressively secure the British state.
In a key passage, Smiley ponders “his sense of civitas, or how much or how little, he 
owed to Oliver Lacon: ‘Your duty, George.’ Yet who could seriously be Lacon’s man? he 
asked himself. Who could regard Lacon’s fragile arguments as Caesar’s due?” (p. 138). 
While ostensibly establishing Smiley’s actions as antipathetic to the state, this passage 
actually highlights a key distinction. “Caesar’s due” is an allusion to Christ’s “Render 
therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are 
God’s” (Matthew 22. 21). While Thatcher had recently interpreted these lines as defining 
the limits of the state’s claim on the individual,583 we might more aptly make a distinction 
between the state as entitled functionaries (bureaucrats) and the state as a deep system of 
interests. That the two are enduringly confused is largely due to the cultural queasiness in
583 Thatcher, Speech at St Lawrence Jewry; http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103522
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owning to capitalism and violence as key facets of the British state. So we can see also that 
Smiley’s invocation of “civitas” (civic duty) is not the same as loyalty to state functionary, 
Lacon. When Smiley later revisits the Circus, he is reported as:
.. .staring at the building he was about to take his leave of, and at the light that was 
burning weakly in his former room, much as old men will look at the houses where 
they were bom, the schools where they were educated and the churches where they 
were married (Smiley’s People, p. 252).
In this way, the political institution, the Circus, wherein both the state’s functionaries and 
the state’s deep structural interests conjoin, is paradoxically recalibrated as personal, via 
the common le Carre technique of investing the institutional with the emotional. This is 
also a key practice of nationalism: indeed Weber’s definition of “civitas” blurs state with 
nation (“the personification of the total body of the citizens”, Weber, p. 697). We shall 
return to the nation, but suffice to say that the national and the personal emphases on 
Smiley’s actions also blur in Smiley’s People, eliding Operation Margarine: the fact that 
Smiley is defending and securing the British state.
“Deniable Blessing”: Smiley and State United
Smiley’s authority during his investigation then is of considerable interest. He carries both 
the limited authority a state functionary (Lacon) has given him to act on the state’s behalf, 
but Smiley carries also the authority of the state’s deeper interests from both his past (as 
state functionary himself), and what has become his personality, wherein the personal 
(Ann being its sole representative) and the political (the Circus) cannot be disentangled.
For the novel’s women, anxious to protect their former Cold Warrior partners, Smiley 
simply represents the state: the state specifically as collective threat to the personal. “‘Stay 
away all of you [...] however bad it is’” says Stella, wife of Soviet emigre, Villem, when
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Smiley visits (p. 107): note the collective address. Emigre, Mikhel’s wife, Elvira,
Vladimir’s lover, shows “contempt” for Smiley when he visits Mikhel’s Baltic Library: she 
blames Smiley for the state’s failure to protect Vladimir (p. 119). When Smiley comes to 
the Oxfordshire “dacha” to interrogate Connie Sachs, Connie’s disturbed lesbian partner, 
Hilary, already sacked by Smiley/the state after running amok in the Circus cipher room 
(p. 178), finds in Smiley a political threat to her and Connie’s personal relationship: “T 
want you to go’” Hilary tells Smiley (p. 183) before again breaking down.
Even the challenges to Smiley’s authority, suggestions that his investigation is 
independent, thus personal rather than political, ultimately reassert Smiley’s integration 
with the state. Connie’s goads -  Smiley is a “baron” in the same “tribe” as Enderby (p.
167); “‘George is fifth floor” (Circus top brass) -  are sufficiently close to the truth to be 
telling. Smiley negotiates another female gatekeeper to obtain an interview with another 
former state colleague, another emigre former Cold Warrior, Toby Esterhase, and another 
challenger to his authority. By again suggesting Smiley is freelancing, Esterhase 
emphasises the institutional reality: “‘Who is speaking here actually? Is it George Smiley? 
Is it Oliver Lacon?”’ (p. 148): i.e. Smiley or the state. The distinction is spurious: it is 
Smiley speaking as the deeper state than Lacon’s bureaucratic myopia can access. Later, to 
Otto Leipzig’s friend, Kertschmarr, in Hamburg, Smiley claims to “represent a large 
company”, though this paltry subterfuge disappears when Kertschmarr responds, “‘your 
parent company -  okay, London’” (p. 195). Arriving to question a besieged Ostrakova in 
Paris, Smiley says he has “‘come from London to help you’” (p. 227). ‘London’ in both 
these cases is the British intelligence services, and thus the state, just as it was in The Spy. 
Roping in Peter Guillam in Paris to his investigation, Smiley employs “all the authority of 
[Guillam’s] old chief’ (p. 231), a reminder of Smiley’s status as head of the Circus in 
Schoolboy. Smiley’s authority then comes from the state both present and past.
Even when the state and Smiley overtly join forces, when Circus chief, Saul Enderby 
authorises Smiley to ensnare Karla, the mutual distancing of Smiley and state continues.
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Enderby gives Smiley’s operation his “totally deniable blessing” (p. 248). Should Smiley’s 
Swiss ‘sting’ against Karla fail, Enderby will disown the operation as, “‘a ludicrous piece 
of private enterprise by a senile spy who’s lost his marbles’” (p. 247; my emphasis). Yet it 
is the distancing of Smiley from the state which borders the ludicrous: Smiley has to visit 
the Circus registry at night (p. 251); there is an attempt to deny Smiley the very Bill 
Haydon file that he himself wrote (p. 253). The effect is a textual “deniable blessing” 
whereby Smiley’s centrality to the state is asserted even via its very disavowal. Indeed we 
might regard the state’s “deniable blessing” as Operation Margarine, as summing up 
precisely the equivocation regarding the state in all these novels.
This equivocation is read by critics as indicative of the book’s lack of political 
meaning. Monaghan claims, “having been stripped of its social and ideological dimension, 
Smiley’s quest for Karla is now nothing more than an acting out of personal obsessions” 
(Monaghan, p. 139). Martin argues for understanding this Cold War novel “without the 
Cold War trappings” (Martin, p. 48).584 However, regarding Smiley’s motivation, Enderby 
asks Smiley if his attack on Karla is “business or for pleasure”: a clear separation of 
personal and political, individual and state. Enderby is referencing Bill Haydon’s seduction 
of Smiley’s wife, Ann, in Tinker at Karla’s orders. Smiley replies, ‘“ I was never conscious 
of pleasure [...] Or rather the distinction’” (p. 248). Haydon’s seduction of Ann was 
political: to distinguish between Smiley’s personal and political pain -  or pleasure -  is thus 
spurious. This is a key admission.
Haydon is a key factor in Smiley’s current operation against Karla however: Haydon 
is mentioned 24 times in Smiley’s People. Enderby makes clear his own desire for political 
revenge for the Haydon debacle (p. 246), an unambiguously state-impelled motive;
Haydon is cited by Smiley at the very moment Karla crosses to the West (p. 333). So 
Smiley’s People can be seen to ‘resolve’ Tinker and thus also to resolve the historical 
humiliation of the British state by Philby. As head of Soviet intelligence, Karla will be a
584 Beene adjudges Smiley’s “quest inconsequential” (p. 90).
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vital source of information on the Soviets, and a tactical blow to Soviet state structures. 
Enderby again: ‘“I want Karla sitting in the hot seat at Sarratt, coughing out his life story 
to the inquisitors’” (p. 245). This is political. In this attack on Karla/the Soviet Union, the 
two versions of the British state come together, the bureaucratic functionaries and the 
state’s deeper interests.
The resultant ‘sting’ against Karla consequently has further political ramifications.
The British state is now (deniably) endorsing anti-detente action, actualised by the 
(unofficial) re-employment of the state’s former (semi-legal) Lamplighters and 
Scalphunters in the sting (p. 264), groups previously prescribed as “anti-detente” by the 
state’s own Wise Men.585 My parentheses here suggest the constant qualification the text 
pursues in order to maintain distance between Smiley and state. In fact the state’s 
monopoly of violence is being put at Smiley’s disposal: a crucial structural link between 
state and ‘freelance’ Smiley. Barley complains that Enderby ditches his previous 
bureaucratic inaction/ detente approach all-too readily (Barley, p. 128). But what we have 
witnessed, through Smiley’s painstaking investigation for two-thirds of the book, is an out­
manoeuvring of the state’s derided bureaucracy, the state as entitled functionaries, by 
Smiley, representative and champion of the state’s deeper interests. These interests are 
defined as requiring aggressive action against the Soviet Union.
The defection of Karla at the Berlin Wall586 is the endpoint towards which all the 
actions and strategies described have been working. However, even here, the equivocation 
regarding the state complicates this political victory. We already know, via the self- 
conscious historicisation of Smiley’s ‘sting’, with its “scale-model at Sarratt” (p. 286) that 
Karla’s defection will be regarded as a victory for the British state within the secret state. 
Now however ownership of this collective “triumph” (p. 333) is abruptly depoliticised via
585 Rita Rippetoe in ‘Layered Genre Strategies in Smiley’s People’, Clues 20; 1 (1999), 89-100, offers a 
convincing reading of this plot section in terms o f the “crime caper”: see The Italian Job (Peter Collinson, 
1969); The Sting (George Roy Hill, 1973). The caper genre’s motifs and lightness o f tone help 
legitimise/elide both the role of the state and its use o f illicit methods.
586 The precise location is Berlin’s Glenlicke Bridge, where Soviet spy Gordon Lonsdale was swapped for 
British spy Greville Wynne -  another fictional ‘resolution’ of history.
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a clutch of personal pronouns: “‘George [...] All your life. Fantastic!”’ congratulates 
Esterhase (p. 335). “‘George, you miracle, you won,”’ says Guillam (c.f. Secret Pilgrim's 
“we won”). But Smiley’s equivocal, “‘Did I [win]? [...] Yes. Yes, well I suppose I did” (p. 
333) seemingly rejects this personalisation, or that this represents a victory. Or, being 
British, he simply does not like to boast. The political victory, however, remains.
Smiley’s relationship with the state then is a faultline. State and Smiley mutually 
disavow one another, but Smiley uses the state’s authority and monopoly of violence 
ultimately to uphold the state. Clearly, the “awkward issue” that is being textually worked 
through is that the state in British culture is normatively bad (Leys, p. 273), especially in 
the Thatcher era. The novel’s collective state is antipathetic to individualism, its 
bureaucracy operates, in arch-bureaucrat Lacon’s words, as “‘a channel, a filter, a brake’” 
(p. 49), benefiting its functionaries, as Thatcher claimed, rather than the citizenry. The 
policy of detente is seen as a major indication of both the bureaucratic stasis of state 
functionaries and the naivety of the Socialist legislative branch. The novel’s plot gives 
Smiley, representing deeper state interests, a triumphant victory over bureaucracy, the 
Labour Party, the policy of detente, and the USSR. However, these deep state interests are 
another “awkward issue” in a culture queasy about its capitalist base and violent 
superstructure, and so the victory is not properly claimed by either Smiley or the state. 
However, despite this Operation Margarine equivocation, there is clearly a victory here, 
and the downbeat reaction cannot dampen the generic satisfaction of the successful ‘sting’, 
or the romance’s joyful triumph of the hero over the villain. We might best regard this 
defeat of Karla then as a national victory, and it is to the concept of the ‘nation’ that we 
will now turn.
*  *  *
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3. “The Survival of Reasonable Man”: Smiley and the British Nation
The ultimate plot trajectory of Smiley’s People is le Carre’s headiest national fantasy yet: 
the defection of the chief of Soviet counter-intelligence to the West, a coup engineered by 
the British, entirely without American help.587 This glorification of Britain was a motif 
entirely in tune with Thatcher’s determination to boost Britain’s international standing:
“we have ceased to be a nation in retreat,” she declared.588 Smiley’s People superficially 
seems to accept the reality of British decline less ambiguously than Schoolboy. During the 
Enderby-Smiley briefing, Enderby asks if Smiley’s Karla operation is “‘not all a wicked 
Bolshie plot, George, to lure us to our ultimate destruction?”’ Smiley replies: “‘I ’m afraid 
we’re no longer worth the candle, Saul.” If “Enderby did not care to be reminded of the 
limitations of British grandeur” (Smiley’s People, p. 246) nor, ultimately, does the novel: 
Britain here is no longer a nation in retreat either.
As ever, it is in this discursive field of the nation that, in le Carre’s fiction, political 
anxieties and fantasies about “Britain” and Britishness are explored, sublimated or 
resolved. British public image was as crucial as its reality in a Cold War often more about 
PR than physical engagement. British self-image was also key in a Cold War where home- 
front morale was perpetually tested by the threat of nuclear war. However nation cannot 
function without the state (Gellner, p. 4). So, just as Thatcher’s real-world reassertion of 
Britain rested on the state’s monopoly of violence (the Falklands War), so does Smiley’s 
fictional reassertion. The Grigoriev sting rests heavily upon the threat of the state’s 
Scalphunters (e.g. “hard man” Skordeno’s manhandling of Grigoriev p. 290). Beyond this, 
Smiley’s employment of expedient means to achieve the national victory of Karla’s 
defection renders the novels’ always-complex maintenance of Smiley’s characteristic 
‘decency’ untenable.
587 Le Carre admitted flattering British intelligence by prioritising “conspiracy” over the more realistic “cock- 
up” (Gross, p. 33). He also admitted deliberately leaving the US out to strengthen British fictional hands 
(Vaughan, p. 340).
588 As Peregrine Worsthome declared at the time, in “calling for a firm stand against Soviet aggression” 
Thatcher was “an interventionist lion abroad, willing to roar furiously in defence o f her cubs against the 
Russian bear,” Daily Telegraph, 27 January 1980, p. 16.
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Character is a key area where ideological contradictions are played out (and 
revealed). Since Smiley has been a synecdoche for Britain, exemplar of British values and 
characteristics throughout, this ‘corruption’ in Smiley in Smiley’s People is also a national 
corruption. We might say that reversing British political decline results in British moral 
decline. But where previously the contradictions in Smiley’s characterisation were elided, 
those contradictions are rendered central in Smiley’s People and Smiley’s moral corruption 
is textually flagged. Rather than exploring the meaning of this contradiction, critics reveal 
a tendency we will see also with Karla’s changing characterisation: to choose the Smiley 
(or Karla) that suits their cultural temperament, and to ignore the other. So let us explore 
the textual evidence for Smiley/Britain first as newly ‘corrupt’ and second as enduringly 
‘decent’, and show how both these characterisations carry political implications, indeed are 
“national allegories”, before grasping and analysing the contradiction, the faultline, itself.
The sub-headings that follow derive from Connie Sachs’ oft-quoted, little understood 
speech: ‘“It’s not a shooting war any more, George. [...] That’s the trouble. It’s grey. Half­
angels fighting half-devils. No one knows where the lines are’” (Smiley’s People, p. 182). 
Typically this is taken as an articulation of the moral equivalence between Soviet Union 
and the West for which le Carre had become acclaimed. Closer inspection reveals that 
“half-angels” and “half-devils” are not the same. If there is a neutral moral line, then half- 
angel is halfway to beatitude, half-devil halfway to damnation: there remains a vast gulf 
between them. Which side of the line is Smiley, and thus Britain, on?
Smiley as Half-Devil
Throughout the book’s last third, the text flags up Smiley’s moral corruption, focused on 
the exploitation of Karla’s daughter to bring about Karla’s defection and defeat. This is 
textually effected by likening Smiley’s behaviour to Karla’s. The first such occasion is 
Connie’s “‘twin cities we used to say you were, you and Karla, two halves of the same 
apple’,” speech. Smiley’s aggressive reaction to Connie here begins to contradict the
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previous definitional certainty that “neither Karla’s methods nor Karla’s absolutism were 
his own” (p. 186). But the shift only really occurs at the two-thirds mark, when Smiley 
switches from investigating Karla to attacking Karla, from reacting to Karla’s moves, to 
proactively moving against Karla. No longer in retreat. In Berne, Switzerland, plotting his 
tactics, Smiley asks himself the key question, “What would the absolutist do which we are 
not doing ourselves?” (p. 271) -  explicitly using Karla as role-model, and so linking 
Smiley’s, thus Britain’s, hitherto ‘decent’ methods to Soviet Communism’s supposed 
expediency.589 In Berne, consequently, Smiley begins to confuse himself with Karla, 
declaring “I wrote it” of the Grigoriev “show”; then correcting himself, “No [...] Karla 
wrote it” (p. 273).
Le Carre, in an interview to publicise the Smiley’s People televisation, flagged up 
this interpretation. “This was to be Smiley’s confrontation with Karla that would destroy 
them both. Smiley, by an act of professional absolutism, Karla, by a lapse into humanity. It 
was to be a moral Reichenbach Falls.”590 This references Conan Doyle’s The Final 
Problem (1893) where, tracking his nemesis, Moriarty, Holmes himself dies with Moriarty 
in the Swiss Falls. This use of Karla as (im)moral reference point for Smiley’s corruption, 
is clinched by the book’s climax:
An unholy vertigo seized [Smiley] as the very evil he had fought against seemed to 
reach out and possess him and claim him despite his striving, calling him a traitor 
also; mocking him, yet at the same time applauding his betrayal. On Karla has 
descended the curse of Smiley’s compassion; on Smiley the curse of Karla’s 
fanaticism. I have destroyed him with the weapons I abhorred, and they are his. We 
have crossed each other’s frontiers, we are the no-men of this no-man’s-land 
(Smiley’s People, p. 332).
589 Smiley will twice be referred to as “bureaucratic” in this section, once playing the part o f a Soviet 
“commissar” in the Berne ‘sting’ against Grigoriev (p. 243; p. 294).
590 Byron Rogers, ‘Closing the File’, Radio Times, 18 September 1982, pp. 88-92.
238
For many critics, this passage is an entirely negative verdict on Smiley. Cawelti & 
Rosenberg put the case: Smiley “deploy[s] methods just as ruthless as his antagonist’s [...] 
Through a process of corruption [...] Smiley has become another Karla” (Cawelti & 
Rosenberg, p. 179). This is widely echoed elsewhere.591 The sense of a political conflict is 
rather vague in critical accounts however, as it is in le Carre’s Reichenbach Falls gloss. 
These critics thus follow the text’s inconsistent and misleading indications that the 
Smiley/Karla conflict is a personal rather than political vendetta.592 Yet the language is 
entirely that of the Cold War conflict, as parlayed in Western culture, and le Carre’s 
fiction: “evil”, “fanaticism” and inhumanity (“no-man”) on one side, “compassion” and 
decency on the other. This, then, is the case for the prosecution; let us now examine the 
case for the defence.
Smiley as Half-Angel
A significant minority of critics assert the continuing untainted ‘decency’ of Smiley as 
against his textually flagged corruption. Dobel asserts: “Smiley does not become Karla 
[...] Smiley never kills his lover or his agents. Nor does he kill to cover his tracks” (Dobel, 
p. 210). Wolfe concurs, “to say that Karla’s defection blurs all moral differences between 
himself and Smiley is to distort le Carre’s meaning” (Wolfe, p. 255).593 Monaghan claims, 
“Smiley is, if anything, a more deeply caring person during the action of Smiley’s People 
than at any other time during his fictional career” (Monaghan, p. 141). While, again, a 
sense of politics is absent here, it is not as if these critics lack evidence. Following the 
mixed, contradictory mythologisation in Schoolboy, Smiley is ushered into Smiley’s
591 See also: “in order to win, [Smiley] has had to use Karla’s methods and ruthlessness [...] lowering Smiley 
to Karla’s level” (Rothberg, p. 62)1 “By succumbing to Karla’s methods, Smiley damages (if not defeats) the 
beliefs he seeks to ratify” (Beene, p. 110). The same point is made by: Sauerberg (pp. 202-206), Panek (p. 
246), Homberger (p. 88), Dobler (p. 45), Buzard (p. 186), Everett (p. 512), Cobbs (p. 146), Aronoff (p. 28) 
and Bennett (p. 94), Atkins (p. 181), Wolfe (p. 234) and Oldham (p. 729) all cite Smiley’s moral ‘fall’ but 
don’t explicitly cite Karla as his role-model.
592 Curiously, Cobbs (p. 146) Sauerberg (p. 206), Dobler (p. 359) Everett (p. 511) and Beene (p. 109) all read 
Smiley’s dismissal o f Ann as testament to his ‘corruption’.
593 Christian critic, Hughes concurs (Hughes, p. 278).
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People in awed tones by the Superintendent’s focalisation at Hampstead Heath, producing 
some of the worst writing of le Carre’s career:
An abbey, the Superintendent decided. That’s what [Smiley] was [...] made up of all 
sorts of conflicting ages and styles and convictions [...] man as God’s architecture 
[...] moulded by the hand of ages, infinite in his striving and diversity {Smiley’s 
People, p. 40).
Secondly, a chapter before Connie’s “half-angels” speech, Smiley has dubbed himself “Mr 
Angel” when visiting Toby Esterhase (“‘Got an angel for you’” says the receptionist, p. 
143). Thirdly, a chapter before, Circus courier, Ferguson, tells Smiley that although 
officially redundant, he is “‘still on the side of the angels’” (p. 135), a line that links 
Smiley, thus, with Britain: the “right” side in the Cold War (with the same parallel of a 
misleading redundancy). Fourthly, seen in Paris, through a besieged Ostrakova’s eyes, 
Smiley is characterised by “goodwill” and “his very air of humanity” (p. 227). “She sensed 
in him a passionate caring for herself that had nothing to do with death, but with survival, 
she sensed that she was looking at a face that was concerned rather than one that had 
banished sympathy for ever” (p. 227). Again, we should recall that in this scene Smiley 
makes his national link explicit: ‘“I have come from London to help you’” (p. 227). The 
personal here and the political merge: Smiley’s compassion and decency is Western 
compassion and decency, as against the coldness and brutality of the Eastern 
representatives, Karla, and even more so, his thug-for-hire, Kirov. The individual is 
ideological.
Fifthly, in precise tandem to the two-thirds point ‘change’ in Smiley’s 
characterisation, the text actually steps up the Smiley-mythologising. After meeting 
Smiley:
240
Collins and Enderby afterwards privily agreed -  how everything that Smiley said 
seemed to pass through the room like a chill; how in some way they failed to 
understand, they had removed themselves to a higher order of conduct for which they 
were unfit (p. 244).
“A higher order of conduct” is quite the reverse of moral corruption, especially given the 
nature of the Enderby/Smiley meeting: the plan an illegal, at best amoral ‘sting’ and then 
blackmail against Karla, using his disturbed daughter as leverage. This reverence for 
Smiley, however, is just a taster: during the actual ‘sting’ in Switzerland, the action is 
regularly telescoped into a reverent, mythologised past, e.g. “the burning of Tricky Tony, 
as it afterwards became known in the Circus mythology” (p. 283). Later conversations with 
Toby Esterhase are quoted, all distinctly reverent: “George always bruised easy [...] you 
see a lot, your eyes get very painful” (p. 250). “Once again, Toby insists on bearing 
witness here to Smiley’s unique mastery of the occasion [....] George held the whole scene 
Tike a thrush’s egg in his hand’” (p. 301). The choice of words makes this not just a tribute 
to espionage technique (thus potentially to expediency), but to Smiley’s delicacy, to a 
decency that needs to be understood in national terms.
Calling upon the author as unreliable witness, le Carre’s statement at Smiley's 
People's publication is instructive: ‘“I am myself absolutely satisfied that, by and large the 
West has a better record. I think it’s quite wrong to say [...] that both sides in fact use the 
same methods’” (Vaughan, p. 340). Clearly this contradicts le Carre’s later Reichenbach 
Falls comment. By 2004, le Carre would go even further, offering an unequivocal 
affirmation of Smiley as moral exemplar, and explicitly connecting him -  and this 
exemplarity -  to the British nation-state:
‘[Smiley] is above all, some kind of arbiter of ethics, some kind of arbiter of morality 
and human behaviour. Some things are simply beyond the pale. I think that’s also, of
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course, as a generality, true [...] of the secret services. That although all kinds of 
wicked things are attributed to them, there were certain things you never fooled 
with.’594
This wholesale affirmation of fundamental British decency rather undermines le Carre’s 
reputation as anti-establishment. But to return to Smiley, we can conclude that there is if 
anything, even more evidence for Smiley’s continued decency than for his corruption: both 
judgements are present in Smiley’s People's text, and a black/white reading necessarily 
reduces and oversimplifies. It is the complexity -  and yes, the contradictions -  in le Carre’s 
characterisation that makes him more satisfying among spy writers than the one­
dimensional characterisation of, say, Charles Cumming. Moreover, in all this, positive and 
negative critical judgements of Smiley alike have been largely divested of political 
meaning. So the task now is to combine these two understandings of Smiley, to confront 
their contradictions and to grasp their political meaning.
Half-Angel and Half-Devil: Smiley’s Contradiction
Smiley’s behaviour in Smiley's People -  endangering Villem; exploiting Connie; 
kidnapping and blackmailing Grigoriev; deploying Karla’s disturbed daughter, Tatiana, as 
bait -  is not a pretty picture. However neither is it quite at the level of Karla’s string of 
murders in the same novel. Smiley’s behaviour is, in fact, no better and no worse than in 
previous books. Smiley castigates his own “decency” after he kills Dieter Frey in Call, but 
Smiley is absolved by the reader, as acting in defence of self and country. Smiley’s role in 
the exploitation of Leamas and death of Liz in The Spy is at best ambiguous. In Tinker, 
Smiley relies on violence to support his investigation, but, in protecting his country, is 
again absolved. Smiley is indirectly responsible for the deaths of Frost and Luke in 
Schoolboy, again accuses himself, and is again absolved: Connie compares Smiley’s
594 Smiley’s People interview (BBC DVDs; 2004).
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contrition with Karla’s supposed inhuman lack of it. So we see that Smiley’s behaviour has 
not changed, despite some critics’ claims:595 it has been consistently expedient, but, until 
Smiley’s People, his ‘corruption’ has been either elided or absolved. This time it is flagged: 
why?
Smiley, at his most pessimistic about defeating Karla asks, “How can I win? [...] 
alone, restrained by doubt and a sense of decency -  how can any of us? -  against this 
remorseless fusillade?” (p. 220). That “any of us” sub-clause is important, as it ratifies the 
collective, the nation, in this war. Smiley’s questioning is immediately followed by a 
meditation on “the Karla of the human heart after all” (p. 221). Thus the answer is that 
Smiley, as representative of the British nation, can only “win” against such an implacable, 
inhuman enemy, by setting aside “decency”. It is worth citing a le Carre interview from 
two years previously: “‘I certainly find myself committed more and more to the looser 
forms of Western democracy at any price. And I've become more and more disenchanted 
about the possibility of understanding the Soviet Union’” (Barber, p. 44: my emphasis).
This is an anti-detente statement. Similarly, Smiley’s decision is a rejection of the detente 
he has already challenged in the safe-flat scene, and is a suitably Second Cold War shift 
into containment of Communism. Thus the need to shroud Smiley’s -  and Britain’s -  
actions in ambiguity, to elide them or ‘resolve’ them is lessened. Although le Carre’s 
sixties Cold-War novels were not the statements of East-West equivalence claimed, 
Leamas’s assertion, “London won -  that’s the point” {The Spy p. 229) revealed the 
cynicism of Cold Warriors, particularly as the price of this victory would transpire to be 
Liz’s life. But in Smiley’s People, with its Berlin Wall finale strongly echoing The Spy, the 
same message of British victory at the cost of expedient morality is conveyed instead as 
political realism, in the face of an implacable, remorseless enemy: Soviet Communism. Far 
from this being seen as the kind of bureaucratic instrumentalism that Smiley has previously 
stood against, Smiley, as shown, retains many of his saintly characteristics. Half angel and
595 E.g. Panek, p. 247.
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half devil co-exist in a flawed human nature.
Indeed there is a hint of this in le Carre’s original “moral Reichenbach Falls” 
statement. Contained within this reference (also in Smiley’s People, p. 234; 237) is the fact 
that Sherlock Holmes was not destroyed, that he did not die in the Falls (although, 
crucially, Moriarty did). Such was Holmes’ popularity with the British public that Doyle 
later contrived Holmes’ escape from the Falls and, from 1901, wrote a new series of 
Holmes stories. In His Last Bow (1917), Holmes is presented as a spy and, for a country at 
war, an overtly national hero: that the story concludes with a warning about an “East 
wind”, while ostensibly referencing Germany, can’t help be significant in the year of the 
Russian Revolution. Pursuing this parallel, Smiley had certainly become a national cultural 
hero in Britain by Smiley’s People, a tendency that continued with the book’s 1982 
televisation. As with Doyle and Holmes, le Carre wanted to drop Smiley,596 but brought 
him back again for 1991’s Secret Pilgrim (complete with Holmes reference, Secret, p. 8). 
In what is inevitably a valedictory post-Cold War novel (“‘We won’”, p. 17), Smiley, 
brought in to address student spies at Sarratt, is “a legend of the Service” {Pilgrim, p. 11), 
who sits on a “throne of honour” (p. 13, my emphasis). Even so, Smiley makes this key 
statement: “‘The end may justify the means -  if it wasn’t supposed to, I dare say you 
wouldn’t be here. But there’s a price to pay, and the price does tend to be oneself.’”
We can read much the same message in Smiley’s People. For even if Smiley/Britain 
is compromised in its Cold-War conduct, Smiley also remains a defender of British 
liberalism against Communist encroachment, and in Smiley’s People brings about the 
ultimate fantasy victory for the British nation.597 The contradiction of violence and 
expediency as against ‘decency’ cannot be resolved, because Smiley, like Western
596 Melvyn Bragg, ‘A Talk with John le Carre, New York Times Book Review, 13 March 1983, p. 22.
597 This is certainly how Stafford sees it: “by the end o f his fictional career Smiley has surely won a place in 
the pantheon o f British heroes by carrying off major coups against the nation’s enemies that outrank the feats 
of Bond” (Stafford, p. 210).
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liberalism, is contradictory.598 If on this occasion, le Carre confronts rather than eliding 
this faultline, what we have in Smiley’s People, is a highly relative critique of Smiley and 
of Britain. In comparison to Soviet nemesis, Karla, Smiley is a bastion of moral integrity 
and a beacon of consistent characterisation, thus the national Britain vs. Soviet Union 
antinomy remains, however complex. It is to this political enemy we will now turn.
*  *  *
598 Lewis comes closest to recognising this: “Smiley lives with the uncomfortable paradox that to defend the 
moral scheme he believes in he must resort to expediency” (Lewis, p. 177).
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4. “We Must Combat Communism”: Karla as the Political Enemy
Smiley’s People features the most Manichaean portrayal of the Soviet Union in le Carre’s 
fiction. For two-thirds of the book, the Soviet Union, “Communism” and “Karla” are 
synonymous: Karla continues as a ruthless, murderous political ‘fanatic’. However during 
the book’s final third, Karla is humanised, via his love for his schizophrenic daughter, 
Tatiana, and Karla’s murders in Smiley’s People's transpire after all to be personally rather 
than politically motivated. This is a fundamental contradiction in Karla’s characterisation, 
a faultline which complicates but does not sever the link between Karla and Soviet 
Communism. Nor does the humanising of Karla transform the presentation of Soviet 
Communism: rather, it provides a fresh flank of attack upon Communism. Let us now 
examine how the Soviet Union is initially presented and define Karla’s relationship to it.
“Karla is a Fanatic”: Karla as Political Enemy
Much of the condemnation of the Soviet system is provided, in Smiley’s People, via the 
testament and treatment of Soviet emigres, dissidents, who -  ideologically intimidated, 
imprisoned, murdered -  are lent huge moral authority. “It was your system which was 
immoral,” thinks Ostrakova, in Paris, when accused of immorality by Soviet enforcer, 
Kirov (Smiley’s People, p. 11). The “system” is Communism. Kirov speaks “in the brutal 
accents of Moscow officialdom” (p. 10). Ostrakova defines the Soviet system as a 
“soulless, numberless universe of brutalized functionaries” (p. 121); humanity eclipsed by 
‘ideology’. Her lover, Glikman’s, imprisonment is a “slow, doctrinal prison death” (p. 71): 
again here ‘ideology’ is dominant. Ostrakova recalls typical anti-Soviet crimes being “[to 
have] questioned the absolute right of the authorities [...] worshipped some unacceptable 
god [...] painted criminally abstract pictures; or [...] published politically endangering 
love poems” (p. 16; my emphasis). While having historical basis, these satirical ‘crimes’ 
are selected as ‘personal’, located where the political, in Western, empirical terms, does 
not ‘belong’. As Arendt wrote, “totalitarian bureaucracy, with a more complete
understanding of the meaning of absolute power, intruded upon the private individual and 
his inner life with equal brutality” (Arendt, p. 245). Ostrakova’s Christianity links with the 
Catholic Polish Solidarity movement, which opposed Soviet control (Barley, p. 15).
The Soviet Union is defined throughout Smiley’s People as dangerous: ostensibly to 
its dissidents, but also, by implication, to the West (rendering detente naive). ‘“The danger 
is absolute,”’ Otto Leipzig, another emigre, warns Ostrakova {Smiley’s People, p. 67). 
“Absolute” recalls both Arendt, above, and le Carre’s favoured term for Communism: 
“absolutism”, merging ends and means. At the novel’s beginning, another dissident,
General Vladimir, “defender of the free individual [...] against faceless Communism” 
(Buzard, p. 167) has his face shot off by the Soviets {Smiley’s People, pp. 27-120). Buzard 
convincingly suggests in this a textual contrast between (Western) subjecthood and 
(Eastern) facelessness. There is a Soviet attempt upon Ostrakova’s life {Smiley’s People, 
pp. 70-72), while the murders of Vladimir and of Leipzig (pp. 210-221) are more extreme 
than previous Soviet acts in le Carre’s novels. That these murders will transpire to be 
committed to enable Karla’s daughter to escape the Soviet Union, and are thus themselves 
dissident, is not revealed until two-thirds through the book (p. 221), and so the murders’ 
association with political rather than personal extremity is never properly overturned via 
retrospect. Indeed Ostrakova opines, “They had been murdering the entire Russian people 
for centuries, whether in the name of the Czar, or God, or Lenin” (p. 70). The “Russian 
people”, the nation, is herein itself defined as dissident: “They” conveys the Soviet state as 
a power elite that transcends professed ‘ideology’, a continuum of an ever-oppressive 
‘absolutist’ ruling class through the Czar’s monarchical absolutism to the Soviet 
totalitarian regime. This recalls Nineteen Eighty-Four, where the only principle is power 
{1984, p. 152). Smiley’s tribute to Estonian Vladimir makes a similar point: “‘Vladimir 
witnessed the ruthless repression of his homeland by the government he had served [...] a 
population of a million sober, hard-working people, cut to bits’” (p. 53). Communism, the 
Soviet system and the Soviet state are thus defined in Smiley’s People by state ideological
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intimidation, imprisonment and murder in the pursuit of power. Let us now examine the 
specific character of Karla.
Karla is strongly linked with the Soviet Union and Communism. Although Karla is 
not named until p. 138, Smiley’s early invocation of “Moscow Centre” as Vladimir’s 
murderer (p. 63) is, we have seen, synonymous with Karla, thus the reader also attributes 
Leipzig’s murder and Ostrakova’s attempted murder to the Soviet state, a link which 
retrospect cannot entirely uncouple. Karla is later described as head of the Thirteenth 
Directorate, a “separate service within Moscow Centre” (p. 236), “the elite” (p. 301): this 
tallies with both Arendt’s assertion of the secret police as bastions of power in Soviet 
society (Totalitarianism, p. 245) and Western culture’s Soviet Union-as-prison motif. 
Karla’s delusional daughter, Tatiana, describes Karla as “more powerful than the Czar” 
{Smiley’s People, p. 283), again suggesting a Russian continuum of ‘absolutism’ beyond 
‘ideology’.
Smiley’s only encounter with Karla, in a Delhi prison, occurred originally in Tinker, 
was revisited in Schoolboy, and is revisited again in Smiley’s People (pp. 139-141): as 
such, it clearly represents an “awkward issue [which] has continually to be revisited, 
reworked, rediscovered, reaffirmed” {Faultlines, p. 74), a locus of political anxieties.
Smiley anticipates Karla’s execution upon Karla’s return to the Soviet Union. Thus Karla’s 
refusal to defect in Delhi -  and thereby to act in self-interest -  is defined as ideological 
fanaticism: “The more Smiley implored him [to defect], the more dogmatic [Karla’s] 
silence became” {Smiley’s People, p. 140). “Dogmatic” signals Soviet ‘ideology’, never 
that of the West:
[Smiley] thought of Karla again, and of his absolutism, which at least gave point to 
the perpetual chaos that was life’s condition; point to violence, and to death; of Karla 
for whom killing had never been more than the necessary adjunct of a grand design
(p. 220).
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The “grand design” is revered by Karla even as he falls victim to it: indeed later on Soviet 
Communism is described as the very “system he had helped create” (p. 329).
In this Manichaean context, with so much narrative energy devoted to depicting a 
‘fanatical’, murderous Karla/Soviet Union, Connie Sachs’ oft-quoted Cold War speech 
comes out of nowhere, and is a textual faultline: “‘It’s not a shooting war any more, 
George. [...] That’s the trouble. It’s grey. Half-angels fighting half-devils. No one knows 
where the lines are” (p. 182). The Soviet state has been evoked as nothing but malevolent: 
why now suggest moral equivalence between East and West? Looking at the plot’s 
trajectory, the reason is surely that Connie’s speech functions, at the novel’s precise half­
way point, to announce a shift of narrative gear. For immediately afterwards comes 
Connie’s account of Karla’s lover, which introduces a new, human, aspect to Karla. But 
this humanity exists in contradiction with Karla’s continuing characterisation as ruthless 
ideologue. We see this contradiction in Connie’s speech immediately:
‘One day she ups and gets ideas above her station [...] soft on revolution. Mixing 
with bloody intellectuals. Wanting the State to wither away [...] He had her shoved 
in the slammer. In the end the old despot’s love turned to hatred and he had his ideal 
carted off and spavined’ {Smiley’s People, p. 184).599
Here we have, for le Carre, the worst of ideological fanaticism -  imposing the political on 
the personal -  but at this extremity of inhumanity a human faultline is revealed. Karla has 
never previously had a personal life, and soon enough it is revealed that this union 
produced a daughter. This is a faultline; clear evidence of a rethink. The text will continue 
in this manner from here onwards, toeing this faultline by balancing the new “human” 
Karla with Karla the “fanatic”, murderous representative of brutal Soviet Communism. So
599 Wolfe reflects his own prejudice when he suggests, “[Tatiana’s] mother [...] was killed by Karla’s own 
order for opposing the Marxist-Leninist view o f history” (Wolfe p. 232).
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Ostrakova continues to witness Karla’s heavies’ threat as Soviet state threat, “The men 
who had come to kill her were the same men [...] who had killed Ostrakov and Glikman, 
and would kill the whole poor world if she did not stop them” (p. 225; my emphasis). 
Ostrakova’s moral authority prevents the reader questioning this association, even knowing 
now that these are non-political heavies, engaged by Karla the father, not Karla the head of 
The Thirteenth Directorate. This contradictory approach is continued by Lacon’s drunken 
dinner with Smiley. Lacon is paraphrased as declaring, “The anti-Communist phobia was 
overdone [...] Communists were only people, after all. They weren’t red-toothed monsters, 
not any more. Communists wanted what everyone wanted; prosperity and a bit of peace 
and quiet” (p. 258). In contrast to Ostrakova, careerist Lacon has no moral authority, so 
this ridicules his ‘detente’ message. But while Lacon’s speech facilitates Karla’s 
characterisation’s shift from “red-toothed monster”, the depiction of Soviet Communism 
also here acquires a new negative critique. Lacon’s attributes to Communists Western 
liberal, capitalist, individualist desires (“prosperity”; separation from the state), implying 
Communism can take no real root within the self-interest of ‘human nature’, as per 
Schaub’s analysis of post-war attitudes. This critique of Soviet Communism underlies the 
book’s last third, but will conduct a contradictory pull-and-push with le Carre’s established 
Manichaean vision, wherein the witness of Soviet emigres and the trilogy’s previous 
characterisation of Karla both cast a long shadow.
“Karla of the Human Heart”: Contradictions in the Political Enemy
Having failed to elicit the “human” response of defection from Karla in Tinker, Smiley 
declares: “‘Karla is not fireproof because he’s a fanatic. And one day, if I have anything to 
do with it, that lack of moderation will be his downfall’” (Tinker, p. 224). Two-thirds of 
the way through Smiley’s People, Smiley now decides that there are “two Karlas”: Karla, 
the fanatic, but also “this other Karla, Karla of the human heart after all, of the one great 
love, the Karla flawed by humanity” (Smiley’s People, p. 221). In Smiley’s People, the
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conclusion of the trilogy, it will not be Karla’s fanaticism, his inhuman pursuit of the 
Communist cause, but his own humanity that will bring his downfall. This is contradictory. 
As Sinfield says, “Character is a strategy -  one that will be abandoned when it interferes 
with other desiderata” (Sinfield, p. 78). Let us explore this.
The revelation that Karla has a troubled daughter, Tatiana, smuggled out of the 
Soviet Union, where she fell foul of the system, and ensconced at an expensive Swiss 
sanatorium, is textually flagged as humanising Karla:
That adversary had acquired a human face of disconcerting clarity. It was no brute 
whom Smiley was pursuing with such mastery, no unqualified fanatic after all, no 
automaton. It was a man; and one whose downfall [...] would be caused by nothing 
more sinister than excessive love {Smiley’s People, p. 315).
Using Karla’s human “weakness’ -  his love for his daughter -  as leverage, Smiley 
threatens to expose Karla’s personal abuse of the Soviet political system: Karla’s use of 
state resources and personnel (Grigoriev) to care for Tatiana in Switzerland; Karla’s use of 
murder to cover his tracks. Smiley surmises that not only would this exposure lead to 
Karla’s own execution; it would result in Tatiana being abandoned, or returned to the 
Soviet Union (p. 325). Karla defects to the West a mere nine pages later. But it is 
absolutely crucial to attest that this new understanding of Karla, very recently 
Communism’s representative, does not offer a new understanding of Communism. 
Although Karla’s murders transpire now to be unrelated to Soviet Communism’s political 
agenda, potentially reasserting the virtues of detente, this does not cause Smiley to desist, 
indeed he goes on the attack. If Karla is acting for personal motives, however, then are 
critics right to depersonalise Smiley’s assault upon Karla? Is Smiley’s People ultimately
251
just a struggle between two old men who have injured each other’s pride? “Nothing more 
than an acting out of personal obsessions”?600
Quite the reverse: this humanising of Karla represents a new flank of political attack 
on Soviet Communism, even if it exposes further contradictions in so doing. Karla’s abrupt 
defection from textually established ‘inhuman’ East to ‘human’ West rejects the political 
system that Karla has lived by, murdered for, been imprisoned for, and by which he has for 
three and a half novels been textually defined. Indeed Karla has personified Eastern 
Communist ruthlessness quite as much as Smiley has personified gentle Western 
liberalism. The implication of Karla’s new prioritisation of the personal over the political 
is that not only is the Soviet system flawed by /^humanity, as we have previously seen, it is 
doomed by humanity. Communism is an infertile ‘ideological’ seed planted in stony 
human ground, which will ultimately reject it. Indeed Smiley will say precisely this in The 
Secret Pilgrim at the end of the Cold War:
‘It was man who ended the Cold War in case you didn’t notice. [...] not even 
Western man either [...] but our sworn enemy in the East, who went into the streets, 
faced the bullets and the batons and said: ‘we’ve had enough’ [...] and the ideologies 
trailed after these impossible events like condemned prisoners’ (Secret, p. 332).
That Karla’s dedication to the Communist cause transcended his own self-interest was 
incomprehensible to Smiley in Delhi: (“[Karla] would rather die at the hands of his friends 
than live at the hands of his enemies” p. 140). Now, however, Karla’s self-interest is 
revealed after all: he defects, as Paulin uniquely points out, as much to save his own skin 
as to save his daughter, though both are forms of self-interest. For Paulin this “trivialises 
Western values” (Paulin, p. 60): but it actually reveals Western values -  and their critique 
of Soviet Communism -  in a less ‘humanist’ and more capitalist light that is entirely
600 Monaghan (p. 139) but see also: Barley (p. 127), Sauerberg (p. 186), Bennett (p. 85), Dobler (p. 14).
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contiguous with contemporary Thatcherism, which also cited a Hobbesian “human nature” 
(Schaub, p. 7). Thus the actual defeat of Karla and the moral defeat of Smiley, unequal as 
they are, actually ratify exactly the same, (neo) liberal, capitalist world-view.
“Two Karlas”: Karla’s Contradictions Confronted
Inevitably, this shift in characterisation creates textual contradictions, and Smiley’s 
People’s “two Karlas” (<Smiley’s People, p. 221), ideological fanatic and fond father, are 
never satisfactorily reconciled. Characterisation is a faultline. Not only is the shadow of the 
former characterisation of Karla the fanatic, carefully established over two and a half 
books, a long one, but the text continues to append “Karla’s” to actions that are brutal or 
expedient long after the ‘human’ Karla has been established. The torture and murder of 
Otto Leipzig then is “‘Karla’s way’” (p. 184), wherein “the killing comes first, the 
questioning second” (p. 211). Smiley, having deployed Tatiana to ensnare Karla, castigates 
himself for “resort[ing] to Karla’s techniques” (p. 315; my emphasis). Even as Karla 
defects to the West, the armed guards on the Soviet side are “Karla’s people” (p. 332), 
while it is “the curse of Karla’s fanaticism” that falls on Smiley (p. 332) and “Karla’s 
cunning” regarding Bill Haydon which has “stained” Smiley’s marriage (p. 333). Karla is 
still being required to represent the evils of the Communist system, even as, technically, he 
abandons Communism and the Soviet Union by defecting.
Of course, silent, unseen, without personal details, Karla never really was a 
‘character’ but rather what Sinfield calls “a fantasy arrangement of elements” that were 
“taken to typify”, generically “the villain” and ideologically, Soviet Communism 
{Faultlines, p. 56). Karla lacked the “subjectivity”, or “interiority” modem readers expect 
of a fictional character {Faultlines, p. 65). Judged only by his actions, the characterisation 
of the silent, invisible Karla reduced Soviet Communist ends to bmtal means, making 
Karla a cardboard cut-out of brutally expedient Communism. This was contradictory 
enough, but via his abmpt humanisation Karla is rendered even more contradictory as a
253
character. He is now presumed to represent human, familial, personal values, but contrary 
to Smiley’s assertion, this new “human face” of Karla’s does not possess “disconcerting 
clarity” (p. 315). In go-between, Grigoriev’s, accounts of his meetings with Karla, Karla is 
described in warmer terms as, “the priest” (pp. 303-314), while “Grigoriev had been 
impressed by the remarkable sense of feeling -  he would call it even a sense of direct 
personal responsibility -  that the priest [...] inspired” (p. 309) when discussing Tatiana. 
Later, we hear the hitherto incongruous description that, “[Karla] was emotional” (p. 311). 
However, quite apart from the fact that Karla’s relationship with Grigoriev is underscored 
by very specific threat (p. 314), the new ‘human’ Karla still does not speak directly, and 
most of what he says, mediated via Grigoriev, is deception. Karla still has no interiority: he 
is still not a character, making the ideological functions of ‘character’ the more apparent. 
Karla is, in the novel’s own terminology a “no-man”, wherein the “no-man’s land” is the 
fictional construct of a novel.
So given both this textual confusion and their own pro-Western agendas, Cold War- 
era critics tended simply to ignore the ‘humanised’ Karla (just as critics tended to pick the 
Smiley they preferred). Anatole Broyard claimed: “merciless, ascetic and amoral, Karla is 
a fanatic, the priest of a new Inquisition. Nothing matters to him but purity of doctrine, a 
passion for certainty, a Pavlovian hunger for cause, effect and control” (Broyard, p. 23). 
This is hardly borne out by the plot trajectory of Smiley’s People's last third. For Dobler, 
“Karla [is] the Prince of Darkness, ruling the night, the time of blackness and jealously 
destroying [Tatiana’s] mother for trying to contact God. [...] Karla is a kind of anti-Christ” 
(Dobler p. 348). While being more revealing of Dobler’s Western, Christian agenda than 
the novel itself, this does highlight how Karla the fanatic still persists in the text, without 
being eclipsed by the “Karla of the human heart after all”.
After Communism’s collapse, Western critics could acknowledge Smiley’s People's 
attempted humanising of Karla, but tended to criticise the novel for this. So Beene regards 
Tatiana as a “symbol of Karla’s inhumanity” (p. 107), as do Wolfe (p. 240) and Martin (p.
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46), who criticises a “worrying inability to deal with Karla’s nature as a villain who 
destroys many human beings” (Martin, p. 48). Beene and Martin highlight a critical unease 
that Smiley’s People’s plot trajectory lets Karla off the hook. As Rothberg says: “for le 
Carre, lying, cheating, stealing even killing seem somehow more justifiable for personal 
reasons, for love, than for political or ideological reasons” (Rothberg, in H. Bloom, p. 61). 
These critical reactions suggest the confusions endemic upon Karla’s contradictory 
characterisation. This contradiction in Karla’s characterisation arguably occurs because of 
diverging ideological “desiderata”. On the one hand there is the continuing and -  in the 
combative contemporary turn of the Second Cold War -  urgent need to present the Soviet 
Union as malignant and potent enough to deride detente and advocate a return to 
‘containment’. This explains the persistence of Karla the fanatic long after his supposed 
humanisation. But on the other hand there is also the need to suggest that Soviet 
Communism is weak enough to be inevitably defeated, for the Cold War to be winnable by 
the West, especially in this concluding volume of the Quest for Karla. The “Karla of the 
human heart” plot effects this by suggesting, as we have seen, that Communism is contrary 
to human nature. However these two characterisations are sufficiently contradictory that 
they even complicate the reading of Karla’s concluding defection.
In one understanding, Smiley/Britain outmanoeuvres the Soviet Union and forces the 
defection of Karla, key exponent of the Cold War, to the West. This is the resolution 
Smiley failed to achieve in Tinker, and which, in the Karla trilogy, had become a symbol 
of British impotence in the face of Soviet expedience. Karla/Communism is sufficiently 
ruthless and implacable that aggressive means are demanded rather than what the book has 
established is the impotence of detente. Karla’s defeat does not just suggest a victorious 
battle then, in which Britain defeats the Soviet Union, but invokes rather a victory in the 
larger (Cold) War, perhaps particularly from a post-Cold-War perspective, armed with the 
knowledge that the Cold War did indeed end, only nine years later, at the Berlin Wall. This 
knowledge that le Carre was ‘right’ should not distract us from seeing this ‘defeat’ as a
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strongly ideological machination, particularly when at the time no such Western victory, 
let alone British role in such a victory, was likely. As such, this fictional, fantasised victory 
is almost crudely propagandistic.
On the other hand, if we read the ending from the point of view of the “Karla of the 
human heart”, in rejecting Communism via defection, Karla no longer represents the 
Soviet Union. This however conveys an equally convenient, if contradictory, message. 
Because, as no such real world victory over Communism had occurred, the West needed to 
justify continued aggressive containment of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union has to be 
shown to be continuing, malevolently, even as Karla, its former representative, defects to 
the West. This explains the melodramatic, mythic imagery deployed during Karla’s 
defection: “it was the tower that dominated everything, one iron-black rectangle at the 
bridge’s centre. Even the snow avoided it” (p. 328). For Smiley the tower is a “black 
castle” (p. 332) a mythic invocation of almost supernatural evil and it is posed against 
Karla.601 “The only ship was a grey patrol boat moored at the Eastern bank, and the only 
commerce that it offered was death” (p. 331). The East then represents “death”, while, in 
inadvertently revealing capitalist terms, the West is “commerce”: vital, alive. The over­
writing here indicates the textual work involved to hold both these contradictory textual 
strategies in place: the Soviet Union is defeatable; the Soviet Union continues and must be 
contained.602 Just as with Smiley, however, the point is that we do not need to ‘choose’ 
either of these characterisations or interpretations. Both judgements serve their purpose of 
damning Communism, and their contradictions are simply part of enduringly contradictory 
Cold War ideology.
*  *  *
601 Powell, (p. 15) Dobler (pp. 18-19) and Sauerberg (p. 44) invoke Frey’s mythic criticism, whereby Karla’s 
defeat is necessitated by psycho-cultural imperatives. Jameson demonstrated ideological resolution was 
inherent in the quest genre’s origins, Political Unconscious, pp. 89-136.
602 These understandings don’t fit their endings, with the Karla-as-Soviet Union understanding seeing 
Communism defeated, and the ‘human’ Karla understanding leaving Soviet Communism in place.
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5. Smiley’s Last Bow: Conclusion
Smiley’s People is, in retrospect, something of a valedictory affair. Valedictory for Smiley, 
except for a brief reappearance in The Secret Pilgrim; valedictory for le Carre’s 
presentation of the Cold War, only laterally present in The Little Drummer Girl (1983), 
and relegated to background in A Perfect Spy (1986), before the Cold War itself ended nine 
years after Smiley’s People's publication, and the Cold War’s -  and novel’s -  potent icon, 
the Berlin Wall, was dismantled. Smiley's People is valedictory for the Berlin Wall.
Smiley's People was also valedictory for the British post-War consensus, its chimes with 
Thatcherism regarding detente, bureaucracy, and an untameable “human nature” hailing 
the slow death of Keynesian welfare capitalism.
In conclusion, this chapter has demonstrated that Smiley's People goes to great 
lengths to separate Smiley from the British state, but, once again, beyond this covering 
fire, Smiley once again works for, defends, secures, and indeed, brings glory to the British 
state. Smiley comes, again, in Smiley's People, to represent the more populist concept of 
the nation. As such, the expedient strategies Smiley deploys to defeat Karla endanger the 
projected moral superiority of Britishness, foregrounding a contradiction in Smiley’s 
representative British ‘decency’ which has underlain the previous books. By the end of 
Smiley's People, however, Smiley’s expedient actions are largely posited as an absolutely 
necessary counterbalance to the political threat of Soviet Communism, represented in the 
most damning terms as an implacable enemy. The humanising of the Soviet state’s prime 
representative, Karla, risks exposing a contradiction in such Manichaean tactics, but 
Smiley's People adroitly upholds the Soviet Union as a potent threat whilst also rendering 
it weak enough to be defeatable. In doing this, Smiley's People undermines its own 
admission of British decline, and repudiates its own putative critique of Smiley, and 
presents le Carre’s headiest national fantasy yet to close off the 1970s: a defeat of Soviet
Communism that, clearly, is to the glory of both Smiley and Britain.
*  *  *
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Conclusion: “No-Men in This No-Man’s Land”
This aim of this thesis has been to show how John le Carre’s Cold War novels are 
illuminated by history, and how history, in turn, is illuminated by le Carre’s novels. This is 
a far from passive process: during a 30-year period of the 44-year Cold War, le Carre’s 
espionage novels illuminated history as it was happening, and like all illuminations, his 
novels cast this or that light on proceedings -  here a slant, there a framing -  while keeping 
other areas dark. Consequently, this thesis has explored not just history as ‘events’ but 
history as interpretation of events: history as something that is made, not just materially 
but discursively. Fiction, especially popular fiction, is a key mechanism for such making.
The thesis has focused exclusively on le Carre’s 1960s and 1970s novels, because 
they emanate from the peak years of the conflict. Second Cold War notwithstanding, 
Gorbachev’s arrival in power in March 1985 began the processes of Glasnost and 
Perestroika which, responding to internal Eastern Bloc pressure, foreshadowed the 
breakup of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc and led, ultimately, to the end of the Cold 
War. Moreover, Smiley’s People's publication in late 1979 (in the US) marked the end of a 
definable era in British history, an era that had stretched from the conclusion of the War to 
the arrival of Margaret Thatcher and her termination of the post-war Keynesian welfare 
capitalist consensus.
The Cold War exerts an enduring influence not just on le Carre’s own subsequent 
fiction (it wasn’t until 2001 ’s The Constant Gardener that he stopped being, in media 
terms, a “Cold War novelist”), but on spy fiction generally (see: Charles Cumming’s 
Trinity Six, 2011),603 and indeed on ‘literary’ fiction (see: William Boyd’s Restless, 2006; 
Ian McEwan’s Sweet Tooth, 2012). It is difficult for any subsequent writer to feature the 
Cold War -  or just to feature espionage -  without being le Carre-esque. Indeed, two War
603 Cumming appears to be getting his history from le Carre. “Donald [...] had a very deep and profound 
hatred of America” (Cumming, Trinity, p. 143) c.f. “[Haydon] hated America very deeply” {Tinker, p. 370). 
Philby’s father, like Haydon’s was a “monster” {Trinity, p. 100; Tinker, p. 380); “Philby spied “‘not out of  
conviction rather than from some misguided sense of [his] own importance’”, c.f. le Carre on Haydon 
{Tinker, pp. 359-380).
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on Terror-era espionage television dramas, the UK’s Spooks (2002-2011) and the US’s 
Homeland (2011-2015), both regularly reference le Carre’s Cold-War work. It is notable 
that not only are these drama series broadly reflective of dominant orthodoxies (left-wing 
activists and Muslims depicted as terrorists-in-waiting), but in Homeland, le Carre 
quotations are deployed to support hawkish US foreign policy manoeuvres.604 So much for 
an enduring oppositional legacy.
The reasons for this continued Cold War echoing, however, do not purely emanate 
from the closed-circle of fiction. Contemporary politics continue to be moulded by what 
occurred during the Cold War. A prime example is US foreign policy, forged in the Cold 
War as interventionist, aggressively capitalising, creating markets, destabilising, removing 
or attacking regimes that interfered with US interests. In the Cold-War era those regimes 
tended to be Communist: now their political affiliations cover a wider spectrum, but are 
still parlayed in much the same manner in the Western press and popular culture, with 
residual implications of both Western neutrality and superiority in the face of a ‘savagely’ 
brutal, unscrupulous, faith or ‘ideology’-blinkered ‘other’. Moreover, Britain’s Special 
Relationship with the US is a political legacy of the Cold War, a post-imperial shift for 
Britain from primary military world power to secondary military adjunct, but, possessed of 
a disproportionate ideological and propaganda voice, with a continuing tendency to 
proclaim its own ‘decency’ compared to both enemies and allies (see: Tony Blair on Iraq 
or Afghanistan).
The disavowals and distancings from institutions that this thesis has noted amongst le 
Carre’s spies are a cultural current that remains potent into modem society: indeed sallies 
against “big government” have become paradoxically institutionalised under neoliberal 
governments, while -  even more paradoxically -  the power of the larger state, beyond 
visible bureaucracies, has increased. Moreover, as the language of “individualism” noted
604 E.g. Dar Adal (F. Murray Abraham) unattributedly quotes Lacon’s ‘“We are pragmatists. We adapt. We 
are not keepers o f some sacred flame’.” Lacon’s words advocate a softer, detente policy as against a more 
hardline strategy; Adal’s words encourage Saul Berenson (Mandy Patinkin) to be more hawkish. The irony is 
presumably deliberate.
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in post-war discourse as filtered through le Carre’s fiction, has become an orthodoxy in 
contemporary Western politics, so ‘individual’ rights have continued to decline as against 
the state: e.g. the 2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act and the 2006 Terrorism Act. However, 
Howard Caygill suggests that, “the network of domination is as much a network of 
resistance”:605 into surveillance, for instance, is written the potential for loss of state 
control, as the 2013 Edward Snowden case revealed. Caygill’s analysis is very much in the 
spirit of this thesis’s dissident reading -  exposing faultlines in fiction as evidence of 
contradictions in society, in order to suggest that the dominant is not necessarily 
permanent, the repressive not necessarily entrenched: to identify a locus of optimism.
*  *  *
It is worth reasserting the extent of the popularity of le Carre’s Cold-War novels. 
Particularly as, in all the critical focus on of le Carre as ‘popular fiction’, there is almost 
nothing, bar Sauerberg’s 1983 study, on the economics -  let alone the political economy -  
of ‘the popular’. For the purposes of this thesis the popularity of “popular fiction” is proof 
of its wide ideological dissemination. It is worth asserting again that popular fiction is not 
any more ideological than literary fiction. We have seen, already, in explorations of 
reviewers’ reception of the books, and in surveys of critical commentary, how the 
designation ‘popular’ -  or even ‘mass’ -  is used by both right and left to depoliticise and to 
dismiss books marketed in this manner, as, respectively, crassly ‘ideological’ or as 
apolitical. Like all culture, popular fiction is imbricated in the political concepts and 
historical events of its era: popular fiction just gets a higher, broader, platform with which 
to do so.
So to briefly summarise: The Spy Who Came in from the Cold was an international 
bestseller that put Ian Fleming’s sales in the shade; the follow-up, Looking Glass War, was
605 Howard Caygill, On Resistance: A Philosophy o f  Defiance (London, Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 203.
260
an automatic international bestseller but presaged a popularity lull. As it happens, that 
(very relative) lull in popularity coincided with le Carre’s attention turning away from the 
Cold War, and his return to the Cold War, with the 1970s Karla trilogy, marked a return to 
greater popularity. Clearly this Cold-War focused, espionage-concentrated work ‘spoke’ to 
its audience; answered a need. Thereafter Tinker Tailor achieved bestseller status, while 
Honourable Schoolboy and Smiley’s People were immediate bestsellers. Add to that the 
film adaptations -  the hugely successful The Spy Who Came in from the Cold (1965), and 
the less successful The Deadly Affair (1966) and The Looking Glass War (1969) -  which 
all shaped popular perceptions. Le Carre’s 1970s resurgence was multi-media, with the 
1979 Tinker television adaptation a kind of saturation-point. Even so, while the Smiley’s 
People televisation in 1982 was less popular, A Perfect Spy's 1987 televisation was not 
discussed on Terry Wogan’s primetime radio show, and The Russia House movie (1990) 
was ridiculed, le Carre’s vision of the Cold War still had an extraordinarily lengthy 
afterlife: for a time as heritage television (endless repeats of Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy), 
then, with a new high profile after 2001 ’s Constant Gardener, as heritage fiction {Absolute 
Friends, 2003), tapping into a Cold War nostalgia in the War on Terror era, capped by 
Tomas Alfredson’s heritage film Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy film (2011) and that ever- 
rumoured Smiley ’s People follow-up. All this cumulatively represents a cultural 
intervention in the Cold War that was as extensive in its reception as in its conception. The 
purpose of this thesis has been to restore consideration of the political and historical to 
these widely read and hugely influential novels, removing them from their aestheticisation 
into ‘genre fiction’ on one hand and personalised humanist thematics on the other.
This thesis has, throughout, located critical preconceptions and presumptions within 
a normative ‘empiricism’ that derives, in literary studies, broadly from the work of F.R. 
Leavis in the UK and the New Critics in the US. However, empiricism, as demonstrated, is 
a deeper discursive mode in British culture: a proclamation of Western, specifically British 
‘neutrality’ that is actually -  and paradoxically -  ideological. Leamas’s ‘“ I believe an
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eleven bus will take me to Hammersmith’” is the manifesto here {Spy, p. 36). ‘We’ defend 
our country for obvious, common sense reasons, this manifesto declares: political analysis 
or justification is not necessary. “‘Sport [...] For Heaven’s sake! ’” cries Jerry Westerby 
when Smiley attempts to formulate an ideological, anti-Communist, motivation for Cold- 
War espionage: “‘You point me and I ’ll march’” asserts Westerby {Schoolboy, p. 123).
Just as Switzerland, a regular location in le Carre’s books, and a major capitalist 
centrifuge, was not in reality ‘neutral’ in the Cold War (it was on the Western side), such 
ideological neutral zones, or no-man’s lands are a fantasy. Even le Carre’s espionage 
controllers are wary, hesitant in pushing ideological imperatives -  thus Smiley allows 
himself to be cut off mid-flow by Westerby; thus also Control’s equivocal The Spy speech 
{Spy, pp. 17-23). Communists, by contrast, have no such qualms about professing their 
caricatured ‘ideology’ (Fiedler), or, if never articulating any precise philosophy (Karla), 
Communists are defined in the text by their ‘fanatical’ ideology.
What is being denied in these empirical positionings -  whether by critics, by le 
Carre’s protagonists, or by le Carre himself -  is not just the ideology that undergirds a 
choice to serve British intelligence, but the ideological concept of “ordinary life” itself in 
Britain during the Cold War: a defence of the British ‘system’ of consensus centrist 
liberalism (and so of the British state); an assertion of the virtues of the British national 
‘way of life’ (the nation); and a forthright anti-Communism (the political enemy).
To sum up, let us reconsider these three faultlines one at a time. The state in le Carre’s 
Cold-War fiction is an area of particularly intensive focus -  and yet it is also almost 
invisible. Of the institutions of the state, we see only the bureaucracy that administrates le 
Carre’s particular branch of the state, the intelligence services, the men of the files and 
dossiers, cabals and careerism. In fact the term “secret state” (Hennessy: passim) is itself a 
misnomer: we hear more about this ‘secret’ branch of the state than many others, which 
remain secret. Sometimes bureaucracy is decried for its ineffectuality; at other times for its
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over-effectuality, an expedient instrumental rationality that subjugates people to political 
objectives. But this anti-bureaucracy trope, is, this thesis has argued, an inoculation with “a 
contingent evil”, as Barthes says of Operation Margarine {Mythologies, p. 41), and so the 
‘evil’ of bureaucracy distracts the reader from the way these novels actually uphold the 
deeper state’s structures. The intelligence bureaucracy is only the visible tip of the state’s 
iceberg: submerged is the violence, the incarceration, the imperial plunder, the capitalist 
profit, all the things the liberal state does not care to admit to, and le Carre’s novels do not 
care to imagine can be changed. So the deep state in this way is quietly restored and 
reaffirmed, whilst the text, and the text’s protagonists, contrive to sound anti-state, anti­
establishment, but being simply anti-bureaucratic: indeed, often, not even that. For in The 
Honourable Schoolboy, le Carre readers’ favourite anti-bureaucrat, Smiley, even heads up 
the bureaucracy. Smiley is a professional in amateur’s clothing; a bureaucrat in 
individual’s clothing. Smiley, for all his regular retirements, resignations and sackings, for 
all his anti-establishment murmurings and anti-bureaucratic seethings, is the state’s reliable 
executor, the state’s saviour, the state’s champion. Yet, in all these decryings and 
disavowals, these contradictions and resolutions, there is a different understanding of “we 
are defensive” discoverable: surely here is also an anxiety, an unease, about the state, about 
the system, that is being laterally, contradictorily, expressed?
Smiley is also the champion of the British nation. Unlike the decried, normatively 
negative -  but secretly upheld -  state, the British nation is less controversial: the nation is 
non-political, ‘innocent’, neutral, a shared landscape, a united citizenry, a collective 
national ‘character’. To protect the British nation against cynical, unnatural Communism 
also projects the British nation: as an “ordinary”, ‘decent’ way of life. These proclaimed 
national qualities all contain faultlines, as nationalism arguably always will: to lionise an 
‘us’ is almost always to demonise a ‘them’ -  or just dehumanise that ‘other’ that is being 
repressed. As Charles Taylor says, “no human identity is purely inwardly formed. The 
‘other’ always plays some role. But it can be just as a foil, a contrast, a way of defining
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what we were not”.606 The “nation” became considerably less normatively positive after 
the collapse of Eastern Communism permitted vicious national tensions to erupt in former 
Eastern Europe. So assertions of Cold-War British nationalism involve implicit assertions 
of or reminders of British empire, invoking violence and plunder on one hand, nostalgia 
for geopolitical power on the other. Consequently Britain’s role and potency in the Cold 
War is again, while apparently realistically appraised, actually reasserted, inflated. In these 
national faultlines we can see le Carre’s novels operating as the British nation’s 
unconscious, conducting a national conversation in which anxieties and reassurances sit 
contradictorily alongside one another.
Turning to the political enemy, every le Carre Cold-War novel, bar The Looking 
Glass War, depicts not just a tactical defeat of the Soviet bloc by the British nation-state, 
but a ‘moral’ victory over a political enemy, Communism, which enemy is always 
presented as more indecent than Britain at its worst. This anti-Communism, reliably elided 
or denied by almost all critics, is a central, defining facet of le Carre’s work. Moreover, 
contrary to Control’s claims in The Spy, this British anti-Communism is by no means 
innocently ‘defensive’. The plots of The Spy, Looking Glass War, Honourable Schoolboy 
and Smiley’s People all feature aggressive anti-Communist operations on Britain’s part, 
even if their protagonists convince themselves they are reactive: an aggressive defence.
The fiction here simply reflects historical Cold-War reality of British anti-Communist 
actions in Malaya (1948-60), Kenya (1952-60), Borneo (1963) and Aden (1963-67).607 
Covert British support of right wing, anti-Communist dictatorships against leftists in 
Greece and Indonesia also did literal violence to the definition of ‘defensive’. In all these 
novels -  again reflecting Cold-War geopolitics -  Communism’s very existence is an 
original sin, a provocation: an aggressive act. Why wouldn ’t there be Soviet rockets at
606 In John A. Hall (ed.), The State o f  the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory o f  Nationalism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 208.
607 See also: combined British/US action in Korea (1950-53) and the Congo (1960-61), US action in Vietnam 
(1955-75) and covert action in, for example, Chile (1970-73), Nicaragua (1981-91) and El Salvador (1979- 
92).
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Rostock? Why wouldn ’t the Soviet state be murdering Estonian emigres on Hampstead 
Heath? Even in the fiction neither of these assumptions proves to be true however. 
Defensiveness is thus a rhetorical not a practical position, a proclamation of Western 
innocence, paralleling those pseudo-empirical proclamations of ideological neutrality 
previously discussed, whilst undermining those same proclamations on their own 
empirical, evidence-based, ground: on their own proclaimed, no-man’s land. In this, of 
course, ‘defensive’ ends up drifting into its secondary meaning of ‘protesting too much’. 
Moreover, while Communist characters throughout these books are described as “fanatics” 
and “absolutists”, and decried as inhuman ideologues, we hear barely a word of this 
ideology in the books, and when we do, as in Fiedler’s speech to Leamas in The Spy, we 
hear only the expedient means, not the ends that, for the ideologists, justify those means. 
The result is to suggest a Communism that is essentially cynical, whose expansionism 
abroad and repression at home is pursuant of a ‘principle’ solely of power.
*  *  sfs
This thesis will end, as these Cold War novels end (and indeed, began) with George 
Smiley. Specifically, we will end where we last saw Smiley, standing, pointedly, at that 
most potently symbolic -  and over determined -  of Cold War icons, the Berlin Wall. In all 
six of the novels discussed in this thesis, Smiley is present: he is the primary protagonist in 
three, with a major secondary role in one, and is ancillary in two. Smiley is always if not a 
state employee, then still pursuing and fulfilling the objectives of the British state. Smiley 
is a benign patriarch, but still a patriarch -  a shift of emphasis rather than a rejection of 
patriarchy itself. In this, le Carre’s rationale is somewhat akin to that of Dickens in 
Orwell’s analysis: there are good humans and bad humans -  the evil is not within the 
structure itself, the society or the system, it is in human nature. “If men would behave 
decently the world would be decent. Naturally this calls for a few characters who are in
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positions of authority and who do behave decently” (Orwell, Dickens, p. 458). Such a 
character then, is, in our case, George Smiley. In le Carre, Smiley is the compassionate 
state, the rational nationalist (whose “deep love of England” is free of xenophobia or 
chauvinism), and the moderate anti-Communist. These are all contradictions, faultlines, 
but that is Smiley’s job, his function in these novels: to ‘resolve’ contradictions. But, as 
this is an impossible task even for this arch-fiilfiller of impossible tasks, to at least embody 
and channel those contradictions.
So, we return to Smiley at the Berlin Wall, in Smiley’s People, where Smiley is 
characteristically embodying and channelling key contradictions in British liberal and 
national ideology. Smiley describes himself as a “no-man” in “no-man’s land”. Ostensibly, 
this is a mordant declaration of the negation of Smiley’s humanism by the demands of the 
long battle against an implacable enemy: Karla -  but really Soviet Communism. We see 
already how the odds are stacked against truly condemning Smiley here. Smiley is being 
modest, avuncular, decent in the patented British manner. Rather, we might think of this 
imagery of “no-man’s land” as evoking the established idea of neutrality. Especially as, in 
this very same “no-man’s land” of the Berlin Wall, in The Spy Who Came in from the 
Cold, Alec Leamas demonstrated the impossibility of neutrality. Leamas truly did become 
a “no-man” in no-man’s land, both by refusing to choose a side -  and return to the West -  
but more to the point, by dying. Equally, Westerby, on the southernmost Hong Kong island 
of Po Toi, borderline between British and Chinese authority, between West and East, 
refuses to choose a side, and, again, is killed. These actions -  asserting ‘neutrality’ and 
being killed -  are both literally and epistemologically connected: when the chips are down, 
the neutrals, the no-men, will simply be shot by both sides, and a cold corpse in no-man’s 
land provides cold comfort for neutrality in a Cold War. Smiley, by contrast, has chosen a 
side: indeed, in The Spy he is calling Leamas over from the West side of the Wall, hailing -  
interpellating -  Leamas as a Western subject: “‘Jump, Alec! Jump man!” (Spy, p. 240). 
Leamas refuses: Leamas dies. In Smiley’s People some 16 years later, Smiley has just gone
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to considerable lengths to manipulate his Communist arch-enemy, Karla, into defecting to 
the West. This thesis’s suggestion is another -  dissident -  reading of these lines, proposing 
that rather than condemning himself as an “no-man” who has forsaken his humanity for 
politics, Smiley is asserting that he is ideologically neutral. And, of course, this is a 
contradiction, a faultline.
In fact, one novel previously, in The Honourable Schoolboy, Smiley makes the 
following speech to Jerry Westerby:
‘A lot of people see doubt as a legitimate philosophical posture. They think of 
themselves in the middle, whereas of course really, they’re nowhere. No battle was 
ever won by spectators, was it?’ (Schoolboy, p. 122)
This is an uncharacteristic speech of Smiley’s, or indeed of anyone’s in these novels, 
undermining the empirical neutrality asserted elsewhere and, crucially, Smiley is cut off in 
mid-flow by arch-empiricist, Westerby. It is not just Westerby who’s embarrassed, 
however. Smiley does not attempt to revive the conversation: Smiley himself has “always 
been a little embarrassed by professions of anti-Communism” (Tinker, p. 160): indeed 
Smiley has been equivocal about any expressions of Western ideology, in the English 
‘neutral’, empiricist tradition. We might recall here the key scene with Karla in the jail in 
Delhi, where Smiley makes a half-hearted attempt to ‘sell’ the West to Karla and persuade 
him to defect. Smiley later declares, almost as an article of faith, ‘“ I was in no clear 
ideological state myself. ‘I felt I lacked philosophic repose. Lacked philosophy, if you 
like’” (Tinker, p. 216). But in the Honourable Schoolboy speech, where Smiley does 
articulate a philosophy, Westerby interrupts, the scene moves on and neutrality is restored. 
“The point at which the text falls silent is recognised as the point at which its ideological 
project is disclosed,” as Sinfield parlays Macherey (Faultlines, p. 74). This speech to 
Westerby is a faultline in these Cold-War books, thereafter papered over. No one will ever
267
make such a speech again in these novels. But, as Macherey says of the “not said”, such 
silences have a way of making their presence felt: Macherey described “a determinate 
absence [...] an eloquent silence” (Macherey, p. 79). So the language of Smiley’s 
Westerby speech -  “nowhere”, “in the middle” -  haunts the rest of Honourable Schoolboy, 
and haunts this final vision of Smiley in Smiley’s People, linking epistemologically with 
the invocation of “no-man” and “no-man’s land” and suggesting that neutrality is a mirage.
Faultlines are not flaws: they are what give a text enduring life. It is one of the 
virtues of a dissident reading that it can reveal -  and dissident readers can enjoy -  such 
faultlines and expose the ideological contradictions that underlie them. So, the 
contradiction is that the expression “no-men in no-man’s land” is a reassertion of 
Smiley’s/Britain’s ideological neutrality, but it is made on the very ground, the Berlin 
Wall, where neutrality has previously been declared -  by Leamas -  and where neutrality 
has been demonstrated -  by Leamas’s death -  to be an impossibility. Indeed, the Berlin 
Wall, far from being a “no-man’s land” is, in Western Cold-War ideology and in le Carre’s 
fiction, a symbol of intransigent, fanatical, Soviet bloc ideology. Into this no-man’s land 
then comes Karla, Soviet arch-ideologist, who leaves Communism behind him and so also 
becomes a “no-man” by abandoning that ‘ideology’, and entering the ‘natural’, neutral 
state in which Smiley -  and by extension, Britain -  has always existed. Except that Karla 
has defected to the West: a huge political victory for the West, and a long-delayed 
‘resolution’ of Smiley’s failed attempt to achieve just that objective in that jail in Delhi. 
This then is a contradictory, untenable, assertion of British ideological innocence, at 
exactly the moment when British ideological imperatives are at their most unequivocally 
victorious. Within that proclaimed ‘neutrality’, that common sense “no-man’s land”, the 
British state is simultaneously and contradictorily upheld, the British nation is championed 
and magnified, and the ‘ideologically’ saturated Communist political enemy is trenchantly 
condemned, and triumphantly, resoundingly, defeated. This is John le Carre’s Cold War.
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